Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Ninth Informal Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, November 26, 1946, 2:30 p.m.

New York, November 26, 1946, 2:30 p.m.

secret

Present

	U.S.
	The Secretary (Chairman)
	Mr. Bohlen
France		U.K.
M. Couve de Murville		Mr. Bevin
		Mr. Hibbert
	U.S.S.R.
	Mr. Molotov
	Mr. Pavlov

The Secretary said that he had called this small group as he thought they might make greater progress. He told Mr. Molotov that he had outlined to Mr. Bevin and Mr. Couve de Murville a list of the unagreed articles of the Italian Treaty and suggested that they take them in order of importance.

He said the first important unagreed article was the method of establishing a provisional regime. He said he felt that the trouble here was that if the treaty went into force before they had agreed on a Governor all these questions would be very difficult. He felt therefore that they should reach an understanding that they would agree on a Governor prior to the entry into force of the treaty.

Mr. Molotov agreed that that was essential.

The Secretary said that as to the setting up of the provisional government, he did feel that if they could agree on a Governor it would obviously be only a man in whom they had the greatest confindence and that they could therefore safely leave to him the selection of a temporary Council of Government. If it had to be referred to the Security Council, that would indicate a lack of confidence in the Governor and would increase the difficulties of finding a suitable candidate. He pointed out that the question of a date for elections was connected with this problem. Mr. Molotov had expressed his opinion that elections should be held within four months of the entry into force of the treaty but that he felt that it should be held within four months from the date upon which the Governor assumed office. If, for some reason or other, they were held up, despite their common desire in naming a government, the Governor might have too short a period to set up a regime, organize police and arrange for elections.

Mr. Bevin said that he had felt that six months would be a better period before elections, but he was prepared to agree to four if it was clear that the Governor would have all that time to make his arrangements.

The Secretary repeated that he thought that they should really agree among themselves, before the treaty was ratified, as to the selection of a Governor so that he could enter upon his functions immediately the treaty went into force. Under those circumstances, four months would be enough. Otherwise, he would agree with Mr. Bevin that at least six months before elections should be provided.

Mr. Molotov said that they all wished to see a stable situation created in Trieste as soon as possible and he agreed that they should reach an understanding in regard to the Governor before the treaty went into force. He said he had four points which he felt were still outstanding on Trieste and of importance:

1. They should agree as to the appointment of the Governor before the entry into force of the treaty.

2. As to the appointment of the provisional regime, he was prepared to think over Mr. Byrnes’ suggestion in regard to the procedure for appointment by the Governor of a provisional regime, provided they could reach agreement on other points.

3. They should set the date of elections not later than four months after the entry into force of the treaty on the assumption that the Governor would assume office on that day.

4. An agreement on the date of withdrawal of troops. He said if they could agree on a date for withdrawal of troops he felt this would be very acceptable to the Yugoslavs, who were very dissatisfied at the agreements here already made as well as those in prospect. He said it was important to do something to meet their desires.

The Secretary said he understood then it was agreed that the Governor would be agreed upon before the entry into force of the treaty, but he felt that we could not merely assume that this would be the case despite our common desire, and cited in this connection the delay in the conclusion of these treaties. He suggested, therefore, that the agreement should state specifically four months after the Governor takes office.

M. Couve de Murville said he thought the possibility of delay lay in the approval by the Security Council of the provisional governor, but that if the four of them had a preliminary agreement prior to ratification by their respective countries the Security Council could then appoint the Governor the day the ratifications were completed.

The Secretary said he agreed with the French Representative and that in his opinion it would take at least 30 days, but he hoped no more than 60, for the United States to ratify the treaty.

Mr. Molotov expressed confidence that if they really desired to do so they could agree on a Governor before the treaty went into force, and that if the four were in agreement there was little chance of delay in the Security Council.

