Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-First Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 1, 1946, 5 p.m.⁴

Paris, July 1, 1946, 5 p.m.

secret

Report of the Deputies

Mr. Bevin opened the meeting and called upon Mr. Dunn to give the report of the Deputies.

Mr. Dunn stated that the Deputies in their morning meeting had not considered the question of the agenda for the present meeting of the Ministers since the latter had on Saturday decided upon the subjects which they would consider.

Mr. Dunn said that the Deputies had agreed to submit to the Ministers the question of the procedure for settling differences over interpretation of the treaties. The Drafting Committee had produced an agreed draft article on this point for inclusion in the peace treaty with Italy (CFM(46)150).⁵ This draft was acceptable to all four delegations, but the acceptance of it by the Soviet Deputy was made conditional upon acceptance of the draft article proposed by the Soviet delegation for the Balkan and Finnish treaties (CFM(46)165).⁶ The United States and United Kingdom Deputies were not prepared to accept the Soviet proposal for the Balkan and Finnish treaties. The matter was accordingly referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The Council approved the report of the Deputies.

Agenda for the Present Meeting

Mr. Bevin recalled that at the previous meeting he had agreed to submit a new draft on the subject of the Danube in order to clarify the proposals which had been made. That draft had now been circulated and he wished to ask whether the other delegations found it acceptable.

M. Molotov said that this question was not on the agenda. They could discuss it at the next meeting.

Mr. Bevin said that he didn’t mind. He had thought that it was expected that he would circulate this new draft, and he had done so. The first item on the agenda was the Italian colonies.

M. Molotov said that he understood the first item to be the Yugoslav-Italian frontier.

Mr. Bevin said that he had the impression that they would take the colonies first, then the Yugoslav-Italian frontier. He was willing to abide by whatever the Council decided. He had thought that that was the order which had been determined on Saturday.

Mr. Byrnes thought that the colonies had been placed first.

M. Molotov said that according to his record the first subject was the Yugoslav-Italian frontier, the second the colonies, the third was the Peace Conference, and the fourth Germany.

Mr. Bevin said that his record put the colonies first, then the Yugoslav-Italian frontier, the Peace Conference, and Germany. He suggested that M. Bidault enlighten the Council since the agenda had been his suggestion.

M. Bidault said that the Italian colonies were certainly on the agenda, but that he could not be sure just what order of priority had been agreed upon, although he was sure that it had been understood that both questions, the colonies and the frontier, would be taken up before the discussion of the date of the Peace Conference. He had proposed that the Council consider the Italo-Yugoslav frontier question and then the date for the Peace Conference. Mr. Bevin had then added that he wanted the colonies discussed. In the absence of agreed minutes it could not be said definitely what order had been decided, if any. It would be easy enough to decide the matter today. If the opinion of the French Delegation should be asked, it was that at the present stage of the Council’s work they would do well to take the more difficult problem first and proceed to the less difficult; that is, they should consider first the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and Trieste, and then the colonies. To use the French saying, they should take the bull by the horns. The French Delegation would, of course, agree to any other proposal regarding the agenda.

Mr. Bevin said that he had no strong feeling on the matter. They might begin with the Yugoslav-Italian frontier. But he wished to circulate immediately his document on the colonies so that his colleagues might have it before them. The French and Russian texts would be available shortly. (The document was then circulated.)⁷

Yugoslav-Italian Frontier and Trieste

Mr. Bevin asked whether there were any observations.

M. Molotov said that, if no other delegation wished to take the floor, he had a proposal to make. The Soviet Delegation believed that the proposal which M. Bidault had made on Saturday could be taken as a basis for settlement of the question of Trieste.⁸ For its part, the Soviet Delegation wished to make certain amendments and was distributing the text of a proposed Statute of Trieste consisting of six points. M. Molotov then read the Soviet proposal as follows:

[Here follows the text of the Soviet proposal, C.F.M.(46) 178, July 1, 1946, printed on page 714.]

M. Molotov added that he felt it necessary to state that the Soviet Government considered such a Statue for Trieste as being far from satisfactory. He had no doubt that it would satisfy neither Yugoslavia nor Italy. However, in view of the failure of other attempts to find a solution, the Soviet Delegation thought that such a solution as this would make it possible to overcome the difficulties. He did not see any need to point out the differences between the Soviet draft and that of M. Bidault. These differences appeared to be evident, but if necessary, he was prepared to explain them.

Mr. Brynes said that he would like to ask what M. Molotov meant by the words “Trieste with its immediately adjacent territory”.

