Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Sixth Informal Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, November 22, 1946, 4 p.m.

New York, November 22, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret

Present

	U.K.
	Mr. Bevin (Chairman)
	Mr. Jebb
	Lord Hood
	Mr. Sterndale-Bennett
U.S.S.R.		U.S.A.
M. Molotov		Mr. Byrnes
M. Vyshinsky		Mr. Vandenberg
M. Gusev		Mr. Connally
		Mr. Dunn
		Mr. Cohen
		Mr. Bohlen
	France
	M. Couve de Murville
	M. Bonnet
	M. Alphand

Neutralization of Trieste

Mr. Bevin: We went as far as we could on the Trieste problem but we have some of Britain’s suggestions regarding the Provisional Regime for Trieste.⁷⁷

Mr. Molotov: The Soviet Delegation just received the English text and half an hour ago the Russian translation of the United States.⁷⁸

Mr. Bevin: A Russian translation of the British text will be up in a few moments. What subject does the Council wish to take up. The agenda was exhausted yesterday as far as Trieste was concerned. We ended in disagreement. Can we go over the points in disagreement or shall we go on to other points?

M. Couve de Murville: It seems to me that there are several questions which had not been discussed—the neutralization of Trieste and the possibility for the Security Council sending troops there.

Mr. Bevin: That’s paragraph 2,⁷⁹ isn’t it?

M. Couve de Murville: Yes.

Mr. Bevin: The original draft says that the territory shall be demilitarized and that there be no troops but that the Security Council can send some. The Soviet amendment proposes that the territory be demilitarized and declared neutral and that there be no troops unless there is a threat to the independence and integrity of a free territory.

Mr. Molotov: I requested that the Soviet proposal be accepted.

Mr. Bevin: The difficulty is under the Soviet proposal that if there were a serious disturbance in the Free Territory and the Security Council wanted to use force that they would not have any to use. What would happen if the Security Council should want to maintain order?

Mr. Molotov: The Governor will assume control of the service as of security and maintain order.

Mr. Bevin: But suppose the local police were not enough?

Mr. Molotov: I don’t foresee such a case.

Mr. Bevin: What is the opinion of the Council?

Mr. Byrnes: I would not want to agree to restrict the action of the Security Council in case of need. If the Security Council were ever called on under the Charter to use troops—to say in this case that the Security Council shall not use troops would be a mistake and should not be put in the Statute. If it is decided to limit the powers of the Security Council, it should be done in the United Nations.

Mr. Molotov: This proposal is to be presented to the Security Council for consideration. It will be the Security Council itself who will decide and formulate its task and there will be nothing wrong in the Security Council deciding to send troops in necessary cases.

M. Couve de Murville: I can accept the neutralization as well as the demilitarization of Trieste. That was what we had in mind when we said demilitarization. On the second point, limitation upon the Security Council sending troops to the Free Territory, there is a difficulty not in case of an exterior threat but in the case of a menace from within the Free Territory. This difficulty might be covered by inserting:

“in case of interior or exterior threat to the integrity or independence of a territory.”

Mr. Bevin: Is that acceptable?

Mr. Molotov: I don’t quite understand how an interior threat is possible. Do you mean a desire on the part of the inhabitants to reduce the size of the Free Territory?

M. Couve de Murville: Suppose the Italians organized with a view to annexing the territory to Italy. This would be a threat to the independence of a territory. In this case we propose that we accept the first proposal made by us and which will be the second.

Mr. Bevin: I think that would be better.

The Free Territory shall be demilitarized and neutral. No Armed forces, except upon direction of the Security Council, shall be allowed in the Free Territory.

Mr. Molotov: I agree.

Mr. Bevin: Do we all agree? (Agreed) May we take up the Provisional Regime?

M. Couve de Murville: I don’t think the Provisional Regime should be discussed by the Deputies. This is the first time the Provisional Regime has been brought up.

Mr. Byrnes: I don’t believe the Deputies can make any headway without a decision from the Ministers. This would be a good way to get it away from us but would accomplish nothing. I think the question involves a political decision. It involves a decision of the question we have been discussing here as to who will be in charge of the police in the interim period and who will organize the Government.

Mr. Bevin: What about the withdrawal of troops? The Deputies can’t settle those questions. For instance, take subparagraph (a) of the U.S. memorandum. I submit that there is no other way we can proceed. The Governor must be able to organize the Governor’s Council. I don’t see how we can avoid that. If we can’t agree, let’s go on from Trieste to some other matter.

