Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Ninth Meeting, Palais die Luxembourg, Paris, July 10, 1946, 4 p.m.⁹⁹

Paris, July 10, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret

German Questions

Mr. Bevin opened the meeting and requested the report of the Deputies.

M. Vyshinsky said that there was no report. The Deputies would make their report on the five peace treaties on Friday.¹

Mr. Bevin said that the Council might then proceed with its discussion on Germany.

M. Bidault then made the following statement:²

“The French Delegation is satisfied that, from the beginning, the new discussion which is taking place on German problems will cover certain general questions which have arisen and will be marked by its breadth since this is a question of the most important part of the peace settlement. Also from the beginning certain differences have appeared. These differences render all the more necessary the examination which we are undertaking, for it is perhaps because this examination has always been postponed up to the present that the viewpoints are different, and that it even seems at the moment that these divergencies might jeopardize the settlement of the questions before us and the future security of the world.

“As for the goal at which we are aiming I think I am right in believing that we are in agreement on a definition which follows that which was given yesterday by M. Molotov, namely: (1) Total disarmament of Germany; (2) Destruction of Nazism and promotion of the democratic spirit; and (3) Reparations for the countries which have suffered from the war.

“I should add that these objectives all tend to deprive Germany of the possibility of becoming a menace to the peace. In regard to the third point I will say in this spirit that it seems to me more important as a measure for insuring industrial disarmament of Germany than as a measure of obtaining for occupied and devastated countries the reparations which they have a right to expect, but which they recognize can be only partial.

“The goal having been defined, it is desirable to determine also the means of attaining it. I have already had the occasion to describe here the measures which the French Government considers the most urgent and essential. I should like now, without again going into detail on these measures, to indicate the position of the French Delegation on the whole of these questions. In our view it is logical to distinguish, in chronological order, (1) the decisions to be taken to determine the frame of Germany, (2) the policy of the Occupying Powers, (3) the main lines of the future status of Germany.

1. The Frame of the New Germany.

“Nothing serious can be done so long as the frontiers of the post-war Germany are not fixed, and it could not really be expected that the occupation authorities could undertake a long term policy so long as they do not know definitely what territories will remain German in the future.

“The Potsdam Conference made decisions on the subject of Eastern Germany which were provisional in principle but were in fact fundamental, and the French Government has not questioned those decisions. The fate of Western Germany remains to be settled. I do not wish to repeat the French proposals concerning the Ruhr, the Rhineland and the Saar except to say that we have not changed our position and that it does not seem possible to us to postpone examination of them any longer.

2. Policies of the Occupying Powers.

“I propose the following aims: (1) To assure the total disarmament of Germany; (2) To assure the execution of the program of reparations; and (3) To extirpate Nazism and to make an endeavor to promote a democratic spirit and democratic institutions.

“The first of these points, the execution of which one would expect to be self-evident one year after the end of the war, might nevertheless raise serious difficulties. For my part I do not see how there could be objection to the total execution of the principles set forth in June 1945, and I can give the assurance that the French Government is ready to give its wholehearted cooperation to every measure and every inquiry which might be proposed by any of the Allied Governments.

“The program of reparation, which is the result of the common decisions taken to fix the level of German industry is, in our eyes, as I have said, a fundamental element of disarmament. We attach primary importance to it from this point of view even more than from the point of view of deliveries which we can expect. Here also the cooperation of the French authorities will be given without reserve. I should like to recall that, in order not to obstruct the execution of the principle we have provisionally accepted the idea of the economic unity of Germany, although this unity includes for the moment western provinces the separation of which from Germany we are demanding.

“The denazification and the reconstitution of the democratic spirit are like disarmament such obvious necessities that there is no need to insist on it except perhaps to say that it is a long term question and therefore linked up with the duration of the occupation itself. It would be an illusion, in the view of the French Delegation, to think that we could be brought in the near future to leave Germany, at our common peril.

“The development of democratic institutions is a function of the progress of denazification. Its function depends also on the conceptions which we may have of the future political organization of Germany. In this respect the French Government subscribes entirely to the plan adopted at Potsdam of decentralization and the development of local autonomy. It is in the framework of the states or Laender that Germany should find again a political life. For the moment there can be no question of thinking of a central German government. As for the central administrative services which have been spoken of so much, the French Government, as it has always said, is ready to discuss them the moment that the framework of Germany is fixed. It believes that in this matter it is necessary to be very prudent and that technical considerations valid for the present should never prevail over political necessities valid over a long period.

