Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Fifth Informal Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, November 21, 1946, 4 p.m.

New York, November 21, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret

Present

	France
	M. Couve de Murville (Chairman)
	M. Alphand
	M. Bonnet
U.K.		U.S.S.R.
Mr. Bevin		M. Molotov
Mr. Jebb		M. Vyshinsky
Mr. Sterndale-Bennett		M. Gusev
		M. Pavlov
	U.S.A.
	Mr. Byrnes
	Mr. Dunn
	Mr. Cohen
	Mr. Bohlen

Agenda

M. Couve de Murville: Yesterday we began to discuss the Soviet amendments to the French proposal on the Free Port of Trieste.⁶¹ Shall we continue this discussion? We reached agreement on paragraph 11(a).

Mr. Byrnes: I have glanced over the French proposal and have asked my associates to draw up a memorandum for me on the important outstanding questions. These are:

a. The Free Port and Economic questions

b. The nationality clause

c. The provisional régime, and

d. The withdrawal of troops.

I believe that if we are going to agree on the treaty we will have to agree on these four questions and we should direct our attention to them.

M. Couve de Murville: I suggest that we discuss the Free Port and economic problems first and then proceed to the questions of nationality, provisional regime and withdrawal of troops.

M. Molotov: Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the French proposal which were adopted by the Peace Conference are also important. We have not finished our discussion of these points.

M. Couve de Murville: In my opinion point 2 (the sending of troops by the Security Council) is important. Point 1(b) depends on our decision on paragraph 8. We can consider point 2 as the fifth item on our agenda.

Mr. Bevin: There are a number of important questions apart from Trieste in which my Government is interested. We have passed over these questions every time.

M. Couve de Murville: They will be taken up after Trieste.

Mr. Bevin: As long as that is understood I will agree to the present agenda.

Free Port and Economic Questions

M. Couve de Murville: The first question is that of special zones under the exclusive jurisdiction of neighboring countries. This is a Soviet amendment to paragraph 11(b). As I stated yesterday, the French Government does not consider it possible to establish special zones under the exclusive jurisdiction of one country. But from a practical point of view we might look into the possibility of setting up reserved zones for the use of Yugoslavia and Italy.

M. Molotov: What do you mean by a “reserved” zone?

M. Couve de Murville: A certain part of the Port and facilities, such as wharves, could be reserved exclusively for Italian or Yugoslav traffic. This special zone, however, would remain under the administration of the Free Port.

M. Molotov: It is possible that some solution might be found along these lines. I suggest that we look into this matter and return to it tomorrow. I am especially concerned with the Soviet proposal regarding a customs union and the joint administration of the railroads.

M. Couve de Murville: Shall we pass over paragraph 11(b) or should we send it to the Deputies for study?

M. Molotov: I have no objection that the question be sent to the Deputies for consideration.

Mr. Bevin: I do not see how we can deal with one question and not the other. It is purely a matter of the economic life of the Free Territory. Either we refer all the economic questions to the Deputies or none of them. I want to see the whole picture together before I decide on anything.

M. Couve de Murville: Do you wish this question referred to the Deputies?

Mr. Bevin: I have no objection so long as I see the entire picture and know what the final results will be.

M. Couve de Murville: I believe it wise to refer this question to the Deputies. It is the knot to the whole problem. There is also a Soviet recommendation on paragraph (c) and (d) regarding economic collaboration between the Free Port and Yugoslavia. Are there any new remarks?

Mr. Byrnes: The United States Delegation has nothing more to add to what it said yesterday.

M. Molotov: I have nothing more to add.

Mr. Bevin: I did not express myself yesterday but I believe that the establishment of a customs union and of a joint administration of the railroad would amount to the incorporation of the Free Territory into Yugoslavia.

M. Molotov: Danzig had a customs union with Poland but Danzig was not incorporated into Poland.

Mr. Bevin: There was only one country affected at that time. Now we are dealing with two countries.

