Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2080: CFM Minutes

United States Delegation Minutes, Council of Foreign Ministers, Third Session, Eighth Meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, November 13, 1946, 4 p.m.⁷

New York, November 13, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret
USDEL(CFM) (46) (NY) 8th Meeting

(The meeting convened at 4:05 p.m.)

Mr. Molotov: Can we open the meeting?

Soviet Amendment to Paragraph 3, Article 16

It seems we decided to begin today the discussion of Article 16, paragraph by paragraph. Then permit me to begin with the beginning of Article 16, with the American proposal.⁸ We have only one amendment to the American proposal regarding paragraph 4. We believe that the provisional regime, which is the subject of this paragraph, should be established not by the Security Council but by the Council of Foreign Ministers, whereas the permanent statute should be established by the Security Council. In our view it is a more practical way and a speedier way to do it.

Paragraph 4. In the recommendations?

Paragraph 3. In the English version.

I am not certain whether our proposal is clear.

Mr. Byrnes: I understand that it has reference to what is known as paragraph 3 in our copy. It is the same.

Our thought on the subject has been if the Security Council is to be charged with the responsibility of the Free Territory and in another part of the recommendation of the Conference it is provided that the integrity and independence of the Free Territory must be assured by the Security Council, that it would seem that at the very beginning the Security Council should be given the necessary power to assure that independence and integrity, that it would be unwise to divide the responsibility between two different organizations, one of them the Council of Foreign Ministers and the other the Security Council.

Mr. Molotov: Our proposal is not intended to diminish the influence of the Security Council in this matter since it remains in force that in accordance with this paragraph that the permanent statute should be approved by the Security Council.

However, it was the Foreign Ministers who discussed the claims, all the details regarding the treaty, and it will be more practical and speedier if we—if the measures regarding the permanent statute were adopted not by the Security Council but through the Council of Foreign Ministers, and as we know we are all members of the Security Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers. It is wise to adopt this course in the case of the territorial statute because we shall be able to deal with the matter in a speedier way than if we refer that to the Security Council, because the Security Council is not familiar with the matter and will take some time to become familiar with the matter. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation suggests that we carefully consider whether it will not be better for the Statute of Trieste to be approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

M. Couve de Murville: I think, Mr. Chairman, that it is particularly important to have a provisional regime laid down as soon as possible. I think this question of a provisional regime is even more urgent than the question of the permanent regime, since this provisional regime will come into force immediately after the entry into force of the treaty, whereas the permanent regime will apply only after free elections will have been held in Trieste.

Now, as regards the recommendation of the Conference, it provides for the laying down of this provisional regime by the Security Council, and also for the appointing of a governor and the definition of the functions of that office. I think that the Council of Foreign Ministers might lay down the general lines of this provisional regime and also decide the question of the appointment of the provisional governor.

As to the modification or elaboration of those provisions, it would be left to the competence of the Security Council.

Mr. Bevin: Mr. Chairman, on the day that the Italians sign this treaty—I beg your pardon.

(Interrupted by the French Delegation—apparently there was some error in the English translation of M. Couve de Murville’s remarks.)

M. Couve de Murville: The Council of Foreign Ministers would lay down the general lines of the provisional regime and the elaboration of these provisions and application of these provisions would be left to the Security Council.

Mr. Bevin: Mr. Chairman, on the day the treaty is signed, this then becomes an international area, and I think on that day the matter immediately—that matter should go—the matter should go to the Security Council. It is quite right and proper that we should draw up the arrangements for the provisional regime, but if the Security Council has got to be responsible from that moment, surely it must have the right to say whether those things suggested by us need amplification or revision or addition or what responsibilities the Security Council has undertaken, and speaking for the United Kingdom Delegation we are particularly anxious to hand this whole business to the Security Council immediately the treaty is signed. And we could not accept the position of the Council of Foreign Ministers having responsibility beyond that moment.