Provisional Regime

Mr. Molotov: We have not yet got the Russian translation of the British proposal, but I think we must agree on the principle of the Temporary Regime. It is too early to send this question to the Deputies. We must discuss it here. There are four questions we ought to settle now:

(1) The manner in which the Temporary Government shall be appointed.

(2) The application of the Permanent Statute prior to approbation by the Security Council.

(3) Withdrawal of troops.

(4) Election of the Popular Assembly.

If this agenda is accepted, I should like to submit the proposals verbally.

Mr. Byrnes: I’m willing to discuss these four questions.

As to question one I propose that pending the establishment of the Permanent Regime that the provisional Governor’s Council be appointed by the Governor.

Mr. Molotov: I think this proposal would be contrary to the decisions we have adopted. The Temporary Regime should not be in conflict with the Permanent Regime.

Mr. Byrnes; How is this counter to what we have decided?

Appointment of the Provisional Government

Mr. Molotov: Neither in our decision submitted to the Peace Conference nor in any other case did we decide that the Governor should appoint the Government. It is now proposed that the Governor appoint the Provisional Government. The Soviet Union can’t agree to this.

Mr. Byrnes: The Council of Government of the Permanent Regime is to be elected by the assembly. When there is no assembly we can’t have it elect the Council of Government. The only way is to appoint one. If there is any other way I would like to see it. If Mr. Molotov doesn’t want a Council of Government I would agree to strike it out and let the Governor rule. I thought Mr. Molotov wanted it.

Mr. Molotov: The fact is we have a decision adopted by the Four Ministers regarding a Provisional Government. Article 16⁸⁰ says that the Governor shall be appointed by the Security Council. As to the Provisional Regime, it depends on what we may recommend. It rests with us and not with the Governor.

Mr. Byrnes: If you mean we ought to name the Council of Government here, what names are you submitting?

Mr. Molotov: I don’t think this is a complicated question. I am ready to reply. I suggest that the Four Ministers send representatives to the field to reach agreement with local democratic organizations. That would follow from our decision. It does not follow that the matter be left to the Governor. I ask you to read Items 5 and 6 of Article 16 which we have agreed on. It is obvious that the Security Council is to appoint the Governor and I think for the Temporary Regime the Government should be appointed by the Council of Foreign Ministers, and if you desire approved by the Security Council. As to the Provisional Government, it is obvious we should settle the question and we can send representatives to select appropriate persons. May I mention that paragraph 6 was adopted unanimously by the Council?

Mr. Byrnes: I am satisfied that there is a difference in the text. There is no reference to it at all in ours. I wonder if you would tell us to what it applies.

Mr. Molotov: The original draft submitted to the Conference, Article 16.

Mr. Bevin: “shall be made by the Conference in accordance with the recommendation of the Moscow Conference”.⁸¹

Mr. Molotov: You refer to point 5.

Mr. Bevin: Article 5 of the original treaty. The Paris Conference arrived at paragraph (a) of the French Resolution “The Provisional Government of the Free Territory shall be organized by the Security Council, etc.”⁸² As I understood it we asked the Conference for a decision and the decision is imbedded in the French Resolution under Provisional Government, paragraph (a). In the draft submitted this morning, we tried to elaborate on the decision of the Conference by defining the power of the Government in the interim period. I think that was strictly in conformity with paragraph 5 of the Conference Decision. Paragraph (6) deals with the Permanent Statute. It bears no relation to the appointment of the Government or to its powers except that the Provisional and Permanent Governments must follow certain principles.

Mr. Molotov: I feel we must adhere strictly to paragraph 6 of Article 16. Paragraphs 2, 4 and 6 were unanimously adopted. Paragraph 6 states that in establishing the Provisional Government and the Statute that general democratic principles must be adhered to—that is the legislative and executive branches must be established according to democratic principles. If we charge the Governor with the responsibility of establishing the Government, we should violate these principles. Our representatives should consult local democratic organizations and select candidates for the Government whose names would be submitted to us. This will be the proper way to do it. It would mean the candidates would be chosen from the local inhabitants. They would be appointed by the Council of Foreign Ministers. This would be democratic. If the Governor does it there would be no democratic principles left.