“A central German government can come into being later, but only when the different states will have found a solid foundation, and we think that the future German government should be that of a confederated state rather than of a federal state.

“If this combination of military, economic and political activities constitutes the task of the occupation authorities, it is clear that it is an immense task, that its realization has only begun, and that a long time will be required for its completion.

“We know the burdens which such an effort requires and of these the food deficit of the zones of occupation represents only a small part. That is a question of sacrifices made for the peace of the world which will be amply compensated if we achieve our program. In any case the French Government believes that a prolonged occupation is the indispensable condition of the success of the enterprise. It is happy to learn that the views of the other governments are, if it has understood them properly, identical.

3. Future Status of Germany.

“It is only when the occupation ceases that the future definite status of Germany will be fixed. But I wish to emphasize that in my view it is during the occupation and through the occupation that the condition will be created which will permit us to call this status final. This status will be characterized by a total disarmament, the establishment of the new level of German industry, and by the creation of democratic institutions and of a certain number of states on a solid basis, thus making it possible for the new Germany to lose its contralizing and militaristic Prussian character.

“The draft treaty proposed by the United States Government to guarantee the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany could constitute, if I may say so, the crown of the edifice. It does not seem to me that it will be an obstacle either to the program of reparation, or to denazification, or to any of the essential and urgent tasks of the occupation authorities. It will not render useless in any way the proposals made by the French Government concerning the status of Western Germany. Finally, it should of course not signify that the occupation should come to an end in the near future.

“On all these points the terms which Mr. Byrnes has used seem to me formal. On the other hand his plan would have the immense advantage of making more concrete the solidarity of the Allies in respect of the ever present danger of a military resurgence of Germany. It would guarantee in a lasting way the security of Europe with the indispensable participation of the United States of America.

“It is in this spirit that we have welcomed the proposals of the American Government and in which we are ready now to study them.

“In the same way we are ready and desirous of studying with the three other governments all the proposals concerning Germany on the subject of which I have set forth our general views, the most urgent questions being in our eyes the status of the Ruhr, of the Rhineland and of the Saar. Any procedure which would make possible general agreement will be acceptable to us. In particular we are disposed to take as a basis of discussion the proposal of Mr. Byrnes for the creation of a commission of special deputies.

“I must apologize for speaking so long but I have a few words to add on a particularly important point, the question of coal. It is indispensable that we have the assurance that the considerable quantities of coal which can be taken from the German mines will be placed at the disposition of the Allied Powers and not at the exclusive or principal disposition of the reconstruction of the industrial power of Germany.

“It is not a question here of long term measures which we will put into a treaty, but of taking now necessary steps so that the authorities charged with control will take the greatest possible account of the reconstruction needs of the neighbors of Germany, especially of France. The French representatives have for several months insisted on this point in the Control Council at Berlin, but thus far their efforts have not been successful.

“The production of coal in Germany has attained only a very low level. We will certainly be in agreement that it would be right to use all the means in our power to increase the production of coal with a view to facilitating the improvement of the present economic situation in Germany. I have no hesitation in saying this. The production should be increased also in order to assure the satisfaction of the essential needs of European countries whose deficit in coal is today so great that their economic rehabilitation is delayed and there is a danger to their stability and even their security.

“Consequently I believe that we should demand that qualified experts proceed without delay to a study of the possibilities of increasing production, and I think we should agree among ourselves on general principles according to which, from this point onward, German production should be distributed, taking into account the need for coal in liberated Europe.

“Therefore I request that we instruct qualified experts to study this problem immediately in order that they may report to us the conclusions which they reach and in order that we may find the methods whereby the coal should be distributed, in the expectation that the minimum quantities which should be exported will be fixed by treaty. Since that is a question of determining a policy and general instructions, I believe that it is to the Council of Foreign Ministers and not to the Control Council of Berlin, an executive organ, that such a report should be addressed.

“Again I apologize for my lengthy remarks but I am sure that my colleagues will understand that I am defending my country.”

