Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Thirteenth Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, December 2, 1946, 4 p.m.⁸

New York, December 2, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret
USDEL(CFM) (46) (NY) 13th Meeting

Motor Torpedo Boats⁹

Mr. Byrnes: The United States position is that whatever agreement is made should apply to all the treaties. If a prohibition remains in one treaty, it should be included in the others. If a certain number of motor torpedo boats are allowed for Bulgaria or Rumania, the same number should be allowed for the others.

M. Molotov: I have no objection to this proposal, that is, to allow all of the states a certain number of motor torpedo boats.

M. Couve de Murville: Do we recognize the principle that the states can have motor torpedo boats, and then shall we limit their numbers? Unfortunately I am unable to give an opinion today since my naval expert is not here. Would it not be preferable to refer this matter to the Naval Committee?

M. Molotov: I have no objection. Our experts would be faced with two questions, (1) whether there should be restrictions, and (2) what the underlying principles on limitations should be. There is a difference between large and small countries which have no battleships or cruisers.

Mr. Byrnes: I have no objection to sending this matter to the Naval Experts.

M. Couve de Murville: We seem to agree on this course of action. However, we should give our Naval Experts some indication as to what the limitations should be.

Mr. Byrnes: Whatever limitations are agreed upon should be applied to all.

M. Couve de Murville: The French Delegation has not yet agreed that these countries should have motor torpedo boats.

M. Molotov: Unless we come to agreement on this question, the Naval Experts will receive no guidance and will be unable to decide on the limitations. I suggest that we postpone this question until tomorrow, by which time the French Delegation will be able to inform us of its position.

The Ministers agreed to postpone consideration of this question.

The Danube

The Ministers postponed consideration of this question.

Human Rights for Jews¹⁰

Mr. Byrnes: These articles were adopted by a majority of 14 to 7. I hope they can be included in the treaties.

M. Molotov: I have no objection, but I do not think it is necessary to include Article 24B¹¹ since Article 3A refers to property rights.

M. Couve de Murville: We discussed this question and agreed to paragraph 1 of Article 24B.¹² Paragraph 2 is still under discussion. Could we adopt 3 bis [3A]; 24 bis, paragraph 1; and drop out paragraph 2 of 24 bis?

M. Molotov: I see no need for 24 bis, since 3A covers this matter.

M. Couve de Murville: 3 bis [3A] concerns the future, whereas 24 bis concerns measures taken against the Jews during the war.

Mr. Byrnes: The U.S. Delegation supports paragraph 2 of 24 bis and believes that it is entirely different from 3 bis [3A]. 24 bis applies to property of persons who were the object of racial, religious and Fascist persecution. They are dead, and their heirs cannot be found. It is a question as to whether this property cannot be given to local organizations. I don’t think that it should go to governmental authorities. I believe that it should be applied for relief purposes.

M. Molotov: I have no objection to the articles in question.

M. Couve de Murville: We might refer the articles to the Economic Experts to put in final form.

The Ministers agreed to the adoption of paragraphs 3 bis [3A] and 24 bis.¹³

Italo-Austrian Agreement

M. Molotov: Since my colleagues insist on this article, the Soviet Delegation believes that it might be possible to reach agreement on it. I would like, however, to reflect on the final wording.

The Ministers agreed to postpone discussion of this subject.

Status of Albania

M. Molotov: Albania is treated as an Allied Power in a number of articles of the Italian Treaty. Article 73 states that Albania shall be included in the consideration of Articles 65, 68, 71, and Annex VIII. There is also a special section on Albania.

M. Couve de Murville: Article 77¹⁴ provides for the accession to the Italian Treaty of members of the United Nations. Albania is not a United Nation; furthermore, there may be a question from a legal point of view whether Albania ever declared war on Italy.

Mr. Bevin: Article 77 would take care of this matter if the words “and Albania” were added after the words, “at war with Italy”.

The Ministers agreed to this proposal.

