740.00119 Council/4–1846: Telegram
The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State
urgent
[Received April 19—10:39 a.m.]
4334. This is Delsec 401 from Dunn for the Secretary. At the close of our discussions here,96 I submit the following observations. The positions taken in the deputies meetings by the various delegations, in particular by the Russians, may have in many instances been bargaining positions but the Russian attitude of insisting upon full acceptance of the demands has made little real negotiation possible on the major issues. Nevertheless, the discussions here have given some indication of the basic policies which are likely to be reflected at the Paris meeting. While I realize that the decisions in Paris will to a considerable extent be guided by considerations of major policy which I am not in a position to evaluate, I hope that the following estimate, when considered in connection with the other information at your disposal, will be useful to you in preparing for the Paris meeting.
With few exceptions such as French insistence upon strict restrictions in the Italian treaty, the questions at issue are between the Russians and the other three governments. So far the Russians have given little evidence that they actually desire to see peace treaties concluded unless, of course, they can achieve their major aims there. [Page 71] Whether they will agree at Paris to make the concessions necessary to permit the conclusion of treaties will largely depend upon (A) What specific advantages they would receive, such as reparations, ships, etc., (B) the effect of the treaties on the Soviet position within the ex-enemy states, and (C) the effect of the treaties upon Soviet relations with the British and ourselves. With respect to concrete advantages, it is of course clear that these would have to be derived almost entirely from the Italian treaty since the Soviet conception of the Balkan treaties is merely to confirm the advantages which they have already obtained under the armistice agreements or by direct negotiation.
It must now be clear to the Russians that they have no possibility of obtaining the trusteeship for Tripolitania although they may continue to press for this in the early stages of the conference in an attempt to strengthen their bargaining position for other claims. Believe their principal effort will be to obtain either a base or bases in the Dodecanese or a trusteeship for Eritrea or the Somaliland. While they may hold out on the Dodecanese they are, in my opinion, unlikely to break down the negotiations because of failure to receive a trusteeship.
An important Russian objective will be to receive a substantial share of the Italian Navy or at least to retain the ships which we and the British have loaned to them. They consider that this is an obligation that we have already assumed and doubt if they would agree to a treaty which did not give them substantial satisfaction on this point.
One of the most difficult points for negotiation will be the determination of Italian reparations. In our meetings here the Russians have never wavered on this point to which they probably attach as much and probably more political than economic importance.
Pending settlement of reparations on their terms they have not allowed discussion of other economic questions. They will not wish to see Italy, which they tend to regard as our client, receive better treatment in this respect than Bulgaria and Rumania.
With respect to Venezia Giulia it seems clear that the Russians will give strong support to the Yugoslavs claim for Trieste and it may not be possible finally to settle this difficult problem at the Paris meeting but if a satisfactory solution can be found on the other issues, I believe it will be possible eventually to reach agreement on the Yugoslav-Italian frontier. However, they will firmly resist any agreement that would obligate the Yugoslavs to evacuate territory now occupied by them.
Although the British agree with us on most issues they are insisting upon strict military and naval limitation and upon the acquisition of the Tenda and Briga area.
[Page 72]Gusev has made it clear that the Russian approach to the treaties is purely political and that they wish to insure that states not in the Russian orbit do not receive better treatment than the states which have accepted their leadership. They have themselves attempted to discriminate in favor of Rumania and Bulgaria. Their chief objective will be to consolidate their privileged position in the Balkans and they will firmly oppose any clauses which would give the British and ourselves any opportunity effectively to dispute this. It will, therefore, probably be impossible to agree upon the Balkan peace treaties unless we can reach agreement on the larger issue of the status of the great powers in this area, to which issue the peace treaties are only incidental. Until the Russians are willing to consider re-establishing Hungarian economy, for example, the economic clauses of the treaty will be of little importance to Hungary. Similarly we cannot resolve the present situation with respect to Bulgaria by means of the peace treaty with that country. On balance I believe that unless the Russians are willing to abandon at least to some extent their exclusive position in the Balkans it will be very difficult for us to agree to the type of treaties they will insist upon. Their present drafts constitute in effect an endorsement of their exclusive control in those countries.
In general [I] feel that the basic objectives of the Russians on the one hand and the British, French and ourselves on the other with respect to the peace treaties are at present so divergent that the possibility of reaching agreement lies chiefly in the hope that the Russians may feel it essential to improve their relations with the British and ourselves and their world standing.
- In the course of their discussions in London between January and April 1946, the Deputies held 39 meetings devoted to the consideration of a draft peace treaty for Italy and 15 meetings given over to the consideration of draft peace treaties for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania. At their final London meeting on the draft Italian treaty on April 20, the Deputies agreed to a Report to be submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers. This Report, designated C.F.M. (D) (46) 80, not printed, set forth the texts of those articles which had been agreed or nearly agreed on, and, in the case of the other articles, cited the subject heading with references to all the relevant proposals tabled, together with a brief statement of the final position in respect to that question. At their final meetings in London on the Balkan peace treaties on April 18 and 19, the Deputies agreed to similar reports with respect to the draft Rumanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian treaties which would be submitted to the Council. These reports, designated, respectively, C.F.M. (D) (B) (46) 37, 38, and 39, are not printed.↩