Mr. Molotov: Perhaps we might accept the following compromise solution of this question. I suggest that we keep the text of this paragraph as it stands now subject to the following addition; namely, “that the provisional regime be established by the Security Council, and then on submission of the Foreign Ministers”. The purport of this amendment is the intention to facilitate the work of the Security Council because the Council of Foreign Ministers had done much in settling this question, and I wish to repeat my suggestion. “With a provisional regime to be established by the Security Council,” and then add the words, “on the submission of the Council of Foreign Ministers.”

Secretary Byrnes: I agree to that. I might suggest that if the word “established” in the text was stricken out, and then insert, “drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers and approved by the Security Council”, it would be better.

Mr. Molotov: No objection.

Mr. Bevin: I must reserve my decision until I see what happens to the Statute. I’d like therefore to come back to it.

Soviet Amendment to Article 1, Paragraphs (a) and (b) of the French Proposal⁹

Mr. Molotov: Now, permit me to pass to the French proposal. I must make a general reservation to the effect that the Soviet Delegation sees considerable difficulties in accepting this proposal because in our view, it contains highly undesirable departures from certain elementary democratic principles. Nevertheless, we shall submit our amendments to the paragraphs of this proposal, to the paragraphs which in our view call for amendment, and the wording of which should, in our view, be more exactly defined.

The first amendment that I am going to suggest is related to Paragraph (1). I must add that the Soviet Delegation will restrict itself to the very essential minimum of amendments to individual Articles.

We think that both Paragraph (a) and Paragraph (b) should be amended, but as an extreme case, we are prepared to confine ourselves to amending Paragraph (b) alone, and we suggest that Paragraph (b) should be amended to read as follows: “To insure the maintenance of the basic foundations of the public order and security in the Free Territory.” The meaning of this amendment is as follows: The language of the French proposal, the language of Paragraph (b), can be interpreted to mean that the Security Council has the right to interfere in the questions of the maintenance of order and security that arise from day to day. On the other hand, if the intention is to insure the basic foundation of public order and security, then this can be undertaken by the Security Council and the Security Council can carry this task out.

In this connection, it will be necessary to define more specifically, more clearly, the rights to be given to the governor. To sum up, our proposal is to keep Paragraph (a) of the French proposal as it stands and to amend Paragraph (b) of the French proposal in such a way that it will read as follows: “To insure the maintenance of foundations of public order and security in the Free Territory.” I think that this is likely to improve the language of this paragraph.

Secretary Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, I doubt that the words suggested would be the best way to provide for what we have in mind. I wonder if we couldn’t pass that until we get to the responsibilities of the governor and in connection with that we may be able to agree upon language.

Mr. Bevin: I would like to hear all the amendments before I take a position on any.

Mr. Molotov: We have no secrets.

Mr. Bevin: One thing depends on another.

Mr. Molotov: Then may we pass to the next point?

Secretary Byrnes: I agree.

Soviet Amendment to Article 2

Mr. Molotov: Paragraph (2). The amendment is as follows: There are two amendments. The first amendment is related to the first sentence in this paragraph. It is proposeed to add the following three words: “and declared neutral”. The proposal as regards the second sentence of Paragraph (2)—the proposal is to add the words, the following words after the words, “the Security Council”. “In case of threat to the integrity and independence of the Free Territory of Trieste.” If these words are added, the whole sentence will read as follows: “No armed forces except upon direction of the Security Council in case of threats to the integrity and independence of the Free Territory of Trieste should be allowed in the Free Territory.”

Mr. Bevin: Could we have the amendment again? Is there one or two amendments?

Mr. Molotov: I shall read them. “The Free Territory shall be demilitarized and declared neutral.” “No armed forces except upon direction of the Security Council in the case of a threat to the integrity and independence of the Free Territory of Trieste shall be allowed in the Free Territory.” If it is found necessary, then I am ready to explain these amendments, but it seems that they are self-explanatory.

Secretary Byrnes: I think it would be good to tell us what you have in mind.