International Financial Commission in Greece¹⁵

Mr. Bevin: I am prepared to withdraw this article if an amendment is made to Article 32.¹⁶ I propose that the words, “and also the Financial Commission in Greece” be added after the words, “and the Permanent Court of International Justice”. This would give us an opportunity to wind up the Commission.

The Ministers agreed to this proposal.

Non-Application op Treaty to Non-Ratifying Powers¹⁷

M. Molotov: This article is not needed since its contents are covered by Article 78.¹⁸ If that article is meant to contain some thought that goes beyond Article 78, it would be useful to know what that thought is.

Mr. Byrnes: Article 78 states that the Italian Treaty comes into force immediately upon the deposit of ratifications by France, the U.K., the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. We understand that to mean that immediately upon ratification Italy becomes bound by the treaty. Thus Italy must recognize the new frontiers and pay reparations to Yugoslavia. But Yugoslavia is not bound by any of the provisions of the treaty because Yugoslavia has not signed it. Yugoslavia would obtain territory up to a frontier line which it does not recognize because it has not signed the treaty. If we can agree that Yugoslavia cannot be a beneficiary of the treaty unless it agrees to all the provisions of the treaty, we can come to final agreement on language. As the treaty now stands, Yugoslavia can obtain all the benefits of the treaty but ignore provisions of it which it does not like. I mentioned Yugoslavia because the Yugoslavs in Paris stated that they did not contemplate signing the treaty. Article 77 bis [77A] however, would apply to all beneficiaries.

M. Molotov: I agree with what Mr. Byrnes has said but maintain that all he wishes to obtain is contained in Article 78. Article 78 states, “with respect to each Allied and Associated Power whose instrument of ratification is thereafter deposited the treaty shall come into force upon the date of deposit. [”] According to this wording Yugoslavia cannot have the benefits of the treaty unless it signs the treaty.

Mr. Byrnes: As long as we agree as to what should be done, we should have no trouble in expressing our intentions. I admit that when I first read the first sentence of paragraph 2 I was not sure of the interpretation. I concluded it would not answer the question that confronts us. Article 11 states that Italy cedes to Yugoslavia certain territories in full sovereignty. According to Article 78 the treaty becomes effective when the four of us have deposited our ratifications. Thereupon this territory will be ceded by Italy to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is not bound by the treaty if it does not sign it, but it will receive the territory. Furthermore, when would Italy be obligated to pay reparations? Would Italy pay reparations on the date we ratify the treaty or would Italy be permitted to avoid paying reparations until Yugoslavia had deposited its ratification? We cannot leave this question for disputes in the future. We should change the wording of 78 or adopt 77.

M. Molotov: If the Legal Experts found that 78 did not cover what is provided for in 77A, I would have no objection to making this change, but we think that it does cover 77A.

Mr. Bevin: I hope this matter will be made clear, for it will affect the withdrawal of our troops. If the sense of 77A were included in 78, there could be no doubt as to the intention. If we all agreed that no benefits should go to a non-signer, our drafting experts should have no difficulty in working out suitable language.

M. Couve be Murville: We have no disagreement as to substance. Perhaps the addition of two words would bring 78 in line. I suggest that we start the second paragraph with the word “however” and place the word “only” after the words “come into force” so that the end of the sentence would read: “the treaty shall come into force only upon the date of deposit”.

Mr. Byrnes: We cannot afford to leave this in doubt. Under paragraph 1 the treaty comes into effect on the date the ratifications are deposited. The date of the withdrawal of our troops is figured from this date. However, if Yugoslavia does not sign the treaty, it would leave its troops in Italy.

M. Molotov: If Yugoslavia refuses to sign, certain difficulties will arise irrespective of whether 77A is included in the treaty or not. We should draw up a treaty which Yugoslavia will sign. The situation will remain the same whether Articles 77 and 78 are included. The question as to what should be done to avoid difficulties cannot be answered by the inclusion or the non-inclusion of 77A.

