860C.51/4–2546: Telegram
The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State
urgent
[Received April 26—10:35 a.m.]
570. Dept’s telegram 342, April 22, 8 p.m. was received morning April 24. Dept’s decision to extend credits to Polish Provisional Govt is most discouraging to me for it indicates either that the Dept has little confidence in my evaluation Poland during my 9 months here, of the situation in Poland or that for reasons of which I am unaware it does not wish to accede to my recommendations. As notes have presumably already been exchanged between the Dept and Polish Embassy in Washington, any further recommendations by me on this matter would presumably be futile.
I do wish, however, now to place on record my official protest as American Ambassador to Poland that we have agreed to extend credits to a Govt which has not only assumed in its controlled press an attitude hostile to the US but has likewise refused to accord to us the rights to which we are entitled by treaty and specifically our right to visit and interview claimants to American citizenship who are now held in Polish jails for alleged political offenses. To the best of my recollection the Polish Provisional Govt has up to date not acceded to any important request which the US Govt has made of it.
It is especially to be regretted that the extension of credit to the Polish Provisional Govt (which has the support at the utmost of between 10 and 15 percent of the Polish people) is announced immediately [Page 437] subsequent to the arbitrary action of the Polish Govt in fixing an unrealistic rate of exchange of 100 zloty to the dollar during the negotiations which were taking place to determine a fair rate. Our granting of credits at this moment can, therefore, be interpreted by the minority group in power in Poland as an encouragement to continue to flout the Yalta and Potsdam decisions (through terroristic activities of the Security Police and through censorship of the press) and to maintain its present attitude of denying to us the rights to which we are entitled under treaty.27
As soon as the KRN meeting which begins April 26 is terminated, I propose to fly to Paris to consult with the Secretary as to what our future policy will be towards the Polish Provisional Govt of national unity in the light of the foregoing.
Sent to Dept as 570; repeated to Paris for the Secretary of State as 75, April 25.28
- According to a memorandum of April 24, 1946, by Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, George Middleton, First Secretary of the British Embassy, called urgently to read a telegram which had just been received from the British Foreign Office. Durbrow’s memorandum read in part as follows: “Mr. Bevin stated that he was ‘dismayed’ that the United States Government had decided to grant credit to the Polish Government since the promises we had extracted from that government were mere paper commitments which the Polish Government most likely will not live up to. He was afraid that this action by the United States Government would indicate that we were backing up the Communist controlled Polish Government and that our action would not be understood by the democratic elements in Poland. Mr. Bevin suggested that if it was not too late the Embassy should immediately endeavor to induce the State Department to withhold granting of credit at least until a definite nearby date is set for the elections.” Durbrow explained again to Middleton the reasons why the United States felt that it was advisable to grant the credit to Poland and expressed the belief that it would no longer be possible to refuse to grant the credit at such a late date. (860C.51/4–2546)↩
- The Secretary of State was Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting in Paris April 25–May 15, 1946.↩