Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

860C.00/4–1646: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

secret
most immediate

Warsaw, April 16, 1946—1 p.m.
[Received April 18—1:07 p.m.]

523. British Ambassador and I have discussed fully situation referred to in mytels 515, April 14 and 516, April 14.¹¹ We have impression that Mikolajczyk perhaps through conditions unknown to us is not anxious to be involved in any conversations with us at this time. We both have been told that he will not return to Warsaw for 10 days (whether his trip is for political or agricultural reasons is immaterial) which means that he will probably arrive on the eve of the Assembly of the National Council of the Homeland on April 26. There are two courses open to us: 1, to consult Mikolajczyk prior to presenting note regardless of date or, 2, to present note prior to April 26 regardless of conversation with Mikolajczyk. Cavendish-Bentinck and I are agreed that course 2 is preferable because (a) we have not until now been physically able to contact Mikolajczyk, (b) and are not certain that whether for political reason or because of his personal safety he desires to refrain from conversing with either or both of us, (c) we are apprehensive lest we be faced with a fait accompli at the National Council Meeting commencing April 26 fixing the date of elections and making it doubly difficult for us to make objections once the legislative body has approved the postponement until autumn as now seems to be the case.

British Ambassador and I agree that Kapelinski’s dismissal should not be made the specific reason for a protest but at best as part and [of] a general protest. Thugutt’s refusal to take the post of Minister of Posts and Telegraphs; the fact that it could be argued that Putek’s party (SL) is as far as nomenclature is concerned identical with Mikolajczyk’s party at the time of the Moscow conversations of 1945; and the uncertainty (on the basis of our records and of Tonesk’s recollections) as to what definite commitments were made with the approval of the Yalta powers regarding “balance agreed upon at Moscow” (see Deptel 299, April 6) with respect to proportionate party representation in various ministerial and other posts would in our opinion weaken any representations on Kapelinski’s dismissal. We have copies of Ambassador Harriman’s telegrams 2218 of June 21, 1945 and 2233 of June 23,¹² which embody reports of conversations between Poles but which do not indicate that any written commitments were made at Moscow re proportional representation of respective parties in Provisional Government of national unity.

Bentinck and I favor a more general course not exactly as suggested by Mr. Bevin but referring in notes as parallel as possible and to be delivered jointly by Bentinck and me to FonOff (to prevent impression that we are being played against each other) to the following effect:

1. The late Wincenty Witos First Vice President of National Council of Homeland and one of outstanding leaders of PSL has not been replaced in accordance with arrangement agreed to at Moscow (I am not entirely sure that on basis of minutes of Moscow conversations we are justified in making an issue over this question as it would not appear that any time limit is set for replacements).

2. Mr. Kapelinski until recently in charge of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs and of the same party as Mr. Thugutt who declined the position of Minister of that Ministry has been summarily replaced by a person of another party, Mr. Putek. The Government of US in accordance with the spirit of the Moscow Agreement is obliged to point out that the number of Cabinet representatives of those democratic elements which were not participating in the Lublin Government prior to the conversations at Moscow should not be reduced.

3. There has been a failure to hold elections despite the promises made at Yalta, Moscow and Potsdam even though 10 months have elapsed since the agreement reached at Moscow. (The British position is much stronger than ours because of the specific assurance by Bierut to Bevin in Potsdam that “in any case elections will be held early in 1946 in Poland.”)

4. The activities of the security police with the large number of arrests of political opponents of the Minority Regime now in power and the internal censorship of the press in time of peace—both measures impeding the holding of “free and unfettered elections” as agreed upon at Yalta, Moscow and Potsdam—are not consonant with our views of democratic liberty.

Bentinck and I are in general agreement as to courses to pursue but naturally with some differences as to details. His views will undoubtedly be communicated to Department in his telegram of today to London. I agree as to advisability (see my letter to Matthews of March 1¹³) re publicity on situation in US. I think, however, that it would be preferable to emphasize in public statement each of freedom of press and arrests for political offenses with emphasis on arrests of American citizens. To me the last argument is the most cogent as the US people is concerned (see mytels 245, February 26, 289, March 5, 290, March 6, 458 April 3 and 481, April 6¹⁴).

I suggest, therefore, that I be instructed to deliver note concurrently but not necessarily in the same language with my British colleague prior to the holding of National Council of Homeland (KRN) referring to four points above but emphasizing points 3 and 4 which in my opinion far outweigh points 1 and 2. I believe it would be well as suggested by Bevin to apprise Soviet Government as one of Yalta powers of our intention to make protest thereby giving [it?] opportunity (which presumably will not be accepted) to join Great Britain and ourselves. Bentinck and I agree that Bevin’s suggestion re inclusion of security police under Ministry of Public Administration (Kiernik PSL) would be regarded and perhaps rightly as interference in Polish domestic affairs. I do not agree with Bevin’s argument that if Soviets and Poles break Moscow agreement such action gives US and the British the same right to do so.

My final recommendations with the concurrence of my British colleague are:

1. We should deliver note to FonOff as soon as possible embodying four points outlined above. I should deeply appreciate it if Department would telegraph me text of note to be delivered which because of Mr. Bevin’s telegram 3438 to Washington it is assumed will be general and not merely confined to Kapelinski case (see mytel 299, April 6¹⁵). It is essential that note should be sent in time to be considered by Government prior to KRN meeting April 26.

2. We should when the proper moment occurs make a public statement in Washington re our policy in granting and refusing credits and specifically referring to situation in Poland today which precludes US granting further benefits under existing legislation. This statement should in my opinion contain a complete list of claimants to US citizenship who have been arrested for political reasons (see mytel 245, February 26¹⁶).

The British Embassy [Ambassador?] and I agree that it is of the utmost importance for us to receive with the least possible delay parallel although not necessary identic instructions as to communications we should deliver to FonOff. We should prefer to deliver such communications jointly.

Please instruct urgently.

Further comments follow in telegram 524, April 16 marked Personal for the Secretary.

Sent Department as 523; repeated Moscow as 72 and London as 86, April 16.

Lane

11. Neither printed; in telegram 515, Ambassador Lane reported that he tried by every possible means, without success, to contact Mikolajczyk in order to obtain his recollection of the June 1945 Moscow conversations with respect to the number of Cabinet posts to be occupied by Mikolajczyk’s party (860C.00/4–1446). Telegram 516 transmitted paraphrase of a telegram from the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington setting forth Ambassador Cavendish-Bentinck’s appraisal of the situation in Poland relative to free elections and the possible form of Anglo-American protests thereon (860C.00/4–1446).
12. Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. v, pp. 352 and 354, respectively.
13. For text of Ambassador Lane’s letter of March 1, 1946, to Matthews, see Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, pp. 193–196.
14. None printed; these telegrams were all concerned with the efforts to obtain the release of claimants to American citizenship under arrest in Poland.
15. Apparent reference to telegram 299, April 6, to Warsaw, p. 419.
16. Not printed, but see footnote 54, p. 400.