Mr. Byrnes: The idea that we would promote democracy by appointing representatives to select candidates like so many carpet baggers is something new. This Council can’t agree on anything in the Statute and the idea that our Four Representatives could select candidates is impossible. The Governor will be an independent agent of the Security Council. No representative of We Four would be independent and the chances are four such representatives would be divided just as we are. I will say that so far as the United States is concerned it will not participate in any selecting of the Government by sending representatives to Trieste.

Mr. Molotov: I know that more than once the United States suggested to the Soviet Union and invited it to participate in all sorts of commissions composed of various states. Although we were not invited to send representatives to Greece (Mr. Bevin: You were.) now the United States can’t accept a similar proposal. This is not a new statement, as up to now it has been the Soviet Union which has declined.

Mr. Bevin: When did the conversion take place?

Mr. Molotov: We have the example of the Roumanian and Hungarian Commission.

Mr. Byrnes: The United States was asked by the Government of Greece. We didn’t invite anybody. We accepted. We weren’t asked to supervise the election in Roumania. That was assumed exclusively by the Soviets.

Mr. Molotov: Your information is very inaccurate.

Mr. Byrnes: Perhaps my information is inaccurate, but that is a perfectly accurate statement.

Mr. Molotov: The United States was represented by Mr. Harriman with M. Vyshinsky for the Soviet Union.⁸³

Mr. Byrnes: We learned a lot but it didn’t amount to anything.

I will not agree to pick the representatives from among the population. That is not democracy in our idea. If the Soviet doesn’t want a Council then there is the Governor. If we can’t agree on this, let’s go on to something else. It was the original intent that this be a Free Territory, without interference by Italy, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia or any other country. I will not agree to interfere. If we can’t agree to make it free let’s admit it to the world instead of we four men, the top man in each of our Governments sitting here discussing it after the hours and hours we have spent on it.

M. Couve de Murville: Naturally, we have less experience in sending missions to foreign governments. It is important that in the provision that both the Soviet and the United States Delegates referred to the persons who were to be sent to the Free Territory were not charged with taking over the Government, as would be the case if we sent representatives to Trieste to select candidates there. We have always considered that the interim period would be very difficult for the Governor. He will have very heavy responsibilities. We thought that we should provide help for the Governor to be above possible reproach and to advise him in his task. It is certain also that in this transitional period that the Security Council will be in a very difficult position for direct action. There is a gap between the coming into force of the Treaty and the date when the Security Council can take the responsibility it is assuming, and in this period the fair government of the Free Territory is particularly the responsibility of the Four Governments represented here, as we have laid down the provisions which shall govern. For this reason we have always believed that the Four Governments could send representatives to the Territory, not to take over the Government, that would be going too far, but to help the Governor and advise him in fulfilling his function. I don’t think we should have illusions. There will be a series of important exceptions to democratic principles. Certainly, there will be an exception to democratic principle that the inhabitants should govern themselves and that the Governor should have only administrative power but it would be possible and desirable if the Governor were assisted and advised by representatives of our Four Governments. They certainly could help him administer his functions and help him in his relation with the inhabitants.

Mr. Bevin: Can we agree on anything in this? According to the United States and British proposals, which are very similar, the Governor should consult locally and set up the Advisory Council. The Soviet Union suggests that the Council of Foreign Ministers send representatives to set up the Council. The third proposal is from the French Delegation whereby the Governor be responsible but be advised by representatives of our Four Governments.

Mr. Molotov: I have a proposal to make. I find the proposal of the French Delegation acceptable with one amendment i.e. the Governor should then propose the composition of the Government after consultation with the Four Representatives of the Ministers—with this addition this composition proposed by the Governor should be approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Bevin: A proposal now is that the Governor appoint the Government after consultation with the Four Representatives of the Ministers and submit it for approval by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Does that cut the Security Council right out?

Mr. Byrnes: There was an agreement which had been referred to that the Peace Conference of twenty-one nations be asked to make recommendations for the Provisional Government. The Conference made such a recommendation which is the French proposal. I stand by the French proposal which was voted by 16 to 5. I don’t believe that the Council of Foreign Ministers has any duty to perform. It is to draft the Treaty and the Statute but then the matter is for the Security Council. It was never intended that the Council of Foreign Ministers supplant the Security Council. It is not proper to exercise that function.

