Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Sixth Informal Meeting, Paris, May 13, 1946, 4 p.m.

Paris, May 13, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret

Present

	France
	M. Bidault (Chairman)
	M. Couve de Murville
	M. Courcel
	Interpreter
U.S.A.		U.S.S.R.
Mr. Byrnes		Mr. Molotov
Senator Connally		Mr. Vyshinsky
Senator Vandenberg		Two Interpreters
Mr. Bohlen
	U.K.
	Mr. Bevin
	Mr. Jebb
	Sir Oliver Harvey
	Interpreter

M. Bidault, who was presiding, said that at the last meeting they had discussed the date of the Peace Conference and the conditions under which it would be convened, but that no definite progress on that point had been made. He said he thought it was wise to look at the principal points at issue and to try to go further and reach more agreement. Then it might be possible to fix the date of the Conference. He listed the following questions of importance which were still at issue: (1) reparations, (2) colonies, (3) the Italo-Yugoslav frontier. He suggested that they might run through those questions and at least exchange views today, tomorrow and even the day after. In regard to the first question, that of reparations, he felt the area of disagreement had been considerably reduced. The main difference was that of using current production as a source of reparation. The French suggestion¹⁵ had been to use current production only to make up the deficit of 100 million dollars for the Soviet Union. The second difference related to the use of naval ships as reparation. He said he felt that if various sources such as assets in satellite countries, the merchant ships the United States had proposed,¹⁶ and others, it would be possible to reach the sum of 100 million dollars.

Mr. Byrnes said he had no objection to discussing reparations but the United States had nothing to add to what it had said before.

M. Molotov said that he also did not wish to repeat previous arguments but he felt that the Soviet proposal was so modest that he did not see that it should be difficult to reach agreement, particularly if, as Mr. Byrnes had said the other day, that other sources of reparations could be considered. He felt that current production should be regarded as a source of reparation.

M. Bidault inquired whether a resolution to the Reparations Committee, instructing them to determine what assets could be used for reparation in order to reach the figure of 100 million dollars basing itself on the United States proposal, could not be adopted.

Mr. Byrnes said he had no objection.

M. Molotov pointed out that there were divergencies as to source and he did not think the Committee should be bound to any one proposal such as that of the United States or any other Delegation.

M. Bidault said that other suggestions as well as that of the United States could be examined by the Committee but its main purpose would be to examine carefully the sources and work out some figures to report to the Ministers.

Mr. Bevin repeated his previous statement that Great Britain could not agree to any formula which would give reparations priority over relief payments.

After further discussion it was agreed that the Reparations Committee should study all proposals concerning sources in an endeavor to obtain a figure of 100 million dollars.

M. Bidault then raised the question of the colonies. He said that progress had been made but the final step had not been taken. The French proposal¹⁷ was well known and the other delegations last Friday had expressed their opinions but no final decision had been reached. There were two points not fully agreed: (1) the duration of the trusteeship, and (2) the British request for a trusteeship over Cyrenaica.

M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation had already gone far to meet the wishes of the others which demonstrated the Soviet’s desire to reach an agreement in the spirit of concerted action. He said he felt his colleagues understood the Soviet concession and that no new explanations were needed.

Mr. Byrnes then said he had nothing to add to his previous statements except to emphasize that our original proposal¹⁸ for collective trusteeship had been based primarily on the interests of the inhabitants. He said that he had agreed in principle with the French proposal on condition that the limits of the trusteeship fixed in our original proposal should be retained. This, however, had not been acceptable to the French Delegation. Furthermore, the British request for a trusteeship over Cyrenaica because of their pledges to the Senussi had apparently not been accepted. Therefore it was apparent that there was no agreement on this point. He therefore felt that consideration might be given to the following proposal. The Secretary then circulated the attached proposal¹⁹ which was read by the other Ministers. Pie explained that he had tried in this suggestion to incorporate all the various views so that during the year period the Four Powers could consider all the possibilities for a trusteeship arrangement for the Italian colonies. He said he had made specific mention of Italy since that country was not a member of the United Nations. If at the end of a year the Four Powers were unable to agree on the future administration of these colonies it was obvious that the question would have to be turned over to the United Nations for settlement.