Mr. Molotov: Paragraph (1) lays down that the Security Council shall be responsible for the integrity and independence of the Free Territory of Trieste, and this is in the first place. The second paragraph says that the Free Territory shall be demilitarized. We believed that this Territory should not only be demilitarized but also neutralized. In other words, no troops whatsoever should be stationed in that Territory, but in view of the fact that the Security Council shall be made responsible for the integrity and independence of the Free Territory, if there is a threat to the integrity and independence of the Free Territory, the Security Council shall have the right to send troops to that Territory to defend its integrity and independence. But normally, in normal times, no troops whatsoever should be stationed in the Free Territory. But if there is a threat to its integrity and independence, the Security Council must have the right to send troops to defend its integrity and independence, and it’s within this restricted meaning that we think it will be justified to vest in the Security Council the right to send troops to defend the integrity and independence of the Free Territory. But in normal times, this Territory should be neutral, that is, no troops whatsoever should be stationed there.

Mr. Bevin: What would happen, Mr. Chairman, if there was a threat to the independence of the territory without sending troops there by any other power? For instance, the threat to Danzig was made by Hitler without sending troops originally. Under these words, I think it would be a military threat to the integrity and independence of Trieste. Supposing, for instance, take this as an example, anything went wrong and the Security Council would be handicapped from preserving or carrying out their duties?

Mr. Molotov: I think that this view of the situation is not in harmony with what we have proposed. In our proposal the character of the danger is not specified, in other words, it does not say whether it refers to military or any other threat. It simply says that if there is a danger to the integrity and independence of the free territory, the Security Council will have a free hand and will act at its own discretion in order to defend the integrity and independence of the free territory, including the right to send troops there for this purpose, but if there is no threat to the integrity and independence of the free territory according to the meaning of our proposal no troops whatsoever should be stationed there—and only in the case of the Security Council deciding that there is a threat to the integrity and independence of the free territory the Security Council will be able to decide what measures should be adopted to stall off this threat and it will even have the right to send troops there if it finds it necessary to do so.

Secretary Byrnes: Mr. Chairman, as to the maintenance of troops, I do not conceive of a permanent military force being kept in this free territory. I conceive that the language that has been suggested by the Soviet Delegation would care for one part of the duty of the Security Council, that is, the preservation of the integrity and independence. I am wondering if there should be such rioting in the free territory that in the opinion of the Security Council it would be necessary to send some troops there to restore order whether they would not be prevented from doing it by the language that has been suggested. I am not afraid of its being abused by the Security Council because it would require unanimous action and troops would not be sent in there unless the circumstances were such as to convince all of the members of the Council that it was necessary to do so in order to preserve order. If you said for the purpose they could be sent in by the Security Council, only for the purposes set forth in the statute, it would cover both of your two points.

Mr. Molotov: It is important and essential to have a reply to the question whether there will be any troops in normal times in Trieste when there is no threat in the situation there, that is to say, to its independence and integrity. I ask this question because our amendment is that the free territory shall be demilitarized and declared neutral at the same time and because this amendment, for some reason or other, has raised objections. If this amendment is accepted it will clarify the question.

Secretary Byrnes: I have expressed my view on that question. I was asking you for your views on leaving the question open for consideration. I simply wanted to get your ideas.

Mr. Molotov: I must say that in the view of the Soviet Delegation the number of reasons to send troops to the free territory of Trieste should be, as far as possible, limited, and it is, in our view, incorrect to increase the number of reasons for sending troops there. In any case, the language as proposed by the Soviet Delegation does not tie the hands of the Security Council and does not prevent the Security Council from taking such action as it finds necessary to defend the integrity and independence of the free territory, including the right to send troops there. Any proposals?

Mr. Bevin: Can we have the next amendment now? We must study this, I am afraid, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Byrnes: Let’s pass it then.

Soviet Amendment to Articles 4 and 5 of the French Proposal

Mr. Molotov: We pass to the next item. We have no amendment to submit on paragraph 3. As to paragraph 4 we should like to discuss the drafting of this paragraph later, we make the wording of this paragraph dependent upon the language of paragraph 8 regarding the rights and duties of the governor. If paragraph 8 is amended as we are going to suggest, we shall have no amendments to paragraph 4. Shall we pass on to the next item? In paragraph 5 we suggest the deletion of the words “in particular” the rest of the paragraph is to stand.

