C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Fifteenth Informal Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 8, 1946, 5 p.m.

top secret

Present

France
M. Bidault (Chairman)
Interpreter
U.S. U.K
The Secretary Mr. Bevin
Mr. Bohlen Interpreter
U.S.S.R.
M. Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

M. Bidault said he had asked this meeting in order to try to get out of the impasse which was again a question of the priority of questions. He said he would propose as he had last Thursday69 that both be settled simultaneously in this restricted meeting. He said as regards the rules of procedure he felt there was only one important difference between them, that of voting procedure, and he suggested that which had been established for the United Nations; that is to say, two-thirds for the conference and a simple majority for the commission. The other question, that of the economic committees, was not so difficult. He said he did wish, however, to point out that under the suggested procedure France would be excluded from five of the ten commissions of the conference.70

Mr. Molotov said that if they could not agree on two economic commissions, he would suggest that they abolish the special economic [Page 829] commissions and have economic matters treated in the five political commissions. As to France he suggested that France might participate in the commissions on the same basis which it had in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The Secretary said that on the subject of France the United States had continually urged the right of France to participate in the drawing up of these treaties and therefore would obviously be in favor of France being a member of the commissions. He said on the general subject under discussion he had made very clear the position of the United States, which was that the peace conference should be free to adopt its own rules of procedure and that the United States would not bind itself in advance to force any rules of procedure on an international conference. He said if these suggested rules went as recommendations to the conference which would be free to adopt or reject them as it saw fit, then he would have no objection. He said our difficulties did not relate in substance to the rules themselves but to the general principle of attempting to impose on an international conference rules of procedure drawn up in advance by four countries. He pointed out that under the Moscow decision the recommendations of the conference would come back to the Council of Foreign Ministers, but that the United States had only agreed to this procedure on the understanding that the conference would be free and unhampered to discuss these questions and give its recommendation. He said if Mr. Molotov could not accept these conditions concerning the rules of procedure he would wish to renew his suggestion that the 21 countries set up a preparatory commission before the opening of the conference, as had been done in the United Nations conference in London. He said he saw no great difficulty in regard to the rules themselves but he did not wish to be in a position where, for example, if Dr. Evatt of Australia offered some suggestion concerning rules of procedure which seemed to the United States to be just and reasonable, not to be able to give its honest opinion because of a prior agreement.

Mr. Molotov said that the Ministers had taken on themselves the responsibility for this conference under the Berlin and Moscow decisions. It was their duty to prepare the work for the conference and to watch over decisions which they had made. He repeated that the Soviet Government had no objection to France participating in the conference on the same basis she had participated in the Council. As to the rules, he said there were only a few questions which remained open; in particular, the question of the economic commissions. As to voting, he felt that in the political commissions the voting should be by two-thirds, which would be the only way to obtain serious decisions. The technical commissions could set their own voting procedures, but in the political commissions vote should be by two-thirds. [Page 830] He stated that the Deputies had virtually agreed on structure and rules of procedure for the conference.

The Secretary replied that we might have different opinions but we should agree on the facts, and the fact was that neither the United States nor UK Deputies had agreed to any rules of procedure. He recalled again the reservation which Mr. Dunn had made at the Deputies’ meeting on July 5.

Mr. Bevin said that he had said all he could on the subject and that he could only agree to make recommendations to the conference and he could [not?] agree to accept the two-thirds rule for the commissions. He pointed out that in the United Nations organization all subcommissions of the General Assembly operated on a simple majority, under Article 99 of the Charter, and he saw no reason to adopt a different procedure for the conference.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that if we had a committee say of 21 nations, the majority would be composed of states which had not been at war with Finland, and you might have the absurd result that eleven countries not at war with Finland could adopt a decision against a minority of ten who had been at war with Finland. He said under such circumstances it would not obtain the signature of any of the countries at war with Finland.

The Secretary said he agreed with Mr. Molotov that it would not be correct but pointed out that the conference itself would operate on two-thirds vote and that any such resolution could not be passed by the conference.

Mr. Molotov repeated that without the two-thirds vote in the commissions you could get an absurd situation whereby the countries [not] at war with a given enemy country could determine the decision against the wish of the countries at war.

The Secretary pointed out that the recommendations came from the conference, which all were agreed would vote on a two-thirds rule, and not from the commissions.

Mr. Bevin said that the key to the difficulties of substance lay in voting procedure. He said he could give illustrations whereby everything could be blocked by the minority in these commissions, and he felt that since all those countries had fought along side they should have a right to express their views through a majority vote.

Mr. Molotov repeated his argument in favor of the two-thirds rule in the commission.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that under this suggestion there would be no provision made for a minority opinion ever reaching the conference.

The Secretary said, reverting to the main issue, that the United States had always taken the view and Mr. Molotov knew that this was one war and that, for example, Norway had lost ships and men at sea [Page 831] in the common cause although she was not technically at war with the satellite nations. He repeated the United States position against imposition of rules of procedure on an international conference. He said he questioned the right of the Council to draw rules for the conference, which under the Moscow decision would be an independent body which would return recommendations to the Council which the Council could then reject or accept in whole or in part. He said he wished to make clear again in regard to the agreements they had reached on the peace treaties that the United States would vote for and support every single one at the peace conference.

Mr. Bevin said that he had hoped when M. Bidault asked them to assemble here a solution could be found and that he also wished to state that on the authority of the British Government they would support every agreement reached here but that he had no authority to bind the British Government to any recommendations of procedure for this conference. He said if the invitations could go out he felt that they could agree on recommendations to the peace conference and that the only question of real importance was voting in the commissions and he must insist that some provision must be made for minority opinions to reach the conference.