Mr. Molotov: At all events it is clear that it was never intended to replace the Council of Foreign Ministers with a Governor as is now suggested—therefore, we consider it right that the Temporary Regime to operate until a Permanent Regime is in force should not by-pass the Council of Foreign Ministers, as we are responsible and because we have been dealing with a question for so long.

M. Couve de Murville: I think we have freedom of action in this matter. According to the recommendation of the Conference what we did the other day was to take the recommendation of a conference which had been adopted by a two-third vote. The Provisional Government is to be organized by the Security Council and according to a Soviet amendment we agreed that the statute be drafted by the Council [of] Foreign Ministers and approved by the Security Council. The next day we had to take another step to reach agreement. We did have the recommendation of the conference. I am content to stick by that recommendation. We cannot disappoint the recommendation of two-thirds of the twenty-one Governments.

Mr. Bevin: Is there any hope for agreement or are we diametrically opposed?

Mr. Molotov: I suggest that we adopt a decision on the following lines as proposed by the French Delegation—that is, that the Governor suggest the composition of the Government after consultation with our Four Representatives and that the Security Council approve this suggestion as Mr. Byrnes has just mentioned. I thought that it would be a more practical method to have that the Council of Foreign Ministers approve the Government, but it is enough to have the Security Council approve.

Mr. Byrnes: I only want to say this. We have always had the view since we agreed to the setup of a Free Territory that this Council was not an administrative body. Once the Free Territory is established, the Security Council will be in charge and any Governor who is appointed will be the agent of the Security Council. Whenever we get away from this in some way the Governor becomes the agent of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which is not an administrative body. Once the Free Territory is established under the supervision of the Security Council, the responsibilities of the Council of Foreign Ministers are completed. The Council of Foreign Ministers was organized to draft treaties. That was all that was intended at Potsdam. If we appoint agents we are just doing something the Security Council ought to do.

Mr. Bevin: What do we do?

Mr. Molotov: Accept the French proposal.

Mr. Bevin: What was that?

Mr. Molotov: The Governor appoints the Government with consultation with the Four Representatives. The Security Council approves.

M. Couve de Murville: I think this is the French proposal. The Governor is to be assisted by the representatives of the Four Ministers. As long as the Security Council does not rule otherwise, the Governor will be assisted and advised by the representatives of the Four Governments and that applies in particular to the appointment of the Council of Government where the Governor, after receiving the views of the Four Representatives, appoints the Council of Government, which is approved by the Security Council. In the Soviet proposal, the Council of Government is chosen by the representatives of the Council of Foreign Ministers, whereas in our own proposal the Governor appoints the Council of Government.

Mr. Molotov: Then I shall uphold the Soviet proposal.

Mr. Byrnes: I say that as far as we are concerned that in the Provisional Government that the Council of Government be appointed by the Governor after consultation with the representatives of Italy and Yugoslavia. We provided for the Governor in that way and we see no reason to go back to the Security Council if the Governor is appointed by the Security Council and is their representative.

Application of the Statute in the interim period

Mr. Molotov: I cannot understand that because the Governor is the representative of the Security Council. It is not necessary to submit the composition of the Government to the Security Council for approval. We have agreed on fundamentals of the Statute. It provides that the Governor, although the representative of the Security Council, will not have control over the Council of Government in Trieste. Even if we work out the Temporary Statute, it is not possible to subordinate the Temporary Council of Government to the Governor, but I agree, Mr. Byrnes, that the Governor appoint the Council of Government after consultation with the Italians and Yugoslavs, but I maintain the necessity for final approval by the Security Council to prevent the Government [Governor] doing anything he likes in Trieste. We have not agreed to that.

Mr. Bevin: The application of the Statute before its approval by the Security Council—U.S. Delegation has put forward certain proposals which they consider necessary to go into the Treaty. They are supplementary to the Permanent Statute and intended to cover the interim period. The United Kingdom has also put forward some proposals which we regard as necessary to govern the interim period. They cover largely administrative matters such as the invoking of elections, etc. With regard to the Permanent Statute, there are certain provisions which apply to the Provisional Regime and those which do not.

Mr. Molotov: I think the United Kingdom proposals are acceptable as a basis, subject to the following amendment i.e. subparagraph 4 of paragraph 2 “Those parts of the Draft Permanent Statute which are relevant shall be regarded as the provisions of the Temporary Regime”.