Secretary Byrnes: I have no objection.

Mr. Molotov: No objection?

Mr. Bevin: I’d like to see what’s going to happen to paragraph 8.

Mr. Molotov: We shall reach it very soon.

Mr. Bevin: I am not very particular, but I am cautious.

Soviet Amendment to Article 6 of the French Proposal

Mr. Molotov: I repeat that we shall have no secrets as regards paragraph 8 as well. Paragraph 6, there are two amendments that we want to suggest. Amendment one, we suggest that in the first sentence the words “in his view” should be excluded and the sentence will read “In matters which affect” and “in his view” will be deleted “the responsibilities of the Security Council” and so on. We think that these words “in his view” give a shade of specific interpretation and this seems to us to be unacceptable. Now as to our second amendment. We suggest that we exclude the words “in his view” in the beginning of this paragraph, that is in the view of the governor, and by doing so we emphasize the fact that the governor will be bound to adhere strictly to the statute established by the Security Council and in this connection we have another amendment to suggest, namely, we propose after the words “legislative measures” to add the words “legislative measures which are in contradiction with the statute” and then the sentence will read as follows: “the Governor shall have the right to propose legislation to the Popular Assembly and to prevent the entry into force of legislative measures which are in contradiction with the statute” and so on. It is clear that the governor has no right to suspend the entry into force of any legislative measures. If he had such a right it would mean violation of the rights of the Assembly, but on the other hand, it will be right in our view to provide for the right of the governor to prevent the entry into force of such legislative measures only as go against the statute and this amendment, in our view, is calculated to improve the language of this paragraph and we have no other amendments to suggest.

Secretary Byrnes: I am more bothered by the first than by the second. Someone has got to determine whether or not it is in conflict with the statute even if you adopted your words. Someone must make the decision in these matters. If every matter had to be referred to the Security Council for action I don’t think it would be practical. I think we must give to him the power to make the determination, and the last words in paragraph 5 provide that it can be referred to the Security Council if the Assembly does not accept his views, so there is a safeguard.

M. Couve de Murvtlle: Mr. Chairman, may I remind the members of the Council that this question has been thrashed out in Paris by the Subcommittee on Trieste and unanimous agreement was reached. If we refer ourselves to Article 13, which contains the statute, and it is contained in an annex to the report of the Committee, we will see there is an agreed part of this article which reads:

“If the Governor considers that this law is in contradiction with the statute, he may in the following 10 days refer it to the Assembly with his observations and recommendations.”¹⁰

Then it goes on. Anyway, on this particular provision there was agreement in Paris, and therefore it seems to me that it should be easy to reach agreement here.

Mr. Molotov: The meaning of our amendment is as follows: The rights of the governor should be established more exactly. It is impossible to give the governor the right to prevent the entry of any legislative measure because this would not be in harmony with the democratic principles to which we have all agreed should be accepted as the basis for the legislative authorities there. The governor, in our view, should have the right to suspend only such legislative measures as are in contradiction with the statute of the free territory. The revoking of any legislative measures cannot be the personal business of the governor because the question is whether a certain measure is in harmony or contradiction with the statute of the free territory. If this measure is in contradiction with the statute, then in our view the governor shall have the right to prevent that measure from entering into force in accordance with the preceding paragraph and procedures stated above.

Mr. Bevin: Mr. Chairman, I think if you studied Article 13, the agreed part, you would really find it is covered. That is of the Subcommittee’s report.

Soviet Amendment to Article 8 of the French Proposal

Mr. Molotov: I have no objection to this question being given further study. May we pass to the next item. Item 7 raises no objection.

