C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes
United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Fourteenth Informal Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 4, 1946, 5:45 p.m.46
Present
| [France] | ||
| M. Bidault [Chairman] | ||
| French Interpreter | ||
| [U.S.A.] | [U.S.S.R.] | |
| Mr. Byrnes | Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Pavlov | |
| [U.K.] | ||
| Mr. Bevin | ||
| British Interpreter |
Mr. Bidault said he had asked for this most restricted meeting since it was obvious that they would not be able to get out of the impasse at the larger meetings. Their difficulty related, in his opinion, not to the substance of the questions but to the priority of their discussion, namely, whether the date of the peace conference or reparations should be considered first. He felt that the only solution was to decide both at the same time in this informal meeting and then return to the plenary session and announce the decisions they had reached.
The Secretary stated that some days ago he thought it had been agreed that they would settle the question of Trieste, the Italian colonies, then fix the date of the peace conference and then go on to the German question with, however, the understanding that they would return to the discussion of reparations. He said he wished to make it clear, as he had stated on a number of occasions, that the United States was prepared to reexamine the question of reparations but that this could be more easily and voluntarily done once the date of the peace conference had been set. The United States objected to being told that they must agree to something before the date of the peace conference could be set. He said that gave the appearance of being forced into an agreement in order to secure a peace conference. [Page 772] He said in such circumstances it would be very difficult for the United States to make any change in its position on reparations. He said that he had in private conversations told Mr. Molotov that the United States might be prepared to consider a change in its position of current production but only if the reparations question was to be discussed on its merits, and he repeated that he could not bring any new approach to the reparations problem if it was to be discussed under threat of a refusal to call a peace conference. He said he must ask his colleagues to understand his position and for them to realize, in view of the position he had taken before, how impossible it would be for him to change that position if there was any appearance that it was being done under threat.
Mr. Molotov said there was no question of any threat and that it was not correct to so interpret the position of the Soviet delegation. What was involved was a question that was directly connected with the peace conference and was one of the fundamental questions which should be settled before the preparations for a peace conference could be regarded as completed. He added that everyone knew the peace conference would be held but it should be held when preparations have been completed. The Soviet delegation felt that this question of reparations must be settled. The Soviet delegation had gone far to meet the wishes of the other delegations on other questions and expected reciprocity of treatment. Reparations was not a new question and, as he understood the matter, there was no serious objection to the substance of the Soviet proposal. He therefore saw no difficulty in settling it and thought the Soviet request was legitimate.
Mr. Bidault said that the question remained which came first: the peace conference or reparations, and he repeated his statement that at this private informal meeting they could agree on both and then announce at the plenary meeting the final agreement. He therefore wished to make the following tentative suggestion: (1) that the peace conference be convoked for July 29, and (2) it be agreed that in the treaty it should be stated that the Soviet Union will receive $100,000,000 of reparation from Italy. He said he thought that this was a reasonable suggestion and if accepted would mean the end of their efforts, for which each one of them had made sacrifices.
Mr. Molotov inquired if Mr. Bidault meant there would be a reference in the treaty to current production as a source of reparation.
Mr. Bidault replied that current production was mentioned in the French proposal but what he suggested was that in the treaty there merely be the statement that the Soviet Union would receive $100,000,000.
The Secretary said everyone appreciated Mr. Bidault’s efforts, that he wished to repeat that he could not discuss reparation in the absence of a date for the peace conference. The American people would [Page 773] not like the appearance of a threat and it would be impossible for him to change his position on reparations in such circumstances. He said he thought that the Soviet Government as well as other governments knew that the United States was not niggardly in regard to financial matters and that if the date of the peace conference was set, the United States would be in a position to reconsider its previous position. He felt if it was done as Mr. Bidault suggested, it would be interpreted as a deal in order to attain a peace conference and the people of the United States do not like deals.
Mr. Bidault said it was not a question of a deal but rather an attempt to settle two outstanding questions.
Mr. Bevin said that Mr. Bidault as a parliamentarian should understand his (Bevin’s) position. He could not defend his position in Parliament if he went out of this room with the implication that he had bought a peace conference for $100,000,000 from the Soviet Union. In addition there were claims of other countries, such as Greece, Yugoslavia and Ethiopia and he could not be accused of buying a peace conference at their expense. He added that everyone knew that the United States and Great Britain desired to settle the Soviet claims for reparations in a just and amicable manner. He could not accept the implication that he had bought it. The British people were not in the habit of making such deals and he personally could not be a party to such an arrangement. He had made statements in Parliament on reparation and if some such deal on the subject was now made, it would cast doubt on the manner in which their other decisions had been reached.
Mr. Molotov replied that there was no intention to buy anything but only to ask consideration for the legitimate claims of the Soviet Union. He would not like to have to tell Soviet public opinion that their Allies had refused this modest request. He felt this would have very bad consequences and would arouse great resentment. The Soviet Government had been patient for a long time and he felt that a refusal would not only be misunderstood in the Soviet Union but by many people in other countries, including the United States, Great Britain and France. He added that this exchange of views had left him with the impression that there was no basic objection to the Soviet claims and that if he was correct in this he would not object to taking up, first, at the regular session the date of the peace conference and then reparation, with the expectation, that both would be settled today.
The Secretary said he was most happy to hear Mr. Molotov’s words and that he was prepared to stay in session until the reparation question was settled and he wished to assure Mr. Molotov that his position had not been prompted by stubbornness and was based on his knowledge of the views of the people of the United States. He said they all wanted to get maximum support for their decisions and it was therefore [Page 774] important that the correct method be chosen in order to insure such support.
Mr. Molotov said his attitude in regard to the peace conference had not gone beyond the limits of the Moscow decision.
Mr. Bevin said he agreed with Mr. Byrnes and that once the date of the conference was fixed he was certain it would be possible to get a satisfactory solution to the reparation question.
Mr. Bidault suggested again that they might agree on the total amount but both the Secretary and Mr. Bevin objected for reasons previously stated and suggested that they return to the meeting and take up the peace conference first.
Mr. Molotov said he was confident that his colleagues would give sympathetic consideration to the Soviet desires on reparation.