Mr. Bevin: I don’t understand the amendment.

Mr. Molotov: I suggest the rewording of subparagraph 4 of paragraph 2 of the British proposal. I formulated this question covered by subparagraph 4 of paragraph 2 independently from other parts of the British draft, whereas in the British draft it is linked to the other parts. I formulated it regardless of the other parts of the draft.

Mr. Bevin: Can we have your views with regard to the remainder?

Mr. Molotov: I am not familiar with the two drafts as I have not received the translations, but I can say that they have taken the wrong path, as they provide for new principles different from the Permanent Statute. They grant dictatorial powers to the Governor during the Provisional Regime. The Soviet Union cannot accept them and believes that we should stand by the Permanent Statute during the Provisional Regime, but as for what may be necessary beyond the Permanent Statute it should be confined to the minimum. Subparagraph 2 of the British draft and parts of the United States draft are all right. If we can agree to the method for forming a Provisional Government and to the amendment just proposed regarding the application of the relevant parts of the Statute during the Temporary Regime, it will continue to avoid conflict between the Provisional and Permanent Regimes.

Mr. Bevin: Our only point in this proposal is to allow the place to get organized and on its feet. We don’t want a dictatorship. We have tried to study what the Governor can do here. He will have to arrange for the finance and economics, and under the Statute he won’t be able to do anything. The Governor will take over from the Allied Military Government but there is nothing in the Provisional Statute to allow him to do anything at all. I understand that the Allies will find money to keep the place going.

Mr. Molotov: The last remark by Mr. Bevin with regard to financial affairs for the Free Territory confirms the correctness of the Soviet proposal. If the Governor is responsible for financial affairs and he is short of money, he may ask the Security Council for funds. The relations of the Governor and of the Provisional Government during the interim period should be the same as between the Council of Government and the Governor in the Permanent Regime. I don’t see why we should give the Governor the right to issue laws in the interim period. The necessary decrees can be issued by the Provisional Government with supervision of the Governor. The Provisional Government will bear the responsibility for the local business until it is replaced by the elected Governor [Government]. The Governor in the Provisional Regime should be empowered to cancel decrees of the Provisional Government which are contrary to the Statute, and the Governor must not allow anything which is against the integrity and independence of the Free Territory. The Governor has these powers under the Permanent Statute. Therefore, the Permanent Statute should be applicable as the Temporary Statute.

Mr. Bevin: “What other powers should the Governor have in the Provisional Government since there are none in the Statute?

Mr. Molotov: The Governor should have the same rights in the interim period as under the Permanent Statute and the Provisional Government should have the same powers as those of the Council of Government. Besides this question we have to decide the manner of appointing the Provisional Government and the time of election of the assembly and of the withdrawal of troops.

M. Couve de Murville: Who will have the legislative power in the interim period?

Mr. Molotov: This will be a short period and we should be able to dispense with legislative powers and the Provisional Government should be able to dispense with legislative powers and confine itself to decrees and orders; and, incidentally, for this reason, who should fix the date for the election of the assembly. I suggest four months after the entry into force of the Treaty, one month after the withdrawal of troops.

Mr. Bevin: Well, we have submitted two papers. Perhaps we can have the Soviet view of the other points we have not yet discussed in them. The remainder seemed to us absolutely essential.

Mr. Molotov: We must decide in principle whether the proposal is acceptable, that the relevant provisions of the Permanent Statute shall be applied in the interim period, and whether the rights of the Governor and the Provisional Government are defined in these provisions, then all will be clear.

Mr. Bevin: Before I decide anything on general grounds, I must see what we are dealing with. We would have an agreement on what was applicable. I can’t decide without knowing your opinion on the rest of this paper.

Mr. Molotov: We can submit our proposals in writing, but they would be based on what has just been said.

Mr. Bevin: I want to know what we are going to do about the other items. I regard them as essential. The public is entitled to know what we are handing them over to. The Governor must know what powers lie will have in the interim period. We have undertaken to set up the Provisional Regime instead of the Security Council doing it and we must discharge our duty. Shall we go on to the next point—the withdrawal of troops.

Mr. Molotov: I request that the Soviet proposal for three months after the coming into force of the Treaty be accepted.

Mr. Bevin: What are the wishes of the Council?

Mr. Byrnes: I don’t care to argue it. The United States position is that all foreign troops be removed within forty-five days after the Governor has informed the Security Council that the Security Force on the Free Territory can maintain order without troops.