On Item 8 there are the following amendments: Our amendments are intended to define more specifically and more exactly Article 8 with a view to eliminating the contradiction between the rights of the governor and our decision of the 3rd of July. As we know our decision adopted on July 3rd reads as follows:

“The legislative and executive authorities shall be established on democratic principles, including universal suffrage.”¹¹

In adopting this decision we based ourselves upon the fact that both the legislative and executive authority should be based on the regular democratic principles. This means that the rights of the governor shall be within certain limits which in their turn should be in accord with the objectives of the Security Council, which is to appoint the governor. The governor, in other words, should not interfere with the daily orders and decrees of the legislative authorities and the execution of the statute established by the Security Council.

Accordingly, I shall announce the amendments which we have to suggest to paragraph 8. Paragraph 8 amended will read as follows:

“The primary responsibility on the governor would be the supervision of the maintenance of the foundations of public order and security.”

That is to say, these words “the maintenance of the foundations of public order and security” ought to be replaced by the words “the supervision of the maintenance of the foundations of public order and security.” It is easy to see that this amendment is in harmony with the amendment I have announced to paragraph 1–B. Paragraph B, Article 8, the Soviet delegation suggests that this paragraph be amended as follows:

“The conduct of foreign relations—” and then the words in brackets should be added “(consular commission) in the closest liaison with the elected authorities of the territory.”

This amendment is intended to define more exactly the functions of the governor as regards the conduct of foreign relations. Otherwise, the functions of the governor in the sphere of foreign relations will be unlimited, and this does not follow from the decision we adopted before the Conference.

As to paragraph C we hold that the judiciary should be elected persons, as is customary in democratic countries. However, if you are insistent on the acceptance of the proposal contained in this paragraph, we find it possible to accept it subject to the following amendment: After the words “the appointment of the judiciary” to add the following words “except when the constitution provides for their election.” The meaning of this amendment is to provide the fact that the governor should not appoint all the judiciary—that would be too much—but only those of them whose election is not provided for in the constitution, and provision should be made in the constitution that the more prominent judiciary should be appointed not by the governor but should be elected persons, as I understand is the case in the United States.

Secretary Byrnes: I would say to my friend that in some States judges are elected, but United States judges are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. I think somebody in our delegation must have had a hand in writing this because they provide for appointment by the governor and they must be approved by the Council.

Mr. Molotov: Britain could try that experiment.

Secretary Byrnes: What do you do with them in the Soviet? Are they appointed or elected?

Mr. Molotov: They are elected.

Secretary Byrnes: All of them?

Mr. Molotov: Yes, including popular judges.

Secretary Byrnes: Elected by the people?

Mr. Molotov: And the Supreme Court is elected by the Supreme Soviet.

In paragraph (c) mention is made of the appointment of the judiciary only in connection with the removal of members of the judiciary. We think that we ought to recall them when there is provision for their appointment. In other words, we should foresee the possibility of the Constitution containing a provision for the election of certain categories of judges. As to the rest, we accept it.

Secretary Byrnes: May I ask a question, please?

Mr. Molotov: Of course.

Secretary Byrnes: The Soviet Delegation does not object to the language providing for the removal for conduct incompatible with the judicial office but does provide whether they are elected or appointed judges. Now, I want to know whether that removal would be as to judges whether they are elected or not?

Mr. Molotov: I agree to the interpretation placed by Mr. Byrnes on my proposal.

Mr. Bevin: I would like to ask, on (b), on this amendment of (b), conduct of foreign relations—do you suggest, does it mean that the governor would be limited to the issuing of these documents, and that is all?

Mr. Molotov: We think that these functions ought to be directed into definite channels.

Mr. Bevin: Yes. I am afraid I misunderstood. The document reads: The conduct of foreign relations. The closest relations. Is it including the issue of exequators and so on? Is that how it reads?

Mr. Molotov: Perhaps some amendment—perhaps it is necessary to make some amendment in our draft, but the purpose we pursued in suggesting our amendment has been to define exactly the functions of the governor in the sphere of foreign relations on the assumption that some possibility for the conduct of foreign relations ought to be granted also to the executive authorities and to avoid confusion between the functions of the executive authority and those of the governor in foreign relations we think it is necessary to define clearly the functions of the governor. And what we propose in paragraph (b) is the definition of the rights he will have in that sphere. If, however, it is wished to indicate any other rights of the governor in this sphere we think it is necessary to indicate them in these provisions.