M. Molotov: There were two interested states—Germany and Poland. Danzig became a very important issue to Germany. Danzig had a customs union with Poland but was not incorporated in that country. Now, as then, there are two states involved. Italy is much larger than Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia is much weaker than Italy. A customs union should be established since the Free Territory is closely linked economically with Yugoslavia and is surrounded by Yugoslavia.

M. Couve de Murville: The French Delegation believes that this problem has a very special character and cannot be compared with Danzig. The reason is that in the Free Territory there are two customs régimes, i.e., one of the Free Port and the other of the Territory itself. From an economic point of view the more important regime will be the Port regime. It is a small region but there should be full freedom of customs. This special situation has lead us to present a system of extending the Free Zone to the entire Territory. That is that there should be freedom of customs for the entire Territory. The Territory can trade freely with its neighbors. From an economic point of view this is a good solution since it will enable Trieste to become an international warehouse. Everyone will be free to enter into commercial relations with the Free Territory. This matter has no political significance. It is not only in the interests of the Territory itself but of the neighboring countries that a free customs régime should prevail.

Mr. Bevin: If we agree that the port is to be absolutely free we might request the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to set up a committee to study these economic problems. The principle of the French resolution is good, but we need a great deal of information on the port which we do not possess. It is possible that it may be necessary to study this situation on the spot. I am against a customs union for I feel that it would be against Italian-Yugoslav interests and would bring about continual disputes between these two countries. I am not suggesting that we hold up the treaty but I feel that if the French proposal is adopted in principle there will be sufficient time to study this question between the present moment and the establishment of the provisional regime. This question might even be studied during the provisional regime and we could obtain expert advice on the railroads, on the ports and on other economic matters.

M. Molotov: We have spent a great deal of time on Trieste. I do not feel that we should postpone our decision or pass the question on to some other body. We should find a solution here.

Mr. Byrnes: In the beginning the United States Delegation believed that Trieste should go to Italy. We could not obtain agreement and we agreed in July on an international zone. When you have an internationalized Free Territory Italy or Yugoslavia should not have any special treatment in that Territory which would not be given to another country. Yugoslavia tried at the Peace Conference to undo what we had agreed to by asking for special treatment. The United States Delegation is unwilling to do indirectly what it agreed [not?] to do directly, and that would be to give Yugoslavia or Italy a special position in the Free Territory. I do not believe it necessary to go into these economic questions. Yugoslav trade with Trieste amounted to 7% before the war. I don’t care whether it is 7, 17, or 70%. We agreed to create a Free Territory of Trieste and not to turn the area over to Italy or Yugoslavia. If we don’t stand by that decision I would rather honestly turn the territory over to Italy or Yugoslavia. I am not going to say that it is a Free Territory and then let Yugoslavia control it in any way, shape or form.

M. Molotov: The Yugoslav proposals went too far when they asked for a postal union, a customs union, common currency, etc. They were excessive and the Soviet Delegation could not accept them. On the other hand, when it is pointed out that the economic ties between Trieste and Yugoslavia were weak, this refers to the past when Trieste was controlled by Italy. The economic situation is now different. Economic ties will be stronger, especially between Trieste and Istria. Therefore we must seek a solution to this problem from an economic point of view. The Soviet Government would like to find a practical solution of these economic questions and is willing to confine itself to a minimum solution. I shall not take up the question of the postal union or the common currency. I am prepared to drop the question of a customs union at this time in view of the objections of my colleagues. But could we not find some solution to the transportation and port questions? I refer to zones in the port and to coordination between the Trieste and Yugoslav railroads. We should make provision for joint administration or perhaps some kind of a railroad convention. Geographic considerations must be taken into account. There are four railroads in the Free Territory. One goes to Italy and three go north, east and south through Yugoslav territory. It is very important to provide for railroad coordination. If we can find a solution to the zonal and railroad questions this will constitute a minimum which would contribute to the economic well-being of Trieste and Yugoslavia.

