Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

IO Files: USGA/Ia/46

Memorandum of Transatlantic Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the American Delegation to the United Nations (Stettinius) in London and the Secretary of State in Washington, January 31, 1946²⁹

London, January 31, 1946, 2:05 p.m.

Mr. Stettinius: Hello, Jim. How are you this morning? We are getting on all right. We got over the Iranian situation yesterday afternoon all right.³⁰ Jim, we have a situation before us relative to a Polish resolution on reconstruction³¹ that is difficult from the standpoint of certain members of the Delegation having raised the point of political assassinations which are taking place in Poland, and Vandenberg³² is particularly worried in connection with his constituency of 500,000 Poles. I am going to put Ben³³ on the phone and he has a statement which he will read to you, which summarizes the whole thing. We also have a specific recommendation to make. Here’s Ben.

Mr. Ben Cohen: At this morning’s session of the Delegation, which was expected to be purely routine, and for that reason Ed wasn’t there, they began to talk about Poland. Great concern was expressed by a number of them including particularly Senator Vandenberg, Mrs. Roosevelt³⁴ and Walker.³⁵ There was a feeling that the members of the Delegation were embarrassed by the fact that Bevin³⁶ had spoken in Parliament about political murders in Poland, and that our Government had not said anything on the subject, and they don’t feel free to talk themselves but they felt embarrassed not to be able to say anything. Whereupon, Vandenberg suggested that the Delegation might call attention to yourself and the Department to this Polish situation and suggest that the Department and you inquire into the facts. Senator Vandenberg seemed to feel that if he could state that the Department had announced that there was to be an investigation into the situation, that would relieve him of embarrassment and obviate the need of his making a public statement, at least until he returned home. Vandenberg’s suggestion was supported by Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. Walker, and we agreed at the meeting to put it before you.

The feeling in the meeting is accentuated by the fact that they were told at a previous meeting that our Naval Attaché had disappeared under circumstances which had never been explained.³⁷ Ed mentioned it to them in the course of a discussion, and the report was current around here, and I have looked into it, and find that the Department merely announced that he had been killed in an accident. While there is some substantial evidence that there may have been other things, apparently we have no evidence to prove that he did not die by accident. They wanted to know more about that since it was mentioned. I make a point of the question because it inflamed their imagination somewhat. Yes, I know, they have difficulty separating their functions and the functions of the Department. But that is just part of the picture, and I suppose particularly to Vandenberg. … I only mention this as something to give you the background, so don’t place it too much in the foreground of our particular problem.

Our position is affected by the fact that the General Committee has reported out a resolution proposed by the Polish Delegation expressing in a lot of language and words the concern of all United Nations in the economic reconstruction in Europe. It was planned to have a day’s debate on this in the Assembly. Up until today, both the British and ourselves had not opposed the resolution and, indeed, they thought it might be helpful generally. Now the question is raised whether we can have the debate proceed without speaking pretty plainly about the political conditions in some parts of the world, and in particular, Poland. It was agreed, before the meeting closed, that we would speak to the British to see whether a way could be found to shelve the resolution without debate, but we all think it is very doubtful if that could be done.

Now, I come not to the Delegation’s suggestion, but to Ed’s and Senator Connally’s³⁸ and mine, as to what might be done.

It is our suggestion that in some way, possibly in a press conference, you might express concern about the reports of the political murders in Poland. You might state that in response to a question or in any other way you choose, and then you could state that you had asked our Mission in Poland to undertake an investigation to develop the facts. You might have the Department show you Bevin’s full statement which appeared in the record and I think you probably have it there. It was made a few days ago in the House of Commons. (Mr. Cohen then asked Mr. Noyes³⁹ to get a copy of this statement from his room to read to Secretary Byrnes.)

If it is found impossible to withdraw the resolution without embarrassment, then it is our thought that if you have made such a statement that you are having an investigation made—that is if you can make such a statement either today or tomorrow—then we believe it would be better if our Delegation not oppose a day’s debate, and it would be our thought that if the resolution does come up for debate, we should not oppose its passage but should, in the course of the debate, point out that political freedom is necessary to secure the cooperation of all the United Nations in the great tasks of reconstruction. This is the general situation, and the Steering Committee and Connally, Ed, myself as well as the Delegation would like your advice and instructions.

The question is, first, I think that they would like to know whether you feel or could let us know in the course of the day whether you can make some public statement that you were having these reports of political murders in Poland investigated. I think that would be helpful to our problem here immensely.

I will just read you what Bevin did say in the House of Commons on January 23rd in reply to a question whether he had heard certain named specific political murders. In reply to that question he said:

“I am seriously concerned at the moment at the number of political murders that have been committed in the various parts of Poland in recent weeks, in circumstances that in many cases appear to point to the complicity of the Polish Security Police. I regard it as imperative that the Polish Provisional Government should put an immediate stop to these crimes in order that free and unfettered elections may be held as soon as possible in accordance with the Crimea decisions.”