Mr. Bevin said he saw the situation as follows: That provision must be made for the transfer of authority from the Allied Military Government in Trieste to the Governor so that there would be no gaps in the administration. Then the Governor should select a provisional regime and then undertake the preparations for the elections. There would follow then the actual holding of the elections. He felt that the Governor should be given ample time to complete these tasks before the troops were withdrawn.

He said that under Mr. Byrnes’ suggestion of 90 days the Governor nevertheless would have to decide in advance of that whether or not the troops would be necessary. He said he felt that at the end of 90 days the Governor should decide whether the troops were necessary any longer or not. And if he considered that they were not necessary, they should get out within the shortest technically possible time.

The Secretary observed that Mr. Bevin’s idea was in substantial agreement with Mr. Molotov’s proposal of yesterday. The only question was whether or not the withdrawal would be completed in 90 days or that the Governor should decide within 90 days. He said he felt that 30 days would be ample to withdraw from a technical point of view the 5,000 troops, which each of the occupying powers would have.

He felt that Mr. Bevin’s difficulty lay in the fact that the Governor would have to decide within 60 days if the troops were to be physically removed within 90. He suggested they consult the military in order to ascertain from a technical point of view how much time was required to remove the troops once the Governor decided they were no longer needed. He pointed out that in Mr. Molotov’s suggestion, if the Governor did not feel that the troops should leave at the end of 90 days they would depart 45 days after the Governor considered the situation entirely safe.

Mr. Bevin said he thought they were putting too much on the Governor; that he had an immense and difficult task of organization to do, and that he objected to fixing an outside limit of three months because that might not be long enough to organize the police, establishing a provisional regime, etc. He felt that it would be unfair to the Governor for the sake of compromise to take a decision which was administratively impossible. That was why he had originally been in favor of six months.

He said he did not see why it was so vital that these troops be out 30 or 60 days earlier. They had been there 15 months and it was not a first-class row. He felt that the importance of Trieste was being exaggerated and all he wished to do was to give the Governor a reasonable chance to carry out his duties.

The Secretary said he thought that the Governor should be allowed 90 days to decide, and then if there was no objection the troops should be removed in the shortest technically possible time.

Mr. Bevin agreed to this suggestion.

The Secretary explained that at the end of 90 days if the Governor had no objections, the troops would start to leave; but they should be allowed a reasonable period of time, say 30 days, if the military authorities felt that this was sufficient.

Mr. Molotov said he suggested the following scheme:

1. That the troops in the Free Territory would be limited to a total of 15,000; that is, that Yugoslavia, United States and United Kingdom would each have 5,000.

2. That they be withdrawn within 90 days if the Governor does not object; but if he objects, within 30 days after he has withdrawn his objection. He felt that this would assure security in the territory and the authority of the Governor, and at the same time take into consideration the wishes of the inhabitants not to have troops unduly long in their territory.

3. As to elections, he thought it would be wise to set a limit of four months from the entry into force of the treaty or one month after the withdrawal of troops. These elections should be conducted jointly by the Governor and the provisional government.

4. As to the provisional regime, he suggested that there should be no special new rules but they should apply the appropriate provisions of the permanent statute as the basis of the temporary regime. This would relieve the Ministers of the task of drawing up a new set of rules and would facilitate a smooth transition from a temporary to a permanent regime.

5. As to the appointment of a Governor, that should be done before the treaty enters into force; then the date for withdrawal of troops would be much easier. He said he would think over the American proposal that the Governor appoint the provisional council in consultation with Yugoslavia and Italy without approval by the Security Council, which up to today had been the view of the Soviet Delegation.

Mr. Bevin said he could not agree to the withdrawal in 90 days but felt that after 90 days the Governor should decide whether he needed the troops or not.

The Secretary said that in his view the difference between Mr. Bevin’s and Mr. Molotov’s position was that Mr. Molotov provided that troops should be withdrawn within 90 days unless the Governor objected whereas Mr. Bevin felt that the Governor should decide whether he needed the troops after 90 days.