M. Molotov said that it would be necessary to look at the map and determine what territory would be considered as adjacent. For his part, lie was willing to make certain proposals.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had a map available. He wondered if the Soviet Representative would indicate on it what he meant by the immediately adjacent territory.

M. Molotov said that he had a map on hand and would indicate on it the territory which, in his view, could be accepted as being the territory immediately adjacent to the city of Trieste. In doing this he was assuming that it would be possible to discuss the proposal in greater detail and felt that some amendments might be made as a consequence of that discussion.

M. Molotov then circulated the map⁹ showing the proposed Trieste area which would be placed under international control.

Mr. Byrnes asked whether it was understood that the remainder of the territory west of the French Line^9a would remain in Italy.

M. Molotov said that he intended to put forward a proposed line for the Yugoslav-Italian frontier. In his view such a line should be drawn as closely as possible to the ethnic line. The line which he was now proposing was a compromise line. If accepted, it would leave 60,000 Italians in Yugoslavia and 36,000 Yugoslavs in Italy.

Mr. Byrnes asked whether M. Molotov had traced this line on a map.

M. Molotov said that he had and circulated a map⁹ showing the line. He called the line a compromise between the former Soviet proposal and the French Line. The population to the east of this compromise line was almost exclusively Slovene, while the population to the west of it was almost exclusively Italian.

Mr. Byrnes asked whether the figures cited were those of 1910 or 1945.

M. Molotov said they came from the 1910 census.

After several minutes of silence, Mr. Bevin remarked that they had the bull by the horns.

M. Molotov said that if so, it should be in accordance with the ethnic principle.

Mr. Bevin said that they would have to decide which end of the bull was economic and which end was ethnic.

Mr. Byrnes said that he could not understand how the figures M. Molotov had given should be so different from those presented by the French Delegation, and confirmed by the U.S. Delegation, respecting the population in the areas on both sides of the French Line.

M. Molotov said that the reason was that, in the figures he had cited Trieste was not included either in Italian or Yugoslav territory. That was what changed the whole picture.

Mr. Byrnes said that he should be glad to consider the Soviet proposal. He had to say, however, that judging from the map which had been circulated, he did not see how it would be possible for the United States to agree to a proposal of this character. At London, the Council had agreed to draw a frontier which would be in the main the ethnic line. Such a line had been drawn by the French expert on the Commission of Investigation and had been finally agreed to by the U.S. Delegation. That line gave Yugoslavia 3,124 square miles with 450,000 inhabitants. It gave Italy only 505 square miles with 423,000 inhabitants. Time and again he had said that this solution was exceedingly generous to Yugoslavia. Under it Yugoslavia would acquire some $191 million worth of mines: coal mines, bauxite mines, etc. Now an international solution had been proposed which would give Yugoslavia more territory than the U.S. Delegation had ever been willing it should have under the London agreement. If any international solution were to be considered, it was obvious that it would only be fair to consider increasing the territory, as by going back to the line recommended by the American expert and by taking in Pola and other Italian cities. That area would come under the international control of the Security Council.

Mr. Byrnes continued that one had only to look at the map which he was passing around¹⁰ to see that the French Line was exceedingly generous to Yugoslavia in awarding to it the whole Istrian Peninsula except a small strip. He could not agree to consider the transfer of any territory west of the French Line to Yugoslavia, He wished to call attention to the map which the Soviet Delegation had circulated showing the proposed frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia. This proposal would take Gorizia out of the territory to be left to Italy under the French Line and would give it to Yugoslavia. It assigned Tarvisio to Yugoslavia and thus cut the railway connection between Austria and Italy. It left Trieste an island and added so little surrounding territory that it did not leave all the city’s streetcar lines inside the proposed international zone. It cut the streetcar line to Opicina and the line which went up the coast. It completely separated the city of Trieste from Italy, leaving it as an island in Yugoslav territory. If anyone was seriously proposing an international free state, he could certainly afford to take in more territory instead of less territory. So far as the details of the Soviet proposal were concerned, he confessed that he had not had the opportunity to study them. He would be glad to do so and would later express any further views which he might have.

Mr. Bevin said that, speaking for the U.K. Delegation, he had received authority that if a satisfactory line were drawn and the zone were made contiguous to Italy, he could discuss a constitution for an international zone, but the line now drawn by the Soviet Delegation handed over large areas to Yugoslavia. He felt that it would be beyond the limits of his instruction to discuss it at all. When the U.K. Delegation agreed to the French Line, thus giving up the British Line, it had known that it was sacrificing a good many Italians in the coastal area. He had thought that, in any proposal for the internationalization of Trieste, there would be a real possibility of extending the area of the international zone. Strategically, under the Soviet proposal it looked as if Italy would be absolutely dominated. He noticed also that the line was drawn in such a way that the shipyards were cut off from Trieste.

