Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Third Informal Meeting, Paris, May 10, 1946, 5 p.m.⁹⁸

Paris, May 10, 1946, 5 p.m.

secret

Present

	France
	M. Bidault (Chairman)
	M. Couve de Murville
	M. Courcel
	Interpreter
U.K.		U.S.S.R.
Mr. Bevin		M. Molotov
Mr. Jebb		M. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harvey		M. Pavlov
Interpreter		Interpreter
	U.S.A.
	Secretary Byrnes
	Senator Connally
	Senator Vandenberg
	Mr. Bohlen

M. Bevin opened the meeting by suggesting that they should take the important open questions in order. He said the first on the list was the question of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav frontier. No delegation had any suggestions to offer on this question and it was passed over.

He suggested that in regard to the question of the Dodecanese Islands, he thought they could all agree that these islands were to be transferred to Greece.

M. Byrnes agreed to this.

M. Molotov, however, said that the Soviet Delegation considered that the question of the Dodecanese should be settled in connection with the other territorial questions as they felt that that would be more just.

M. Bevin renewed his suggestion that they take up this item separately and not treat it as an object of bargaining.

M. Molotov replied that it was necessary to work out the whole picture.

M. Bevin then raised the next question, that of the former Italian colonies.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet Government is now prepared to accept the French thesis that these colonies should be under Italian trusteeship under the United Nations for a definite period of time. He said that his conversation with de Gasperi had made it clear that the Italians did not regard these colonies as a burden, but as an asset since they provided a market for Italian goods and an outlet for surplus population. He said that, in view of Italian opinion on this subject, the Soviet Delegation had come to the conclusion that they should meet Italy’s wish in this matter and thus demonstrate a favorable attitude toward the new democratic Italy.

M. Bidault expressed satisfaction and said that the views of the French Delegation coincided with those of M. Molotov.

M. Byrnes inquired what period of time M. Molotov had in mind for Italian trusteeship.

M. Molotov said that there would be no objection to adopting the periods of time suggested in the US proposal.

M. Bidault pointed out that no time limit was set in Chapter 12, which he read, setting forth the United Nations principles governing trusteeships.⁹⁹

M. Bevin remarked that Great Britain was under a pledge to the Senussi and that it, therefore, could not be a party to any plan to turn them back to Italian rule. He said he had no objection to a new Tripolitania, which would be redefined following study, being placed under Italian trusteeship, but that Great Britain must pay attention to its position in the Middle East, and that the Bengazi-Mareth Line and Tobruk area were of vital importance to the defense of the British Commonwealth and its interests. Furthermore, he pointed out that west of the Mareth Line, there were French claims for rectification of the frontier. He said Great Britain would be prepared to give a favorable answer to the question of Italian trusteeship provided Cyrenaica was put under British trusteeship. He said this was not desired for offensive purposes, but merely to safeguard Empire communications which the Dominions, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa regarded as absolutely vital to them. He said in order to remove any suspicion that Cyrenaica would become a military base, he would agree that Tripolitania should go to Italian trusteeship in order to meet French desires not to create a precedent that might cause trouble in North Africa. He said he wished to give satisfaction to France and reassurance to the Soviet Union, but in view of the blood and treasure which England had spent from Alamein to Tunis, he must safeguard this area. He added that he was aware the Arabs and other races involved would be very upset, but that he was making his suggestion in a genuine desire to reach agreement and bring about peace. He said he was making this suggestion on his own responsibility.

M. Molotov inquired whether Bevin meant that Tripoli should go to Italy, but Cyrenaica would go to Great Britain.

M. Bevin replied in the affirmative and repeated that he was making this proposal on his own responsibility without authority from his Government in the hope of settling this question. He explained that the boundary rectification between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania would be for the purpose of including Cyrenaica and as many of the Senussi as possible. He repeated that he was aware he was risking Arab discontent. He said that 300 years of Mediterranean history had revealed the importance of Cyrenaica, and that his proposal would protect British vital interests without affording any grounds to arouse Soviet suspicion. He said that his proposal was designed to preserve peace in that area since in the last two wars the only threat had come from German attack. He said he hoped that eventually the entire region would be involved in a security system under the United Nations Security Council.