Mr. Molotov said he thought that the advantage of his proposal was that it would follow the example of the peace treaties and fix the same period, namely 90 days, for the withdrawal with the reservation that the Governor could prevent the withdrawal if he objected.

The Secretary said that there was a difference, however, between any of the treaties and the situation in Trieste since in the former cases there was an established government ready to take over whereas in Trieste an entirely new administration and regime had to be organized. He said he would consult with his military authorities in order to find out from a technical point of view how much time was required to withdraw 5,000 troops.

Mr. Bevin said that he really was fed up with this discussion since he felt that if there was any confidence that the question that one month or more would have no importance. He wondered if it was worthwhile going on with the discussion. He said that some of their people on the spot felt that the chief concern of the local inhabitants was a Yugoslav coup d’état organized by Tito, but that he did not see why they constantly had to be on the defensive and defending their motives.

Mr. Molotov said that it was Up to Mr. Bevin to decide whether the discussion should be continued or not.

Mr. Bevin continued that he would accept the opinion of his military experts as to the technical time required to withdraw the troops after the Governor had decided they were no longer needed. He imagined that once the Governor decided the troops were no longer needed for the preservation of law and order, they would cease police work and would be sent to camps in preparation for their disembarkment. He merely wished to make sure that there would be no uncertainty as to the length of time the troops would be there.

The Secretary repeated that he would also consult with his military advisers and find out how long it would take to withdraw 5,000 troops. He felt that whether it was 90, 100 or 120 days the withdrawal was on the whole a small matter.

Mr. Molotov said he agreed to consult the Military advisers.

Mr. Bevin said that before leaving the question, he merely wished to emphasize that it was important for the military commanders to know how long their troops would be at the disposal of the Governor.

The Secretary then said that they had discussed the question of the provisional regime and that the next item was the Free Port and inquired whether the French Delegation had prepared their proposal. He said, however, they might first finish the discussion on the elections and he inquired whether his proposal that the four months should begin to run not from the date of the ratification but from the date the Governor assumed office.

Mr. Couve de Murville said he thought that that was correct.

The Secretary continued that four months was a short time for the very difficult job which the Governor would have to do. He would not only have to draw up a list of voters but also the whole problem of citizenship would have to be settled.

Mr. Bevin said that he agreed with this proposal, namely, within four months after the Governor takes office.

Mr. Molotov said he proposed an amendment if possible that the election should be held within four months after the Governor takes office or within a month after the withdrawal of troops.

The Secretary pointed out that these questions were entirely unconnected; that they had on the whole agreed that the Governor would decide when the troops were no longer necessary and they had also discussed the date of election and he felt they were quite separate questions.

Mr. Couve de Murville pointed out that Mr. Molotov was offering an alternative.

Mr. Molotov said he would agree merely to state that the elections should be held within four months after the Governor took office. He continued that as to the conduct of elections he felt they should be jointly conducted by the Governor and the Provisional Council.

Mr. Bevin suggested that the Governor should conduct them in consultation with the Provisional Council.

Mr. Molotov agreed with Mr. Bevin’s suggestion. He inquired whether or not they all did not agree that the provisions of the permanent statute should serve as a basis of the temporary regime.

Mr. Bevin said he agreed with this except that there were certain matters which the Governor would have to do which would not be covered in the permanent statute. He said he had submitted a paper covering these points, but that unfortunately no one had taken much notice of it.²¹

Mr. Molotov pointed out that there had been two proposals—a United Kingdom and a United States one.²²

The Secretary said he thought that the Deputies might look over these various suggestions in order to ascertain whether or not the provisions of the permanent statute and the subsequent decisions took care of the matters which Mr. Bevin had in mind.

Mr. Couve de Murville said he thought that they had decided today two very important points, namely, that the troops in the Trieste area should be at the disposal of the Governor as long as they remained there and that (2) the Provisional Council should be appointed by the Governor.

