864.00/12–646

The Minister in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

secret
No. 2336

Sir: In its reports on Hungarian political developments since the cessation of hostilities this Legation has frequently had occasion to refer to Communist penetration of the Hungarian Government and the effects upon Hungarian political development of Communist control of the Hungarian executive. This penetration has been one of the decisive factors in Hungarian politics. The current political crisis, for example, is in fact largely based on this factor. (See my [Page 351] telegrams 2052, October 30, 2194, November 22 and 2265, December 4).6 The consistency with which Smallholder leaders have been concerned with efforts to achieve a redistribution of administrative positions and the tenacity with which the Communists have maintained and continued to expand their control of key administrative positions confirm the importance of this issue in the eyes of all Hungarian leaders.

The question whether or not provincial municipal elections were to be held this year, to take an additional example, was little more than a reflection of the Smallholders’ desire to reduce the effective control of the Communists and of Communist determination to maintain and expand this control, since the crucial element in the election issue was not the expression of the public will in such elections, but rather the reapportionment of administrative positions to follow the elections in accordance with their results.

In achieving administrative control the Communists have followed one of their basic strategic tenets in full accord with the political directives enunciated by Lenin and Stalin. Their success in this field has advanced the political struggle in Hungary to a point where, as reportedly stated by Communist Deputy Prime Minister Rakosi in a recent meeting of the Political Committee of the Communist Party, the Hungarian situation is no longer a struggle for power, since this the Communists have already obtained through the control of the police force, the Ministry of Interior and other key administrative positions, but it is rather a question of perpetuating fear and suspense in order to thwart “bourgeois democratic” political and social stabilization. (See my telegram 2228, November 297).

The Communist administrative control had its origin in the days of the Red Army’s liberation of Hungary. At that time the organization of the Left Bloc parties, i.e. the Communist, Social Democratic and National Peasant Parties, followed quickly on the heels of Soviet occupation. These parties were allowed greater freedom to organize and circulate, as a result of which they were early able to muster organized political groups. In addition the Red Army, looking benignly on the political aspirations of these parties, which shared the Soviet ideology, brought with it a number of Communist organizers and leaders from Moscow who were to wield executive power in Hungary in accordance with the declared Soviet policy of establishing “friendly governments” in neighboring countries, and to establish the public [Page 352] basis of their power at a later date by whatever means might be available. This fixed plan contrasted with the disorganized state of the indigenous anti-fascist groups, particularly the Smallholders, whose leaders were in hiding near Budapest and were unable to reach Debrecen, the scene of establishment of the Hungarian Provisional Government.8

In the formation of the Debrecen Government the Communist objective was made clear when the Marxist parties took for themselves the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Communication, Industry, Agriculture, Social Welfare and later Public Supply. With initial control secured in the Ministries most concerned with internal governmental power, the Communists proceeded to penetrate in depth the organs of government. In this phase of their activity they utilized all who would assist them toward their ends regardless of party. In this process the then Minister of Interior, Erdei, who, though a member of the Peasant Party, acted upon the instructions of the Communists, bore a large share of the responsibility. During his term of office the Marxist parties first gained complete control of the police, following which they launched an offensive for control of local administrations.

The disorganization of the Hungarian administration following the German retreat and in particular the absence from their posts of numerous civil servants aided the Communist drive. Temporary appointments in the civil service were made strictly along party lines. The Communists then brought about the creation of the political certification boards designed to examine the activities of all civil servants, particularly during the period of German occupation. These boards, so composed as to guarantee a majority to the leftist parties, frequently eliminated not only justifiably suspect individuals, but large numbers of technicians and experts who it was felt would not be sufficiently zealous in implementing partisan control of the civil service. For example, a high official of the Foreign Ministry recently described to an officer of the Legation the two months’ battle he had been forced to wage to continue the employment of a multi-lingual stenographer, with 27 years experience in the Foreign Office, whose chief offense was that she had at one time been assigned to Bardossy’s9 office. These boards, in conjunction with appropriate action by the Interior Ministry, [Page 353] brought about, besides the elimination of much of the old civil service, the regularization of temporary, partisan appointments.

An important number of civil servants were also eliminated through intimidation, threats, press campaigns and intervention by the political police, who were by that time completely controlled by the Communists.

In 1946 the inauguration of the governmental retrenchment program, known as the “B List”, afforded the Communists opportunity to complete the work started in the previous year. Nearly 100,000 officials have been eliminated under this program which has assumed an entirely political complexion. (See my telegrams 1431, August 2 and 1787, September 2410).

The importance which practical control of the administrative apparatus assumes by virtue of the fact that in present-day Hungary the executive power, operating under enabling acts passed by the National Assembly, is in fact the government, has led me to make a survey of the extent of Communist control of administrative positions in the Hungarian Government. I have the honor to transmit herewith the result of this survey,11 which may be of interest to the Department as a concrete documentation of the extent of Communist administrative control in Hungary. The enclosure includes the names and titles of Communist officials occupying responsible positions in the various Ministries, in the Budapest municipal administration, various national economic agencies, and in the provincial county police administration, plus a statistical summary of the party affiliations of responsible Hungarian officials in these various organizations. It will be noted that the Communists possess 31.6 percent of these positions and that, together with their Left Bloc allies, they control 62.3 percent. On the other hand the Smallholders, who received a majority vote of 57 percent in the November, 1945, national elections, control only 16.4 percent of these positions. It should be emphasized that the percentage figures, revealing as they are, do not accurately describe the true situation, inasmuch as the Communist percentage includes absolute control of those organizations of public administration through which it would be possible to paralyze within a few hours all governmental activity in Hungary.

Respectfully yours,

H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld
[Page 354]
[Enclosure]

Statistical Summary of the Party Affiliations of Responsible Hungarian Officials12

Com. S. Dem. Party N.P. Total Sm.H. Dem. Party Unknown Total Grand Total
Office of Prime Minister 2 2 4 5 5 9
Ministry of Information 1 2 3 1 1 2 5
Min. of Interior 10 11 1 22 2 6 8 30
Min. of Justice 4 2 6 1 5 6 12
Min. of Finance 10 19 2 31 15 1 8 24 55
Min. of Agriculture 7 4 3 14 18 21 39 53
Min. of Commerce 4 11 3 18 4 2 6 24
Min. of Communication 11 8 1 20 1 1 2 22
Min. of Supply 8 15 1 24 26 6 32 56
Min. of Education 2 4 8 14 9 7 16 30
Min. of Social Welfare 22 5 2 29 4 3 7 36
Min. of Nat. Defense 7 3 10 3 10 13 23
Min. of Foreign Affairs 4 3 1 8 4 13 17 25
Min. of Reconstruction 3 2 1 6 9 16 25 31
Min. of Industry 4 19 23 2 3 5 28
City of Budapest 32 37 1 70 23 1 27 51 121
Police and Public Safety 62 39 2 104 7 15 22 126
Total: 219 186 26 431 114 2 144 260 691
Percentage: 31.6 27.0 3.7 62.3 16.4 0.3 23.0 37.71 100
  1. Telegrams 2052 and 2265 not printed.
  2. Not printed.
  3. The Hungarian Provisional Government was established at Debrecen, Hungary, on December 22, 1944.
  4. László Bárdossy, Hungarian Prime Minister, 1941–1942; convicted of war crimes by an Hungarian court and executed in November 1945.
  5. Neither printed.
  6. Only the statistical summary of the survey is printed as an enclosure to this despatch.
  7. The parties identified in this table are as follows: Communist, Social Democratic, National Peasants, Smallholders, and Citizens Democratic.