Mr. Molotov: If we fail to fix a date then it will be received by the inhabitants of Trieste as showing lack of confidence in them. This is unfair. However, if we decide now, we shall clarify the question and avoid cause for misunderstanding. If the circumstances are regarded as extraordinary then decision regarding the Governor and Security Council remains. In the main we agree on their providing for the security of the Free Territory. If we provide a date for the election, we shall guarantee clearness and emphasize confidence in the people of Trieste.

Mr. Bevin: I can’t add any to what I said last night. I am willing to abide by the decision of the Security Council as provided for by the Peace Conference.

Mr. Byrnes: There is no use in arguing. If the Italians didn’t distrust the Yugoslavs and the Yugoslavs didn’t distrust the Italians, we wouldn’t spend all this time on a Free Territory. Because of the extraordinary circumstances we have agreed that there be a Free Territory. I would not appoint a Governor and then set a date for the withdrawal of troops because the troops might be due to be withdrawn even though the Governor might know that in a few days there would be violence. The Security Council would be responsible in this situation and we would be responsible for having created an impossible situation. The United States will not be a party to such an agreement.

Election of the Popular Assembly

Mr. Bevin: Since there is no agreement on this point let us go on to the other item, election of the popular assembly. Our proposal is to adopt a decision then the election would take place within four months of the entry into force of the Treaty.

Mr. Bevin: Is everyone satisfied that this can be done? There are the questions of the drawing up of electoral rolls, and of citizenship. There will be those who’ll want to return to Trieste. Can all this be done within that period? There was an undertaking in the case of Poland for an election to take place in the Spring. This was agreed to at Potsdam. The election did not take place then. I do not complain. It was very difficult for the Poles. It is difficult to set dates. The provision that the elections be held at the earliest possible date seems correct. I don’t feel that we know enough to set a date. We can entrust the Security Council to see that there are free and unfettered elections with universal franchise at the earliest possible date. I don’t want to take a decision which will disenfranchise a lot of people.

Mr. Molotov: It is very difficult to compare the case of Poland and Trieste. Poland has a population of 25,000,000, Trieste 300,000. There is only one big city with the rest small villages. It would be easy to draw up the election lists in a short time. The main thing is to let the people know that there is a return to normal conditions. This would not only please the Security Council in accord with its rights but also with the rights of the population.

Mr. Bevin: Can we dispose of the other items from the Trieste Paper before we break up? Item 4 was left over to be redrafted in relation to point (a). There was a Soviet proposal. I should have thought the Deputies could settle this now that point 8 is almost settled. On paragraph 4, three of the delegates agreed but the Soviet proposed that the drafting be deferred and considered in relation to point 8.⁸⁴

M. Couve de Murville: Was it not later subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1?

Mr. Bevin: Sorry, I proposed that one.

M. Couve de Murville: The final drafting of subparagraph (b), taking into consideration a final form of paragraph (8) which we adopted. I think we can refer this to the Deputies.

Mr. Molotov: I wondered if paragraph 4 is needed at all.

Mr. Bevin: Let us deal with subparagraph (b) first. This point was left outstanding subject to redrafting. Does the paragraph meet with everyone’s approval?

Mr. Molotov: I have seen the text and I think paragraph 4 is superfluous.

Mr. Bevin: This was not paragraph 4 of the French resolution as corrected in the Conference.

Mr. Molotov: This paragraph is not a concrete one. We have worked out paragraph 8 in greater detail and thereby exhausted the subject of paragraph 4.

M. Couve De Murville: Paragraph 4 was merely a provisional stipulation and not a provision for the Permanent Statute.

Mr. Byrnes: I have no objection to its details.

Mr. Bevin: Do we agree to take it out? (Agreed) Did we deal with paragraph 5 and the words “in particular”?

Mr. Molotov: We propose to delete the words;⁸⁵ otherwise, paragraph 5 of the French resolution and paragraph 5 of the Soviet proposal are at variance.

Mr. Bevin: Any objections? (None) Point 9 is outstanding.

Mr. Molotov: I should like to reflect on the wording of paragraph 6. Our proposal regarding this paragraph is to delete “in his opinion” and add after “by measures” “which are in contradiction with the Statute”.⁸⁶ This implies that the Governor has the right to prevent legislation which is in contradiction with the Statute.