Mr. Bevin said that there was one point he must emphasize and that is that Great Britain could under no circumstances violate its pledge to the Senussi and turn them back to Italian rule. He said he had consulted the Cabinet over the week-end and that they were very strong on that point. He said the Cabinet had been somewhat upset by the general trend of the discussion on Italy and that according to their information there was already agitation among the Arabs. Great Britain was the occupying power of these colonies at the present time and they did not wish to shoot Arabs in order to turn them back to Italy. He said he would prefer a study of the U.S., French and British proposals since the Soviet Delegation was not pressing its original point but if there was to be immediate renunciation by Italy he would prefer that it be done directly to the United Nations rather than to the Four Powers. He said Great Britain had been prepared even last September to accept the original United States proposal and had only changed their view in order to meet the French request, but in accepting the French request they had felt it necessary to raise the question of Cyrenaica. He repeated that he would prefer to have Italy renounce its title directly to the United Nations but that he would have great difficulty in accepting renunciation to the Four Powers because of the views of certain Dominions and Egypt.

Mr. Byrnes said he wanted to make it plain that the United States had always believed that the wisest solution was to place these colonies under UNO trusteeship with the appointment of a neutral administrator and an advisory committee on which the Four Powers and Italy would be represented, as well as two representatives of the local population. He said that when the Soviet Government had made a compromise proposal to accept the French position the United States in a spirit of conciliation had agreed to it but that our views as to the best course had not changed. He pointed out that M. Molotov had agreed last Friday with his condition that the limits of Italian trusteeship should be those of the original United States proposal.

Mr. Bevin said that as far as he was concerned the only difference between the United States and British point of view in regard to UNO trusteeship was whether or not provision for the appointment of an administrator should be made in advance. He preferred to turn the colonies over to UNO and let them decide. He repeated that they had only raised the question of British trusteeship for Cyrenaica when there seemed to be general acceptance of the idea of Italian trusteeship.

M. Bidault said he was somewhat disappointed with the present discussion since it appeared to reverse the trend toward solution which had been noted last Friday. He said he would have to study the United States proposal but he foresaw at first glance the several serious objections. He said these territories were adjacent to French North Africa and therefore of vital interest to his government and his people. In order to avoid any false impressions which might be created by looking at a map alone he wished to give certain concrete facts. He said there were 20 million inhabitants in French North Africa, but in Libya, which included Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, with about the same area, namely 1,750,000 square kilometers, there was not 5% of that population. According to available statistics in Libya there were only 888,441 persons. These were mostly nomad except for 100,000 foreigners predominately Italian who lived on the coast. In 1939 the trade turn-over for Libya had been 1.5 billion lire, of which 92% were imports and only 8% exports. As to the budget for Libya, in the same year it reached the ridiculously low figure of 204 million lire, of which ¾ came from metropolitan Italy. From an objective point of view given the situation of these territories, the simplest solution was the best. He said it was difficult to speak of independence for areas with such characteristics. He wished to emphasize furthermore that it was not a matter of returning these territories to Italy to rule as they had in the past but that it would be under the trusteeship council of UNO. He felt it would be a dangerous gift to try the experiment of independence in regard to territories which were so far from any modern development.

M. Molotov said he agreed with M. Bidault that the new United States proposal was a disappointment. He said at the last discussion the Soviet compromise, which had been in harmony with the French proposal, had marked a step forward that the United States had agreed to, which, while Great Britain, although not fully agreeing, had nevertheless also taken a step in advance. He felt the new United States proposals were a step backwards. He said, however, he would have to study the suggestion in translation before expressing any view. He remarked, however, that Great Britain had several times referred to a pledge to the. Senussi but that he was ignorant of these pledges and inquired whether it would be possible to learn what pledges had been made to the highly respected Senussi. He said that the last time progress had been made it was largely due to the Soviet compromise which had been made at the expense of their own interests and he hoped that the Soviet spirit of cooperation would be fully understood and that they would continue to make progress and not go backwards. He added that he hoped the Soviet conciliation on this point would be helpful on other questions.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that he also, in a spirit of compromise, had agreed to the French proposal provided the period limitations were retained but the French Delegation had not been willing to accept this condition. He said the United States, which based its main position on the well-being of the people concerned, could not agree to an Italian trusteeship unless the time limits were retained. He said he had also gathered that the Soviet Delegation could not find acceptable Mr. Bevin’s proposal for trusteeship over Cyrenaica and that what he was in fact proposing now was merely to leave the question open for the four nations to consider during the year and in the meantime proceed with the Italian treaty.

