Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Fifth Informal Meeting, Paris, May 11, 1946, 4:30 p.m.

Paris, May 11, 1946, 4:30 p.m.

secret

Present

	U.S.A.
	Mr. Byrnes (Chairman)
	Senator Connally
	Senator Vandenberg
	Mr. Bohlen
U.S.S.R.		U.K.
M. Molotov		Mr. Bevin
M. Vyshinsky		Mr. Jebb
Two Interpreters		Sir Oliver Harvey
		Interpreter
	France
	M. Bidault
	M. Couve de Murville
	M. Courcel
	Interpreter

Draft Peace Treaty With Italy

Mr. Byrnes, who was presiding, inquired whether the subject of bilateral treaties had been disposed of. He said it was his understanding that they had agreed to get a list of treaties from the Italian Government for study by the Deputies.

Mr. Bevin stated that he would object to the Four Powers’ being placed in a position to deal with these treaties which would be contrary to the sovereign rights of the countries concerned. He said, by implication any one of the Four Powers then could prevent any bilateral treaty’s being renewed. He thought a defeated country such as Italy should accept the renewal of a bilateral treaty if the other party, an Allied country, desired. He pointed out that all treaties were public, and there was no need to request the Italian Government to supply a list.

M. Bidault stated that it was not a question of putting this point in the treaty but merely of obtaining a list for the Deputies to study. He said the Soviet amendment would submit bilateral agreements to multilateral agreement, but the Soviet Delegation had stated that if they could examine the treaties, they might withdraw the condition. The French Delegation had no objection whatsoever to a list’s being furnished to the Deputies or any committee.

M. Vyshinsky said it was not a question of checking on bilateral treaties nor would there be any doubt of the right of a sovereign country to notify Italy of its desire to renew; such right was incontestable. He said the chief Soviet difficulty was that they did not know what the treaties were, and Article 104 would in effect be a blank check. He said that after study of the treaties it might be possible to accept Article 104 without amendment, but he felt that these treaties should be renewed either by agreement or at the discretion of Italy.

Mr. Bevin repeated that he could not accept the thesis that the Four Powers had the right to scrutinize any bilateral treaties. If this principle was accepted, it would seriously interfere with the bilateral relations between states.

M. Molotov inquired if there was any objection to obtaining a list since the Soviet Government was not familiar with all these treaties.

Mr. Bevin stated that there were no secret treaties, and that anyone, including the Soviet Union, could obtain copies.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that the matter be referred to the Deputies and the legal experts. He pointed out that, as drafted, Article 104 was not entirely clear since its obvious intent was not accurately expressed and might leave the impression that any country could have a say on any bilateral treaty.

It was agreed that the matter should be referred to the Deputies for drafting and examination.

Treaty Commission for Italy

Mr. Byrnes then turned to the question of a treaty commission and inquired if there was any objection to this suggestion.

M. Molotov said he felt that there was a contradiction between the desire of the Allies to abolish the Control Council in the suggested revision of the Armistice terms, and the placing in the treaty of a clause reconstituting an Allied control body.

Mr. Byrnes said he had made his point clear on that, and he felt that it was logical and sensible to provide an Allied body which could verify Italian execution of the treaty obligations. He suggested that since there was disagreement, the subject be passed over.

Economic Clauses of Peace Treaty for Italy

Mr. Byrnes then turned to the economic clauses of the treaty, on which he said little or no progress had been made by the Deputies. He suggested that the Deputies be directed to work on these clauses and report to the Ministers.

Mr. Bevin said he had certainly no objection, but that according to his information no discussion had been possible for the last six months because the Soviet Delegation had linked these questions up with the settlement of the reparation question.

M. Molotov said that the economic questions should not be delayed by consideration of the reparation matter, but that an attempt should be made to settle both.

Mr. Bevin said he wished to be clear, and was he to understand that each of these questions could be settled on their merit?

It was agreed that the Economic Committee would be asked to accelerate its work on the economic questions and to report to the Conference, if possible, on Monday.