Mr. Byrnes: The United States stands by the Recommendation of the Conference. It would be exceedingly unwise to accept the amendment offered.

Mr. Molotov: Why?

Mr. Byrnes: You want to strike out “in his view” so that when he proposes to veto some act you will say it is not right. If the words “in his opinion” affect the rights of the Security Council, the Governor should have the right to propose or prevent legislation as “in his view, etc”.

Mr. Molotov: Should we keep the words “in his opinion” and add the words “which are in contradiction with the Statute”?

Mr. Byrnes: I don’t question that I was directing my remark at the deletion of “in his view”. I won’t object to that.

Mr. Bevin: The United States and Russia agree.

Mr. Molotov: And I am sure the United Kingdom and France will agree.

M. Couve De Murville: We join the Russian-American bloc.

Mr. Bevin: Citizenship has gone to the Deputies. What’s next?

Mr. Molotov: Paragraph 4 of the American proposal is still unagreed.⁸⁷

Mr. Bevin: Article 16A?

Mr. Molotov: Article 16, the American Proposal, Part A, paragraph 4.

Mr. Bevin: Is the American proposal, 16a, now acceptable?

Mr. Molotov: No, we suggested an amendment as follows: “Upon renunciation of Italian sovereignty the Free Territory of Trieste shall be governed by a Provisional Regime to be prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers and approved by the Security Council”. (This was agreed to)

Mr. Bevin: Article 16A now goes in. Anything else? There are some technical matters which were never discussed, water supply and those of that kind. Couldn’t they go to the Deputies. There is Annex III and the United States proposal, formerly Annex IX, which have never been discussed as they are purely technical matters.⁸⁸ I suggested that they go to the Deputies. (Agreed). The Free Port—what is our point of view on that, Mr. Molotov?

Mr. Molotov: The French draft is acceptable except “regarding the International Commission”. I suggest that this go to the Deputies for rewording. There remains the question of the railroad agreement between Trieste and Yugoslavia.

Mr. Bevin: Are we taking the French proposal, the Recommendation of the Conference?

Mr. Molotov: No, the document dated August 23rd of the subcommittee for the Port of Trieste. (CFM (46)254⁸⁹)

Mr. Byrnes: I haven’t got that here. I have the Conference Recommendation but not what the Soviets are discussing.

Mr. Bevin: Could Mr. Molotov tell us what he agrees to in this document?

Mr. Molotov: Page 5 of the Russian text. A proposal of the French Representative for the purpose of satisfying the special needs of shipping of the Italians and the Yugoslavs. If we delete the words “referring to International Commission”, this draft is acceptable. I suggest that we refer this to the Deputies.

Mr. Bevin: I should prefer that this whole paper be referred to the Deputies. It is not unusual for a port to let certain piers and berths. The place is not idle. It is a job any sensible port director would ordinarily do. However, I don’t want to be committed to it until I can see the whole thing. I am willing to have the Deputies go into it. I don’t want to quarrel about nothing. I have no objection.

Mr. Molotov: What about the railroad agreement? We could take note of two agreements in the Treaty—first, the railroad agreement between Yugoslavia and Trieste. Then we could discuss over again the Austro-Italian agreement.

Mr. Bevin: Why exclude the Italian railroad? Why couldn’t the Council of Government enter into agreements with anybody? Why discriminate? Railroad rates can be worse than a tariff in limiting trade. I want Trieste to be a successful port. Why can’t it be left to the Council of Government to regulate railroad agreements with all the countries around on the understanding that there will be free traffic?

Mr. Molotov: It is important to bear in mind that Trieste is linked by economic ties with other countries but especially by railroads through Yugoslavia. Out of four lines running out of Trieste, there are three, Southern, Eastern and Northern which run through Yugoslavia—the other to the West, and thus we see the curious situation of Trieste and we must favor the interests of Trieste and Yugoslavia in safeguarding the railways. Therefore, I think we should mention the detailed agreement with regard to railways. We must safeguard not only the interests of the people of Trieste but must not forget the Yugoslavs. If we neglect the railroads it will have an adverse effect upon Trieste and Yugoslavia. There is needed a joint administration of the railway or provision for an agreement of Trieste and Yugoslavia. Such an agreement could be particularized by the Deputies. We must have either a detailed agreement on joint administration of the railways. We could then accept the Austro-Italian agreement.