Mr. Bevin then made the following statement:

“I welcome this discussion on Germany because one of the duties imposed on the Council of Foreign Ministers at Potsdam was to prepare a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a Government adequate for the purpose is established. I cannot foresee how long that will take or the date when that situation may arise but it is clear that any step which we now take must be related to that ultimate development.

“For this reason the United Kingdom Delegation think it imperative that differences between the Allies be removed in order to preserve their solidarity and to work out a comprehensive policy with regard to Germany. Any failure in this would encourage the Germans to seek the opportunity for further aggression. We are all agreed, as I gather from the speeches which I have heard, that it is essential to keep Germany demilitarized and to make a new German aggression impossible if we are to make the peace of the world secure. We are also agreed that denazification is essential. When a country has been fed so long on these pernicious doctrines it cannot be an easy matter to root them out, nor can this be done in a short space of time. The fact that Hitler, whom they worshipped, was beaten may make the German people democratic temporarily; but we wish to make this conversion permanent. To this end, the whole education of German youth will have to be re-orientated. We are under no illusions and do not lightheartedly accept a superficial renunciation of Fascism by a people who can be arrogant or servile as circumstances suit. The whole British people, who with their Allies, have taken part in the last two wars, attach the greatest importance not merely to the eradication of Nazism but also to the eradication of the earlier Prussian spirit which is the foundation of German militarism. The British people regard the resurgence of Germany on a military basis as the greatest possible danger to peace. It is for this reason that His Majesty’s Government have expressed their warm approval of the American draft treaty for the continued demilitarization and disarmament of Germany. This does not mean that if the draft were discussed we would not have proposals to make.

“There are three possible approaches to the peace of Europe:

A balance of power between states of equal strength;

Domination by one power or two blocs of powers;

United control by the four powers with the cooperation of their Allies.

“His Majesty’s Government regard the last approach as being the one likely to produce the greatest stability. Under the last concept I hope to see the continent of Europe raised to a higher standard of living so that it may give an even higher example of culture to the world. It was for this reason that I told the House of Commons recently that I would come to Paris determined to prevent a division of Europe and to find a way of peace for all countries. It was for this reason that I felt that Mr. Byrnes’ draft treaty provided a basis on which studies towards this end could be promoted.

“Reference has been made to the period for which this treaty should remain in force. This is not a matter which should stand in the way of agreement, although I have no authority to commit my Government to any particular period. It has been said that the seeds of all future wars are sown in the settlement of previous wars. The opposite is equally true; if we sow the right seeds permanent peace may grow from them. It is my constant anxiety in all these questions whether I am producing a situation which will cost a future generation the pain of another war. Therefore, I hope that we shall not take our decisions hurriedly. The important thing is that we should arrange matters so that the world can enjoy peace for a very long time. Prussia has been a continuous danger since 1864. It is a terrible record and we must ensure that this danger is finally removed.

“We approach the problem of Germany from both the short term and the long term point of view. On the solution of our short term problem depends to a great extent the success of our long term policy. On the short term basis we stick to the Potsdam agreement provided that it is fully carried out and that every effort is made to make it successful. One of the Potsdam provisions which is not at present being carried out is the treatment of Germany as an economic whole. On this subject the Potsdam Agreement reads as follows:

‘During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to … (d) import and export programmes for Germany as a whole …’

Paragraph 15 of the Agreement reads:

‘Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary … (c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.’

Paragraph 19 reads:

‘Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports …’

“Mr. Byrnes stated yesterday that the American Government were spending 200 million dollars a year on subsidizing the zone of Germany as a result of the failure to carry out these provisions of the Potsdam Agreement.

“The estimate for H.M.G.’s expenditure in their zone of Germany in the current financial year is 320 million dollars and we cannot agree that this should continue.

“A great deal of this expenditure is clue to the fact that we are not obtaining in our zone the benefit of the surplus indigenous resources from the other zones of Germany.

“It is no secret that a great part of this surplus is being removed from Germany contrary to the Potsdam provisions which I have quoted.

“Another example of the failure to implement the Potsdam agreement is the refusal of the Soviet authorities in Germany to agree to a common import-export program for the whole of Germany.