Mr. Byrnes: We agreed to the establishment of the Free Territory. Yugoslavia asks for a special zone. My experts tell me that such a zone would be contrary to the economic and financial interests of Yugoslavia. But this is of no importance. I will not agree to anything that would destroy the free character of the Free Territory. I know of no economic obstacles to Yugoslavia in the port itself. Yugoslavia has free opportunity to trade and use the port. The Yugoslavs do not come in and ask for equality—they request a preference. The Free Territory must remain what we agreed to make it—that is, an absolutely free territory under international auspices.

M. Molotov: I have withdrawn the question of a customs union since there is objection to it. I believe that we would be making a much better decision if we could settle two questions, i.e., the joint administration of the railroads and the question of zones in the port. If we do not reach agreement on the railroad question Yugoslavia would not be obliged to supply railroad services to Trieste in the measure in which they might be needed. It would be advisable to reach agreement on these points.

Mr. Bevin: I propose that the administration of the port be left under the port authorities. They would have the right to allocate piers or facilities to Yugoslavia. The word “zone” has a wide meaning.

M. Molotov: It seems to me that M. Couve de Murville’s proposal can be taken as a basis.

M. Couve de Murville: There are two problems. The first is the question of reserving a part of the port for one country and the second is the question of the railroads between Trieste and neighboring countries. The second question is quite simple. I think it is evident that some kind of a railroad convention would have to be drawn up especially in connection with transit rights. There should not be any problem in this. The first question is more technical and it would be difficult for us to study it. I suggest that both questions be referred to the special committee.

M. Molotov: We should decide them.

Mr. Bevin: Whether we grant special privileges or not I take it that paragraph 11(c) of the French proposal is the basis of our entire approach. This paragraph states that freedom of transit shall be assured between the Free Port and the states which it serves without any discrimination. It is a question of paragraph 11 (c).

M. Molotov: It would be impossible for me to accept paragraph (c) because Yugoslavia is not a vanquished country and (c) applies to Yugoslavia and other states. We cannot write in the treaty any demands on Yugoslavia.

Mr. Bevin: That is the main issue. What is the intention of the Soviet proposal? If you have zones and a joint railroad administration will there be one charge for trains going to Italy and another for trains going to Yugoslavia? If you have such discrimination there would be no free port.

M. Molotov: There should, of course, be no discrimination for countries transporting goods through neighboring countries. But it is inappropriate to mention this in respect to an Allied country. On the other hand, Yugoslavia cannot be denied the right, if she has an economic agreement with this or that country, to grant economic facilities to that country. But this matter should not be dealt with in the Italian Treaty.

M. Couve de Murville: I understood that the Soviet Delegation did not object to paragraph 11(c) and that it only had amendments to paragraphs 11(b) and (d).

M. Molotov: There should be no misunderstanding. We stated in writing that we were prepared to accept paragraph (c) on definite conditions which have now been dropped.

M. Couve de Murville: Our present position is that (c) has not been agreed to and that there are two problems linked to paragraph (d); i.e., a reserved area in the port for Italy and Yugoslavia and the problem of railroad conventions which should be drawn up by Trieste and its neighboring countries. We might pass on to the other questions on our agenda and return to these matters at a later time.

Nationality Clauses

M. Couve de Murville: The Soviet Delegation has proposed to add a new paragraph, paragraph (c), to Article 10.⁶² This paragraph excludes Fascists, members of the police force, etc., from Trieste citizenship.

M. Molotov: I believe this is a good proposal. The Soviet Delegation accepts paragraphs (a) and (b) but it believes that it would be desirable to make mention of Fascists and other elements.

Mr. Byrnes: The United States Delegation believes that we should have confidence in the democratic government of Trieste. Paragraph (b) provides for the acquisition of citizenship. We ought to have enough confidence that the Popular Assembly will be able to take care of this matter.

M. Couve de Murville: Is paragraph (c) an exception to paragraph (a) or (b)? Is it an exception to the principle of citizenship or to the origin of citizenship?