Mr. Byrnes: We should tell the Yugoslavs, the Greeks and any others that we have worked for months on this difficult task, and that we are not going to permit one government to have its own way. If we wish to protect ourselves, we should add the words suggested by the French Delegation and also the following words at the end of the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 78; “and the existing military rights of the Occupational Powers shall not be affected in relation to any of the Allied and Associated Powers until the deposit of such ratification”. We do not wish to leave the question of the Occupying Powers in doubt.

M. Molotov: This language means that the treaty will not come into force in respect to U.S. and U.K. forces in Italy. I believe that the main question is that of drawing up a treaty with Yugoslavia will sign. We might try to achieve a better wording of Article 78—one that is satisfactory to all of us. But the main question is to make sure that Yugoslavia will sign the treaty.

Mr. Bevin: I agree that this matter should go to the Drafting Committee to clarify 77 bis [77A] and 78 and to express our positions on this matter. It is my understanding that we agree that no nation should receive benefits from the treaty unless it actually ratifies the treaty.

The Ministers agreed to refer this matter to the Legal and Drafting Committee.

Greco-Bulgarian Frontier

Mr. Bevin: I suggested that this go to the Deputies, because I did not think both parties had been heard.

M. Molotov: I suggest that we don’t raise this question and so avoid exciting passion between Bulgaria and Greece. We did not see the need to put this question to the Conference since what we had heard from the two parties seemed to be enough to us.

Mr. Bevin: I don’t want to stir passions—they are stirred without our help. We wanted to give more security to Greece.

M. Molotov: That will only stir passions more. Greece’s security is sufficiently guaranteed.

Mr. Byrnes: Shall we consider the next item (Demilitarization) in connection with this?

M. Couve de Murville: I suggest that we leave Article 1 in the draft presented to the Conference¹⁹ and accept the recommendation of the Conference on the second question.²⁰

Mr. Byrnes: I would agree to that.

M. Molotov: It seems we are agreed.

Mr. Bevin: No, we left this open to the Conference.

M. Molotov: I mean we are agreed now.

Mr. Bevin: No, We had a suggestion from Mr. Byrnes that we consider demilitarization. I was waiting to hear what he had to say.

Mr. Byrnes: I asked if the two questions could not be considered together, and the French Delegation proposed that Article 1 be adopted with the provision 11 bis being added; the frontiers as they are now be recognized and that 11 A, [11 bis] the recommendation of the Conference, be adopted. I hope the United Kingdom Delegate can agree. I think it will be the best thing to do to take the French proposal, accept the 12 to 6 vote of the Conference, and then the demilitarization project. The language is similar to the language regarding the French and Yugoslav frontier. It does not provide for the destruction of existing fortifications and only applies to new ones. The language in 11 bis exactly the same as in Article 41 of the Italian treaty regarding the Italian and Yugoslav frontiers and Article 14 dealing with the French frontier.

M. Molotov: I agree.

Mr. Bevin: Let me reflect on this until tomorrow.

M. Couve de Murville: We shall postpone this, then.

Report of the Naval Committee

M. Couve de Murville: Shall we consider the report of the Naval Committee or wait to have time to study it?

M. Molotov: It would be best to wait (agreed).

Reparations

M. Couve de Murville: We will start back on reparations again. The last meeting broke up in confusion since there were so many proposals. Each Delegation had made one. Mr. Byrnes proposed that Italy pay $125 million to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria pay 20 million dollars to her; and that Italy pay 100 million dollars to Greece and Bulgaria pay 45 million dollars to Greece.

Mr. Byrnes: I made at least two proposals.