“While the Potsdam Agreement does not exclude the taking of reparation from current production, it does make clear that this should not be done in any zone until the adverse balance of payments of Germany as a whole has been eliminated.

“The Prime Minister and myself had certain doubts concerning the decision which was taken on reparation at Potsdam, but we never imagined that this agreement would involve the imposition of taxation on the British public. When Generalissimo Stalin appealed to me to agree to a higher reparation figure for the Soviet Union I was sure that no one envisaged that the agreement would not be carried out according to the letter and in such a way that the British public would not have to suffer additional taxation.

“I will now turn to the question of demilitarization and will revert later to this question of economic unity. Meanwhile, I wish to refer to the Four Power Commission of investigation into disarmament.

“When to my very great regret it became apparent that agreement on such an investigation could not be reached, we published in Berlin an exhaustive account of the state of disarmament and demilitarization in all aspects in the British zone.

“We gave copies of this report to our allies in Berlin and to the press.

“Since then, press representatives have been freely touring our zone to satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of our report.

“We have received no comments on our report either from our allies or from the press.

“If Germany is to be prevented from rising again as a formidable military power, it seems to me to be essential above all things that the manufacture of war material in Germany should be completely prevented, as is laid down in paragraph 11 of Section II of the Berlin Protocol which says:—

‘In order to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented.’

“About this time we received reports alleging that the manufacture of war materials was being carried on in the Soviet zone. I did not accept these reports as accurate but, in accordance with the principle adopted by the Council of Foreign Ministers, advised that a Four Power Commission should investigate them and satisfy the public by refuting them. If there are any doubts existing in peoples’ minds, the refutation of these reports will assist our mutual relations and the German people will not be allowed to obtain encouragement in the knowledge that there are such reports and that they are undenied. If an investigation is agreed by the other three Delegations the U.K. Delegation would be prepared to put these reports on the table and have them investigated. I agree with Mr. Byrnes that the Control Council in Berlin should be instructed to begin this investigation in all its aspects.

“As regards the zonal division of Germany, we have always thought that occupation troops would have to remain for a long period in certain areas of Germany but we did not envisage that this would involve the perpetual maintenance of the division into zones which M. Molotov seemed to contemplate yesterday. It would be helpful to His Majesty’s Government if he would elucidate his views on this question.

“If the zones remain shut off from each other, it means that, in effect, Europe is being divided and this will cause serious difficulties and endanger peace.

“As regards reparations, I agree with Mr. Brynes’ statement that we never agreed to a figure of 10 billion dollars as the amount of reparation which Russia should obtain from Germany.

“As regards long term questions, I should like to deal first with the policy of administration.

“We must do nothing to deviate from the principle of international control by the Allied Control Council. Any questions, such as that of coal, with which the Allied Control Council has authority to deal, can be considered if necessary in special committees or discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers, but we insist that it is the Allied Control Council, not the Council of Foreign Ministers which will take action in regard to these questions. I therefore propose that the administration should remain as it is under the Allied Control Council but that special deputies should also be appointed to consider the future policy in Germany with special reference to frontiers etc., and any other measures that it will be necessary to take when the Four Powers reach agreement. I am prepared to take the proposals circulated yesterday as a basis for the work of the special deputies.

“To sum up, His Majesty’s Government considers that the Berlin Agreement must be regarded as a whole and must be implemented in whole and not in part.

“A most important part of that Agreement is that Germany should be treated as an economic whole. That implies that indigenous resources must be equitably distributed among the various zones. It implies, and indeed states, that the proceeds of exports must be used in the first instance to pay for approved imports.

“I must formally state that the United Kingdom will cooperate on a fully reciprocal basis with the other zones, but insofar as there is no reciprocity from any particular zone or agreement to carry out the whole of the Potsdam protocol my Government will be compelled to organize the British zone of occupation in Germany in such a manner that no further liability shall fall on the British taxpayer. I should be very sorry to see us forced into a situation of this kind which would be injurious to future collaboration.

“I hope that we will institute a system of complete reciprocity, and set up a special committee of deputies to look ahead to the future organization of Germany with a view to preventing the growth of conditions likely to cause war or aggression in the future.”

M. Molotov then made the following statement:³

“The time has come when we should discuss the fate of Germany and a peace treaty with that country.

