Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, First Informal Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, November 15, 1946, 4 p.m.

New York, November 15, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret

Present

	France
	M. Couve de Murville (Chairman)
	M. Bonnet
	M. Alphand
	Interpreter
U.S.		U.K.
The Secretary		Mr. Bevin
Mr. Cohen		Mr. Jebb
Mr. Dunn		Mr. Sterndale-Bennett
Mr. Bohlen		Interpreter
(Senator Connally)
	U.S.S.R.
	Mr. Molotov
	Mr. Vyshinsky
	Mr. Gousev
	Mr. Pavlov

Trieste (Relationship of Police to Governor and Government Council)

M. Couve de Murville, who was presiding, inquired whether the members of the Council wished to return to the essential point which they had been discussing yesterday or whether the Soviet Representative desired to present the additional amendment on Article 11 which had not been ready yesterday.³⁴

The Secretary said he thought it would be better to have a general discussion rather than go on to another subject, particularly as they had gone over many times the economic questions in the Trieste Statute. He said he thought that we would consume a lot of time to no good purpose if other questions were discussed, and it would be best to stick to the essential point in the Statute.

Mr. Molotov agreed that they might continue discussions on Paragraphs 8 and 9 in continuance of yesterday’s discussion. He remarked that the Soviet Delegation had made an effort to break the deadlock and had put forward proposals which should move the matter forward, and he hoped, taking this into consideration, a common accord could be reached.

The Secretary said he thought that in this restricted meeting they could talk frankly and that he personally was in the same good humor as yesterday. In this spirit he wished to ask the Soviet Delegation to consider our position, namely, that in Paris, despite our original position, we had agreed to the French compromise on Trieste, which had represented quite a concession, and that this compromise had been adopted by two-thirds vote of the Conference. He wished to impress most earnestly on the Soviet Delegation the difficulties of accepting any important variation from the French proposal confirmed by the Conference. It would be most embarrassing to depart from the Conference recommendation as that would mean that we would not be fulfilling our obligation to take these recommendations most seriously.

He said he was sure that we all wished our allies to feel that we were not neglecting their recommendations. He added that since September of last year we have spent more time on this question of Trieste than on any other. We have finally reached agreement on the frontier and the principle of internationalization and specific principles for the Statute have been adopted by two-thirds of the Allied nations concerned. He pointed out that he had said previously that a recommendation of two-thirds would be regarded as virtually binding in so far as the U.S. Delegation was concerned.

Mr. Molotov replied that each Delegation here had indeed assumed obligation to consider seriously the recommendations of the Conference but that not all Delegations here had stated that a two-thirds recommendation would be binding on them. The Soviet Delegation did not make and could not have made any such statement. Nevertheless, the Soviet Delegation had not here at the Council resubmitted their own proposition on Trieste but instead had accepted the Conference recommendation as a basis subject to certain amendments. He said we should not forget that the only directly interested Allied government, namely, Yugoslavia, had objected to the Conference recommendation and found it unacceptable. He therefore felt the certain minimum changes more in harmony with the views of the Allied country directly concerned was the least that could be done to make this proposal acceptable.

The Secretary replied that he agreed that other countries had not taken exactly the same attitude as the U.S. on the two-thirds recommendations. He recalled that the U.S. Delegation had drawn a distinction between a recommendation of two-thirds and one of a simple majority. He was sure that the four Delegations here would want our Allies to be certain that most careful consideration was being given by the Council to the recommendations adopted by two-thirds vote. He pointed out that there were 59 such recommendations in regard to these treaties and that only six had been accepted by the Ministers, and three of those were the same recommendation applying to different treaties and that the other three dealt with minor matters. He also agreed that Yugoslavia was a power directly concerned; that he had talked with their representatives many times and he could not for the life of him understand why they objected to a genuine international control in an area predominantly Italian. He had been impressed by their statement that during the past 20 years the Italian authorities had persecuted and discriminated against the Slavic minority. It was therefore our task to see that there was no repetition of such discrimination. If the Representative of the Security Council was not given adequate powers it would be an open invitation to the Yugoslavs and Italians to continue the struggle which had caused so much trouble and sorrow to us all.