M. Couve de Murville: I was about to add that. Your second proposal was for a 162½ million total to be paid to Greece with 62½ million from Bulgaria and 100 million from Italy. Mr. Molotov made three proposals. The last one was for Italy to pay 105 million to Yugoslavia and 105 million to Greece and 10 million to Albania; and Bulgaria to pay 35 million to Greece and 15 million to Yugoslavia. I proposed that Italy pay 125 million to Yugoslavia, 105 million to Greece, and 5 million to Albania; and that Bulgaria pay 30 million to Yugoslavia and 50 million to Greece. We did not agree on the exact figures, but we did agree that both Greece and Yugoslavia should receive an equal total amount, and that they should receive payments from the current production of Italy and Bulgaria.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation accepted the principle of equal reparations for Yugoslavia and Greece at the last meeting, although we considered this unfair to Yugoslavia. We agreed to accept this Conference proposal. I suggest that each of these countries receive 140 million dollars and that Albania receive 10 million dollars. The Soviet Delegation will agree to either of the following two proposals: Yugoslavia shall receive 125 million dollars from Italy and 15 million dollars from Bulgaria, Greece shall receive 105 million dollars from Italy and 35 million dollars from Bulgaria; or Yugoslavia shall receive 130 million dollars from Italy and 10 million dollars from Bulgaria and Greece receive 100 million dollars from Italy and 40 million dollars from Bulgaria.

Mr. Bevin: There are two points in this matter: the first that Italy shall pay more reparations than the Conference recommend; and the second, that the sum of reparations to be paid each country is less than the Conference recommendation. This would be unnecessary and wrong. We have met the Soviet figure on Finland, Hungary, and Rumania. We can’t understand this cut in the reparation figure for Greece when the figure was recommended by the Conference. Why, if we are just, should we be so mean to Greece? I persuaded my Government to accept the figure for Italy when we were in Paris and I accepted all the Armistices.

M. Molotov: We agree to accept equality. One cannot refer to unfair treatment for Greece but to unfair treatment for Yugoslavia.

Mr. Byrnes: I have another difficulty in this matter. I am considering the French proposal for 155 million as it is nearest to the Conference proposal, 162½. Another thing we must consider is that the Conference recommended that Italy pay not more than 225 million and that Bulgaria pay 125 million. (Addressing Mr. Molotov) If we adopt your proposal, we would add 35 million to what the Conference recommends that Italy pay and reduce what Bulgaria pays by 45 million. I would like to know if we can agree that the privately owned property in the territory to be ceded to Yugoslavia can be counted as a source of reparations. If we add 35 million dollars to what the Conference recommended that Italy pay, should we not provide that that could be paid out of the property in the ceded territory to the extent of the value placed upon it by the Ambassadors?

M. Molotov: Let us not raise new questions, particularly that of private property in the ceded territories. We have considered reparations independently of other questions, and we should adhere to that course. We would accept as an ultimate figure 145 million for Yugoslavia and Greece; Greece to receive 40 million from Bulgaria, 105 million from Italy; Yugoslavia to receive 20 million from Bulgaria, 125 million from Italy.

Mr. Byrnes: As I said the other day, the proposal of the Conference was that Greece receive 62½ million from Bulgaria and 100 million from Italy. The first figure I suggested was a 145 million total, and there was no provision for any payment to Albania. This suggestion was not accepted, and after we discussed it I said the amount paid should be the Conference figure or the nearest to that. That is why I admitted that the French proposal was better than mine. I don’t think we should change the Conference recommendation by adding 35 million to the amount Italy shall pay and subtracting 45 million from what Bulgaria shall pay. I should prefer to base the reparations on the French proposal as nearest to the 62½ million the Conference recommended.

M. Couve de Murville: The first thing to do is to agree on the total.

Mr. Bevin: I will accept 155 million.

M. Molotov: I will agree to 145 million.

Mr. Bevin: I can’t accept it.

M. Couve de Murville: I hardly dare suggest the middle figure of 150 million.

M. Molotov: It is impossible to recommend a figure for Yugoslavia higher than what she has asked for, which is 20 million dollars from Bulgaria.

