Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

860C.00/10–846: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

secret

Warsaw, October 8, 1946—11 a.m.
[Received October 10—2:50 p.m.]

1559. Since the termination of KRN meeting September 23³⁸ we have had numerous talks with Poles of various political parties and leanings and with diplomatic colleagues. On basis these talks and out of observation we submit following conclusions on present situation and on possible future developments:

Action of KRN in forcing passage of electoral law which in effect permits fraudulent practices in counting votes in coming elections confirms general belief that Provisional Government can control legislative and electoral procedure through stooge handpicked National Council of Homeland. Elimination of Popiel element of Labor Party³⁹ illustrative of Governments intention to remove factors expressing opposition to minority in control. Similar action may be taken at any time against Polish Peasant Party and Mikolajczyk personally although because of probability that faked elections might now be held to retain present ruling clique in power, dissolution of PSL may no longer be considered necessary. If as we assume rigged elections will be held opposition forces such as PSL would automatically be eliminated from Government and from KRN. It is considered possible furthermore, that even members Polish Socialist Party which has recently been taking more independent position than before insisting on less subservient role for Poland in relation with USSR may be eliminated from Government after elections are held.

It is clearly evident from KRN meeting, from general line of action taken by Lublin nucleus of Polish Government during past year, and from openly hostile attitude taken by Government controlled press against US and UK that determination of ruling clique to remain in power regardless of Yalta, Moscow and Potsdam decisions regarding holding of free elections has unqualified support of Soviet Government. As long as Soviet Government condones this attitude protests to Polish Government regarding flouting of its international commitments will in our opinion have relatively minor effect but will in any case serve to record our views. As Soviet Government would undoubtedly prefer to maintain Polish Government such as present one which is entirely subservient to Soviet wishes than to have a government which would probably resist present Soviet policy of exercising complete control over army, security police and foreign affairs, I see no probability in near future, unless relations with US [garbled group] of change in Soviet policy towards internal situation in Poland. Therefore when representations are made regarding fulfillment of Yalta and Potsdam decisions they should be directed to Soviet and only secondarily to Polish authorities to be effective. Anticipating usual Soviet reply that question is internal one for Poles alone to decide and that it is contrary to Soviet policy to interfere in domestic affairs of any country, I am indeed pessimistic as to our ability of guaranteeing that Polish people will be able to express their will freely at polls and that freedom of speech and freedom from fear of political arrest will be restored in Poland.

With foregoing in mind I recommend following basic position be maintained by US for present as matters directly affecting relations between two countries:

(1) We should continue to make vigorous representations regarding mistreatment of American citizens and should make known facts to the press.

(2) We should insist on Polish Government giving prompt and adequate compensation for American property nationalized. We should refuse to be satisfied with mere promises.

(3) We should emphasize our dissatisfaction with Polish Government’s present policy of indifference towards friendship with US and towards our wishes such as negotiation of bilateral aviation agreement.

(4) We should not encourage granting of further charitable assistance to Poland if present Government continues existing policy pointing out that Polish Government should obtain food supplies and materials for reconstruction through normal financial channels open to a foreign government in US or elsewhere. Assistance extended through UNRRA, AMCross, and other organizations largely financed by American public has not resulted in improvement relations with US although Polish people as distinguished from government undoubtedly appreciate our humanitarian motives.

(5) We should refuse to consider requests of Polish Government for further financial assistance until Yalta and Potsdam commitments are fulfilled, until compensation for nationalized property actually made, and until Polish Government permits US to visit valid claimants to American citizenship now under arrest. We should be prepared to make public reasons for such refusal which even though it would probably occasion bitter attack against US in Polish Government controlled press would be appreciated by Polish people as determination not to appease Government minority group but should serve to strengthen our prestige generally in Poland as well as in all other satellite countries.

Shall hope to discuss foregoing more fully with Dept on my forthcoming arrival Washington.⁴⁰

Sent to Dept as 1559; repeated to Paris for Secretary as 333, to Moscow as 194, to London as 235.

Lane

38. The 11th session of the National Council of the Homeland was held September 20–23, 1946.
39. Regarding developments in the Labor Party during July, see telegram 1128, July 26, from Warsaw, p. 484.
40. Ambassador Lane departed from Warsaw on October 10, 1946, and, after vacationing for several weeks in France and Italy, arrived in Washington for consultation on November 5, 1946. See Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, pp. 269–271.