Mr. Bevin: Then I would like to ask a question again about this foundation of the public order. The language in (a). I cannot understand what is meant by the maintenance of the foundation of the public order.

Does it mean the general supervision of the maintenance of public order and security? It may be that the language is confusing?

Mr. Molotov: If there is any lack of clearness in that language then possibly it should be eliminated.

I do not think that we should cling to every word in our draft, but I should like to explain the main thought by which we were guided in our proposal. We believe that it is necessary to make the executive authority the executive authority and to provide that the governor should not interfere in any current affairs, in every current affair connected with the maintenance of public order and security.

But as soon as the question arises of violating the foundation of the political structure of the free territory, or of any radical changes in the political structure of the free territory, these changes cannot be made without agreement on the part of the governor whose duty shall be to supervise the maintenance of order and security in accordance with the constitution, with the statute and constitution of the free territory. If there are any measures that are directed against the constitution and the statute of the free territory, the governor should take action to prevent them from being put into effect, but the governor should not interfere in current questions, current affairs connected with the maintenance of security and public order.

This should be entirely the matter of the executive authority and the governor should not interfere in their daily activities in connection with the maintenance of public order and security unless these activities do impair the foundation of the constitution and the statute of the free territory.

The language is, of course, susceptible of elaboration, of defining, of more exact definition, if we agree to this basic principle.

Mr. Bevin: Who would have control over the police and frontier guards under this proposal?

Mr. Molotov: The Council of Government.

Mr. Byrnes: Suppose we go on to the next one?

Mr. Molotov: I have an amendment on that proposal. I shall read it as amended in our language.

“When as a result of exceptional circumstances the independence and integrity of the free territory, public order and security or the human and civic rights of the inhabitants are in danger, the governor”

the following words are to be added now

“in conjunction with the Council of Government may take all necessary measures.” Full stop. “The governor in the cases which allow of no delay the governor shall take necessary measures subject to his making an immediate report to the Security Council.” The last words “under the same reservation immediately proclaim a state of siege” are to be deleted.

It seems to me this proposal calls now for an explanation. If it is found necessary, I am ready to give it.

Mr. Bevin: Does that mean that the governor—you say he shall take these actions in conjunction with the Council—suppose the Council does not agree with the action and the governor takes action? What about that?

Mr. Molotov: The meaning of our proposal is as follows: We believe that it is necessary to recommend to the governor to try to act in conjunction with the Council of Government in the cases when it is necessary to take measures to strengthen public order and security as well as to safeguard the human and civic rights. It will be better to provide that the governor should strive to take his measures in conjunction with the Council of Government. However, we recognize, on the other hand, that there may be cases which allow of no delays. In those cases the governor will have the right to act at his own discretion subject to his making an immediate report in the Security Council. We think that the provision contained now in paragraph 9 should be restricted only to the cases, exclusively to the cases which allow of no delay, but in other cases the governor should be made, bound to act in conjunction, should be bound to act in conjunction with the Council of Government.

We think also it is not right to provide for the right of the governor to proclaim a stage of siege. It is sufficient, in our view, to provide for the right of the governor to act at his own discretion only in cases which allow of no delay and thus to secure the taking of measures which it is necessary to take in order to assure the performance by the governor of the duty assigned to him.

Secretary Byrnes: May I ask this? Suppose there is what is regarded by the governor as a threat to the integrity and independence, or there is mob violence on a large scale. He talks to the Council and the Council does agree with him. Say in those cases where a delay should not be tolerated, he can take measures, but he hasn’t got any control over police forces. What measures can he take except write in a message to the Security Council to advise him about it. That is the trouble.

Mr. Molotov: I shall reply to Mr. Byrnes’ question. According to the second part of our proposal, the governor has the right to act in urgent cases under his own responsibility independently. This means that as far as any urgent cases are concerned, he has a free hand. It can, of course, be provided as far as these cases are concerned, that the governor should have some measure of control over the police, but his power should not be extended beyond this. Only he should have that measure of control only in these urgent cases. Any observations on this item?

