Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

740.00119 EW/5–2346

The Italian Prime Minister ( De Gasperi ) to President Truman ¹

Mr. President: The harsh realities with which my country is faced, prompt me to appeal to you, with the utmost frankness, trusting that the sincere friendship which has for so long linked our two countries, permits me to solicit your attention.

I wish first of all to express the warm feelings of gratitude of the Government and the people of Italy for the new evidence of understanding and concern shown us by the United States through the “modus vivendi”, the text of which (though still unknown to us), thanks to the initiative of America and to the unflinching action of the Secretary of State, has been initiated in Paris.²

This is a source of hope for the Italian people, sorely tried by the developments of the London and Paris negotiations, which have revealed unreasonable aspirations and demands, both territorial and economic, and conjure up anew the threat of that punitive peace which, we were formally assured, was out of the question.

I cannot refrain from stressing here that Italian public opinion is now under the painful impression that the discussions on Italy’s problems in London and Paris have revealed a play of power politics, in which the Italian questions have been the object of bargaining instead of being considered within the higher aims of ensuring a real and final European pacification.

The Italian people are grievously feeling that, consequently the demands against them at the Paris Conference are constantly increasing and stiffening:

• —On the eastern frontier, the natural ethnical border is threatened by continual retrocessions, from the Wilson Line towards the Morgan Line^2a which expose several hundred thousand Italians—whose ancestors have always inhabited those regions—to the most tragic and uncertain future under alien rule.
• —As for the colonial question, the threat is evident to exclude from Africa, through different formulae, the only nation which, owing to its over-population, can effectively contribute with its labor to elevate rapidly the pre-Fascist territories to ever higher standards of civilization.
• —On the western frontier French intransigence is stiffening not only on the question of minor claims, but also on the major demands on Briga, Tenda and Moncenisio.

I know and deeply appreciate the efforts made by the Honorable the Secretary of State and by the American Delegation to oppose several of the above-mentioned demands and ambitions.

I fully realize the many obstacles and difficulties involved in the Italian peace and the full weight of the conflicting interests. But it is for this very reason that I earnestly appeal to you now, Mr. President, so that the United States which have put no claims on Italy and which can see impartially the requirements for a lasting peace in Europe, do not permit unjust solutions to prevail.

I wish, therefore, to submit once more to your attention those solutions which, inspired by a sincere and impartial spirit of good will, though demanding from Italy painful sacrifices, may alone represent an equitable adjustment and promote in Europe reconciliation and harmony among all nations:

• —The opposition to the reparations’ principle is not based only on the contribution of blood, sacrifices and economic efforts brought by Italy to the cause of the United Nations in two years of co-belligerency against the common foe, but also on the admitted material impossibility of the exhausted Italian economy to bear further burdens.
• —With regard to the western frontier Italy, while ready to consider French requests for minor claims, cannot admit French demands for major rectifications (in particular the Briga, Tenda and Moncenisio demands) which, apart from the economic consequences of considerable weight, would have enduring repercussions on future relations with France.³
• —The present border line with Austria corresponds to the geographic and natural frontier between the Italian and the German people. Democratic Italy has already decided to grant the minority living on her territory the most equitable treatment and the most reasonable autonomy. Why should Italy alone be obliged to make their territorial sacrifice when all other nations concerned are taking the most severe precautions against the rebirth of a German threat?

And allow me now, Mr. President, to invite your special attention to the two other grave questions of the colonies and Venezia Giulia. With regard to the pre-Fascist territories in Africa (Tripolitania, Cirenaica, Eritrea and Somaliland) Italy is ready to accept the principle of self-government according to the Charter of the United Nations, but she feels entitled to be charged with their administration in the framework of that principle. In fact, Italy has invested therein huge capitals which have basically transformed those regions; she has acquired a valuable administrative experience, while the Italian population of two hundred thousands, permanently settled there, is carrying out an indispensable social and economic function. The Italian pre-Fascist territories are bound to the hearts of the Italian people by indissoluble ties. The different tendencies revealed at Paris imply that if the United States will give all their support to the thesis of an Italian administration, such a solution, vital to Italy, can finally prevail.