“The Soviet Government has always held that the spirit of revenge is a poor counsellor in such affairs. It would be just as incorrect to identify Hitler Germany with the German people though the German people cannot divest themselves of the responsibility for Germany’s aggression and for its gravest consequences.

“The Soviet people went through unparalleled sufferings of occupation as a result of the invasion of the Soviet Union by German armies. Our losses are great and inestimable. Other peoples of Europe and not of Europe alone will long feel heavy losses and hardships caused by the war which was imposed by Germany. It is therefore natural that the problem of Germany’s fate agitates at present the minds of not only the German people but naturally also those of other peoples who are trying to safeguard themselves for the future and to prevent a new aggression by Germany. And one should bear in mind the fact that thanks to the industrial might she has achieved Germany is an important link of the whole system of the world economy. Neither can one forget the fact that more than once this industrial might has formed the base of the armament of aggressive Germany.

“Such are the premises from which conclusions are to be drawn.

“I proceed from the fact that in the light of the interests of world economy and tranquillity in Europe it would be incorrect to adopt the course of Germany’s annihilation as a state or that of its agrarianization, including the annihilation of its main industrial centers.

“Such a course would result in undermining the economy of Europe, in the dislocation of world economy and in a chronic political crisis in Germany which would spell a threat to peace and tranquillity.

“I think that even if we adopted such a course the course of history would subsequently impel us to renounce this course as an abortive and groundless one.

“I think therefore that our purpose is not to destroy Germany but to transform Germany into a democratic and peace-loving state which beside its agriculture will have its own industry and foreign trade but which will be deprived of economic and military potentialities to rise again as an aggressive force.

“While still engaged in the war the Allies declared that they had no intention of destroying the German people. Even at the time when the overweening Hitler openly proclaimed that he wanted to destroy Russia J. V. Stalin, the head of the Soviet Government, holding these boastful stupidities up to ridicule said: ‘It is no more possible to destroy Germany than to destroy Russia. But the Hitler state can and must be destroyed’.

“Germany has long held an important position in the world economy. While continuing as a single state Germany will remain an important factor of world trade, which also corresponds to the interests of other people. On the other hand the policy of Germany’s annihilation as a state or that of her agrarianization and annihilation of its principal industrial centers will result in making Germany a center where dangerous sentiments of revenge will be nourished and will play into the hands of German reactionaries and will deprive Europe of tranquillity and stable peace.

“One should look not backward but ahead and should be concerned about what is to be done in order that Germany may become a democratic and peace-loving state which will have a developed agriculture, industry and foreign trade but which will be deprived of the opportunity to revive as an aggressive force. The victory over Germany delivers into our hands powerful means to achieve this purpose. It is our duty to utilize these means to the full.

“It has of late become fashionable to talk about the dismemberment of Germany into several ‘autonomous’ states, about the federalization of Germany and about the separation of the Ruhr from Germany. All such proposals originate in the same policy of destruction and agrarianization of Germany for it is easy to understand that without the Ruhr Germany cannot exist as an independent and viable state. But I have already said that if the interests of peace and tranquillity are dear to us the destruction of Germany should not be our objective.

“Naturally, if as a result of a plebiscite throughout Germany the German people express their wish to transform Germany into a federal state or if as a result of a plebiscite in various former German states the desire is manifested to break away from Germany, it goes without saying that there cannot be any objection on our part. There have been not a few instances in which the Allied authorities in the western zones of occupation of Germany have encouraged the idea of a federal structure for Germany. But the attitude of Allied authorities is one thing whereas the real desire of the German people or at least the desire of the population of some part of German territory is another thing. We, the Soviet people, hold that it is incorrect to impose upon the German people some one or other solution of this question. Such an imposition would not in any case produce any good if only for the reason that it will be precarious.

“If on the one hand we should not stand in the way of the rightful aspirations of the German people after the revival of their state on democratic lines, then on the other hand it is our duty to prevent the rise of Germany as an aggressive force. It would be a crime to forget about this sacred duty of ours to the peoples of the world.

“If the world is to be safeguarded against an eventual aggression on the part of Germany, the latter should be completely disarmed both militarily and economically, and the Ruhr should be placed under an interallied control of the four countries with the object of preventing the revival of war industries in Germany.