M. Molotov suggested that they continue the discussion of this question at the next meeting.

M. Bidault then turned to the question of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier.

M. Molotov inquired whether it might not be possible to meet the desires of Yugoslavia on this point.

Mr. Byrnes said he had nothing new to add but that in a spirit of compromise he was prepared to accept as a basis the line recommended by the French expert.²⁰ He added that according to our calculations if this line were adopted Yugoslavia would obtain economic properties, minerals equipment, port installations, etc., to the value of 191 million dollars, most of which lay in the area between the United States and French lines. He said he did not refer to the agricultural forests and other natural resources but only installations and certain mineral mines. He felt therefore that the United States was making a real concession but he wished to emphasize very strongly, so that it would be clear to all, that the United States intended to abide by the ethnic principle adopted at London and could not agree to any line that went farther than the French.

M. Molotov said that his colleagues were well aware of the Soviet position on the Italo-Yugoslav frontier and of their views that Trieste forms an indisputable part of Venezia-Giulia and since there was general agreement that the greater part of Venezia-Giulia should go to Yugoslavia, Trieste should also. He said figures had been cited to show the value of economic property which would go to Yugoslavia but the figures cited by Mr. Byrnes were far from the damage caused by Italy to Yugoslavia. He said he had not drawn up any figures but that they all knew the Yugoslav estimates of more than several billion dollars. He said Yugoslavia was one of the Allies in which the Fascists had held sway longest. He said this factor should be taken into consideration in considering the point in dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia. We should also remember, he said, that this was a dispute between an Ally and a former enemy country. We should take Italian interests into consideration as has been done in the case of the other colonies since no Ally had been a former possessor of these colonies but it was different when the direct interest of an allied country was involved. He said all had recognized that in 1918 a wrong decision had been made and all agreed that it should be rectified. He pointed out that this was a national question for Yugoslavia and that he felt to leave the most important center of this area to Italy would be the continuance of an old injustice. He concluded that on the one hand you had an Ally whose claims were national in character and well founded and on the other a former enemy to whom the territory had never belonged. He said we should support an Ally and endeavor to meet her wishes in this respect.

Mr. Bevin stated that they had re-studied the question and that they fully agreed with the United States position regarding the London discussion but they were prepared to abandon the line drawn by the British experts which would have left the port of Pola to Italy, and accept the French line. This would give Yugoslavia, in addition to Fiume the port of Pola, and they felt they had gone a long way to meet Yugoslavia’s desires. He felt the French line would be a wise and fair decision.

M. Bidault remarked that some progress had been made since the number of lines had been reduced to two. He suggested that they leave the question for today and inquired what would be the procedure and subject for the next meeting.

Mr. Bevin remarked that the question of the Dodecanese was not settled although it appeared all agreed it should go to Greece and should be demilitarized. Could it not be thus decided?

M. Molotov replied that they had not yet completed the questions of fundamental importance and in reply to Mr. Bevin’s question, in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation, the Dodecanese was not a fundamental question.

Mr. Byrnes said that he thought it would be a good idea to devote tomorrow to the German question to give an opportunity to France to present its views and then on Wednesday²¹ to return to the question of the peace treaties.

M. Bidault agreed with this but raised the question of Chinese participation, which had been requested by communication from the Chinese Ambassador.²² He said that France does not object to China’s being present but that he felt that some provision should be made for the participation of states not members of the Council who are, nevertheless, directly interested in the German question. He had in mind particularly the border states. He said in view of the time element they might be invited to participate at a later stage in the discussion on Germany.

Mr. Byrnes said he of course had no objection to the participation of China and would indeed welcome it. As to the other states, he likewise thought that they could be heard at a later stage.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation preferred to dispose of the questions of the peace treaties before going on to the German question. Once the treaties were disposed of there would be no objection to then discussing Germany. He proposed that tomorrow they continue the discussion of the peace treaties in informal session and possibly the day after and then turn to the German question.

