Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Eleventh Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, November 29, 1946, 4 p.m.⁶⁹

New York, November 29, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret
USDEL(CFM) (46) (NY) 11th Meeting

Report of the Deputies

Mr. Jebb: The Deputies have prepared a list of oustanding questions which has been circulated by the Secretary General.⁷⁰

The U.K. Deputy stated that he considered the withdrawal of troops from Rumania and Hungary as an outstanding question and that Articles 20 and 21 should be brought into line with the corresponding articles of the Italian and Bulgarian treaties.

The Deputies considered the Danube formula of November 28. The U.K., U.S. and French Deputies said that they understood the exception mentioned in M. Molotov’s formula as referring to cabotage. They therefore considered that the text could be clarified by omitting the words “within, etc.” and stating as a new sentence “The foregoing shall not apply to traffic between ports of the same state.”⁷¹ In reply to a question of the French Deputy concerning the conditions concerning merchant shipping, the Soviet Deputy stated that these conditions covered judicial, fiscal, administrative, etc. matters.

The Deputies approved the text of Article 4 in principle and referred it to the Trieste Committee.⁷² They also referred the text of Article 16 to the Trieste Committee since the Soviet Deputy stated that his Delegation had some suggestions to make on it.

The Deputies agreed on a new text on paragraph 10B of the French resolution concerning citizenship in the Free Territory of Trieste.⁷³ This new text has been circulated to the CFM. The Deputies were informed that the Military Commission had reached agreement on the time limit for the withdrawal of forces from the Free Territory. This agreement is contained in CFM(NY) (46)34.⁷⁴34, November 29, see footnote 46, p. 1323.

Withdrawal of Troops

M. Molotov: Mr. Jebb mentioned Mr. Bevin’s proposal regarding withdrawal of troops. I do not think it advisable to revert to this question since it has been disposed of.

Mr. Bevin: I said that I had agreed to Articles 20 and 21 of the Rumanian and Hungarian treaties and I will not go back on my agreement, but I thought it desirable to reduce the troops in these countries. If the Soviet Government does not wish to do so I will drop the question.

The Danube

M. Molotov: I would like to reflect on the new draft considered by the Deputies. I request that consideration of this question be deferred.

Citizenship

M. Molotov: I move that we approve the draft adopted by the Deputies. This refers to paragraph 10B. Paragraph 10A was approved some days ago. There is, however, a U.S. proposal known as paragraph 3.⁷⁵

Mr. Byrnes: The French Delegation reserved its position on this proposal.

M. Couve de Murville: We thought that it was covered by the human rights article.

Mr. Byrnes: I doubt whether this article covers the U.S. proposal which makes clear that civic rights can only be taken away for certain reasons.

M. Couve de Murville: I refer to Article 4 in the draft statute for Trieste.

Mr. Byrnes: The U.S. proposal makes more precise the right of citizens to vote notwithstanding his political beliefs. This is not included in Article 4 and it would be better not to leave this question in doubt.

M. Couve de Murville: Human rights imply political rights but if Mr. Byrnes wishes to spell them out I do not object.

M. Molotov: I understand that the U.S. proposal is approved by all of us with the word “judicial” placed before the word “punishment”.

Date of Withdrawal of Troops

The Ministers agreed on the report of the Military Committee.

Reparations

Mr. Byrnes: Did the French Representative ever talk to the Yugoslavs regarding private property in ceded territories?

M. Couve de Murville: I saw the Yugoslavs two days ago and explained to them the suggestion of certain of the delegations of the CFM that concessions belonging to private owners be used as reparations and that the Italian Government would compensate the private owners. The Yugoslavs replied that these assets had been claimed by Yugoslavia at the Peace Conference and that the question had not been settled. They asked for time to study this question and I have not seen them since.