Secretary Byrnes: Suppose we go to the next one. You have some more?

Mr. Molotov: A whole box of them.

Secretary Byrnes: Let’s see what you have in the box.

Soviet Amendment to Article 10 of the French Proposal

Mr. Molotov: All of them are good. Article 10. The Soviet Delegation considers Items (a) and (b) acceptable, but suggests that a new paragraph be added which I shall now announce. “The right to acquire this Trieste citizenship shall not be enjoyed by active participants of the fascist regime in Italy, active members of the fascist party, war criminals, and persons who were in the service of the Italian police and government officials who arrived in the Territory after 1922.” Of course, the language of this paragraph can be improved, but what matters is that we accept its principle. In my view, no explanations as regards this item are necessary.

Secretary Byrnes: Let’s go to the box again.

Soviet Amendment to the Article on “Provisional Government”

Mr. Molotov: I shall fish for something in it. My proposal as regards Article 11 is not yet ready, and therefore I shall pass to the Article, “Provisional Government.” As regards paragraph (a), our proposal is to provide that the provisional government of the Free Territory will be organized not by the Security Council, as stated in this paragraph, but by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The reasons for this are clear because it’s an urgent question and the Council of Foreign Ministers is better prepared for this question now than the Security Council. It’s only a question of the provisional government, and incidentally, this paragraph can be worded in the same way as paragraph (4) of the American proposal.

Permit me now to formulate an amendment as regards paragraph (b). This paragraph should be amplified by the following words at the end of it. The whole paragraph will, when these words are added, read as follows: “The Security Council shall fix the date or dates for the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in the Free Territory, but not later than within a period of four (4) months of the entry into force of the Treaty.” My only doubt concerns Article 11 dealing with Free Port and Economic Questions. On this Article, the Soviet Delegation will submit its proposal at the next meeting. The meaning of paragraph (b) as amended by us was not conveyed exactly. It would be more accurate to formulate it as follows: “The Security Council shall fix the date or dates for the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in the Free Territory on the condition that this withdrawal of troops shall be carried out not later than within a period of four (4) months as from the date of entry into force of the present Treaty.”

Secretary Byrnes: Is the box empty now?

M. Molotov: The box is empty now. Only one item is left.

Secretary Byrnes: I think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to have an opportunity to think about these amendments and at our next meeting, we can discuss them. I don’t think we can do it tonight.

Mr. Molotov: May we adjourn this meeting?

(All delegations indicated approval by nods of the head.)

Secretary Byrnes: When shall we meet tomorrow?

Mr. Molotov: 4 o’clock?

(The delegations approved.)

I declare the meeting closed.

(The meeting adjourned at 6:50 p.m.)

7. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
8. Under consideration at this point was part 4 of the United States proposals for article 16 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, included in the Recommendations of the Peace Conference, vol. iv, p. 895. This United States proposal and the amendment suggested thereto by the Soviet Delegation at this meeting of the Council is included in document C.F.M. (64) (NY) 13, November 14, 1946, p. 1156.
9. The French proposal under reference, which was concerned with Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste, had been discussed at the 7th Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 12; see the United States Delegation Minutes of that meeting and footnote 97, pp. 1111 and 1118. The text of the French proposal as well as the amendments proposed thereto by the Soviet Delegation at this meeting of the Council were set forth in document CFM(46) (NY) 13, November 14, 1946, p. 1156.
10. At this point, Couve de Murville was quoting article 13 of document CP. (IT/P) (S/T) Doc. 8, Annex, September 30, 1946, the Annex to the Report by the Sub-Commission on the Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste to the Political and Territorial Commission for Italy. This Report, which set forth the comparative texts of the various draft Statutes proposed by the Delegations, is printed in vol. iv, p. 632.
11. The quotation is from document C.F.M. (46) 186, July 3, 1946, on the Free State of Trieste, p. 752, which was amended and approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers at its 33rd Meeting in Paris, July 3, 1946.