Mr. Molotov answered that the Yugoslavs had complained at the action of the former Fascist authorities of Italy but that they did not fear similar actions on the part of a democratically elected régime. There were no grounds for believing that a democratically elected régime would pursue policies similar to those of the Fascists or to believe that a democratic regime under the control of a Governor appointed by the Security Council would oppress any element of the population.

Mr. Bevin stated that apart from the Security Council there were three interested parties in this Trieste question, namely, Italy, Yugoslavia and the inhabitants of Trieste itself. Trouble might arise not from the local inhabitants themselves but from the fact that the neighboring states continued to carry on agitation; that to handle this responsibility was one of the added responsibilities of the Security Council. Yesterday he had asked if the allegiance of the police could not be given to the Governor, who was responsible for the maintenance of order and whose duty would be to the Security Council and the inhabitants of Trieste and not to one or the other of the contending parties.

He had suggested that an impartial neutral person be selected to organize a police force and establish it on a secure basis for the early period when the tensions might be at their highest, but not as a permanent feature. During this period the importance of the proper carrying out of elections was obvious and a neutral Chief of Police would give great confidence in this respect. He said they were gravely concerned as to the difficulty of insuring in this Free State that the factions, both political and racial, should live in peace with each other. That was why the British Delegation had thought that the French Resolution gave a basis for a proper Statute, although obviously not the final terms of the Statute, which would have to be worked out. He said it was not easy to create a new state, especially when tension had been so high.

The British Delegation had put forth what they thought were the best principles for a Statute and had been told that they were trying to set up a colony. They had not paid too much attention to these criticisms, which were at least in part polemic in character. They had tried and tried and had finally accepted the French proposal. He thought that the Soviet amendments put the matter back and were therefore not acceptable. He felt they had a duty and if they decided something it was up to them to see that it was permanent and workable. If the Representative of the Security Council was not given more power than provided for under the Soviet amendments, the Statute just would not work. Chaos with all its attendant difficulties might ensue.

He said that Great Britain had done her best to meet the views of the other Delegations, even giving up her original proposition, but on this he felt a fundamental principle was involved. He said he had agreed to an international zone subject to a satisfactory Statute, although he always thought and still did that the territory should be Italian. Nevertheless, having agreed to an international zone, he would support it to the full, but we must create an organization capable of carrying out its duties. Otherwise, the door would be open for all types of aggressive action on the part of one or the other of the parties. They were all in favor of unanimity but not at too high a price if they did not think it was right. He hoped that it would be possible to meet their views on this point.

He said if the principle could be agreed in the sense of a Conference recommendation, then it would not be difficult to find words. He said for example, take the first words of the Soviet amendment on the powers of the government, that it should “supervise the basis of public order.” This meant that he could supervise and not enforce and would be powerless to preserve public order, which was his responsibility, so that people could sleep quietly in their beds.

Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Government had had their proposal for the Free Territory and the Yugoslavs had had theirs. The Soviet Delegation had withdrawn theirs and is not supporting the Yugoslav proposal. They had accepted the French draft as a basis since it had been adopted by a majority at the Conference, but they could not adopt it in its entirety without some amendments. He said they had not introduced amendments which should be unacceptable to any Delegation here since they were in conformity with our common views. They felt that the Governor, as Representative of the Security Council should not concern himself with current insignificant affairs as this would impair his prestige. He should only concern himself with the violation of the decisions of the Security Council. In such cases he said he admitted that the Governor should have the authority and the real power to act. He said they were prepared to make more precise some points and would agree, for example, to say that the Governor shall be a foreigner and should have real possibilities to intervene when necessary. They were ready to define more specifically their proposals to cover such contingencies. They had agreed that the Governor should have the power to confirm the Chief of Police on the recommendation of the Government Council and furthermore, that in cases which did not permit a delay the police should be subordinate to the Governor when he would act alone on his own responsibility.