M. Bidault said that in addition to the fundamental questions still open with regard to the peace treaties there was the report of the Naval Committee, the report of the Franco-Italian Frontier Commission, and several other questions.

Mr. Byrnes said he thought that the Ministers should confine themselves to questions regarded as fundamental and not those of a secondary nature.

Mr. Bevin remarked that they had reached an interesting stage in their discussion. He said that it was impossible to discuss the fundamental questions because they could not reach an agreement on them, but it was likewise impossible to discuss other questions because they were not regarded as fundamental. He referred in this connection to the question of the freedom of navigation of the Danube and freedom of trade in Eastern Europe which he personally regarded as very important. He said, however, that he was ready to discuss the German question tomorrow.

Mr. Byrnes said that he had suggested the German question tomorrow and return to the peace treaties on Wednesday but that he would have no objection to continuing discussion on peace treaties tomorrow and taking the German question on Wednesday. He then said in regard to Germany that when he had proposed his Four Power Treaty M. Molotov had objected to its discussion here on the grounds that the actual disarmament of Germany under existing agreements was the important subject. He said that after this discussion he had communicated with General Clay and that General Clay was today proposing to the Coordinating Committee of the Allied Council in Germany that the Four Powers appoint a representative each to go into all four zones to investigate the status of German demobilization and disarmament and to report back to the Council any instances of failure to carry out existing agreements.²³ He said he wished to repeat what he had said before, namely that the question of the actual disarmament of Germany was not relevant to the Four Power Treaty which was designed to keep Germany disarmed for 25 years after the conclusion of the peace treaty. He wished to state again in any event that it was the determination of the United States to have Germany disarmed now as provided in existing agreements and to keep her disarmed for the future.

M. Molotov replied that the Soviet Government had held a different view in regard to this treaty, that it would welcome a Commission to investigate the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. Returning to the peace treaties, he said that the Council should continue its efforts to dispose of them tomorrow or the next day and then they might be in a position to draw up a definite balance sheet. Then the Council could turn to the German question. In so far as the German questions were concerned, he said that since they were to be of a preliminary character they could best be discussed in informal session of the Council as composed of the present meeting, that is of representatives of the four occupying powers.

After further discussion, however, M. Molotov agreed that the discussion of the peace treaties would continue tomorrow and that Germany would definitely be discussed on Wednesday. It was decided the Ministers would meet in official session at 11 o’clock on Tuesday, May 14.

15. Reference here presumably is to the French proposal on reparations, C.F.M.(46) 20, May 2, 1946, the text of which is included in section IV of the Report of the Reparations Committee, C.F.M.(46) 53, May 7, 1946, p. 286.
16. The United States proposals referred to here were made during the 4th Informal Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 11; see the United States Delegation Record of that meeting, p. 341.
17. The French point of view on the disposition of the Italian colonies was set forth by Bidault at the Fourth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, April 29; see the United States Delegation Record of that meeting, p. 153.
18. The original American proposal for a United Nations trusteeship for the Italian colonies in Africa was included as Section III of the United States memorandum, C.F.M.(45) 16, September 14, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 179.
19. The United States proposal was not attached to the source text. It was subsequently circulated to the Council of Foreign Ministers as C.F.M.(46) 89, May 15, 1946, p. 423.
20. The lines proposed for the Italo-Yugoslav boundary by the French, Soviet, British, and American experts on the Italo-Yugoslav Boundary Commission are set forth in the annexes (pp. 149–152) to the Minutes of the 73rd Meeting of that Commission, April 28, 1946, and on the map facing p. 152.
21. May 15.
22. The letter of May 9, 1946 to the Council of Foreign Ministers from the Chinese Ambassador in France, together with an annexed memorandum, was circulated to the Council as C.F.M.(46) 64, May 9, 1946, p. 162.
23. At its meeting on May 17, 1946, the Coordinating Committee of the Allied Control Council for Germany reached agreement on General Clay’s proposal for the establishment of a quadripartite commission to investigate disarmament in Germany. The preliminary report of that commission is reported upon in telegram 1342, May 25, 1946, from Berlin, vol. v, p. 559. Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay was Deputy United States Military Governor for Germany and United States Representative on the Coordinating Committee.