I therefore warmly appeal to you, Mr. President, in order that also in the African question the United States, having already given so many evidences of friendship and comprehension in all the other questions, will take a stand in favor of an Italian administration in the framework of the United Nations Charter, to which the entire people of Italy is looking forward.

As for the all important problem of Venezia Giulia, Italy’s stand in favor of the ethnical principle of the Wilson Line is too well known and appreciated to insist on it here. I already had occasion to state that neither my Government nor any other popularly elected Italian Government in the future could sign a peace treaty that gave Trieste and the predominantly Italian part of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia. I only want to stress herein that, should the Four fail to reach an agreement on such a basis, Italy is willing to see the question deferred to the Conference of the 21 Powers or, if that fails, to a larger assembly as the U.N.

These are the outlines, Mr. President, that Italy, in a wide vision of European problems not confined to selfish interests but based on severe sacrifices, trusts they may prevail through the action of the United States for the sake of Italy and peace of Europe.

And allow me to close by expressing the deep and unalterable confidence that the people of Italy place in you and in your country.

Please accept [etc.]

Alcide De Gasperi

President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Rome , May 23, 1946.

1. This letter was transmitted to President Truman by Italian Ambassador Alberto Tarcbiani on May 23, 1946, under cover of the following note of May 23 from the Ambassador to the President:

   “Following the conversation I had the honor of having with you this morning, I am sending you the enclosed message cabled from Rome, which the Italian Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Signor De Gasperi, has directed me to convey to you personally.

   “With renewed thanks for your gracious understanding, please accept, etc.”

   No American record of the conversation between President Truman and Ambassador Tarchiani has been found. A memorandum of May 25, 1946, from the Division of Southern European Affairs to Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, reports the following information about that conversation:

   “With reference to De Gasperi’s letter to the President, the Italian Embassy has allowed me to read Tarchiani’s cable to Rome regarding his conversation at the White House on Thursday.

   “According to Tarchiani’s report, the President referred to his previous statement that Trieste must remain Italian and declared ‘I repeat what I said. Trieste is an Italian city and will remain so. We haven’t given an inch on that question and we won’t. Naturally, the port must be international, to allow free traffic to its economic territory, composed of several nations. But the city will remain Italian.’

   “As regards Venezia Giulia, Tarchiani reported that he had expressed to the President Italian fears that the CFM might reach a compromise agreement on the French line, thus ceding much Italian territory to Yugoslavia, and that the President replied ‘This must not be done.’ [A marginal notation by the Secretary at this paragraph reads as follows: ‘President says he did not say’].

   “Tarchiani also reported, but in less detail, in connection with the Austrian claims, colonies, the loan, etc. and said that the President had spoken most sympathetically of the necessity of an early peace for Italy.” (C.F.M. Files, Lot M-88, Box 2111, Italian Memos)

2. Reference here is presumably to the Protocol Regarding the Revision of the Armistice with Italy; see C.F.M. (46) 95, May 16, 1946, p. 436.
3. Regarding the Morgan and Wilson Lines, see footnotes 2a and 2c, pp. 76 and 78, respectively.

3. On May 24, 1946, the Italian Embassy communicated two memoranda to the Department of State in connection with the Franco-Italian frontier question. Memorandum No. 5898 was concerned with the “unyielding firmness” of French claims to Alpine zones of the frontier, and it read in part:

   “Italy so far has given concrete proof of her good will offering reasonable concessions and she might also take into consideration the possibility of acceding to some other French demands—now that these have at last been officially brought to the knowledge of the Italian Government—provided that the French Government renounce the inadmissible claims on Valle Roja (Briga and Tenda) and the Moncenisio Basin. It is to be pointed out that on the latter question it is absolutely impossible from the territorial point of view to find any compromise of solution whatsoever.”

   The note concluded with expression of the hope that “the American Government would possibly consider an opportune action with the French Government in order that a change may take place in the French uncompromising attitude.” (740.00119 EW/5–2446) Memorandum No. 5899 reported renewed French propagandistic activity in the Briga and Tenda areas. (740.00119 EW/5–2446) On May 24, in memorandum No. 5897 Ambassador Tarchiani also addressed a note to the Secretary of State regarding the desire of the Italian Government to present its views on the whole of French claims to Italian territory to a forthcoming meeting of the Deputies of the Council of Foreign Ministers (740.00119 EW/5–2446).