740.00119 Council/6–1146
The Secretary of War ( Patterson ) to the Secretary of State 46
My Dear Mr. Secretary: In anticipation of a possible discussion of a German settlement at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, I should like to comment briefly upon the Ruhr-Rhineland problem in relation to the security of the United States. Although I realize that your own exploration of the subject has considered the security aspect fully, it might be helpful for you to have before you the position of the War Department.
The War Department is impressed by the fact that there exists in the Ruhr–Rhineland an industrial concentration which would constitute a great threat in the hands of an enemy of the United States. This industrial concentration has already provided much of the economic [Page 487] support for two aggressive efforts which, plunged the world into war. Although the further development of new weapons and techniques may serve to reduce the role of the Ruhr-Rhineland in producing armaments, its overall ability to contribute to the war potential of a nation will remain very great. Present political uncertainties are such that a more precise statement is difficult, but the existence of this threat seems to lead to the conclusion that the Ruhr–Rhineland industrial potential should not be left under the unrestricted control of Germany, Russia or France (or of all three) for a considerable number of years.
The War Department further believes that the national security of the United States requires the achievement of political and economic stability in Central and Western Europe as soon as possible. With this in view, it would be most unfortunate to separate the Germans of the Ruhr-Rhineland from the rest of Germany in such a way as to create a great Germania irredenta as a source of agitation and confusion for years to come. Further, there is every indication that economic stability is unlikely to be achieved in Europe unless the Ruhr–Rhineland is enabled to play an appropriate role in the production and exchange of wealth. Although our policy provides that the German standard of living should be no higher than that of surrounding countries in Europe, I believe that all agree that we should seek an ever-increasing standard of living for Europe, including Germany. To accomplish this, a re-integration of the industrial economy of the Ruhr–Rhineland with that of Europe will be essential.
I am aware that great difficulties are attached to the application of the considerations indicated above. In the short run it seems to me that we should give priority to the element of control in order to assure ourselves that the Ruhr–Rhineland will not once again sustain an enemy of the United States. As the post-war political scene clarifies, however, it seems to me that we might permit, upon good evidence that the new Germany will be a peaceful member of the family of nations, a larger degree of German control. Our present problem appears to be that of devising machinery which can assure the demilitarization of the Ruhr–Rhineland industrial area but which will also permit a restoration of the role of the Ruhr–Rhineland in the peaceful economy of Germany and of Europe.
From the point of view of our long-range military commitments, it seems to me that any control arrangements which are applied to the Ruhr–Rhineland should be such as to facilitate transfer of responsibility to appropriate agencies of the United Nations when the overall political situation permits.
[Page 488]Apart from general security considerations, the settlement of the Ruhr–Rhineland question is urgently required to assist our Military Government in Germany. The failure of the occupying powers to agree upon centralized machinery to facilitate treatment of Germany as an integrated economic unit constitutes a severe handicap of the first magnitude. Further, until the Ruhr–Rhineland question is solved, little progress can be made in the matter of reparations and import-export operations. Unless some agreement on these matters can be reached in the near future on a four-power basis, we may wish to explore the possibility of a greater degree of integration between the United States and British Zones.
In conclusion, I should point out that the disposition of the Saar does not seem to me to offer the same security problems as does the Ruhr–Rhineland; any settlement of the Saar problem which you consider appropriate would be acceptable to the War Department.
Sincerely yours,
- For additional documentation regarding the problems of quadripartite control in Germany raised in this letter, see vol. v, pp. 481 ff.↩