760F.61/1–2546: Telegram
The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
operational priority
[Received January 28—3 p.m.]
133. Since his return from his recent visit to Moscow, Laušman, Minister of Industry, has been secretive and evasive as to the purport of his talks with high Soviet officials. Notwithstanding his denials I have come to the conclusion that his visit was of major significance in connection with future Soviet Zecho trade relations. I have reason to believe that Laušman failed to disclose to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade1 the full extent of the engagements assumed by him in Moscow.2
On Jan 20 Kopecky, Minister of Information, who is notoriously loquacious and indiscreet, in the course of a casual public appearance at the town of Chomutov while he was discussing the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Zecho, enthusiastically interpolated the following remark: “In the event that the plan brought back by Minister Laušman materializes we are to be included in the 5-year economic plan of the USSR which would mean much to us.”
In connection with the foregoing I should add that of late the chasm between the moderates such as Masaryk, Stransky, Urziny, Ripka, Zenkl, Drtina, Prochazka and Hala3 on the one hand and the radicals [Page 179] such as Fierlinger, Gottwald, Laušman, Nosek, Nejedly, Kopecky, Duris and Soltesz4 on the other hand has perceptibly widened. Every effort by Clementis, Svoboda and Majer5 to shift from radicialism to a more moderate course is bitterly resented by the radicals which tends to keep them in line.
During the past month a combination of tangible and intangible factors has lead me to the conclusion that those members of the Government who favor even closer political and economic relations with the Soviet Union than already exist are at the same time disposed to seek to evade the payment of fair compensation to nationalized foreign capital. While they admit the obligation and profess the intention to make payment they have been making efforts and some progress in the direction of undermining both the justice and the amounts of the foreign claims. Their progress has been largely the result of a lack of coordination within the Government coupled with the timidity of the moderate elements in giving expression to their point of view. In potential influence the moderates could readily overcome this drift were they to assert themselves. It is, however, becoming more and more apparent that the moderate elements have not yet thrown off their fear complex. It is difficult to determine whether this fear complex reflects the country’s recent release from nearly 7 years of Gestapo operations or whether this a new fear that the radicals will be supported by Moscow to the extent that the moderates may be subjected to personal reprisals. I am inclined to the latter view. In Zecho where the charge of collaboration is easy to make and difficult to disprove and where thousands are still in prison without having been accorded even a preliminary hearing, where the Communists control the press, the radio and the police and the courts are functioning only to the extent permitted by Government police, this fear is not without some justification, particularly in the light of increasingly aggressive tactics by the Communists.
In view of this recent trend and until the situation is clarified, and particularly having regard to the numerous appropriation of $275 [Page 180] million by UNRRA for Zecho, which is the equivalent of Zecho’s imports from the US for nearly 10 years or of 1 billion, 375 million dollars of exports on a 20 percent profit basis, I am disposed to advise caution on the part of the Exim Bank in extending any loan at this time for reconstruction purposes. In any event I recommend that should a loan be made at this time full disclosure should be required first by the Zecho Govt of its commitments to the Soviet Union in connection with trade, industry and finance and that the loan be conditioned on the payment in dollars to American citizens who acquired their citizenship prior to an agreed date of the full value of their nationalized property as well as the payment of any other claims by American citizens.
- Jan Masaryk and Hubert Ripka, respectively.↩
- Telegram 167, January 31, 1946, from Praha, reported on a conversation between Ambassador Steinhardt and Czechoslovak President Eduard Beneš who minimized the importance of Laušman’s talks in Moscow. Beneš indicated that while his Government was desirous of ascertaining what the Soviet Government expected in the way of economic relations with Czechoslovakia, there was no expectation that the Soviet Government would insist on disrupting Czechoslovakia’s trade relations with the West. (660F.6131/1–3146)↩
- The persons enumerated here and not otherwise identified are: Jaroslav Stránský, Deputy Prime Minister; Jan Ursíny, Deputy Prime Minister; Peter Zenkl; Prokop Drtina, Minister of Justice; Adolf Procházka, Minister of Health; and František Hála. Of those mentioned here, Zenkl, Stránský, Ripka, and Drtina were leaders in the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, Ursíny was Chairman of the Slovak Democratic Party, Procházka and Hála were leaders in the People’s Party, and Masaryk had no party allegiance.↩
- The persons enumerated here and not otherwise identified are: Zdeněk Fierlinger, Czechoslovak Prime Minister, April 1945–May 1946; Klement Gottwald, Deputy Prime Minister until May 1946, after which he became Prime Minister; Václav Nosek, Minister of the Interior; Zdenek Nejedlý, Minister of Education; Július Ďuriš, Minister of Agriculture; and Joseph Šoltész, Minister of Social Welfare. Gottwald was Chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Nosek and Kopecký were leaders in that party, Nejedlý soon became a leader in that party, Ďuriš and Šoltész were leaders in the Slovak Communist Party and Fierlinger and Laušman were leaders in the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party.↩
- Vladimir Clementis was Under Secretary in the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry and a Communist, General Ludvík Svoboda was Minister of National Defense and unaffiliated with any party, and Václav Majer, Minister of Food, was a leader in the Social Democratic Party.↩