Mr. Bevin said that as long as these points were covered either by the permanent statute or by subsequent agreements, he would be satisfied, but he must verify that.

Mr. Molotov said he agreed that the Provisional Government should be appointed by the Governor after consultation with Yugoslavia and Italy.

The Secretary inquired if they could take up reparations next.

Mr. Molotov said that he thought that Yugoslavia’s share should be increased and that Albania should receive something from Italy.

The Secretary pointed out that there was a Conference recommendation on this and that other delegations attached great importance to them whereas the Soviet Delegation did not attach so much importance. He said he felt that concessions had been made in the Council, before the Conference and at the Conference, but it was difficult to consider amendments to the Conference recommendations.

Mr. Molotov said that as to reparations he proposed that Yugoslavia should receive $150,000,000; Greece $100,000,000; Albania $25,000,000 and Ethiopia $25,000,000, thus bringing the total reparations, apart from the Soviet reparations, to $300,000,000.

Mr. Bevin said he thought they should consider the whole question of reparations in all the treaties together.

Mr. Molotov proposed that Greece should get $20,000,000 from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia $20,000,000.

Mr. Bevin said he could not agree to this scheme reducing Greek reparations.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that Bulgaria had occupied twice as much Yugoslav territory as Greek.

Mr. Bevin said that Greece had suffered greatly during the war.

Mr. Molotov said that the Greek statements had been very much exaggerated.

The Secretary said that the Conference had numbered $125,000,000 as reparations from Bulgaria, to be divided equally between Yugoslavia and Greece. Yugoslavia had stated that she did not want more than $20,000,000, but he did not see why that should affect the position of Greece. He said he had been told that Mr. Vyshinsky at Paris had proposed $135,000,000 for Yugoslavia from Italy and that if that was so, why was $150,000,000 now being suggested?

Mr. Molotov said that Vyshinsky had made no such suggestion. He pointed out that the Italians themselves had admitted the possibility of $300,000,000 reparations for countries other than the Soviet Union.

The Secretary mentioned that the Yugoslavs were never willing to take into account the value of the property on ceded territory.

Mr. Molotov said that they had counted on getting Trieste, Monfalcone and Gorizia.

The Secretary said it was not what they counted on getting but actually what they were getting was the question. He said that according to his figures Yugoslavia would receive over $200,000,000 in railroad, mining, navy yard and other equipment, which had been the property of the Italian Government, or of corporations under their control. In addition, there would be approximately $55,000,000 of privately-owned property in the ceded territory. He suggested that Italy might be required to compensate the private owners of this property and this would in effect add $55,000,000 to the reparations which Yugoslavia would receive from Italy. He said he felt sure that Yugoslavia did not intend to take this private property without some form of compensation to the owners. He said the same principle could be followed with regard to Greece and although the value was small, the private property in the Dodecanese could be assumed by Italy and be considered as reparations to Greece.

Mr. Molotov said he thought that $100,000,000 was too much for Greece and that Yugoslavia should get twice as much, but, however, he was not raising the question of a reduction for Greece but an increase for Yugoslavia. He repeated his statement concerning the division of the total amount of $300,000,000. As to the property mentioned by Mr. Byrnes, he felt that that should be settled by the Italian Government, and that the general statement could be included in the treaty with Italy that the Italian Government would make compensation.

The Secretary pointed out that this would be an increase of $55,000,000 for Italy if Italy would have to pay compensation.

Mr. Molotov stated that Italy had attacked Yugoslavia and not vice versa.

The Secretary said that Yugoslavia could claim no right to private property in ceded territory, but he had thought that if he could get it in the treaty and Italy would assume the obligation of compensation that this might be an additional favor to Yugoslavia.

Mr. Molotov said that he felt that was a matter of internal legislation in Yugoslavia and Italy, but that we did not know what the Yugoslav Government intended to do with this property. The treaty could mention that Italy would arrange compensation, leaving the matter and the amount up to the Italian Government.

