Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

860C.00/2–2546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State

secret
most immediate

Warsaw, February 25, 1946—1 p.m.
[Received February 26—4:53 a.m.]

242. At Soviet Embassy reception commemoration Red Army anniversary February 23, Gomulka⁵⁶ stated to me with triumphant air that electoral question is not settled because of Mikolajczyk having made condition of his party joining bloc that PSL should have 75% KRN membership. He said that this proposal was rejected by other parties and Mikolajczyk will have to run on separate list. Gomulka said that PPR⁵⁷ and PPS⁵⁸ had proposed equal membership of four principal parties in KRN with minor parties receiving slight reduction. Mikolajczyk had rejected this. Gomulka continued that the country would laugh at the possibility of Mikolajczyk having 75% support of electorate. In reply to my question as to when elections would be held he said that starving people are not qualified to vote intelligently and unless Poland has bread, elections could not be held.

He then proceeded to discuss UNRRA situation (my telegram 229, February 21, 2 p.m., repeated Moscow as 11⁵⁹) saying that UNRRA decision to cut grain deliveries to Poland was based on political reasons,⁶⁰ that UNRRA’s action was but another example of policy of Western Powers, especially Great Britain, to discriminate against Poland. He said that Germany and Italy were being treated more favorably than Poland and that UNRRA supplies were not being curtailed in India and Africa despite their having applied later than Poland. My arguments on non-political nature of UNRRA and this specific UNRRA action obviously made no impression nor did my reference to Soviet Union being represented on administrative council of UNRRA. His reply to latter was that country which supplied the greater part of the funds had the power to make decisions. In reply to his request that I recommend no decrease in grain shipments reminded him of international character of UNRRA and of real reason for curtailing deliveries, namely, worldwide grain shortage. Obviously he was not or did not wish to be convinced.

Then he asked me to use my influence in obtaining credits for Poland. I said that I had recently been in a false position in this regard but I considered this incident a closed episode and preferred not to argue about it. I expressed belief, however, to Gomulka that he might not be correctly informed as to what our position is. I referred to memoranda which had been given to Mine, Lange and Rajchman last November setting forth our general policy on extension of credit by Eximbank⁶¹ and pointed out that these conditions did not apply to Poland alone but to all countries seeking credits, including Great Britain. I said that in addition to our desire for information regarding Poland’s economic commitments with other nations we desired in accordance with our rights under treaty of 1931 access for American citizens to inspect their properties which had been recently nationalized and I insisted on adequate compensation. I referred to our failure to obtain information regarding Poland’s treaties and said that it was unfair to put blame on US for Poland’s not having received credits when it was actually Polish Government which had not supplied information orally promised by Minc last November. Gomulka said he saw no reason why we should not receive this data and that American citizens may come into Poland to inspect properties. As to compensation, he said decree is being issued setting up commission which would provide for Polish majority representation and said that equal representation would be delegation of sovereignty. I referred to Mexican Claims Commissions which provided for equal representation and observed that Mexico, 20 years ago, was more sensitive as to sovereignty in its relations with US than any European country is today. He appeared to be impressed by my argument. Soviet Ambassador,⁶² who was celebrating day in very liquid fashion then joined us and rudely accused US Government of being responsible for curtailing of UNRRA grain shipments to Poland in order to bring pressure on Polish Government. He said that if UNRRA, which is considered by everybody to be an American organization, could not furnish grain then Soviet Union would furnish it. In fact, he added, Soviet Union had already given Poland 200,000 tons of grain (cf report that Soviets had taken that amount from Poles, my telegram 229, February 21, 2 p.m., repeated Moscow 11). He said if Soviet Union saved Poland from starvation prestige of USA would be greatly diminished and that of USSR would be consequently increased. He brushed aside my arguments and reasons for UNRRA’s action and our not being responsible therefor and said with great vehemence “Let’s not be diplomatic. You know as well as I that the person who pays is the person who controls. It is absurd that the poor United States has not enough grain for Polish needs.” The interview ended on an outwardly cordial basis even to extent of his saying that if Poland would receive sufficient grain from UNRRA he and Gomulka would call me Tovarich Lane. (The foregoing account of this conversation has been cleared as to accuracy with Tonesk⁶³ who acted as interpreter with Gomulka and was present at conversation with Lebedieff which was in French and Russian).

In view of Soviet and Polish obvious intention to discredit US because UNRRA action I earnestly recommend that in the President’s reply to Bierut there be reference to misapprehensions which appear to have arisen regarding curtailing of grain shipments to Poland with a full explanation of reasons actuating UNRRA action.⁶⁴ It is doubtful whether anything we say or do will induce Soviet authorities to admit our actions are in good faith. The Polish people, however, would in my opinion believe an official statement from the President of the US. I could at same time test the alleged freedom of the press in Poland by requesting that the telegram be published here.

There is no doubt in my mind of the serious nature of the local political situation, phase of which is the food shortage. I shall report further as soon as I have talked with Mikolajczyk.

Sent to Department as 242; repeated to Moscow as 12.

[

Lane

]

56. Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Recovered Territories in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity; Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers’ Party.
57. Polska Partja Robotnicza (Polish Workers’ Party). The Communist Party of Poland had been dissolved sometime in 1938. The party was reestablished in January 1942 in German-occupied Poland under the name Polska Partja Robotnicza (Polish Workers’ Party).
58. Polska Partja Socjialistyczna (Polish Socialist Party).
59. Not printed.
60. In February 1946 the UNRRA Mission in Poland advised the Polish Government of the world shortage of cereals and the necessity for introducing stringent measures to conserve indigenous stocks and for curtailing grain importations by 30 percent. Polish officials complained to UNRRA Mission that the reduction in grain allocations to Poland appeared to have a political rather than an economic basis. For an account of the development of relations between the UNRRA Mission and the Polish Government during the period of the world grain shortage, see George Woodbridge, UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (New York, Columbia University Press, 1950), vol. ii, pp. 207–208.
61. Ambassador Lane’s conversations with Mine and Lange in August, September, and October 1945 regarding the granting of credits to Poland are briefly described in Lane, I Sew Poland Betrayed, p. 226. Lane’s conversation with Rajchman on November 7, 1945, is related in telegram 543, November 9, 1945, from Warsaw, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. v, p. 409.
62. Viktor Zakharovich Lebedev.
63. Lt. William J. Tonesk, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air.
64. For texts of the exchange of messages between President Bierut and President Truman regarding the critical grain shortage in Poland, see Department of State Bulletin, March 31, 1946, p. 542.