740.00119 EW/11–146

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

Participants: Mr. Tarchiani, Italian Ambassador
The Secretary
Mr. Matthews

Mr. Tarchiani called at his own request on the Secretary this morning. He began by expressing his deep appreciation and that of his government for all the Secretary’s efforts on behalf of Italy during the Paris meetings. He said that these efforts were well understood in Italy. He then raised the same two questions that he had raised with Mr. Matthews on October 30 (see Mr. Matthews’ memorandum of October 30). The Ambassador asked whether the American Government would (a) consent to any modification of the Italian-Yugoslav frontier as accepted by the four CFM powers and recommended by two-thirds vote of the Conference or (b) accept any free territory statute which did not assure the territory’s integrity and adequate powers for a Governor appointed by the Security Council. The Secretary replied that he had read Mr. Matthews’ memorandum of the Ambassador’s conversation and wished to confirm what Mr. Matthews had told the Ambassador. The United States would not accept any modification of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier unless such modification would favor Italy and be acceptable to Italy. He did not want the Ambassador to tell his government that the United States would not agree to any wording of the proposal for the basis of the statute other than recommended by the Conference. He might accept some change in wording. In reply to the Ambassador’s further question, the Secretary stated that the United States would definitely not accept any statute which did not in its opinion assure the integrity of the free territory and adequate powers for the Governor; this, he said, was the essence of the whole free territory plan.

The Ambassador said he was relieved to hear this for he had reports that the Yugoslavs were endeavoring to obtain inclusion of Gorizia in Yugoslav territory possibly in return for inclusion of Pola in the free state territory. In reply to Mr. Matthews’ question, he said that this would definitely be inacceptable to the Italians, that Gorizia was the last important city in the area which Italy retained, and he felt confident no government could accept any plan which did not include Gorizia in Italian territory. The Secretary said that the only basis on which we would have considered any such arrangement would be its acceptability to Italian opinion, and since the Ambassador had [Page 962] clarified the point he could assure him that we would insist on retention of Gorizia in Italian territory.

Mr. Tarchiani then asked whether the Secretary thought that Russia would agree to the treaty as drafted on the foregoing basis and if not, what would happen. The Secretary said that he naturally hoped that the Russians would go along but of course he could make no prophecy. If the Russians did not sign the treaty, then we would have to study the situation and determine the best course. Mr. Tarchiani asked whether we would in such case make a separate treaty with Italy. The Secretary replied that he saw only two courses to pursue, one would be to make a separate treaty acceptable to the Western powers, the other would be to leave the status quo.27 If the Ambassador could think of any other course, he would be glad to hear of it. He saw great disadvantages and many headaches in both alternatives. The Ambassador said he saw no other alternative but pointed out that American economic help to Italy, which he understood was being given consideration, was vital to his country and some way would be found, he hoped, not to cut it off. Mr. Matthews said that the Secretary had already been giving serious consideration to this aspect of Italy’s problems and that he did not think that possible American economic help in the near future would be adversely affected by failure to agree upon a treaty.

Mr. Tarchiani finally inquired what the situation would be if the Soviet Union signed the treaty but Yugoslavia did not. He said it would hardly be fair to ask such heavy sacrifices of Italy if Yugoslavia did not sign a treaty and accept the proposed frontier. The Secretary said that he was hopeful that if the Soviet Union accepted the treaty the Yugoslavs in spite of all their tactical denunciation of the treaty would finally accept. If not, such development would likewise create many headaches and we would just have to study the situation. He reminded the Ambassador that the United States is endeavoring to obtain inclusion in the treaty of a provision that no nation shall receive any benefits derived from the treaty unless it becomes a signatory. Mr. Tarchiani said he was aware of this provision and very much hoped it would be included in the final text.

In taking his departure the Ambassador said that he would be available in Washington or in New York if the Secretary desired to see him any time in connection with the treaty.

H. F[reeman] M[atthews]
  1. According to Ambassador Tarchiani’s recollection of this conversation (Alberto Tarchiani, Dieci anni tra Roma e Washington (Milan, Mondadori, 1955), pp. 119–120), which otherwise follows closely the record kept by Matthews, Secretary Byrnes at this point stated that if the Soviet Union did not sign the Italian Peace Treaty, “the United States would be ready to adopt a modified armistice regime, or simply to conclude a separate peace along with those nations which would be disposed to sign it.”