The Secretary said that if under the present recommendations of the Council you add to the reparations the value of state or parastatal property and private property in the ceded territory, Yugoslavia would receive $355,000,000. He said that it was difficult to draw a distinction between Greece and Yugoslavia in regard to Italian reparations nor would he think it was possible to go against the Conference recommendation in regard to Bulgaria, which would have given Greece $62,500,000. He said that if Yugoslavia only wanted $20,000,000, you could increase Greece’s amount from Bulgaria to $72,500,000, and that this would balance off their respective shares of reparations as a whole if you took into account the $55,000,000 of private property in the ceded territory.

Mr. Molotov said he thought that the sum of $125,000,000 was unfair to Bulgaria and had not really been seriously studied by the Conference. Bulgaria was a little country and he felt the $40,000,000 was enough in reparations.

The Secretary pointed out that under his latest suggestion, Bulgaria would pay $33,000,000 less than the Conference had recommended.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that Bulgaria had not taken an active part in the war whereas Italy had sent troops as far as the Volga. He said no Allied soldier had died as a result of Bulgarian action.

The Secretary pointed out that Bulgaria had helped the Axis in a declared war against the United States.

Mr. Molotov admitted that Bulgaria had been in the opposite camp, but he felt that $40,000,000 in reparations was sufficient since she had not taken an active part in the war and had rendered useful service in the end. He said it was never their intention that Bulgaria should go unpunished, but that these circumstances should be taken into account.

Mr. Bevin said his instructions were to support the recommendations of the Conference on reparations to Greece.

Mr. Molotov said then there was disagreement on this point.

Mr. Couve de Murville said that he agreed with Mr. Byrnes that private property in ceded territory should in effect be regarded as reparations and suggested that possibly the opinion of the Yugoslavs should be asked on this.

Mr. Molotov said he wished again to draw attention to the fact that the Italians considered $300,000,000 a possible amount for reparations for countries other than the Soviet Union, and said that there was a written document to that effect.

The Secretary said he had seen the document, but the Italians maintained they had meant it to include Soviet reparations.

Mr. Molotov then said that if they could agree on the reparations the Soviet Delegation would accept 50% for compensation, but only in that case. Otherwise, they would insist on 25%.

Mr. Bevin said that his instructions were to support 75%. As to Greece he would support the figure of $162,500,000, as recommended by the Conference, from Italy and Bulgaria, but that if some help to Greece on the frontier question could be given, he might ask his Government to reconsider.

Mr. Molotov said he thought it was superfluous to discuss the question of frontiers which he felt was dangerous and even harmful to Greece itself.

Mr. Bevin said that the Greeks also desired to be heard on Northern Epirus, but he was not raising that question here. He said that on the Bulgarian frontier, they had reduced their claim to only Mt. Belsis.²³

The Secretary said he understood that the Yugoslavs, although originally asking for $16,000,000 from Bulgaria, had subsequently said they did not wish any.

Mr. Molotov said he knew of no such statement.

Mr. Bevin said that in effect Mr. Molotov’s suggestion meant increased reparations to Yugoslavia and reduced them from Greece, and in addition provided for $25,000,000 for Albania. He said he had no prejudice against Albania, but nevertheless in 1940 and 1941 prior to Soviet entry into the war, the Albanians had done great damage to Greece. He said he could not support any reduction in Greece’s reparations. He felt it was unfair to punish Greece in order to satisfy Yugoslavia.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that Greece was receiving as much reparations from Italy as was the Soviet Union.

Mr. Bevin said that the Soviet Union was a large country with great resources and could afford to be more generous than Greece, which was poor. He pointed out that neither Great Britain nor the United States was asking for anything from Italy.

Mr. Molotov then inquired whether the recommendations of the Conference on Hungary could be accepted.²⁴

The Secretary said that they had felt that the figure was too high for Hungary, and it would be nice if the Soviet Union could be generous to one of her neighbors.

