Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Paris Peace Conference: Documents, Volume IV

CFM Files: Telegram

Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel, Military Adviser, United States Delegation, to the War Department

top secret

Paris, September 20, 1946.

OCD 160. WDCSA for Norstad personal from Bonesteel. Info: USFET for Huebner personal please show Lincoln.

1. Present estimate here of Soviet policy, as evidenced by their actions here and elsewhere since visit of Molotov to see Stalin,⁷⁰ is that of interim change in emphasis on objectives, tending for the moment to put in secondary emphasis their efforts to strengthen Communism in Germany, France and Italy while making first priority the firming up of control over and more strongly supporting Slav nations inside curtain. Among evidence is reversal to previous year long encouragement of German Commies by dangling possibility of favorable rectification of German-Polish border and change to straight out public support of Poles giving assurance that border will not change. Also vigorous support of Jugs with regard to a statute of Trieste designed to put Trieste in Jug hands about 60 days after Allied forces get out. Similarly strong support Bulgars against Greeks, efforts to get recognition for Albanians as working members of Conference, support of Jug claims for amendment French line in Venezia Giulia, slaps at Italians on numerous occasions, etc.

2. Reason for changed policy seems to be (a) firm US position including evidence that US does not intend to withdraw from Europe (b) Worry that Soviet hold over satellites was not so strong as desired and (c) Frequent outvotings Soviet bloc gets here at Paris (how the Wallace business will affect all of this not yet clear but Russians are using his lines now every chance they get⁷¹). Most important result of changed Soviet policy likely here is even more adamant stand on Trieste with result that possibilities of CFM or Conference reaching agreement thereon are dwindling.

3. U. S. Delegation has made clear to Conference its position that agreement on French Line⁷² and true internationalization of Trieste are part and parcel of one agreement and that if effective permanent statute can not be agreed then US agreement to French Line is automatically voided. In view Russian stand on Trieste it becomes possible that (a) Trieste solution may be postponed or more likely, (b) that Conference may bust up with no treaties agreed.

4. I have gone over implications of no settlement on Trieste with Lincoln who will no doubt be giving you his views. Apparently needed is some rapid planning as to just what is to be done regarding U.S. forces in Europe in the face of a split of such magnitude. What the Russian play will be needs some careful thought. Particular attention should be given the Allied forces in Venezia Giulia who might have to stay there indefinitely and who will be in very tense and hot spot. It is not impossible CFM might agree to disagree within a matter of weeks.

70. Molotov departed for Moscow on August 31 and returned to Paris on September 5.
71. Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace delivered an address in New York on September 12, 1946, which was widely construed as critical of existing United States policy. For the text, see the Washington Post, September 18, 1946, p. 16, col. 1. Circumstances seemed to associate President Truman with the views of Wallace, evoking doubt as to whether Secretary Byrnes’ activities in Paris accurately reflected the policy of his Government. Byrnes asked Truman on September 18 either to insure him the undivided support of the Administration or to accept his resignation. The President and the Secretary of State conversed by teletype the following day. On September 20, Truman requested and received the resignation of Secretary Wallace. See James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 239–243, and Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 555–560.
72. The “French Line” mentioned here refers to the proposal for the Italian-Yugoslav frontier submitted by the French Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, originally described in Annex A to the Summary Minutes of the 73rd Meeting of the Commission on the Italo-Yugoslav Boundary, April 28, 1946; these minutes are printed in vol. ii, pp. 148–153. The lines proposed by the Delegations of France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union are also indicated on the map facing p. 152 in vol. ii.