Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

848.00/4–1246

The British Embassy to the Department of State³

Ref: 1212/–/46

Memorandum

His Majesty’s Government have been considering what action can be taken to prevent the Polish Provisional Government gradually producing a situation in which any hope of moderately free elections will be frustrated for good and the dictatorship of a Communist minority is permanently established. The referendum⁴ may, for instance, be used as an excuse for not holding elections and the National Council might take decisions on constitutional points on the basis of the referendum (e.g. as regards the question of whether there should be one or two chambers in the new Polish Parliament), which should properly be taken by the new Assembly after the election. His Majesty’s Government think, therefore, that they should shortly make their maximum effort to ensure the holding of early elections in fulfilment of the Yalta Agreement and the undertakings given to Mr. Bevin at Potsdam, and to prevent the Opposition parties being hamstrung meanwhile.

2. Representations to this end are unlikely to be effective unless the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government can con-convince the Polish Provisional Government (who will no doubt have Soviet backing in withstanding them) that the consequences will otherwise be unpleasant. The question is, therefore, what “sanctions” could if necessary be invoked. His Majesty’s Government do not think that the threat of publicity only will be sufficient. His Majesty’s Government, moreover, have no very important levers at their disposal. They could refuse to ratify any agreement, which might be reached for a financial settlement, including the transfer to the Polish Government of the gold of the Bank of Poland under British control. His Majesty’s Government do not know whether the United States Government have any specific levers to use with the Polish Provisional Government. But failing anything better it might be possible to make a threat of a general nature and say that in default of the Polish Provisional Government adopting a satisfactory attitude in regard to the demands set out in following paragraph they will receive no further help in the form of credits or otherwise and must expect a generally unsympathetic attitude towards all their requirements both political and economic. It would, of course, also be stated that the reasons for this attitude would be made abundantly clear to world opinion.

3. The Polish Provisional Government should be required to fulfil the undertakings given at Potsdam to hold elections early this year on the basis of the 1921 Constitution, by fixing and announcing immediately an early date for the elections, and should as soon as possible communicate to His Majesty’s Government and the United States and Soviet Governments the draft of an election law conforming to the principles of the 1921 Constitution. The strongest representations should be made regarding all forms of activity on the part of the Polish authorities and security police directed against the opponents of the present Communist clique and also regarding departures from the Moscow Agreement (elimination of M. Kapelinski and failure to replace the late W. Witos by another member of the Polish Peasant Party on the praesidium⁵). It is for consideration whether it is not desirable to go further and demand as guarantee that the conditions for free and unfettered elections shall not be prejudiced in advance of the elections, that the Ministry of Public Security⁶ should be abolished and the Security Police placed under the control of W. Kiernik⁷ as Minister of the Interior. Such a demand might be criticised as involving a departure from the Moscow Agreement, but could be defended in view of Polish departures from the Agreement referred to above.

4. If the United States Government agree to action on the above lines, His Majesty’s Government suggest the foregoing proposals should be first discussed by one of the two Ambassadors with M. Mikolajczyk and thereafter, if time permits, the two Ambassadors should submit concerted recommendations as to the precise form and contents of the representations they should make. His Majesty’s Government would prefer not to consult the Soviet Government beforehand, since they would no doubt merely seek to delay or thwart the proposed representations. But His Majesty’s Government see no objection to informing them as the third Yalta Agreement power immediately before the representations were made and inviting them to take parallel action.

Washington, April 12, 1946.

3. This memorandum was handed to Under Secretary Acheson by the British Chargé on April 16; see memorandum of conversation by Mr. Acheson, April 16, p. 423.
4. At the beginning of April 1946, the leadership of the six major Polish political parties agreed to support a referendum which would be held in late June in advance of the national elections. In reporting on this referendum in telegram 485, April 6, from Warsaw, Ambassador Lane stated that it was proposed that the referendum contain the following three questions: (1) Does the nation favor a unicameral or a bicameral legislature; (2) does the nation support the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s western frontier; (3) does the nation support the nationalization of industry and land reform. (860C.00/4–646)
5. Wincenty Witos, Polish Prime Minister, 1920–21, 1923, 1926, leader of the Peasant Party before World War II and titular leader of the Polish Peasant Party until his death in October 1945, had been a Vice President of the Presidium of the National Council of the Homeland.
6. Stanislaw Radkiewicz, the Minister of Public Security, was a member of the Polish Workers’ Party.
7. Wladyslaw Kiernik, the Minister of Public Administration, was a member of the Polish Peasant Party.