740.00119 EW/10–3046
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
Mr. Tarchiani called at his request this afternoon having just recently returned from Italy. He said that there was still considerable anxiety in Italy with regard to the Peace Treaty. He said specifically his Government would like to know whether at the forthcoming CFM Meeting the question of any modification in the so-called French line19 for Italy’s eastern frontier was contemplated in spite of the [Page 954] fact that the four CFM Powers had agreed to it and the fact that it had been recommended by a two-thirds vote of the Conference. He said he asked this in view of the worry in Italy caused by rumors that the Yugoslavs were still trying to obtain a modification in the north giving Gorizia to Yugoslavia and putting Monfalcone in the Free State territory. He said that either of these changes would cause dismay in Italy. I said that according to my understanding the United States would stand firm on the agreed French line and I did not see any reason why this question should be reopened in the CFM.
Mr. Tarchiani then asked whether his understanding was correct that the United States had made its acceptance of the French line contingent upon approval of a satisfactory statute for the Free Territory of Trieste. I said that this was correct. He said that he hoped there would be no weakening on our part for he was certain that the Yugoslavs would continue their efforts to prevent the establishment of any free territory statute which would be other than a disguised preliminary to Yugoslav annexation. I reassured him that we attached the utmost importance to the adoption of a really adequate Trieste statute which would protect the integrity of the Free Territory and pointed out that any violation of its integrity would mean an attack on the Security Council and not an attack on Italy which the Yugoslavs might attempt to distort into some sort of retaliation for Italian aggression. He said that his Government was aware of this aspect and appreciated the validity of the argument. He felt that the Treaty in its present form if a satisfactory Free Territory Statute is adopted would in the last analysis be accepted by the Italian Government. He was convinced, however, that any Treaty less favorable either as to the Italian-Yugoslav frontier or the Trieste territory would be overwhelmingly rejected by Italy.
He asked what would happen if the Soviet Government would not agree to a Treaty along these lines. I said that in such case there would be no Treaty and we would have to determine how next to proceed with regard to Italy. What would happen, he then inquired, if Russia accepted the Treaty but Yugoslavia would not sign—a contingency which he considered highly possible. I said that in my opinion the resulting situation would require careful study. He said that he did not feel that Italy could be fairly asked to accept the sacrifice involved in the proposed French line frontier if the other frontier party would not accept it. He went on to say that if no Treaty resulted and the present status quo on the Morgan line20 were maintained for the next two or three years this would be welcomed by Italian public opinion [Page 955] because they felt that they would be in a much stronger position both morally and economically by that time. This was based, however, on the supposition that some “modus vivendi” could be worked out with the three western powers.
I asked Mr. Tarchiani about economic conditions in his country and he said that they had improved considerably in the last six months. Industry is now operating at between 60 and 65% of the pre-war rate and if this can be raised to 80 or 85% he thought the situation would be satisfactory. He said he did not fail to point out, however, to Nenni and all other Italians with whom he conversed that the present relative improvement was due entirely to assistance from the United States through coal imports, raw material credits, UNRRA foodstuffs, etc. He said that he felt it was necessary to drum this into Nenni’s head since Nenni was not a wise man and frequently made very wild and indiscreet statements.
Turning to the political situation he felt that the recent agreement for joint action by the Socialist and Communist Parties (which was engineered by Nenni against the wishes of Sarragat)21 was highly unfortunate. Nenni nourished the hope that since a Communist regime would be unacceptable to Italy a Communist-Socialist majority would result in his being chosen to head the Government—a development Tarchiani would consider highly unfortunate. He said Nenni did not realize that given the vigor and energy of the Communist Party the Socialists might well become relatively powerless in many communities. However, he said, fear among the people aroused by this joint action might well result in increased votes for the Christian-Democrats in the next elections which he expected to take place around June. He pointed out that it was fear of Communist and Socialist excesses which had brought the Fascists into power and a similar reaction might now strengthen De Gasperi’s Christian-Democrats.
He told me incidentally that while he did not trust Nenni or the people he might bring into the Foreign Office he had a system of direct private communication with De Gasperi so that we need have no fear that anything he was told in confidence might get into the wrong hands.
In leaving, the Ambassador asked if he could see the Secretary before the CFM starts in New York as he felt that it was important in view of the uncertainty and anxiety existing in Italy today that he be able to send his Government some form of reassurance from the Secretary himself. I said that I would endeavor to arrange an appointment.
- The “French line” referred to here was the Italian-Yugoslav frontier proposed by the French Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers and described in Annex A (p. 149) to the Summary Minutes of the Commission on the Italo-Yugoslav Boundary, April 28, 1946. The “French line” is also indicated on the map facing p. 152. This line was tentatively agreed upon by the Council at its 31st Meeting, July 1, and was formally accepted by the Council at its 33rd Meeting, July 3; for the United States Delegation Records of those meetings, see pp. 701 and 730. The Council’s agreement with respect to the French line was incorporated into articles 3, 4, and 16 of the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, vol. iv, pp. 3, 4, and 9.↩
- Regarding the “Morgan line” see footnote 2a, p. 76.↩
- Giuseppe Saragat, President of the Italian Constituent Assembly and a leader in the Italian Socialist Party.↩