740.00119 Council/3–2146: Telegram
The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:17 p.m.]
3256. Delsec 297 from Dunn. Organization of Paris Conference was considered in preliminary exchange of views by deputies March 20 when French memo (attached to record of 30th meeting March 16) was discussed. In general, French plan proposed there be (A) plenary conference (B) general commission consisting of heads of all delegations of invited states which would direct work of conference and to which a secretariat would be attached (C) special commissions (military, economic, territorial, etc) to which pertinent parts of draft treaties would be referred (D) an administrative secretariat (which might be exclusively French).
After US and UK Delegations made some comments and suggestions on French paper, Gusev, saying he had no instructions and was [Page 31] presenting his personal views, raised questions concerning (1) name of conference (2) tasks of conference and manner of their execution (3) role of CFM at conference.
On (1) he said it was not a peace conference but, as Moscow decision of December 1945 states, a conference for the purpose of considering draft peace treaties. Other delegations said name of conference not a matter of importance.
On point (2) all agreed it was clear from Moscow decision that task of conference was to consider draft treaties and to make recommendations. Gusev raised question whether all states represented at conference would participate in consideration all 5 treaties regardless of whether they were at war with the enemy states in question. I said I saw no reason for differentiation between the various states represented at conference although naturally the states most directly interested would serve on the various subcommissions. Couve and Jebb took same position. Gusev limited himself to pointing out that there was a difference between states and the discussion was not carried further.
Gusev stated with reference to his point (3) that CFM should, of course, continue to function during conference if they found it necessary. UK and French deputies believed CFM would have no specific role as such at conference itself.
Position of the 5 enemy states was also brought up. It was agreed that they would not be participants in conference in same sense as Allied states. I made clear, however, that my government considered that our four governments had agreed in exchange of letters in January between you and Bidault that the enemy states in question would be able to express their views and to discuss the draft treaties at the Paris Conference. British and French supported this view. Gusev referred to the Moscow decision and appeared to suggest that under its terms enemy states would not be asked to express views until after conference had agreed upon recommendations. I pointed out that letter of January 13 to Bidault was agreed to by US, UK and Soviet Governments and that it was in no way inconsistent with Moscow decision.
From this preliminary exchange of views it is apparent that Gusev, and presumably Soviet Government, conceives of Paris Conference as a meeting at which the great powers responsible under the Moscow decision for drafting the 5 treaties will push through their agreed drafts, limiting the role of the smaller Allied states and the consultation, if any, of the 5 enemy states to a minimum.