“The program for a complete military and economic disarmament of Germany is not something new. The decisions of the Berlin Conference deal with this in detail. And it is natural that the Ruhr as the main base of Germany’s war industries should be kept under a vigilant control of the principal Allied powers. The purpose of complete military and economic disarmament of Germany must also be furthered by a plan for reparations. The fact that until now no plan for reparations has been drawn up in spite of repeated demands of the Soviet Government that the corresponding decision of the Berlin Conference be carried out and the fact that the Ruhr has not been placed under an interallied control on which the Soviet Government insisted a year ago, is a dangerous thing as far as the maintenance of future peace and security of nations is concerned. We are of the view that it is impossible to put off the accomplishment of these tasks without running the risk of frustrating the decision to carry out a complete military and economic disarmament of Germany.

“Such is the view of the Soviet Government regarding war industry and war potential of Germany. These considerations cannot hamper the development of peaceful industries in Germany.

“In order that the development of German peaceful industries may be of benefit to other peoples who need German coal, metal and manufactured products, Germany should be granted the right of export and import and if this right of foreign trade is to be effectuated we should not put obstacles in the way of the increase in the output of steel, coal and manufactured products of a peaceful nature in Germany, naturally within certain bounds and provided that an interallied control shall inevitably be established over German industry and over the Ruhr industries in particular.

“As we know the Control Council in Germany recently fixed the level which would be reached by German industries in the near future. Germany has not yet by far reached this level. Nevertheless it should already now be admitted that peaceful industries in Germany must be given an opportunity to develop on a wider scale provided only that this industrial development should really be used to satisfy the peaceful needs of the German people and the requirements of trade with other countries. All this calls for the establishment of a proper interallied control over German industries and over the Ruhr industries in particular. The responsibility for the latter cannot rest only upon one of the Allied countries. The adoption of a corresponding program for the development of German peaceful industries which will provide for the development of foreign trade of Germany as well as for the establishment of an interallied control over the whole of German industry satisfies the need for the implementation of the decisions of the Berlin Conference which provide for the treatment of Germany as an economic whole.

“It remains for me to dwell on the question of peace treaty with Germany.

“Of course we stand in principle for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, but before concluding this treaty there should be set up a single German government sufficiently democratic in order to be able to extirpate all remnants of fascism in Germany and sufficiently responsible in order to be able to fulfill all its obligations towards the Allies including and more particularly those in respect of reparation deliveries to the Allies. It goes without saying that we raise no objection to the setting up of a German central administration as a transitional step towards the establishment of a future German government.

“From what I have said it follows that before talking about a peace treaty with Germany it is necessary to solve the question of setting up an all-German government. However to this day no German central administration of any kind whatsoever has been created though the Soviet Government raised this question at the Berlin Conference a year ago. But while at that time this question was put off it is becoming now particularly urgent as the first step towards the establishment of a future German government. But even when a German government has been set up it will take a number of years to check up on what this new German government represents and whether it is trustworthy.

“A future German government must be such a democratic government as will be able to extirpate the remnants of fascism in Germany and which will at the same time be able to fulfill Germany’s obligations towards the Allies and amongst other things and above all it will be bound to carry out reparation deliveries to the Allies. Only when we become satisfied that the new German government is able to cope with these tasks and is really honestly fulfilling them in practice, only then will it be possible to speak seriously of concluding a peace treaty with Germany. Unless this condition is fulfilled Germany cannot claim a peace treaty and the Allied powers will not be able to say that they have fulfilled their duties towards the nations who are demanding that durable peace and security be assured.

“Such is the view of the Soviet Union on fundamental problems of Germany and on the question of a peace treaty with Germany.”

Mr. Byrnes said that he did not expect to make a long statement but did wish to refer to some of the statements which had been made concerning the demilitarization program. Also it had been stated that there was no plan for reparation. He wished to call attention to the fact that there was such a plan which had been agreed to by all of them and published on March 27, 1946.⁴ That plan of course provided that Germany would be treated as a single economic unit. In addition to the reparation plan, there was a wider demilitarization plan so far as the American zone was concerned. Forty-four large war plants had been dismantled 100% and twenty-four others were well advanced in being dismantled. Mr. Byrnes had with him a report on the status of demilitarization and industrial disarmament in the American zone. It set forth the names of the plants and gave full information. He would be glad to give a copy of the report to each of his colleagues and would appreciate receiving from them information on the status of demilitarization in their zones.