Mr. Bevin: Suppose the railroad question were handled by agreement. It must be by agreement. If that is done, why not include Italy in the Agreement so that the whole thing converges on the port?

Mr. Molotov: Italy has not got anything to do with this as the railroad runs through Yugoslavia.

Mr. Bevin: According to the map, one railroad runs up through Monfalcone.

Mr. Molotov: This one can not play as big a part as the three that run through Yugoslavia.

Mr. Bevin: I see the need for an agreement but can agree to its being mentioned only if you can see your way clear to mention the Italian railway. All railroads should be covered. There is another one which joins Venice. If we encourage them so, there is no inducement to boycott the port. It will be in the interest of the Free Territory. In addition, there is the old Orient Express Line through Trieste. You don’t want the railroads and communications to be blocked and so waste capital. I think it will be in the interest of the Yugoslavs, since you have transferred all of this territory to the East of the line, to bring in both countries in this agreement and also in the interest of Trieste.

Mr. Molotov: It will be unwise to bring in Italy, because Italy has not asked for this. It was asked for by the Yugoslavs and by no accident the provision would not be for the usual type of agreement but for an intimate agreement or for joint administration. If we do this and meet the Yugoslavs on this question, and they are insistent on more than this, then we could approve of the mention of the Tyrol Agreement.

Mr. Byrnes: One that hadn’t been agreed to and one that has.

Mr. Molotov: Neither of them are in existence, at least not in our Treaty. There are many people who are dissatisfied with the Agreement on Tyrol.

Mr. Byrnes: It must be a pretty good agreement then. If there aren’t any who think they got a little the short end of it, it is a pretty good agreement. That is why the Free Territory is organized. Neither the Italians nor the Yugoslavs like it.

Mr. Bevin: It is late now. Could the Deputies clear up what we have agreed to and the points still outstanding tomorrow morning? (No Objection) When do we take up the rest of the Treaty, tomorrow?

Mr. Molotov: Tonight, Mr. Byrnes asked whether it would be worthwhile going on with the other treaties.

Mr. Byrnes: I don’t remember saying that, but I am willing to agree to that statement.

Mr. Bevin: Shall we meet tomorrow at 4:00 p.m., the Deputies at 11:00 a.m., and shall we meet on the veto at 11:00?

Mr. Molotov: At 3:00 p.m. perhaps start with the veto at 4:00 p.m.

Mr. Bevin: Veto at 3:30, then meeting at 5:00 p.m. (Agreed)

77. The British proposals were set forth in document CFM(46) (NY)23, November 22, 1946, p. 1252.
78. The United States proposals for a provisional regime for the Free Territory of Trieste were set forth in CFM(46) (NY)22, November 22, 1946, infra.
79. The paragraph under reference was the one in the French proposal regarding the Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste under article 16 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy and included in the Record of Recommendations of the Paris Peace Conference; for text, see vol. iv, p. 895. Portions of this French proposal continue to be discussed throughout the remainder of this meeting.
80. Reference here is to the French proposal cited in footnote 79, p. 1236.
81. The quotation is from paragraph 5 of article 16 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy as referred to the Peace Conference by the Council of Foreign Ministers; for text, see vol. iv, p. 9.
82. The quotation is from the section on Provisional Government of the French proposal for article 16 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy and included in the Record of Recommendations of the Paris Peace Conference; for text, see vol. iv, p. 897.
83. The reference here is to the tripartite Rumanian Commission which met in Bucharest in January 1046 to consider the question of broadening the Rumanian Government. For documentation on the work of the Rumanian Commission, see vol. vi, pp. 555 ff.
84. The reference here is to paragraph 4 of the French proposal under article 16 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy cited in footnote 79, p. 1236. The Soviet suggestion to defer decision on this paragraph was made in the course of the Council’s 8th Meeting, November 13; see the United States Delegation Minutes of that meeting, p. 1129.
85. The Soviet proposal under reference appeared in document CFM(46) (NY)13, November 14, p. 1156.
86. This proposal also appeared in the document cited above.
87. The proposal under reference was that for article 16, Part a, of the Recommendations by the Peace Conference on the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, vol. iv, p. 895.
88. The Annexes, which had not been considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers, had been included in the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy referred to the Peace Conference by the Council; for texts, see vol. iv, pp. 40 and 60.
89. Not printed.