Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

868.014/12–1246

Memorandum Prepared by the Greek Government⁶

private and confidential

Memorandum on the Question of Northern Epirus

I. On October 30, 1946, the Greek Government submitted to the Council of Four their fresh appeal concerning the question of Northern Epirus.⁷ Some days later they were advised from London to limit Greece’s claim to the line Santi Quaranta–Delvino–Konispolis extending to a point opposite the island of Corfu.

II. It is superfluous to repeat the historical, ethnological, economic, strategic and psychological arguments which were advanced in reply to this friendly counsel. It suffices to stress the fact that no Greek Government could survive, for however short a time, such an official abdication of rights to nine-tenths of this Greek province, as is implied in a claim to only one-tenth thereof. This is the more evident if one takes into account the bitter disappointment which the Greek people have suffered in the meanwhile by reason of the refusal of the Council of Four to proceed to an examination of their demand for an adjustment of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, a demand that is essentially just and of imperative necessity.

III. The situation in Northern Epirus has deteriorated still further since that time, and the systematic, political eradication of the Greek population (murders, executions, imprisonments, deportations to Northern Albania, confiscation of property, etc.) has assumed such proportion that it is a matter of elementary duty to take steps to pat an end to it without delay. Furthermore in view of present international conditions, and pending an improvement of those conditions such as will permit of the realization of the only lawful and moral solution, i.e., the incorporation of the whole of Northern Epirus in the Mother Country, it might be possible to envisage the granting of a wide measure of autonomy to Northern Epirus (including Valona) under the supervision and control of the United Nations, with the exception of the area referred to which is bounded by the line Santi Quaranta–Delvino–Konispolis, which would be ceded to Greece immediately together with the necessary hinterland. Pending the dawn of better days, a provisional solution of this kind would, among other things, correspond to the necessity of establishing security on the eastern littoral of the Adriatic.

New York , 12 December, 1946.

[On December 12, 1946, the Acting Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs delivered notes to the American, British, French, and Soviet Embassies in Athens, protesting the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding the Bulgarian-Greek frontier and requesting that the Council re-examine the Greek territorial claims. The Greek note delivered to American Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh is briefly summarized in telegram 1719, December 14, 1946, from Athens, printed in Volume VII, page 281. The substance of all four notes is described in detail in Stephen Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers 1944–1947 (Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), pages 421–422.]

6. According to a memorandum prepared by William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, December 20, 1946, of a conversation of that date between Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Greek Foreign Minister Constantine Tsaldaris, Tsaldaris read and commented upon each item of this memorandum, a copy of which had previously been given to the Secretary of State in New York. The memorandum of conversation read in part as follows:

   “Referring theto the Greek desire for early consideration by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Greek claim for Northern Epirus, Mr. Tsaldaris suggested the possibility, pending a final solution, that a small section of territory near the Corfu Straits be ceded to Greece at once and the rest of the disputed area be placed under United Nations control in order to halt Albanian mistreatment of Greek minorities. Mr. Acheson said that he could not state what the Secretary’s attitude would be on this question but that speaking personally he felt the Greek Government was attaching too much importance to territorial issues when there were many other matters of more vital concern to the future of Greece. It would seem that now, as during the war, all loyal Greeks should face with unity and determination the problems of reconstruction and economic stabilization.” (868.50/12–2046)

   For a review of the visit to the United States of Foreign Minister Tsaldaris, see telegram 8, January 3, 1947, to Athens, vol. vii, p. 286.

7. Not printed, but see footnote 22, p. 956.