761.64/4–2046: Telegram
The Minister in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
urgent
[Received April 22—3:20 p.m.]
742. Mytel 737, April 19.75 PriMin asked me to call and told me today that during his visit at Moscow he had spent altogether nearly 8 hours on two occasions with Stalin. He had explained to Russians he felt it was necessary to take positive steps to end isolation of Hungary and to establish personal contact with Sov Govt as he hoped to do later with other great powers.
He had first raised question of extension of term for reparations which had been agreed to but details have not yet been worked out. Hungarian proposal contemplates total deliveries for 1945 and 1946 of 33 million dollars of which 18 millions have been already delivered, leaving some 17 millions to be delivered before end of this year with subsequent annual deliveries of approximately 27 million dollars for additional 6 years.
PriMin asked and obtained moratorium on deliveries of finished textiles under trade agreement of last summer. Deliveries now will not be concluded until middle of 1947. Delay was due to fact that Hungarian textile machinery was inadequate to complete processing finished goods this year in payment of cotton received from Sov Union.
PriMin raised question of speeding return of Hungarian POWS which was assented to without stipulation as to final date. In this relation, Stalin inquired as to conduct of occupation troops which PriMin answered by saying it was better.
This led to spontaneous statement by Stalin that occupation forces could be withdrawn gradually leaving only small garrison in Hungary. When I asked PriMin whether this withdrawal was related in point of time to conclusion of peace, he said no date had been set implying [Page 281] that maintenance of Red Army garrison is not considered by Russians to be so related. PriMin brought up matter of very large Sov bill for Red Army services in rehabilitating Hungarian railroads and bridges. This was settled by agreement to balance bill against Hungarian counterclaim for transportation services. Soviets also agreed to return Hungarian rolling stock presumably to facilitate delivery of reparations.
PriMin said he had then raised political issue by indicating Hungarian policy was directed first to cooperation with great powers in establishing durable peace, secondly, to safeguarding development of Hungarian democracy and thirdly to protection of interests of large number of Hungarians outside borders of Hungary. To these ends settlement with Czecho and Rumania was necessary. Referring to Czecho, he had pointed out that desire of Beneš to expel all Hungarians from Czecho meant further impoverishment for Hungary where density of population, as Gyöngyösi has often said to me, is already excessive for agricultural country. Moreover he had argued Hungarians in Slovakia were settled closely packed along border with Hungary. If these Hungarians were deprived of “equal rights” in Czecho and also of minority rights, Hungary should in all justice receive the territory where this dense population has so long been settled. Molotov and Stalin had pointed out this was matter for decision by Allied Powers and made no territorial commitment but agreed Hungarians in Czecho were entitled to equal rights.76
On Transylvania question, PriMin said he had pointed out that since more than one million Hungarians in Transylvania lived deep in Rumanian territory, Hungary did not aspire to territory in that particular area. However, there were approximately one-half million Hungarians adjacent to present frontier. Nearly one million Rumanians also live in this adjacent area and Hungary would be willing to incorporate them with full rights subject to determination by the powers whether these Rumanians should be mutually exchanged for about same number Hungarians living in the more remote settled region of Transylvania. Molotov and Stalin heard this Hungarian proposal without raising objection but Stalin mentioned that language of Rumanian armistice re right of Rumania to acquire all of [or] greater part of Transylvania suggested Hungary had basis for claim of some territorial adjustment. Russians however emphasized this was matter [Page 282] for decision by armistice signatories.77 PriMin said these statements by Stalin must be considered strictly secret.
PriMin expressed confidence positive results had been achieved during Moscow visit and his strong conviction that he now had free hand to manage his Govt.78 He had not been called upon for slightest political undertakings. He said it was his hope to establish same relations of confidence with other Allied Powers and perhaps to make similar visits to their capitals as opportunity offered but he felt we would understand it was his first duty to establish personal relations with Soviet leaders.
Sent Dept; repeated to London as No. 194; Paris for Dunn US No. 89 and Moscow as No. 172.
- Not printed; it reported that Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi had informed Minister Schoenfeld of the recently concluded visit to Moscow of a delegation headed by Prime Minister Nagy (761.64/4–1946). Gyöngyösi’s account of the visit was essentially the same as that given in this telegram by Nagy himself. Significant additions are given in footnotes 77 and 78, p. 282.↩
- For additional documentation on the concern of the United States regarding the negotiations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia for the exchange of populations, see pp. 361 ff.↩
- Telegram 737, April 19, 1946, from Budapest, reporting on Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi’s account of Prime Minister Nagy’s visit to Moscow, stated the following on this point: “Stalin had pointed out that the armistice agreement assures Rumania of all or greater part of Transylvania. Consequently no promise was made that USSR would support Hungarian proposal for acquisition of as much as 22,000 square kilometers of western Transylvania.” (761.64/4–1946) In telegram 760, April 24, from Budapest, Minister Schoenfeld reported that he had reliable information that at a conference on April 15 in Moscow between Prime Minister Nagy, Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi, and Foreign Minister Molotov, the latter had urged direct negotiations between Hungary and Rumania. Molotov had emphasized that it would not be advisable to submit the Transylvania matter to the Peace Conference without prior discussion between the Hungarian and Rumanian governments. Molotov further stated that the Soviet Union would approve the Hungarian initiative in starting the negotiations. (761.64/4–2446)↩
- Telegram 737, April 19, from Budapest, added the following paragraph relative to Stalin’s views on Hungary: “Foreign Minister told me that at dinner given by Stalin, latter disavowed any intention on part of USSR to interfere in domestic affairs of Hungary citing Lenin’s principle of self-determination from which USSR would not deviate. In same speech Stalin adverted to unprovoked Hungarian attack on USSR in 1941 but disclaimed any vindictive spirit as shown by fact that USSR had heeded Horthy’s appeal for armistice. ForMin said no publicity can be given Stalin’s speech.” (761.64/4–1946)↩