Mr. Byrnes: I feel that the Peace Conference recommendation on reparations to Yugoslavia and Greece should be adopted. According to this recommendation, which received a 14 to 2 vote, with 5 abstentions, Greece and Yugoslavia should receive equal reparations. The Paris Conference also adopted by 15 votes to 0, with 6 abstentions, a proposal that Greece be given $100 million. The facts are that Yugoslavia, in addition to receiving $100 million, will receive public utilities and mines estimated at $200 million and property of private individuals valued at $55 million in the ceded territories. This gives Yugoslavia $355 million as against $100 million for Greece. It is true that Greece receives the Dodecanese Islands but assets therein are negligible. The Soviet Delegation has recommended that Bulgarian reparations be reduced from $125 million to $20 million for Yugoslavia and $20 million for Greece. In an effort to bring about agreement the U.S. Delegation is willing to make the following proposal:

Italian reparations	to Greece	$100		million
Italian reparations	to Yugoslavia		$125	million
Bulgarian ”	to Greece	$ 45		million
” ”	to Yugoslavia		$ 20	million
		$145	$145	million

This preserves the principle of equality. The U.S. Delegation would rather see Greece receive $62½ million from Bulgaria, as recommended by the Conference, but is impressed by the argument that Yugoslavia only wished to receive $20 million. In order to reconcile the Yugoslavs the U.S. Delegation is willing to give Greece $25 million more on the Bulgarian account and Yugoslavia $25 million more on the Italian account.

Mr. Bevin: I cannot stand for a reduction for Greece from these two sources. Greece was given $162½ million by the Paris Conference. Yugoslavia receives the same amount and all these other assets as well. I cannot understand why Greece should be asked to suffer. Greece, according to Mr. Byrnes’ plan, would receive $145 million. Yugoslavia would receive the same amount, plus $255 million. The results would be that Yugoslavia obtains $400 million and Greece at the outset would receive $150 million since the maximum of the assets in the Dodecanese are not more than $5 million. I do not see how we can cut Greece down after what Greece went through and after the Conference recommendation. Bulgaria has gained out of the war. It has obtained territory. Its economy has decreased only 8% as against 45% in Hungary and I don’t know what figure in Greece. Such a solution would be entirely unjust.

Mr. Byrnes: Under my proposal both Yugoslavia and Greece receive $145 million, or $17½ million less than the conference recommendation but there is a difference since property in the territory ceded to Yugoslavia is far greater in value than property ceded to Greece. The Conference did not take into consideration this property. It advocated the principle of equality. As to Albania, there is no conference recommendation. The Conference rejected by 12 votes to 6 reparations to Albania. Therefore I do not see how we can accept any proposal in this regard. The U.S. would be willing to study any other proposal maintaining the principle of equality.

M. Molotov: I recall that Italy admitted that it could pay $300 million in reparations over and above reparations to the Soviet Union. I consider that the principle of equality between Yugoslavia and Greece is devoid of foundation. Both Yugoslavia and Greece were equally good allies but we must bear in mind that Yugoslavia is at least twice as large as Greece in size and population and her damage was considerably larger. Yugoslavia and Greece are to receive territorial gains but in all our calculations we have never based ourselves on the value of property transferred in these territories. Our figures have been fixed independently of this. Furthermore, the method of calculation at the Paris Conference did not take into consideration assets in the ceded territories. With regard to Albania, I recall that Article 64 of our original draft foresaw reparations to Albania, Greece, Ethiopia and Yugoslavia. The Paris Conference examined the question of reparations to Albania and rejected various proposals to pay reparations to that country. The CFM should decide, however, that reparations should be paid to Albania because we contemplated such a move in our original recommendation to the Conference. I previously made the following proposal:

1. Italy to pay the following reparations:

Yugoslavia	$150 million
Greece	$100 million
Albania	$ 25 million
Ethiopia	$ 25 million
	$300 million

2. Bulgaria to pay:

Greece	$ 20 million
Yugoslavia	$ 20 million
	$ 40 million

I am now willing to make the following compromise proposal:

1. Italy to pay:

Yugoslavia	$130 million
Greece	$100 million
Albania	$ 15 million
Ethiopia	$ 25 million
	$270 million

2. Bulgaria to pay:

Yugoslavia	$ 20 million
Greece	$ 30 million
	$ 50 million

Mr. Bevin: I am sorry but I cannot cut down reparations to Greece. I will not argue adjustments for Greece. They must not be reduced from the figures set forth in the Paris recommendations. If Yugoslavia is doing so well and does not want reparations from Bulgaria, why should not all Bulgarian reparations be paid to Greece? This would not quite meet the Paris Conference recommendation of $162½ million. As far as I can see it, Greece is being punished because she is Greece and not because of the merits of the case. Greece was left a complete wreck by the war and I feel that the $162½ million should be maintained. Railroad stocks were taken by Bulgaria and never returned. Cattle was stolen and there was much damage by troops. I am quite sure that the amount of Bulgarian reparations would not cover these losses. According to the Molotov proposal the Yugoslav figure is increased by $30 million and the Greek figure by $30 million. This is unfair. I did not argue in Paris against the Soviet claims for reparations but I do think that the Soviet proposal of today is of a character that cannot be justified. This attempts to bring in Albania, to increase reparations to Yugoslavia and to cut down reparations to Greece. I cannot accept it.