M. Molotov stated that this was a plan for advanced deliveries, not a plan for reparation.

Mr. Byrnes said that that was correct. However, the second document to which he had referred was a report on the war plants that had been dismantled. He wished next to take the opportunity to express a few thoughts on some of the things which had been said in the present discussion. He agreed with what had been said on treating Germany as an economic unit. It was now more than a year since they had agreed that Germany should be treated as an economic unit, yet today the zones represented airtight territories with no free exchange of commodities, of persons, or of ideas. Only through free trade in Germany and a common policy for foreign trade designed to serve Germany as a whole could they hope to bring about economic unity. They must adopt a common financial policy and have a common import-export program as was provided in the Potsdam Agreement. At Potsdam the Allies had said to the German people that it was their intention that the German people should be permitted to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a peaceful and democratic basis. It had to be admitted that little progress had been made. At any time they might now be faced by serious runaway inflation accompanied by economic paralysis in Germany. They would have to admit that these problems could not be solved by slogans or by speeches. Their aims must be accompanied by acts that had been carefully thought out and planned. In the light of those considerations he (Mr. Byrnes) had circulated on the previous day an American proposal for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany, substantially the same paper which had been circulated at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers on May 15. His suggestion was that the Council appoint special deputies, high ranking officers acting under the closest supervision of the members of the Council. With the help of the Foreign Ministers these special deputies should tackle the problems which had been mentioned by the four Delegations at the Council table and which each was willing to admit were not being solved. Reference had been made to the fact that if there was to be any progress, some form of German government would have to be established. He agreed that that was so. The special deputies could look into the question of the establishment of a German government and could make a report on the possibilities of the organization of a provisional government. In the American zone a plan had been worked out for a Council of Ministers who were the presidents of the several states. This plan was working satisfactorily. The deputies could look at it and see whether it was a wise plan and whether it could be improved. As a result some progress could be made toward the carrying out of the Potsdam commitments. Government in the American zone was decentralized, and that was in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. If the deputies should not agree to support that plan, they might report to the Council some plan for central administrative agencies, without which there could be no progress in Germany.

Mr. Byrnes remarked that the Council had just had the experience of trying to agree on draft treaties for Italy and the Balkan states. It had taken from September 10, 1945 to July 10, 1946 to get preliminary drafts, and they did not know how much longer it was going to take. He knew that his colleagues understood that his plan did not contemplate the early presentation of a treaty to Germany. This matter had been discussed before. The problem was that the Four Powers should agree among themselves what kind of a treaty they would wish to conclude after a central German government had been established. The German people should be given the opportunity to demonstrate their capacity to take their place among the free and equal nations. They could make no headway as long as Germany was divided into four separate zones with no communication between them. The German people had been given no indication of the ultimate fate awaiting them. This was one of the tasks which had been assigned to the Foreign Ministers by the heads of governments at Potsdam, and the time had arrived, in Mr. Byrnes’ view, when they ought at least to make a start by appointing special deputies who would present a plan for the approval of the Council of a peace treaty eventually to be concluded with a German government. As he understood the statements which had been made that afternoon, the French and British Delegations agreed to the plan of such special deputies. He wondered if his friend M. Molotov would not agree.

M. Bidault stated that it seemed that the interventions of the French Delegation were given less attention on questions which concerned France than on other matters in which France had taken part in order to bring about a settlement. He thought, however, that it was not necessary to exaggerate the character of the French proposals or to picture them as going beyond their actual scope. He had heard the annihilation of Germany spoken of. France had not proposed that, but what was important to France in this connection was the question of the possible annihilation of France. He wished to read the opinion of a qualified French expert. After setting forth the view that France did not contemplate making any annexations this expert said that if in 1914 France was able to hold until England could bring over large armies to hold at the Marne, at Arras and at the Yser, it was because the Russians engaged an important part of the German forces, invaded Silesia and threatened Berlin. To sum up, that expert went on, if we could not hold the Rhine permanently there would be no neutrality, no disarmament, no treaty clause that could prevent Germany from debouching from the Rhine to her advantage, and there would not be the possibility of relief coming from England or America in time to avert disaster on the plains of the north and complete defeat.