M. Molotov asked to what shipyards Mr. Bevin was referring.

Mr. Bevin said that he meant the shipyards at Muggia. Trieste depended to some extent on the work which was done there. He had also been hoping that, if they could find a good frontier line, giving the international zone sufficient territory on which people could live decently, it might be possible to create such an autonomous state as was proposed. On the basis of the draft constitution which M. Molotov had put forward, they might be able to reach an agreement. However, it would be more honest to face the necessary odium and go against what the British had sincerely believed and give the Trieste area to Yugoslavia than to create such a situation as was proposed on the map now before them. He was afraid that if this was the only proposal put forward, he should be driven back to the position where he was in the previous week and would have to stick to his suggestion that the whole Trieste area go to Italy.

Mr. Byrnes wished to point out that at Muggia, in addition to the shipyards, there were important oil refineries.

M. Molotov said that he was ready to add this area to the international zone of Trieste. Then the refineries and shipyards would be in the zone.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that there were other difficulties. For example, the water supply of Trieste was north of the city near Duino. The Soviet proposal gave it to Yugoslavia. Near Opicina were located the transformers essential to the entire city. By the proposed line they were cut off from the city. So far as the U.S. Delegation was concerned, it would not agree to transfer to Yugoslavia any territory west of the French Line. After all, the territory which would go to Yugoslavia under the French Line included 86% of the Istrian Peninsula. This line was exceedingly generous to Yugoslavia. He was not sure whether it could be said that it was fair to Italy.

M. Bidault wished to say that the French Line, which he still supported, would be neither inequitable nor unjust to anybody. The Council was now faced by a difficulty which was not unforeseen. It was a question of bridging the difference which existed between the Soviet proposal and the original proposal of the French Delegation. The difficulties in reconciling these proposals certainly were not insurmountable. However, concerning the territorial issue, from what he had heard at the present meeting, he could see that the difficulty was very great. Pie wondered whether, resting for his part on the French Line, it would be opportune to take the time to see whether the conflicting views could be composed.

M. Molotov said that it seemed to him clear that they must study more carefully the question of the boundary between Yugoslavia and Italy on the basis of the proposals that had been made, but they ought to have some basis on which to proceed. Therefore, the question might first be given further study. From what had been said at the present meeting, he understood that the proposal for internationalization of Trieste made by the French Delegation had been found acceptable to the United States and United Kingdom Delegations. For his part, he had already said that the Soviet Delegation considered it acceptable as a basis. He did not suggest that the Council accept at once inclusion of this or that piece of territory within the Trieste territory. They could revert to that later. He did want to note that no proposals had been made other than that of the Soviet Delegation. They might wait until the other delegations had submitted more specific proposals, but he wished to stress that some basis must be found immediately for a solution.

Mr. Byrnes said that he would be surprised if there was any misunderstanding concerning the position of the U.S. Delegation because he had not expressed any approval of the French proposal for the internationalization of Trieste. He had not discussed it at all. He had stated that he would study the Soviet proposal which had been made at this meeting and in doing so he had made some inquiries regarding what was intended by the phrase “territory immediately adjacent to Trieste”. It was true that he had made no specific proposal at this meeting. In the many months during which this matter had been under discussion, he had proposed first an American Line, had then supported the French Line, had proposed a plebiscite and then had proposed that the matter be sent to the Peace Conference. The record would show that the U.S. Delegation had made proposals and was now standing by its proposal to accept the French Line. He wanted it noted and remembered that at London the members of the Council had solemnly agreed that the Yugoslav-Italian frontier would be the ethnic line, and three of the members of the Council had now agreed that the French Line was the ethnic line.

Mr. Bevin said that like Mr. Byrnes, he had already abandoned his original line with a view to reaching agreement. He thought that this method of trying to get a compromise on a compromise was not quite fair bargaining. Before the Council could study the question of a constitution for any part of this territory, they must settle the question where the frontier should run. He could not go beyond the French Line, and in saying that made the reservation that if part of the territory was to go not to Italy but into an international zone, then the possibility of extending the territory of the zone south of the French Line should be envisaged. This territory was mainly Italian and would be included in the international zone by a slight change of the French Line in the south.

Mr. Bevin did not see any great difficulties preventing agreement on the constitution of the international zone on the basis of the French and Soviet proposals. That should be comparatively easy if they could only get prior agreement on the question of the frontier. Whatever might happen to Trieste, its communications with the rest of Italy should not be cut.

M. Molotov asked what the U.K. Delegation was suggesting in the way of a concrete proposal.

Mr. Bevin said that the Council must first agree on the boundary and then decide whether there was justification for putting any portion of the territory into an international zone. In his view, the French Line was acceptable subject to an adjustment in the south to cover the point he had raised. If only that could be settled, then the other problem concerning the Statute of an international zone of Trieste could be discussed.

M. Molotov asked what was being proposed with respect to the definition of the international zone of Trieste.

Mr. Bevin said that he could not be a party to any definition on that zone until he knew what territory was going to be Italian and what was going to be Yugoslav. He would then be prepared to discuss whether any part of that territory, including the territory south of the French Line which he had mentioned, would be placed within the international zone.

M. Bidault said that he had become accustomed to sacrificing himself in attempts to arrive at compromises, but that he was willing once more to take the plunge. The French proposal regarding the Statute of the international territory of Trieste had been made after rather careful preparation. He now wished to make an improvised proposal which would take into account what had been said at the present meeting and also would be based on the original French Line, to which the French Delegation still adhered. Under this new proposal, everything east of the French Line would go to Yugoslavia. The international territory of Trieste would include the area west of the French Line from Duino to Cittanova d’Istria. This solution would maintain the line which several of the delegations had already accepted and also the principle of internationalization which appeared to be the only possible solution.

M. Bidault continued that the French Delegation had once again taken the responsibility of presenting a compromise and the risk of irritating everybody in the hope of trying to arrive at concrete agreement. The French Delegation hoped that its attempts would be understood and that its new proposal would receive sympathetic consideration.

Mr. Bevin said, by way of comment on M. Bidault’s proposal, that he had always felt that the French Line should extend further south to the Canale di Leme, a few miles below Parenzo. That population was practically all Italian.

Mr. Byrnes mentioned the fact that the additional area mentioned by Mr. Bevin had a population of some 23,000, of whom 18,000 were Italians. In any effort to establish a stable and peaceful settlement, certainly it would be wise to extend the area to the south as Mr. Bevin had suggested.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation had an amendment to suggest to the French proposal. He proposed that south of Trieste the line should be drawn so as to follow the Morgan Line,¹¹ the line which divided the Yugoslav and Allied zones of occupation.

Mr. Byrnes said that the Morgan Line had been established for military reasons without any idea of its being an ethnic line such as the Council, at its meeting in London in September, had decided should be drawn as the final frontier.

M. Molotov said that when the Morgan Line was drawn, account was taken of ethnic factors, although the line did not exactly correspond to the ethnic line.

Mr. Byrnes said that his information was quite different. When the Morgan Line was drawn, the war was still going on. The line had been established to facilitate the moving of troops to the Far East. At that time no consideration had been given to an ethnic line. The ethnic line had come into the picture at London when the Foreign Ministers had taken the decision to instruct the Deputies to report on a line which would be in the main an ethnic line leaving a minimum under alien rule.

Mr. Bevin said that if a line such as M. Molotov had proposed was to be adopted, there would be no justification at all for creating an international zone. If the ethnic plan was to be followed south of Trieste, why could it not be followed north of Trieste also, and then the whole area to the west of the ethnic line could be left to Italy and there need be no international zone at all. The Morgan Line, of course, was not an ethnic line at all. The number of Italians in the area south of the Morgan Line down to the Canale di Leme was certainly much more numerous than the Slovenes in the narrow coastal strip north of Trieste around Duino. There were some 175,000 Italians south and east of the Morgan Line, while the number of Slovenes in the Duino area would be at the most 8,000.

M. Molotov said that the statistics given by Mr. Bevin were open to serious doubt. They did not correspond to the objective facts. The Soviet Delegation in making its proposal had had the purpose of leaving as few Yugoslavs as possible outside Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs which had been under Italian rule had suffered a long period of oppression, and their aspirations were worthy of the attention and support of the Allies.

Mr. Bevin said that his purpose had been to show that there would be no justification, if the Morgan Line were taken, for setting up an international zone at all. The area West of the line might as well be given directly to Italy.

After a period of silence, Mr. Bevin asked whether there were any further comments.

M. Molotov suggested that the Council accept, without amendment, the proposal made by M. Bidault.

M. Bidault said that he naturally agreed with his own proposal. He then suggested that the Council adjourn for fifteen minutes to give it further consideration.

Mr. Bevin said that he wished to clarify the issue, in order that they might all understand exactly what they were considering. M. Bidault had proposed that all territory east of the French Line would go to Yugoslavia. West of the French Line there would be an international zone extending from Duino in the north to the terminus of the French Line in the south. M. Molotov had suggested accepting that proposal without amendment. The Council should consider, if such a proposal should be adopted, what should be the constitution of the international zone and the nature of the international control. On that subject, two proposals had been made, one by M. Bidault and the other by M. Molotov. The members of the Council should also consider whether they were ready to deal with these questions at this meeting or wished to take time for further study.

The Council then adjourned for twenty-five minutes.

After Mr. Bevin had re-opened the meeting, Mr. Byrnes stated that he would, of course, agree to the line proposed by M. Bidault as the eastern frontier of Yugoslavia. He was not prepared to make a further statement that afternoon concerning whether an area on the other side of that line should be internationalized. He had said time and again that he thought that area should go to Italy. He would look into it further and would be able to make a statement on the subject at the next meeting.

Mr. Bevin said that, as he had stated early in the meeting, he had authority to study plans for the internationalization of the Trieste area provided that the territory was saisfactorily defined. The proposals for determining the area of the international zone and those which concerned its constitution and administration had only just been made. It seemed as if more progress might be made if the matter were left for discussion the next day. The U.K. Delegation, of course, accepted without any question the proposition that the territory east of the French Line should go to Yugoslavia. Some progress had been made on this difficult question and the points had now been narrowed to a very definite issue. Was it possible to carry it any further at the present meeting?

M. Molotov said that he wished to give the view of the Soviet Delegation. He had agreed to the French Line as the boundary line of Yugoslavia. He agreed also to M. Bidault’s proposal concerning the boundaries of the international zone of Trieste. He was also agreeable to taking as a basis for the Statute of Trieste the French proposal as modified by the amendments proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

Mr. Bevin said that the question of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier and Trieste would be taken up again on the next day.

M. Molotov proposed that the Council adjourn.

Mr. Bevin said that he had thought the colonies were going to be considered.

M. Molotov said that he had only just received Mr. Bevin’s draft.

It was decided that the Council should meet at 4:00 p.m. the next day.

The meeting adjourned at 7:55 p.m.

4. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
5. C.F.M.(46) 150, June 26, 1946, not printed. The draft article under reference was subsequently set forth in C.F.M.(46) 180, July 2, 1946, p. 726.

6. The proposal of the Soviet Delegation as set forth in C.F.M.(46) 165, June 28, 1946, read as follows:

   “Any disputes which may arise in giving effect to the present Article of the Treaty shall be referred to a Conciliation Commission consisting of Representatives of the Government of the United Nations concerned and the Government of (Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary or Finland), appointed on an equal footing. If within 3 months after the dispute has been referred to the Concilaltion Commission no agreement has been reached, either Government may ask for the addition to the Commission of a third member selected by mutual agreement of the two Governments from nationals of third countries. Should the two Governments fail to agree on the selection of a third member of the Commission, the Governments shall apply to the Ambassadors of the Four Powers who will appoint the third member of the Commission.” (C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2061: CFM Documents)

7. Reference here is to C.F.M.(46) 177, July 1, 1946, p. 713.
8. Reference here is to the French Delegation’s proposal, the text of which is contained in the United States Delegation Record of the Council’s 30th Meeting, June 29, 1946, p. 683.
9. A copy of the map circulated by Molotov is reproduced on the facing page. The green line indicates the Italo-Yugoslav boundary proposed by the experts of the Soviet Delegation. The blue line indicates the boundary proposed by the experts of the French Delegation. The red line indicates the new proposal of the Soviet Delegation for the boundary. The area with a preponderantly Slovenian-Croatian population is colored pink. The area with a preponderantly Italian population is colored yellow. The map is included in the CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 2102, File—Maps.
10. The line proposed for the Italo-Yugoslav boundary by the French expert on the Italo-Yugoslav Boundary Commission as set forth in Annex A (p. 149) to the Minutes of the 73rd Meeting of that Commission, April 28, 1946.
9. A copy of the map circulated by Molotov is reproduced on the facing page. The green line indicates the Italo-Yugoslav boundary proposed by the experts of the Soviet Delegation. The blue line indicates the boundary proposed by the experts of the French Delegation. The red line indicates the new proposal of the Soviet Delegation for the boundary. The area with a preponderantly Slovenian-Croatian population is colored pink. The area with a preponderantly Italian population is colored yellow. The map is included in the CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 2102, File—Maps.
10. The map under reference is presumably the one facing p. 152 or a version thereof.
11. See footnote 2a, p. 76.