M. Molotov: We might drop (c) if we amended (b) to read as follows:

“The conditions for the acquisition of citizenship by persons not qualified for original citizenship (for instance, active members of the Fascist regime in Italy, former members of the Italian police) shall be determined …”

M. Couve de Murville: This is an exception to paragraph (a). Everybody who lived in Trieste on a certain date becomes a citizen whether he is a Fascist or not.

M. Molotov: The purpose of the amendment is to provide that active members of the Fascist regime may be denied citizenship by the Popular Assembly.

Mr. Byrnes: Exactly who are meant by active members of the Fascist regime? Are political views taken into consideration?

M. Couve de Murville: It is a question of definition. Most people in Italy were Fascists. There were exceptional cases which should be defined. These special cases would probably be better off in Italy than in Trieste.

M. Molotov: I agree with M. Couve de Murville that the popular Assembly should decide who a Fascist is.

Mr. Bevin: I consider paragraphs (a) and (b) sufficient.

M. Molotov: It would be a bad thing if active Fascists entrenched themselves in Trieste. W might add what we have adopted in Article 46(b) of the Italian Treaty. I refer to the words “with the exception of such persons as shall have been exonerated by the appropriate body in accordance with Italian law”.⁶³

Mr. Bevin: What you are doing is that you are punishing these persons—you are depriving them of their citizenship and making them stateless persons.

M. Molotov: They can return to Italy.

Mr. Bevin: I don’t want to start another march on Rome.

M. Couve de Murville: What shall we decide?

Mr. Bevin: I think we should leave the whole matter to the discretion of the Popular Assembly.

M. Molotov: Could we not refer the matter to the Deputies and instruct them to include something in paragraph (b)?

Mr. Bevin: I don’t object to the matter going to the Deputies but I won’t commit myself. I want to see what they produce.

The Ministers agreed to refer this matter to the Deputies.

Provisional Regime

M. Couve de Murville: There is a combined US–USSR proposal on this matter.⁶⁴ Mr. Bevin has reserved his position on it until he could see the whole picture.⁶⁵ It is proposed that a draft for the provisional regime be drawn up by the CFM and confirmed by the Security Council.

Mr. Bevin: I understand that the wording is that the regime of the provisional government will be established by the CFM and approved by the Security Council.

Mr. Byrnes: How about the last words concerning the appointment of a Governor?

M. Couve de Murville: There are two questions; a, the establishment of a provisional regime, and b, the nomination of the Governor. Mr. Bevin has agreed that the regime shall be established by the CFM and approved by the Security Council. The second question has not been discussed.

M. Molotov: I agree that the regime should be established by the CFM and approved by the Security Council.

Mr. Bevin: I believe that the Governor should be appointed by the Security Council. We should draw up the regime and obtain the approval of the Security Council which would nominate the Governor.

Mr. Byrnes: I thought we had agreed to replace the word “organized” by the word “drafted”.

M. Molotov: Mr. Byrnes is correct and I accept the proposal to use the word “drafted” for “organized”. In such a case the words “and define his powers” would be superfluous since we will define his powers iii our decisions.

Mr. Byrnes: Thus far there is no agreement as to the powers of the provisional government. I mention this because it is important and we must have no misunderstanding as to what the powers of the Governor will be. Immediately upon the coming into force of the Treaty someone must go to Trieste and establish a government. He must be given powers to act and to fulfill the terms of the Statute as agreed upon by us. The provisional governor would have to be agreed upon by the Security Council. His duties must be defined so that he can enter upon them immediately.

M. Molotov: I think that the Statute which we will prepare for the Security Council can serve as the provisional statute. It will be in operation as such. If it is approved by the Security Council it will become the permanent statute. There may be amendments to it. But if it is not approved it can serve as the provisional statute.

M. Couve de Murville: This is not a difficult question. The Statute of the CFM will be forwarded to the Security Council and will be included in the Treaty. It can be used as a provisional statute until it is approved. If the Security Council wants to make some changes in it, it can do so. It is probable that a number of permanent governmental organs will be included in the constitution. They will not be in existence until the constitution is adopted. Until then the Statute will not be applicable in the way it should be. Therefore there must be some provisional statute to cover this period. It is the task of the government to organize the elections and to arrange for the establishment of the institutions of the Territory.

M. Molotov: This difficulty can be overcome without delay. I do not know whether we will be able to draft a new statute for this period. It would be difficult for none of us have enough time to draft such a Statute. The Statute which we have prepared should serve as the provisional statute until it is approved. It is true that there will be no assembly or council of government. A governor will go into Trieste and a temporary regime will be established. We should, however, fix the time of the elections and I suggest three months after the coming into force of the Treaty. I propose that we accept Mr. Byrnes’ suggestion that the provisional governor should be suggested by the CFM and approved by the Security Council.

Mr. Byrnes: I did not suggest that the provisional governor be appointed by the CFM. I always believed that the Security Council should do this. If the Security Council found a man good enough to serve as provisional governor he would be good enough to serve as permanent governor. My position is that we must provide for a provisional governor who will exercise administrative authority. He should appoint the Council of Government and the administrative services. He should consult on the holding of elections. He must have authority to organize the police force and take security measures. We must write that out in addition to his other powers.

Mr. Bevin: There are certain preliminary matters which are not included in the permanent statute. If we could agree in principle on these matters then they could be quickly drafted by the Trieste Committee. These are the matters which Mr. Byrnes has mentioned. There are many things in the statute which would serve as a guide. I suggest that we say something like this—the provisional government of the Territory will be organized and directed according to an instrument of provisional regime which will include a definition of the rights of the Governor drawn up by the CFM and approved by the Security Council which will appoint the Governor. If we could agree in principle on this the committee could get to work and spell out what should be done. This matter is important because the powers of the Governor will be wider at first until they become limited by the permanent statute. Furthermore, these powers are not included in the permanent statute. The permanent statute will always be before the Governor to guide him as a goal toward which he is working. If the Trieste Committee got to work at once I feel sure they would be able to produce something for us. It should not be a long document.

M. Molotov: I do not believe that it is possible to draft a new provisional statute. We have not enough time.

Mr. Bevin: I cannot sign the Treaty without knowing how the Territory is going to be set up.

M. Molotov: We must decide on one and not two statutes.

M. Couve de Murville: In the permanent statute we could provide for the provisional regime. M. Molotov himself stated that some mention must be made of how the territory would be administered until elections took place. This is what Mr. Bevin has in mind, i.e., interim provisions.

M. Molotov: We have no provisional provisions from the Paris Conference. This is a new question and I doubt whether our discussion of it will facilitate our work.

Mr. Byrnes: It will be impossible for us to secure agreement on this question at this time. I have before me a document that includes certain measures which should be taken. I think that we must give the provisional governor certain powers. I suggest that we let our Deputies try to work out what these powers should be. I will circulate this document.⁶⁶

Mr. Bevin: I will do the same thing, basing my proposals on paragraph 11.⁶⁷ We were given definite instructions by the Paris Conference to do something along these lines and I think we ought to be helpful.

M. Couve de Murville: Perhaps it would be advisable to pass this question and await the US–UK papers.

Withdrawal of Troops

M. Molotov: This matter should not be postponed. When the Statute is adopted there will be elections and the formation of the Council of Government. Troops are in the area and the elections will be under their influence and pressure. In order to make the Statute really effective these troops must be withdrawn. I suggest that the foreign troops be withdrawn in three months, and that the elections take place in four months.

Mr. Bevin: As far as the British Government is concerned, it does not wish to keep its troops in Trieste any longer than it has to. We have a responsibility to our Allies. We want to know what is going to be in the Treaty and in the Statute. It is useless to discuss the withdrawal of troops until we have a treaty. I don’t know whether we will get a treaty. Let’s first complete the treaty and then we can decide what to do about the troops.

M. Molotov: I recall that the time limit for the withdrawal of troops is included in all of the treaties. This is not an exceptional matter. If there are no treaties, there will of course be no withdrawal of troops. But the time has been fixed in the other treaties and it should be fixed in the Statute.