M. Bidault said that he had heard mentioned a moment ago the process of history. He thought that the process of history could fit in the lines which he had just read. The French Government considered it its mission and duty to prevent the process of history taking a course which had been disastrous to France. The lines he had quoted were written on March 31, 1919 by Marshal Foch.

M. Bidault concluded by saying that the French Government would certainly examine in the best spirit the various suggestions put forward at the meeting. It had already given its agreement in principle to the appointment of special deputies. He wished to repeat, however, that the position of the French Government was maintained in its entirety.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation did not believe that the work of the deputies on the German question could have any basis at this point because agreement had not been reached in the Council of Foreign Ministers on such a basis. The work of the deputies would not be based on any concrete foundation agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation thought it more appropriate not to refer the question to special deputies but to give more time to this question during the next year and to devote to German matters a special session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at a later date. The Soviet Delegation felt that at the present moment it was too soon to assign this task to deputies and that it was for the Foreign Ministers themselves to undertake the preparation of a basis for the further and more concrete elaboration of the German question. When such a basis had been agreed, then the Council would be able to instruct the deputies to work on the German question in a more specific way.

Mr. Byrnes wished to point out to the Soviet Delegation that the four governments had all agreed that Germany should be treated as an economic unit and that it was not actually being treated in that way at the moment. M. Molotov had pictured the seriousness of the problems confronting them in Germany. Since that was so, why could they not within the next few days agree on a basis on which the Deputies could work and then report to the Council some time later in the year. The French Delegation wished to know about German frontiers. That matter ought to be decided because intelligent handling of reparation depended upon it. If the Ministers appointed as deputies high ranking officials who would keep in close touch with them, they could try to reconcile the various differences and agreement might be reached at the next session of the Council. The deputies could also help settle current disagreements on Germany. Certainly it would do no harm to have four deputies in constant contact with each other and they might bring about some agreements. He did not ask the Soviet Delegation to commit itself definitely on this point at once. They might meet tomorrow and try to agree on a basis for the work of the deputies.

M. Molotov stated that in any case he had no objection to adjourning the meeting until tomorrow.

Mr. Bevin said that before adjourning the meeting he wished to raise a point which required immediate action. He was presenting a matter different from that proposed by Mr. Byrnes. He wished to get an immediate agreement on treating Germany as a whole on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement, so that instructions might be sent to the Control Council to act immediately in that sense. He was therefore circulating a paper on the subject. (The paper was then circulated.⁵) Mr. Bevin indicated that this proposal dealt only with immediate short term action. It did not in any way conflict with or detract from Mr. Byrnes’ proposal for the appointment of deputies to deal with major developments. All he asked was that the paper be studied and they come back tomorrow and agree to it.

M. Molotov said that he took this opportunity to circulate a draft of his own which referred to the Commission for the demilitarization and economic disarmament of Germany. (The Soviet Delegation’s draft was then circulated.)⁶ He was in doubt whether it would be possible for the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss the economic situation in Germany without hearing the views of the Control Council. The Soviet Delegation would, however, familiarize itself with the draft which Mr. Bevin had submitted.

M. Bidault stated that he did not wish to be behind his colleagues and was accordingly circulating a draft on the subject of coal. (The draft was then circulated.)⁷

It was decided to meet the next day at 4:00 p.m.

The meeting adjourned at 7:50 p.m.

99. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
1. July 12.
2. For the French text of Foreign Minister Bidault’s statement, see Documents Français relatifs à l’Allemagne, août 1945–février 1947 (Paris, 1947), p. 28.
3. Foreign Minister Molotov’s statement was published in the Soviet Government newspaper Izvestia on July 11, 1946.
4. The text of the plan for reparations and the level of post-war German economy of the Allied Control Council for Germany, March 27, 1946, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 14, 1946, p. 636. Regarding this plan, see telegram 891, March 27, 1946, from Berlin, vol. v, p. 533.
5. C.F.M. (46) 224, July 11, 1946, p. 900.
6. C.F.M. (46) 222, July 10, 1946, p. 878.
7. C.F.M. (46) 216, July 10, 1946, p. 878.