Peace Conference

Mr. Byrnes then said that he thought it had been helpful to review the outstanding questions and that they had now reached the end of the list, and he would like to return to the question of calling a conference. He said that he did not wish to repeat all of the arguments he had used, but that he did wish to say that at Moscow we had told the nations of the world that there would be a peace conference not later than May 1. We had been unable to meet that date, but he felt that we had even a stronger responsibility to let the world know there would be a conference and on what date. He said that he had mentioned June 15 but he would not quarrel over a date—July 1st or even July 15 would be acceptable, although he thought the sooner the better. He said the Ministers could meet on June 15, examine the work of the Deputies, and present the drafts to the Conference.

M. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation could not agree on fixing a date for the Conference. He felt that the matter should be approached very seriously since it involved the success or failure of the Conference itself. He felt that adequate preparation was vital for this purpose, and he did not have full confidence that during the present session of the Council it would be possible to make adequate preparation. He said it does not depend on one delegation alone, but on all, and he therefore felt it was important to continue their preparatory work, which would be of such vital importance to the success of the Conference. He said the Soviet Government had made a great step forward to meet the views of the other Delegations in renouncing all claims on Italian colonies as well as its desire to have a port of call in the Mediterranean for Soviet merchant vessels. Everyone knew that the Soviet Union had great interest in developing its trade with both the west and the east, and for this reason had desired a port of call in the Mediterranean for its merchant ships. However, despite this interest, the Soviet Government had gone forward to meet the wishes of its Allies in order to reach an agreement. He felt that this Soviet concession would help in the solution of the controversy. He requested his colleagues to understand correctly the significance of the Soviet concession.⁶

Mr. Byrnes said that he felt more optimistic in view of the progress that had been made in the last twenty-four hours that before the date of the Peace Conference they would reach a very large measure of agreement. He said that they were staying on in Paris as there was still the German question to discuss, but he felt that it was very important to fix a date for the Conference before the end of the present session.

M. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation had always agreed to the fixing of the date with, however, the reservation which he had made to the Secretary’s proposal. He added that there might be no need for that reservation if it were possible to reach agreement on fundamental questions.

M. Bidault remarked that he had made a suggestion to overcome the difficulties.

Mr. Byrnes then said he felt that sometimes misunderstandings arose, but he wished to say now what he had refrained from saying at the formal meeting, namely, that the Soviet amendment in fact meant that any one Power could delay indefinitely the Peace Conference by simply saying that a point in which it was interested was a fundamental question. This in effect gave the right to any one Power to veto the holding of the Peace Conference. He said he could not believe that that was the Soviet intention, that he felt the difficulty could be overcome by the acceptance of the inclusion of his wording “as soon as possible”. M. Molotov had said that this went without saying, and if so, why not put it in in the interests of clarity?

M. Molotov said that the Secretary’s suggestion would not be in conformity with the Moscow decision, and that he felt that it might result in two conferences instead of one, which he was sure no one desired. He added that if we could shut our eyes to the manner in which the Conference is to be organized and not require the preparation be such as to ensure the success of the Conference, the result might be quite contrary to our desires. He said he thought it would be better to intensify the preparation for the Conference and explore all roads to an agreement. He said if, on the other hand, we believed that all possibilities have been exhausted, that is, of course, another matter, but if not, as the Soviet Delegation considered, then we should intensify our efforts.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that there was still a great deal of work for the Deputies to do, and that even if the Ministers did not reach an agreement next week, it could not be said that all possibilities had been exhausted before the holding of the Conference. After all, the Ministers would reassemble on June 15 in a final endeavor to reach full agreement before the Conference. He said he could not share M. Molotov’s fear of two conferences, and pointed out that even if agreed drafts were presented to the Conference, there was still the possibility of two or more recommendations on any point emerging from the Conference. He said on the contrary he felt that the settlement of a date for the Conference would provide a strong impetus to clear up outstanding questions before the Conference actually met. He also wished to emphasize that after the Conference the Ministers would assemble to prepare the final drafts of the treaties which would afford a final possibility of adjusting any differences which might exist at that time.