M. Molotov: We have a special article requiring Bulgaria to return rolling stock to Greece. Bulgarian troops did not fight the Greeks and the damage done in Greece was done by German and Italian troops. We consider that the Paris figure of 125 million is absolutely unfair. We do not suggest that Bulgaria should go unpunished for occupying Greek territory and therefore have fixed the figure at $50 million, i.e., $30 million to Greece and $20 million to Yugoslavia. Bulgaria must satisfy the reparation claims of Greece.

Mr. Byrnes: With respect to Albania, the Paris Conference voted down the $25 million proposal by 12 to 6, and the $5 million proposal by 13 to 7. The Paris Conference therefore went on record positively not to pay reparations to Albania. There is nothing to justify reparations to Albania from the Paris recommendation and the U.S. cannot agree to the Soviet proposal. With respect to Yugoslavia, I could not agree to a figure in excess of $125 million from Italy. As to Bulgaria, the objective I had in mind in my compromise proposal was to preserve the principle of equality. If Yugoslavia were given $125 million from Italy and $37½ million from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia would receive $162½ million, Greece might be given $100 million from Italy and $62½ million from Bulgaria, thus receiving $162½ million and thus respecting the principle of equality. Our Economic Experts could work out how Bulgaria could pay this amount over a period of years. This would be a better settlement all around since Bulgaria would be paying $100 million while the other Balkan countries would be paying $300 million.

That would take into account that Bulgaria didn’t actually wage war and account for the distinction between Bulgaria and the other countries. M. Molotov stated that the Italian Delegation had said that they would be satisfied to pay $300 million in addition to what they must pay the Soviet government. While I was in Paris I heard that statement and I inquired about it. I was advised that it was inaccurate and was a misunderstanding. I was told that it was made to the Economic Committee. I found in a letter from M. de Gasperi to the Economic Committee that there was this statement:

“The Italian Delegation which has already upon several occasions given a very candid statement on the real economic and financial condition of the country, would point out that the four great powers who are largely responsible for the peace treaty, realizing the extreme difficulty in which the Italian economy is placed, envisaged the necessity of fixing a general total figure of about $200 to $300 million as a maximum burden which could be imposed upon Italy. This conviction on the part of the four powers can surely not have altered for unfortunately the economic situation of Italy has certainly not changed except for the worse.”⁷⁶

I call attention to that statement of the Italian Representative because it states that the figure between $200 and $300 million is the maximum figure that could be imposed. He understood that that was the agreement of the four great powers and stated that the situation in Italy was worse instead of better. When asked, the Italian representative said he meant that compensation as well as reparation was contained in the above-mentioned figure. When he said “total” he meant “total”. I called attention to it because while we cannot justify-larger reparations to be paid by Italy only because Italy says it can’t pay them but because we must determine the best compromise that can be arrived at. I submit that the principle that must guide us is the one used at the Conference, that is, to provide equal reparations for Yugoslavia and Greece. It must influence our decision here. The Conference recommendation is that $62½ million is to be paid by Bulgaria to Greece—if we add to that $37½ million for Yugoslavia it does not make an unusual burden for Bulgaria. It would equalize the payments for Yugoslavia and Greece and would not reduce the Conference figure for Greece. It would be a good settlement. If we can’t agree on that, let us pass on to the next point.