Mr. Molotov said he would ask that this question be withdrawn; that the Soviet Union had made many concessions as to time, et cetera, to Hungary.

The Secretary said he thought it would be a pity to come to a stalemate over sums and dollars, but he did not see how it would be possible to reduce Greek reparations from Bulgaria from $62,500,000 to $20,000,000, and increase reparations from Italy for Yugoslavia. He said the Yugoslavs were the best people in making claims that he had ever seen. He said that they had never once taken into account the value of the property they were receiving from ceded territory.

Mr. Molotov said that Mr. Byrnes knew that they had a very difficult problem with Yugoslavia. She is dissatisfied with both territorial and reparations decisions, and that they must find a way to give her some compensation on the frontier in regard to Gorizia and the area between the French and Morgan Lines, as well as on reparations. Otherwise, there was little prospect that Yugoslavia would sign the treaty. He said they had talked a good deal with the Yugoslavs, but without success. Their claims were extensive but they felt they had played a large part in the war, and that not all but some of their claims with regard to territory and reparations would have to be met in order to solve the deadlock. He said he thought such concessions would be right and in the common interest.

The Secretary inquired about the Danube.

Mr. Molotov said he felt if they could get agreement on the other points, there was no reason why they could not agree on the Danube.

Mr. Molotov said he wished to inquire in this connection whether the problem of the retention of the barges was finally settled. He understood that there had been a United States decision on the matter.

The Secretary said that was correct—that two weeks ago he had told the Council of orders issued to return the barges²⁵ and that he knew these orders had been carried out and that they applied to all barges and ships belonging to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary.

Mr. Molotov said that he hoped to be able to make a proposal concerning the Danube tomorrow. He repeated that something must be done for the Yugoslavs. Otherwise, he said it would be difficult to oust the Yugoslav troops from the areas in which they were now.

The Secretary said they had reached a decision on the French Line and he could not believe that the Yugoslavs would go against a decision accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. He said he knew the Yugoslavs were very aggressive people, but he did not feel that you could yield to the demands of aggressive people when those demands were not right.

Mr. Molotov said that they were all interested in having Yugoslavia sign the treaty.

Mr. Bevin said that in regard to their discussion on the withdrawal of troops he had always understood that all foreign troops would be withdrawn, including Yugoslavia.

Mr. Molotov said this was correct and asked what would happen if the Yugoslavs did not sign the treaty.

Mr. Bevin replied that if the Yugoslav forces stayed, he thought the American and British forces would have to stay.

The Secretary said that if the Yugoslavs left troops in the territory of another country, this would be a matter for the Security Council.

Mr. Molotov said he felt that it was not a question for the Security Council, but one connected with the treaty.

The Secretary replied that he had in mind a situation where after the treaty had been signed Yugoslavia would continue to occupy territories which did not belong to her, and that he felt in those circumstances the world would find some means of persuading them to leave.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether the Secretary meant by force.

The Secretary stated that he was not worried because he felt that if the four of them agreed on something, the Yugoslavs would hardly defy the four of them, and in any case the United Nations would have means of persuading the Yugoslavs to leave, but if Yugoslavia felt that she was more important than all the other nations put together, she would find out differently.

It was agreed that they would meet in restricted session tomorrow at four o’clock in Mr. Byrnes’ office.

21. The paper under reference appears to be CFM(46) (NY) 23, November 22, 1946, p. 1252.
22. The United States proposal referred to here appears to be CFM(46) (NY)22, November 22, 1946, p. 1251.
23. The most recent Greek proposals with regard to the rectification of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier were set forth in document CFM(46) (NY)2, November 3, 1946, p. 956.
24. Article 21 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary, which was concerned with reparation and restitution (see vol. iv, p. 105), was accepted by the Peace Conference by majority vote and recommended to the Council of Foreign Ministers.
25. The Secretary’s statement under reference was made at the 6th Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 11; see the United States Delegation Minutes, p. 1095.