M. Molotov said that if four nations could not agree, what ground was there for believing that twenty-one nations could? He said he had only in mind fundamental questions and not that every single point in the peace treaties should be agreed upon before the Conference. Pie said that questions of a secondary nature might be left open in order to hear the recommendations of the Conference, but that fundamental questions should be agreed on by the four Delegations; otherwise, it would make very much more difficult the work of the Conference which might result in disagreement, difficulties, and even the complete failure which certainly no one here desired. He repeated that the Soviet Government had made a big concession concerning the Italian colonies. In order to facilitate agreement it had abandoned the position which it had pressed at London and at the beginning here. He repeated that he hoped that this concession was correctly understood.

Proposed Revision of Armistice Terms for Italy

Mr. Byrnes said he wished to return to another question, and that was the revision of the Armistice terms. He said that under the best of conditions it would take considerable time before these treaties could enter into effect. He inquired whether the revision of the Armistice terms with Italy which he had previously communicated through diplomatic channels and on which now there was general agreement in principle could not be signed now.

M. Molotov said that the Secretary’s proposal for armistice revision was important and should not be delayed, but that our principal task was the preparation of the peace treaties, and he did not think we should be diverted from that.

Status of Peace Treaties for Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italy

M. Molotov said he would like to sum up the status of these peace treaties and would begin at the end with Finland. In this case there were only a few non-important questions open and only one of any substance which would not be difficult to settle before the Conference since the Soviet desires were very modest.

In regard to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary there were no questions in those treaties which were of sufficient importance to delay the Conference, although there was the specific question of Bulgarian relations with the United States and Great Britain.

It was only in the case of Italy that there were certain fundamental questions left to decide. The other matters could be left, but this could only be done if we agreed on the fundamental questions which would permit the fixing of a date for the Conference. He said that unless these fundamental questions in the Italian treaty were settled, the Conference would have no assurance of success.

Proposed Revision of Armistice Terms for Italy (Continued)

Mr. Byrnes said he agreed, but had reverted to the revision of the Armistice because he felt we might finally conclude one question we had left. He urged this because of the length of time which would be required before treaties could go into effect.

M. Molotov said he talked to Gasperi here, who had expressed the same desire for a modification of the Armistice terms. He said he felt that this matter could be settled before the Ministers left Paris.

Italian Colonies, Reparation, and Question of Trieste

M. Molotov said, however, that first of all they should accomplish the principal task for which they had met. He said that in view of the Soviet concession in regard to the Colonies, there should be some way found to settle the question of reparations in favor of the U.S.S.R. and Trieste in favor of Yugoslavia.

Mr. Byrnes agreed that they should continue their efforts.

He said in conclusion that he thought it might be of interest to his colleagues in view of the discussion on reparations this morning if they could have the information concerning the extent of American assistance to Italy. He then read the following statement of direct and indirect American contribution to Italy:

Direct civilian relief	$485,000,000
Advance of funds to cover Italian payment of occupation costs	140,000,000
Export-Import credit for purchase of cotton	25,000,000
Total direct aid		$650,000,000
U.S. contribution to UNRRA for Italy		330,000,000
Total direct and indirect aid		$980,000,000

Peace Conference (Continued)

Proposed Revision of ArmisticeTerms for Italy (Continued)

M. Bidault then said that the reception of his proposal regarding the Conference had not encouraged him to discuss it now. He felt that it would be a good idea to study the subject further.

As to the Armistice terms, he felt that they were in basic agreement, while there might be certain points of detail which might be examined.

In the meanwhile he agreed that we should go on with the treaties; he felt that there was a certainty of success.

It was agreed that there would be no meetings the next day (Sunday), and that the next meeting of the Ministers, which was informal, would be set tentatively for 11:00 a.m. Monday.

6. In reporting upon this Soviet concession in telegram 2315, Delsec 493, May 12, from Paris, not printed, the Secretary observed: “Without so stating Molotov gave the impression that they would not insist on special facilities in the Dodecanese” (740.00119 Council/5–1246).