M. Bidault said that under the French proposal, Article 29, the conference would have the right to amend or reject these proposals after they were adopted. He repeated the suggestion that the two-thirds rule should apply to the conference itself and the general commission, but the majority rule should apply in other commissions.

Mr. Molotov said he was not suggesting that all rules of procedure be drawn up but merely a few basic principles.

Mr. Bevin said that he could accept M. Bidault’s suggestion provided it was clear that the conference had the right to adopt its own rules and that the British Government was not bound to vote against any suggested changes.

Mr. Molotov outlined the structure of the conference as he proposed. He suggested namely that there should be a general commission which would coordinate the work of the other commissions, five political commissions, one legal, one drafting and one military, and either two economic commissions—one for the Italian treaty and the other for the Rumanian treaty—or else abolish the economic commissions for the time.

M. Bidault then read his suggested last paragraph which would go at the end of the invitation to be sent the other governments, namely: “In order to facilitate the work of the conference the proposals concerning the organization and rules of procedure which are recommended for the conference for its consideration are being handed [Page 832] to the Embassy (Legation).”71 He said France would be willing to agree to Mr. Bevin’s suggestion that if no agreement could be reached in the commissions, two or more reports reflecting the various views should be sent to the conference.

Mr. Bevin inquired whether he would be expected to support such recommendations at the conference.

Mr. Molotov said that unless they were willing to support the recommendations there was no point of wasting any time discussing them.

Mr. Bevin replied that he had tried many suggestions to settle this issue but apparently unless the Soviet views were accepted Mr. Molotov regarded the discussion as a waste of time.

Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet Delegation did not wish to violate the Moscow Agreement and that in effect they were holding five peace conferences in one whereas after the last war there had been separate conferences for each enemy country. He repeated his objection to the majority rule in the commissions but said he had no objection to M. Bidault’s proposal, namely, that if a two-thirds vote was not obtained in any commission, two or more reports reflecting the various views could be submitted to the conference.

The Secretary said he wished to return to the main point at issue, namely, whether or not the four of them will be bound to support only the rules of procedure that they might agree on or whether they would be free to consider on its merits any amendment or new proposal which might be brought up at the conference on the subject of procedure.

Mr. Molotov stated it was their duty to facilitate the work of the conference; that in view of the different status of the five treaties the countries who were actually at war with a given enemy country should be safeguarded against decisions which they could not accept.

Mr. Bevin said that he understood the commissions would be composed of 20 countries for the Italian treaty, 11 for Rumania, 12 for Bulgaria and Hungary, and 10 for Finland, with France being deemed to have been at war with these countries for the purpose of this conference. He said the British Delegation had done its best to meet Mr. Molotov’s views and he felt it was Mr. Molotov’s turn to make a suggestion.

Mr. Molotov repeated that in reality they had five conferences and that they should strive for unanimity in these treaties but at the very least for a two-thirds vote on political questions. He said, for example, a 6–5 or 7–6 decision would be dangerous and undesirable. He repeated that he agreed that if a two-thirds majority could not be reached in any commission the different views could be reported to the conference. In respect to Mr. Bevin’s question he also agreed that even if a two-thirds [Page 833] majority was achieved in the commission the minority could still present its views to the conference.

After further discussion in which the points of view previously outlined were repeated it was agreed that there should be a short adjournment while M. Bidault drew up a clean draft of his suggestions.

After the adjournment and some further discussion the following agreements were reached:

1.
Agreement on text of invitation to include as a last paragraph: “With the view of facilitating the work of the Conference proposals concerning organization and rules of procedure which have been recommended for its consideration are being handed to the Embassy (Legation).”
2.
The French revised Article 13 concerning the general commission which was to vote by two-thirds majority.
3.
Article 29 of the French draft proposals setting forth the right of the Conference after the adoption of the rules to amend or suspend any part of them.
4.
British proposal for voting in the commissions: “Should a two-thirds majority be obtained in any commission, the commission’s report will be presented as a recommendation but the minority shall have the right to present its views and to ask for a decision. Should a two-thirds majority in any commission not be obtained, the commission will submit two or more reports to the general commission (or to the Conference), each member retaining his full right to present his own point of view and to request that this should be subject to a decision in the general commission (or in the Conference)
5.
The composition of the five political committees to be made up of the states at war with a given enemy country plus France, who, however, would not have the right of vote.
6.
Two economic committees, one for the Italian treaty and one for the Bulgarian treaty, composition not determined.

Although no specific agreement was set forth it was generally understood that the full conference would make recommendations on substantive matters by two-thirds majority and on procedure matters by simple majority.

The Secretary in agreeing to these proposals said that he wished it clearly understood that when the conference convened the United States was entirely free to accept or reject on its merits any amendment or new proposals concerning rules of procedure which might be offered. He said he had no particular changes or amendments in mind but he could not bind the United States in advance to taking a dishonest position in regard to any amendment or new proposal on rules of procedure because of prior agreement with his three colleagues.

Mr. Molotov stated that he felt that it was up to the head of each Delegation to decide its view on any new suggestions or amendments [Page 834] to the rules of procedure, that there was no need for a decision to that effect but that it should be left to the heads of each Delegation.

The Secretary said that on that condition he was prepared to accept the proposals concerning procedure and he hoped that the invitations could be sent out promptly.

It was agreed that the invitations, with the last paragraph suggested by M. Bidault, will be dispatched tomorrow morning and that the Deputies would put into final form the points agreed on concerning procedure for submission to the Ministers at five o’clock tomorrow.

  1. July 4.
  2. Under consideration at this point were the French proposals, C.F.M.(D) (46) 52 and 53, April 2, 1946, pp. 38 and 43, respectively.
  3. For text of the invitation to the Peace Conference as finally approved by the Council, see C.F.M.(46) 190 (revised), July 8, 1946, infra.