I think really what they want is that you take cognizance of these reports and say you are having an investigation, and indicate that if the investigation warrants, you will call upon the Polish Government to fulfill their responsibilities under the Crimea decisions.

You see, what they would like more than anything else, and Connally will speak to you in a moment about it, would be for you to say that you are undertaking an inquiry and that this is a matter that our Department is investigating. The thought is that if we can’t have the resolution withdrawn, should we let it go forward to debate; should we support it and merely add our strong feeling that political freedom is essential to our full cooperation in economic reconstruction; or should we take a more aggressive and more prosecuting attitude on the things that have been occurring in some of these countries? Your thought is the first. Yes.

You agree with our proposal, then, that we should emphasize the principle of political freedom, but should not go into details as to what is happening in different countries.

I think I understand that in general as you have told it to me—you approve of what we are suggesting, and I will put Senator Connally on the line for just a moment.

Senator Connally: Hello, Mr. Secretary. Your voice is as clear as a bell. Here is the situation. Vandenberg, as you know, has a political situation in Michigan. 500,000 Poles, he says. Unless you make a public statement over there that you are having these matters looked into, I think he is going to pop off over here and make a statement of his own.

We kind of thought that if you decided to make a statement, you could base it on Bevin’s. I think that will satisfy him, but if you don’t, he says he is here as a Delegate but also here as a Senator, and I think he will go on his own and make a statement along the line of Bevin’s. He said in conversation to me the other night “My God! Why can’t we do something like this.” And he has been bawling on this ever since.

The resolution itself is perfectly harmless because it’s a general sort of psychological appeal to reconstruct and they probably hope we can help them. Nobody was objecting to it.

They make the point now that if it comes up that reconstruction is such a broad term that it concerns political reconstruction as well as economic, and you can’t exclude that from public debate.

Yes, this was dumped in at the last hour and rushed through to the Committee.

Here’s Ed.

Mr. Stettinius: You will send us a transcript of what you say? That’s fine; thank you so much. Goodbye.

Mr. Byrnes said he would examine Bevin’s report and determine whether to make a statement. He said he would handle the matter and wire us within an hour. He added that if he made a public statement it would look as though the Polish murders were true, and we weren’t sure.

(Mr. Cohen gave the following as his and the Secretary’s, conversation:)

Mr. Byrnes: If I understand correctly, the Polish resolution relates exclusively to economic reconstruction.

Mr. Cohen: That is right.

Mr. Byrnes: I think we can support it in general terms if it does not bind us as to details.⁴⁰ On the statement, I will have to look into the matter. I had not heard of it before. I hope that I will be able to make the statement.⁴¹ As to the resolution, the situation is too complicated for me to go into detail.

But in general I favor the idea we should confine our speeches to the principles of political freedom and not go into details when we have not conclusive evidence. We are not yet ready to file a formal complaint. We want to avoid a general row. You are over there to-make peace not war.

29. This verbatim record was made in London where the conversation began at 2:05 p.m.
30. For documentation regarding the discussions in the United Nations Organization at this time on the question of Iran, see vol. vii, pp. 304–326, passim.
31. On January 29, 1946, the General Committee of the United Nations General Assembly unanimously recommended that the General Assembly consider a draft resolution by the Polish delegation on the reconstruction of countries, members of the United Nations, devastated by war. For texts of the General Committee’s Report and the Polish draft resolution, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Plenary Meetings, p. 581 (hereinafter cited as GA (I/1, Plenary).
32. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, United States Representative to the First Part of the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly at London.
33. Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State and Senior Adviser to the United States delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.
34. Eleanor Roosevelt, United States Representative to the First Part of the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
35. Frank Walker, Alternate United States Representative to the First Part of the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
36. Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
37. In late December 1945, Lt Col. Andrew Wylie, U.S.M.C., Naval Attaché in Warsaw, died in an accidental fall from a damaged bridge in western Poland. Regarding Wylie’s death, see Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, pp. 189–190.
38. Senator Tom Connally, United States Representative to the First Part of the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
39. Charles P. Noyes, Special Assistant to Mr. Stettinius.
40. At its 22d meeting on February 2, 1946, the General Assembly adopted the Polish draft resolution as amended at the initiative of the United States. For text of the amendment, see GA (I/1), Plenary, p. 582, footnote 1.
41. On January 31, 1946, the Secretary of State issued a statement to the press regarding political murders in Poland. For text of the Secretary’s statement, see Department of State Bulletin, February 10, 1946, p. 209. In a transatlantic telephone conversation with Stettinius at 5 p.m. (London time) on January 31, the Secretary of State read the text of the statement he was about to issue hi Washington (IO Files: USGA/Ia/Gen 30 (Conv. 59)).