M. Couve de Murville: I think really that the first proposal of Mr. Byrnes’, while not the exact solution, would make a good basis for a solution. Yugoslavia would receive a greater amount from Italy than would Greece and Greece would receive a larger amount from Bulgaria. The figures presented by Mr. Byrnes and M. Molotov are not so different. The difficulty on Albania is greater. On the question of Albania the Paris Conference did not give a specific recommendation. On the question of whether she should receive any reparations there was a vote of 10 to 10 and Norway did not decide to vote one way or the other as they had no precise ideas on the matter. As for the figure of reparations for Albania, $5,250,000, there was a somewhat comparable situation so far as the voting went. There were different countries on different sides in the two votes. We can’t attach too much importance to the votes. As far as Albania is concerned we could give her a symbolic figure as $5 million suggested by the French Delegate at the Conference. I would suggest that Italy give Yugoslavia $125 million, Greece $105 million and Albania $5 million; and that Bulgaria give Yugoslavia $30 million and Greece $50 million. Then Yugoslavia and Greece would each receive $155 million which would be close to the $162 million which the Conference recommended.

M. Molotov: I could accept M. Couve de Murville’s suggestion subject to slight amendment. I base myself on the desirability of preserving the principle of equality. I would change the Albanian figure from $5 million to $10 million and I would change the figures for reparation by Bulgaria to Yugoslavia and Greece. I would accept for Yugoslavia not $30 million but $15 million and $35 million, not $50 million for Greece. Then the total reparation to be paid by Bulgaria would be $50 million. Then the total reparation for Yugoslavia would be $125 million from Italy, plus $15 million from Bulgaria and for Greece $105 million from Italy and $35 million from Bulgaria. In both cases the total figure would be $140 million.

Mr. Bevin: And the net result would be to reduce Greece.

M. Molotov: It would be on terms of equality, though not fair to Yugoslavia.

M. Couve de Murville: It would be the same total for the two countries in both proposals.

Mr. Bevin: I stay where I was.

Mr. Byrnes: That would make Italy pay $265 million, which is $40 million more than the Conference recommended. Bulgaria would be reduced $125 million to $50 million, a reduction of $75 million, and it adds $40 million in the case of Italy. I know that the French Delegate will say that since the Conference wouldn’t pay $5 million to Albania that it is not proper to pay them $10 million.

M. Molotov: When the French proposal for $5 million was voted on the Ukraine, USSR and Yugoslav Delegations voted against it because they thought it was insufficient.

Mr. Byrnes: You voted against it but it was because I thought you were wise.

M. Molotov: We thought our common wisdom would reach a middle figure. If we had the votes of the Ukraine, USSR and Yugoslavia we would have a vote of 10 to 10 and 1 abstention, which would be just the same as the vote for the British proposal. Norway abstained on all the reparation clauses.

Mr. Bevin: The effect of all this is to cut Greece down from $162½ million to $140 million. That is $22½ million and we do it by taking off from Bulgaria’s reparations and giving it to Albania. In the early days of the war both countries attacked Greece. I never believed much in reparations but now we have indulged in it. We are asked to cut down a country which was attacked to relieve the attacker or at least invader. On every ground I see nothing to justify it. Nor do I see it on theoretical grounds. Bulgaria came out of the war better than any other country. I don’t think it is right to relieve Bulgaria at the expense of Greece. The situation as I see it is this: that the Conference decided that $162½ million should go to Greece. What argument has been advanced that justifies a change? I cannot believe there is any on the basis of economic reasoning or ability to pay. The other day when the figure of $55 million was being put forward I thought it was as an alternative to increasing reparation from Italy but now I see that that is thrown in as well. What argument is there for it?

M. Molotov: I don’t think Mr. Bevin’s remarks are well substantiated that Bulgaria came out better than the others. It sounds very strange. Bulgaria is the poorest of the countries to pay reparations. As to the figure of $125 million, it is unjust. Moreover, when arguments are advanced in favor of this figure then it appears that railroad stock and cattle are mentioned but they do not pertain to this subject of reparations, they pertain to restitution. This argument is devoid of foundation. The Soviet Delegation thinks it is unfair that we have placed Yugoslavia and Greece on equal footing.

Mr. Beven: But the total is not on the same footing. It’s not taking into account the territorial gain of Yugoslavia—that is not counted at all.

M. Molotov: There is nothing being said about the Dodecanese and what Greece is to receive from them.

Mr. Bevin: I counted that in just now and the difference is about $4 million.

M. Molotov: Mr. Bevin has not given figures to substantiate his argument.

Mr. Bevin: We have no accurate statistics but I am advised that the parastatal property comes to $5 million at the outside.

M. Couve de Murville: Could we not advance toward Mr. Bevin’s solution by amending the total figure which would be paid by Bulgaria? You have yourself, Mr. Chairman, suggested $15 million to Yugoslavia and $35 million to Greece. Mr. Byrnes suggested $20 million to Yugoslavia and $45 million to Greece. Could we not accept from Italy for Yugoslavia $125 million, to Greece $105 million and to Albania $5 million, and from Bulgaria to Yugoslavia $30 million and to Greece $50 million, and the totals would be the same as at first suggested.

Mr. Byrnes: I confess we have a lot of figures. My proposal meant to give Yugoslavia $400 million or more. Mr. Bevin wants to give $162½ million to Yugoslavia, $100 million from Italy, $62½ million from Bulgaria and he has agreed to the figure of $200 million from the ceded territory. Then we look with favor upon the $55 million and if you add those up that gives to Yugoslavia $417½ million. My proposal was to give $125 million from Italy, $200 million in the ceded territory and the $55 million of private property. Then I would give to Yugoslavia from Bulgaria $20 million which would give them $400 million as against $417 million. As to Greece, the figures are different. Yugoslavia would get a total of $162½ million in reparation, $100 million from Italy, $62½ million from Bulgaria. My proposal is that they get $100 million from Italy, $45 million from Bulgaria. This would give them $17½ million less.

Mr. Bevin: I didn’t say I favored this $55 million. What I said was that I thought the $55 million in property was to be set off against any increase for Yugoslavia. Today it appears that it is being put in the pool. I accept M. Molotov’s proposal that we leave property out of the discussion and continue on a purely cash basis.

Mr. Byrnes: I agree to that, because every time I have discussed reparations I have discussed the value of the property ceded and the installations. I know the Chairman has never agreed that it be considered. I have thought it should be. The Conference considered the question of reparations the equivalent of dollars. I suggest that if we can’t agree that we go on to compensation. I must say that I believe in view of the discussion that the best solution would be to give Greece the $62½ million Mr. Bevin urges so strongly and if we preserve the principle of equality, give Yugoslavia $37½ million and if it doesn’t want it, then $15 million will be all right. If we don’t care for equality, give the $20 million that the Soviet Union urges. That added to the $62½ million would give $82½ million. In my opinion that would be the best solution. If we give $82½ million that would not be burdensome to Bulgaria. That would let us give more to Yugoslavia out of the Italian fund, the $125 million.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation has stated that the principle of equality is unjust to Yugoslavia—that she ought to receive at least two times as much reparation as Greece. If a contrary proposal is accepted the Yugoslavs will be in a worse position and no one will understand that.

Mr. Byrnes: Then why not stick to the Conference report? That had equality, let’s stick to it.

M. Molotov: On the basis of the principle of equality and as a last resort, we could accept $140 million for each. Since there is no agreement, let us go on to compensation.

Compensation⁷⁷

Mr. Bevin: We have asked for the Conference recommendation of 75%.

M. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation maintains its attitude stated at the Conference in favor of 25%.

Mr. Byrnes: The U.S. at the Conference suggested 25%—in fact, introduced it. That is our view. If the others agree, the U.S. will agree to increase the proposal by 25%, making it 50%.

M. Couve de Murville: The French Delegation thinks that the Council should accept the very strong vote of the Conference on this subject which was 13 for, 6 against and 2 abstentions.

M. Molotov: There is no common ground. We must go on. The Soviet Delegation objects to paragraphs D and E of Article 24 of the recommendations of the Conference on the Rumanian Treaty.⁷⁸ We suggest that they be cut out. This Article 24 contains paragrapn E and prior to the Paris Conference the corresponding paragraph in the Italian Treaty was deleted by common consent of the members of the CFM but it was adopted in the Rumanian Treaty by a simple majority vote in the Paris Conference. I suggest we revert to the earlier decision and delete this paragraph. There is no similar paragraph in the Italian Treaty and we must exclude paragraphs D and E from the Rumanian Treaty as well as similar paragraphs from the other treaties.

Mr. Byrnes: Paragraph D was not in the Italian Treaty as there was no reason for it, but it was necessary in the case of Rumania. Paragraph E was proposed by the French Delegation and the U.S. did not vote for it.

M. Couve de Murville: Paragraph E in the Rumanian Treaty is covered in the Italian Treaty by Article 68, paragraph D which is identical except for lire being substituted for lei.

M. Molotov: That is true but the Soviet Delegation objects.

Mr. Byrnes: What is the objection to D?

M. Molotov: It means expressing mistrust in the Rumanian Government. There is no justification for this. As far as the substance is concerned, this means a privileged position for certain foreign nationals for which there is no reason. At all events this paragraph will mean interference on the part of foreign representatives in the internal affairs of Rumania which is not fair.

Mr. Byrnes: If it was intended to be an interference I would agree. To give the nationals of other countries privileges not granted the nationals of Rumania—it only prevents discrimination against a national of the Soviet Union as compared with the treatment of a Rumanian national.

M. Molotov: In reply to what Mr. Byrnes has said, namely that he is aiming at the observance of the principles of non-discrimination with regard to Rumanian nationals and foreign citizens, that is covered by Article 30, paragraph C, which reads as follows:

“Natural and juridical persons who are citizens of any one of the United Nations shall be granted national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment in all matters pertaining to trade, industry, shipping and other forms of business activity in Rumania.”

That paragraph was agreed to by all of us. Accordingly, discrimination against foreign nationals is prevented in Article 30 of the Rumanian Treaty but paragraph D provides for equitable treatment in the allocation of materials and in the allocation of foreign exchange as far as foreign nationals are concerned. But what does equitable treatment mean? Any interpretation is possible. It will result in conflict between the Rumanian Government and foreign nationals. This will give rise to interference in the internal affairs of Rumania which will be of no use to any-one. Consequently, whatever necessity there is for providing for non-discrimination against foreign nationals is covered by Article 30 whereas paragraph D provides a reason for interference.

The meeting adjourned at 7:43 p.m.

69. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
70. The list under reference, which was included as annex to the Record of Decisions of the 123rd Meeting of the Deputies, November 29, 1946, 11 a.m., is not printed.

71. The amended text agreed upon by the Deputies at their 123rd Meeting read as follows:

    “Navigation on the Danube shall be free and open on a footing of equality to the nationals, merchant vessels and goods of all States insofar as this concerns port and navigation charges and conditions of commercial shipping. The foregoing shall not apply to traffic between ports of the same State.”

72. On this point, the Record of Decisions of the 123rd Meeting of Deputies read as follows:

    “It was agreed to accept Article 4 and to ask the Trieste Sub-Committee to arrange, jointly with any additional experts required, to have the frontiers as defined in this Article delineated on a map.”

    According to the United States Delegation Minutes of the 123rd Meeting of the Deputies, not printed, it was the description of the boundary between Italy and the Free Territory of Trieste proposed by the United States that was accepted in principle by the Deputies. This United States proposal appeared as paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy submitted by the Council of Foreign Ministers to the Peace Conference, vol. iv, p. 4.

73. The French resolution under reference, as included in the Record of Decisions of the 123rd Meeting of the Deputies, read as follows:

    “The conditions for the acquisition of citizenship by persons not qualifying for original citizenship shall be determined by the Constituent Assembly of the Free Territory and embodied in the Constitution. Such conditions shall, however, exclude the acquisition of citizenship by members of the former Italian Fascist police (O.V.R.A.) who have not been exonerated by the competent authorities, including the Allied military authorities who were responsible for the administration of the area.”

74. For text of CFM (46) (NY)
75. The wording of article 16 bis, Paragraph 10 (b) on citizenship in the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy as approved by the Deputies together with the addition proposed thereto by the United States Delegation is included in item V of the Record of Decisions of this meeting, infra.
76. The De Gasperi letter quoted here cannot be further identified. For a summary of the presentation by Ambassador Tarchiani to the Economic Commission for Italy of the Italian views on reparations, see the United States Delegation Summary of Proceedings of the 14th Meeting of the Economic Commission for Italy, September 11, 1946, vol. iii, p. 425.
77. Under consideration at this point is proposed article 68, paragraph 4a, of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy as set forth in the Recommendations of the Peace Conference, vol. iv, p. 916.
78. Ibid., p. 925.