The Secretary said they had gone over this question at great lengths. The essence of it was who in the Free Territory would have the power to hire and fire the police force? Other words could be used, such as “recruit” or “organize”, but in essence it was who would have the power to hire and fire? If it were to be the Government Council and in the event of an emergency or disunion between the Governor and the Government Council, the Governor would have no power over the police force. The police force would pay no attention to the order of the Governor in such cases.

He said it should not be left unclear where this power lay, that in his opinion the final authority to hire and fire the Director of the Police should be with the Governor. Yesterday, in order to make plain that it was not his intention that the Governor should interfere in minor administrative matters affecting the police, he had proposed an amendment, which he had read, that the Governor should entrust the execution of his authority to the local officials in so far as he considered it consistent with his responsibilities.

Mr. Molotov said that this would create not a Governor but a Dictator. He repeated that the Governor could confirm the Chief of Police nominated by the Government Council and that he felt that this was quite a concession. He added that there was nothing in the French draft about the Governor appointing the Police.

M. Couve de Murville, in reply to Mr. Byrnes’ question, said that as he had remarked yesterday the difficulty arose from the fact that the formula was vague and general but that they had contemplated that the Chief of Police, or Director of Public Safety—whatever he might be called,—should be appointed by the Governor. As to the recruiting of the police force, he felt that this should be done by the Director of Public Safety, which should be the normal administrative procedure.

Mr. Molotov said the problem of recruiting was not raised yesterday. Then the issue had been to whom the police should take an oath of allegiance—to the Governor, as the British suggested; or to the Government Council, as they suggested.

M. Couve de Murville inquired whether in Mr. Bevin’s opinion the oath of allegiance carried with it the right to appoint. He was not quite clear on that point since there was no oath in France for police.

Mr. Bevin said that he had not been thinking of the actual police force but only of the Director. He had in mind that the oath, or contract, should be to the Governor. He had not gone into the actual question of recruiting. He said in London the police have a contract with the State and not with the local authorities, but are hired and fired by a High Commissioner. He felt that the system was pretty much the same everywhere. In emergency the local or other police were bound because of their contract to carry out all orders of the Government. He said in this case he thought the supreme authority was the Security Council but that they would not interfere in daily affairs. He said if they did, it might make the sessions of the Security Council more entertaining. He said obviously the Governor would not bother in the daily details of police work. But he must have the power to preserve order and security. That was what reserved powers meant.

Mr. Molotov said he thought that that was acceptable.

The Secretary pointed out that in the original French draft the Governor was given flatly the power to appoint the Chief of Police.

Mr. Couve de Murville stated that it was true that their first draft went beyond what was finally agreed to. For example, they had insisted that the Governor should not be Chairman or Governor of the Government Council. He said he thought they had reached the point where the powers of the Governor were analogous to those of the London police cited by Mr. Bevin.

The Secretary said what we were interested in was the question of control of the police. If the Governor did not have it, then it would either be in the hands of an Italian or a Yugoslav.

M. Couve de Murville said could we not agree that the Director of the Police should be named by the Governor?

Mr. Bevin added “and with the right of dismissal.”

Mr. Molotov stated that the Governor should have the right to confirm on recommendations from the Government Council and that this would apply equally to dismissal. In other words, without the Governor no Chief of Police could be appointed or dismissed.

M. Couve de Murville then said could we not agree that the Director of the Police would have the power to recruit his police force, which was the only practical solution.

Mr. Molotov agreed to this.

M. Couve de Murville said then he thought there was a third and last important point, and that was that in the interest of security, public order and fundamental freedoms, the Governor should have the right of administrative as well as legislative veto.

Mr. Bevin said he thought the main difficulty was the question of the double loyalty of the police. If they were in one set of circumstances subordinate to the Council and in another to the Governor, you might easily get a conflict between the Governor and the Council, and he felt that that was what had been troubling Mr. Byrnes.

Mr. Couve de Murville said he agreed that the difficulty was that in normal times the Governor would not have the powers he would have in an emergency; that is, the Governor would not be allowed to interfere in daily internal affairs of the police or others, but must have the right to intervene when in his judgment his responsibilities were affected, and for this purpose should receive daily reports from the Director of Police.