Mr. Bevin: In the present case we have no statute, no government, no police. We have a duty to perform. When law and order prevail our troops can be withdrawn. I will agree to the withdrawal of troops on definite lines, not as suggested by M. Molotov but as soon as possible after the signing of the treaty.

Mr. Byrnes: The great difficulty is that there are existing governments in Italy and Bulgaria and armed forces which can guarantee the preservation of order. We are dealing with the very beginning of the Free Territory. There is only a Governor there. We haven’t even determined his powers. He will need armed forces which preserve order. It must be left to the determination of the Security Council, or to the Security Council on the recommendation of the Governor, when troops can be withdrawn. They must remain in the area until an adequate police force has been organized. I cannot accept as serious the statement that the presence of troops in the area would coerce the elections. If it is desirable we might place a ceiling on the troops of the three governments in the area. But I cannot believe that the U.S., U.K. and Yugoslav troops would have pressure on the elections. On the other hand, suppose we fixed a time limit—three or four months—and the public order in Trieste remained dangerous. Nevertheless we would have to move our troops. The Security Council is responsible in the area for public order, yet in a dangerous situation we would be obliged to move our troops. We would be impairing the prestige of the Security Council. The Security Council would not be fulfilling its obligations because we had been obliged to withdraw our troops.

Mr. Bevin: I can give assurances that we would never block any move to withdraw our troops as long as we felt that the situation in Trieste was satisfactory. I want our troops out of there as quickly as possible. But the Security Council must be satisfied that the situation in Trieste is satisfactory.

M. Molotov: We would be creating a strange situation if we leave this question unsettled. 90 days was fixed for the withdrawal of troops from Italy. We have failed to indicate any time limit for the Free Territory. This would serve to emphasize a lack of trust in the people of Trieste. We should fix the election date. All troops should be withdrawn and the elections should take place one month thereafter. This would permit Trieste to begin life on democratic lines. Otherwise we would emphasize a mistrust of Trieste. There would be a Governor who would act as representative of the Security Council. We have suggested that we define threats to the integrity of the area so that the Security Council may send troops. There should be no fear in this respect. For this reason the Soviet Delegation believes that the time for the withdrawal of all troops should be fixed at 90 days.

Mr. Bevin: We had better return to this question when we know we are really going to have a treaty.

M. Molotov: Why should we defer this controversial issue?

Mr. Byrnes: We have deferred all other controversial issues.

Mr. Bevin: We have passed over all the matters I am interested in.

M. Couve de Murville: We will be unable to settle this question today and I suggest we postpone it for the time being. Our agenda is exhausted.

Mr. Byrnes: So am I.

Mr. Bevin: What about paragraph 9?

M. Molotov: We will settle that question when we solve the question of withdrawal of troops.

Mr. Bevin: It appears that M. Molotov is using pressure on me in this regard.

The meeting adjourned at 7:45, and it was agreed to meet tomorrow at 4 p.m.

61. The Soviet amendments discussed at this meeting were those set forth in document CFM(46) (NY)15 Revised, November 17, p. 1185. The French proposal referred to here and throughout the remainder of this meeting was the proposal for article 16 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy as included in the Record of Recommendations of the Peace Conference, vol. iv, p. 895.
62. The reference here is to the new sub-paragraph c of paragraph 10 in the French proposal for article 16 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy as set forth in CFM(46) (NY) 13, November 14, 1946, p. 1156.
63. The quotation appears to be the new article, 46a, proposed for inclusion in the Peace Treaty with Italy by the Peace Conference and printed in vol. iv, p. 900.
64. The proposal under reference here was set forth in document CFM(46) (NY) 13, November 14, 1946, p. 1156.
65. The British reservation on the United States–Soviet proposal is recorded in the United States Delegation Minutes of the 8th Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 13, 1946, p. 1129.
66. The document under reference was circulated to the Council as CFM(46) (NY)22, November 22, 1946, p. 1251.
67. The British proposals were circulated to the Council as CFM(46) (NY)23, November 22, 1946, p. 1252.