740.00119 Council/7–946
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State95
The Italian Ambassador called on me this morning at his request to say that he had been instructed to express to me the Italian Government’s profound disillusion and disappointment at American concurrence in the recent decisions by the Council of Foreign Ministers on the Italian treaty. He said that he and all thinking Italians deplored the anti-Allied incidents which had occurred throughout Italy in recent days, but he hoped that we would understand that these events were the immediate and spontaneous reaction of a hurt, angry people who felt that grave injustices had been done them by their friends.
At this point Tarchiani hesitated and then remarked that although his instructions covered only the expression of views given above, he wished to try to explain the present situation of the Italians for which he felt some personal responsibility since he had repeatedly assured de Gasperi that the United States Government appreciated the Italian point of view, would stand permanently for a just peace, and was sincerely desirous of aiding the establishment of Italian democracy on a stable foundation. He said he had received an impression of real friendship in his talks with the President, the Secretary, and officials of the Department and that he was still convinced that the American Government was sincerely friendly and sympathetic toward the new Italy. He reminded me that the Allies had during the war given various assurances to the Italian people and that he himself had been assured [Page 857] of American support on a number of occasions. For example, the President had said to him on four separate occasions that Trieste must remain Italian.
Tarchiani continued that he himself was fully aware of the great effort which the American Government had been making to implement these promises and obtain a just treaty for Italy. But, he said, the Italian people had no way of knowing the full story and perhaps they should not be blamed if they judged American friendship and American efforts in the treaty negotiations by appearances and results as well as in the light of the public assurances which the U.S. had given them. On the basis of these latter considerations it looked to the Italian people as if American support had failed them on all major treaty questions—colonies, reparations, Trieste, Tenda and Briga, and even the South Tyrol. He added that the Italians were by now convinced that the only treaty decision favorable to them—the Austrian frontier—had been due primarily to Soviet support of the Italian case, and that while they were well aware that Molotov’s position in that matter indicated a dislike for Austria rather than support of Italy, it nevertheless afforded an unhappy contrast to the “enthusiasm” with which the Secretary was reported by the press to have supported the French claim to Tenda and Briga.
At this point the Ambassador remarked that it seemed to him and to many members of the Italian Government that the Soviet Union had followed the principle of divide and rule and had endeavored to separate Italy from the other countries in Western Europe. Only this theory could explain the somewhat inconsistent Soviet attitude on various treaty questions. If, he said, this had been their aim, he feared they had succeeded all too well.
Continuing Tarchiani said that after accepting Allied assurances and looking to the Western Powers for friendship and support, the Italians now felt their contribution to the Allied war effort had been ignored and that those they had been led to believe their friends had in the end done them the greatest harm. This, he said, made the present situation all the harder for the Italians to bear as one could face wrongs done by one’s enemies but it was almost unbearable to have one’s friends impose injustices. He advanced the argument that insofar as the Italian people were concerned, the U.S. and the USSR were the protagonists of the only two ways of life today; that up to the present time U.S. prestige and influence had been dominant in Italy and life there had developed accordingly; but that in concurring in the CFM decisions especially on reparations and Trieste, American [Page 858] prestige had suffered a serious decline with a corresponding rise in the prestige of the USSR.
He felt, he said, that this prestige was the most important element of U.S. power in Italy and Europe; if it were to disappear with the imposition upon Italy of a peace settlement as now formulated he believed a direct consequence would be communist dominance of Italy. This, he said, would be first of all a disaster for the Italians but at the same time it would be a tragedy for the rest of Europe.
In conclusion Tarchiani said he was doubtful that anything could be done to change the situation but he urged that the general peace conference be assured of complete freedom of action and expression and also that Italy be given a full opportunity to present her views to the whole conference so as to afford a possibility for an amelioration of the CFM decisions.
In the course of the conversation I reminded the Ambassador of the unsparing efforts of this Government to achieve a just peace for all countries, of the importance to all of us of agreement in the CFM so that the general peace conference might be held and of the firm intention of this Government to give full consideration to the Conference recommendations. He readily acknowledged all of this but said he felt it was important to give some indication to the Italian people of a continuing American interest and expressed the hope in this connection that it might be possible to obtain early action on the Export-Import Bank loan to Italy and on the so-called suspense account. I said that I would speak to Mr. Clayton about these two matters and that I would also inform the President of his views.
- The substance of this conversation was reported in telegram 3403, Secdel 465, July 12, 1946, from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary, at Paris, not printed (740.00119 Council/7–946).↩