The Secretary said that he thought that the matter could be settled if the words “in consultation with the Government Council he should have the authority to appoint and dismiss the Chief of Police” were added to point (a) of Paragraph 8.

Mr. Molotov said instead of “in consultation” that the words should be “on presentation” by the Government Council.

The Secretary said he had in mind if the Council recommended someone and the Governor vetoed him, then the Governor would have the power to go ahead on his own.

Mr. Couve de Murville pointed out that this formula would be the same as for the appointment of the Governor, in which the Security Council would appoint him after consultation with Italy and Yugoslavia.

Mr. Molotov remarked that there was a great difference between a Governor and a Chief of Police. The Governor would be appointed by the Security Council, and the Chief of Police by the Governor under this formula. He said it might be possible to agree that the Government Council would have a limited period of time in which to make their recommendation. He said that in their opinion in normal times the Chief of Police should be subordinate to the Government Council, but in emergencies when the situation permitted no delay, they should be subordinate to the Governor.

M. Couve de Murville said that the difficulty still lay in the double allegiance between normal times and emergency.

The Secretary pointed out that there might be a dispute between the Government Council and the Governor as to whether the times were normal or an emergency.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would agree that the Governor should decide by himself when an emergency exists.

M. Couve de Murville pointed out that in practice the Governor would attend the meetings of the Government Council and would therefore be informed of what was taking place in all phases of local administration.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether they could say that an agreement had been reached as to the subordination of the police to the Government Council in normal times and to the Governor in emergency.

Mr. Bevin said he would like to see the question as a whole and he felt that the essential point of control had not been settled by the Soviet proposal. The difficulty was in the words “on recommendation for presentation by the Government Council.” For example, the Government Council might refuse to put up anyone else after a candidate had been vetoed by the Governor.

M. Couve de Murville said that he thought that all the members would like to think over today’s discussion and he suggested that they adjourn. He said that if the other members desired he would be glad to sum up in writing his suggestions as to the relationship of the police to the Governor and Government Council in the light of today’s discussion.

Mr. Bevin inquired what would be the solution in the event of a dispute between the Government Council and the Governor. Would the Governor have the right to decide?

Mr. Molotov said that that question would be easy to answer if they could agree on the question of the subordination of the Chief of Police.

Mr. Bevin repeated that the question was one where the responsibility lay. He said they had no intention to have the Director of the Police ignore the Council or the local authorities. For example, it might be that the Director would have the right to appeal to the Governor on anything he thought contrary to the Statute. He pointed out that there might not be an emergency with riots but that the day to day administration might tend to violate certain of the basic civil rights.

M. Couve de Murville said he thought the answer to Mr. Bevin’s suggestion would be found in the right of the Governor to veto administrative acts which in his opinion tended to violate the Statute, public order or basic rights.

The Secretary said he was interested in the question of appointment and dismissal. As to the matter of daily administration, Mr. Cohen submitted a suggestion which might take care of that. It follows:

The Director of Public Safety shall execute administrative orders of the Council of Government but the Governor shall have power (a) to suspend administrative orders the carrying out of which he deems to endanger the integrity and independence of the territory or the fundamental rights of its inhabitants; and (b) to give direct orders to the Director of Public Safety when he deems necessary to maintain public order and security.

Mr. Molotov said he felt this suggestion should be clarified and that they should say:

(1) that the Chief of Police would not merely execute the orders of the Government Council but was subordinate to it;

(2) the Chief of Police should be subordinate to the Governor only in cases which should not permit of delay;

(3) the governor has the right to veto the orders of the Chief of Police which are in violation of the Statute or threaten the independence and security of the Free Territory.

It was agreed that the French Representative would draw up in writing his suggestions for consideration at a restricted meeting at 4:00 p.m. November 16.

The meeting adjourned.

34. Under consideration at this meeting was document CFM(46) (NY) 13, November 14, 1946, p. 1156, which had to do with the proposed Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste.