C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2111: Delegation Memos
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (Cohen)
| Present: | Mr. A. J. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. B. V. Cohen | |
| Interpreter: Mr. O. A. Troyanovsky |
Mr. Vyshinsky said that he was anxious to talk with Mr. Cohen informally in the hope of facilitating our agreements.
Mr. Vyshinsky spoke first about Trieste. Were they right in thinking that Mr. Byrnes would accept the Soviet line. Mr. Byrnes, he said, had stated that if Trieste could be settled there should be no difficulty on the other problems.
Mr. Cohen pointed out that Mr. Byrnes had stated only what Mr. Molotov had stated on an early occasion. The idea was not that there would be no other problems, but that there would be a common will to find agreed solutions for them.
As to Trieste, Mr. Cohen stated that certainly the establishment of the boundary line was a part of the problem of Trieste and was so regarded by Mr. Byrnes. It was not easy for Mr. Byrnes to accept the international solution for Trieste. There was strong feeling in America that the western littoral should go to Italy. I did not think that Mr. Byrnes would consent to giving more to Yugoslavia under an international solution than he was willing to concede when we assume that the balance of the territory would go to Italy. I did not think Mr. Byrnes could yield on the French line.
Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out that there were many Slavs within the French line. Mr. Cohen replied that that fact was even less significant under the proposed international solution than it was when we were considering drawing a line between Italy and Yugoslavia.
Mr. Vyshinsky then raised the question of the treaty with Bulgaria and asked whether we could sign a treaty with a government we did not recognize. Mr. Cohen stated that no one was objecting to asking the Bulgarian government to the Peace Conference. From what Mr. Byrnes had said to Mr. Molotov, Mr. Cohen did not think there would be any questions raised on the signing of the treaty. But Mr. Cohen stated that he hoped before signing the treaty, and certainly before it [Page 699] had to be submitted to the Senate for ratification, the Moscow Agreement would be carried out.1 There followed considerable discussion by Mr. Vyshinsky of the difficulties of getting the opposition to enter the government without an election and repeated reiteration by Mr. Cohen that an agreement was possible if the parties tried to reach an agreement and knew that it was our mutual desire that they should. Mr. Cohen said if M. Bidault could get M. Thorez2 to enter his Government the Bulgarian Government could also find a basis of agreement with their opposition.
Mr. Vyshinsky then raised the question of reparations which he stated they consider the most important issue outside of Trieste. He stated that they were disappointed that Mr. Byrnes had said nothing at yesterday’s Meeting about current production, as they had gathered from earlier conversations he would.
Mr. Cohen stated that Mr. Byrnes had always been opposed to taking reparations out of current production, but had in one conversation with Mr. Molotov indicated that he might consider current production as reparation if the coal, lumber, steel and other raw material needed from abroad was furnished by the Soviet.
Mr. Vyshinsky stated that then the Soviet would have to pay before they got reparations. Mr. Cohen stated that that was true, but in the end they would get much more than they paid. Mr. Cohen further stated that, if the Soviets did not do this, reparations would have to be financed by America and this we could not do. President Truman had made this position clear at Potsdam and Mr. Byrnes could not depart from it. American sentiment was in favor of helping Italy, but it would not support loans to Italy to finance reparations.
Mr. Vyshinsky indicated that the reparation issue was probably the most difficult of the issues outstanding, but thanked Mr. Cohen for reviewing the questions with him.
In the course of the conversation Mr. Vyshinsky remarked that reparations out of current production would not amount to more than 10 or 15 millions a year. In the course of the conversation Mr. Cohen expressed the hope that the Soviet would not press their claim for reparations too far, as there was feeling on our side that we had been very generous, particularly in the distribution of Navy ships which they conceded to be our war booty but which they had been unwilling to credit as reparations. In reply Mr. Vyshinsky stated that they had [Page 700] shared Berlin with us. In reply Mr. Cohen stated personally he had always favored a more centrally-located city as the seat of the Control Commission.
Mr. Cohen asked Mr. Vyshinsky if there would be any difficulties over the colonies. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that he still thought an advisory council would be helpful. Mr. Cohen stated that he thought it more important to send out a joint commission to study conditions and to assist the Council of Foreign Ministers to agree on the final disposition. Mr. Vyshinsky then indicated that possibly we could agree on the French-American proposal in the committee. In any event, he indicated that he was not very much concerned about the colonial question now.
Mr. Cohen asked whether the colonial committee should not meet tomorrow morning as Mr. Jebb had received some instructions and perhaps we could work out something for the Ministers. After first expressing a willingness to meet, Mr. Vyshinsky said it might be better to wait until after the Ministers’ Meeting. We could, he said, meet tomorrow night, if necessary.
- Part VI of the Report of the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, December 16–26, 1945, dealt with the question of the broadening of the Bulgarian Government. For documentation of the American efforts to assure fulfillment of the Moscow agreement and to bring about the establishment of democratic government in Bulgaria, see vol. vi, pp. 46 ff.↩
- Maurice Thorez, Secretary General of the French Communist Party and a Deputy Premier in the Cabinet of Premier Bidault.↩