Mr. Byrnes: When I stated my proposal I had in mind your point of view, but if we give Yugoslavia more than she asks, she needn’t accept it.

M. Molotov: We could not make such a recommendation. The fact that the Conference recommended a higher amount than Yugoslavia wants from Bulgaria shows how rash the decision of the Conference was.

Mr. Bevin: There is still a difference of 30 million between M. Molotov and myself.

M. Molotov: It depends on us both, not on me alone.

Mr. Bevin: Yes, largely. I have tried to meet you, but I can’t accept your figure.

M. Couve de Murville: I wonder if 150 million will be acceptable.

M. Molotov: I accept.

M. Couve de Murville: Then Yugoslavia would receive 125 million from Italy, 25 million from Bulgaria; and Greece 105 million from Italy and 45 million from Bulgaria.

Mr. Bevin: I propose as an alternative to M. Couve’s proposal that Greece receive 100 million from Italy and 50 million from Bulgaria, and that Yugoslavia receive 130 million from Italy and 20 million from Bulgaria.

M. Molotov: That is unfair.

Mr. Bevin: I am only trying to meet your figure for 20 million. The totals are the same.

M. Molotov: I suggest that Yugoslavia receive 130 million from Italy and 20 million from Bulgaria; Greece receive 110 million from Italy and 40 million from Bulgaria.

Mr. Bevin: No, I can’t agree to that.

Mr. Byrnes: That would increase what Italy pays?

Mr. Bevin: Yes, by 40 million. I will accept M. Couve de Murville’s original proposal, Yugoslavia to receive 125 million from Italy and 25 million from Bulgaria; Greece to receive 105 million from Italy and 45 million from Bulgaria.

Mr. Byrnes: I agree.

M. Molotov: I can’t agree. It is higher by 60 million dollars for Bulgaria, and I am also interested in Albania.

M. Couve de Murville: We proposed 5 million for Albania. The Soviet Delegation asked for 10.

Mr. Byrnes: I think that is a mistake. M. Molotov accepted my proposal, and I proposed nothing for Albania.

M. Molotov: No, we were discussing Greece and Yugoslavia at the time.

Mr. Byrnes: I understand that under the French proposal Bulgaria would pay 20 million dollars to Yugoslavia. If the Yugoslavs don’t want but 10 of this, they can give the other 10 to Albania. We all agree.

M. Molotov: Then we will violate the principle of parity between Greece and Yugoslavia.

Mr. Byrnes: No, no, we must not violate the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. She can give 10 million to Albania if she wants to.

M. Molotov: I ask that we defer this question of the division until our next meeting.

M. Couve be Murville: Shall we adjourn now and meet tomorrow at 4? (Agreed).

8. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
9. In the draft peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, motor torpedo boats were dealt with in articles 14, 12, 13, and 16, respectively.
10. Under consideration at this point were articles 3A of the Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania and 2 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary as recommended by the Peace Conference; for texts, see vol. iv, pp. 920 and 939, respectively.
11. The reference here is to article 24 bis of the Draft Peace Treaty with Rumania, ibid., p. 921; see also article 23 bis of the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary, ibid., p. 942.
12. Article 24 bis had been discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers at its 12th Meeting, November 30; see p. 1364 and footnote 97.
13. According to the Record of Decisions of this meeting, infra, the Council also agreed to the adoption of article 2 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary.
14. The text of amended article 77 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy is included in the Record of Decisions of this meeting, infra.
15. Article 74 bis of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy; for text, see vol. iv, p. 916.
16. The text of the amended article 32 as approved here by the Council is included in the Record of Decisions, infra.
17. Article 77A of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy as recommended by the Peace Conference, vol. iv, p. 916.
18. Article 78 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, as submitted to the Peace Conference by the Council of Foreign Ministers, ibid., p. 36.
19. Vol. iv, p. 96.
20. Article 11 bis, ibid., p. 935.