M. Byrnes stated that the US proposal had been based primarily on the desire to promote the development of the people of the colonies in the direction of self-government. The US had felt that a collective trusteeship under the United Nations was the best method of achieving this end through the medium of an administrator appointed by the United Nations. France, however, had desired that the colonies go to Italian trusteeship. The Soviet Union had wished that Tripolitania could be placed under Soviet trusteeship. In view of the wide gap between the views of the various delegations, and in a desire to meet the views of the other Governments, the US would be prepared to support the French proposal for Italian trusteeship, including, however, the time limits embodied in the American proposal. He said he had listened with great interest to Bevin’s remarks which had made a deep impression on him, but he would like more opportunity to study the proposal. He said that as matters now stood, the Soviet Union, France and the United States were agreed that Tripolitania should be a trusteeship for a ten-year period, as provided in the US proposal.

M. Molotov agreed.

M. Bidault said, however, that there appeared to have been a misunderstanding; that he had pointed out that under Chapter 12 of the Charter there was no fixed period for trustee territories; that if there were to be a fixed period for any trusteeship, he did not believe it should begin with Tripoli, but what the French Delegation proposed, he said, was a trusteeship without any fixed period, but in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

M. Byrnes pointed out that the Charter provided for special agreements in regard to any given territory and that in this agreement would be set forth the conditions of trusteeship, including a time limit. He mentioned that the Charter contemplated the eventual independence of territories held in trust.

M. Bidault then read Article 79 of the Charter and pointed out that Italy as the contemplated mandatory power would be involved. He said he felt that there should be no special measures taken in connection with the Italian colonies, but merely the general principle of trusteeship should be applied.

M. Bevin then said he wished to correct his previous statement when he had said the Mareth Line. He had, of course, meant the Agheila.

M. Byrnes said to sum up again, France, the Soviet Union and the US were in agreement that Tripolitania should be under Italian trusteeship. The Soviet Union and the US agreed on the ten-year period, but France had a reservation on this point. M. Bevin, he said, agreed to Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania provided Great Britain received a trusteeship over Cyrenaica with frontier rectifications to include as many of the Senussi as possible. He said he understood M. Bevin would have no objection to an Italian trusteeship to the other Italian colonies.

M. Bevin replied that he felt they could agree on that, but he would like consideration to be given to some special arrangement for Somaliland and that the Ethiopian claims in regard to Eritrea should be considered. He said he merely wished an investigation and did not oppose the general idea of Italian trusteeship provided the question of Cyrenaica could be settled.

M. Molotov said that the Soviet position was connected with their attitude toward the new democratic Italy. He felt that the French proposal was in harmony with this attitude and that it would be well for the Ministers unanimously to show a favorable approach to non-Fascist democratic Italy. The Soviet Government had met objections to its proposal to leave Tripolitania under Soviet trusteeship, but in order to demonstrate its disinterestedness in these areas to the countries present on the one hand, and its desire to help the new Italy, the Soviet Delegation supported the French proposal. He felt if this could be accepted, it would improve international relations in Europe and strengthen peace.

M. Bevin said he would like to say that Great Britain is as interested in security as is the Soviet Union and the US. For example, in the Far East the Soviet Union had said that it must have the Kurile Islands before firing a shot. It felt that that was right and there had been no objection. Three times Great Britain had fought over this desert area. Great Britain had no aggressive intentions and would do anything to prove it. It would not wage war or prepare for war, but the Dominions and the British Commonwealth were vitally interested in the security of this area. After the collapse of the island [Islamic?] empire, these areas had gone to a then democratic Italy, but what had happened? He repeated that he was taking a big personal risk since the Bengazi-Tobruk area meant as much to the British as Stalingrad did to the Russians. He felt it was too risky to turn this area back to Italy and he asked that his colleagues accept his view. He said that Great Britain would have accepted United Nations trusteeship for this area, but France had objected. He now supported France’s claim for rectification of the frontier. He said his proposal would make clear who sought to harm Great Britain and destroy its Empire and who trusted Britain. He hoped his colleagues would accept his solution and abandon suspicion regarding any aggressive attempt. He repeated that Great Britain was prepared to merge this trusteeship to any regional arrangement which might be set up under the Security Council. He said he was working on the assumption that the four powers here would never want to fight each other. He recalled that Stalin had told him that this area had been a magnet and that if in 1939 and 1940 Great Britain had not held it, all might have been defeated. Great Britain regards this area as one of her vital spheres, as vital as other nations regard areas adjacent to their borders. He said that if his proposal was accepted in freedom and confidence, it would work to the interests of all the countries here. He said he had tried to recognize the position of France and the pride and prestige of England, and to reconcile these factors with the need for security. He asked whether his colleagues could not accept this proposition and after Great Britain’s effort in this war give her some small return.

M. Molotov said that no one here wished to offend Great Britain or ignore her interests. That would not be right nor in keeping with the interests of all here. However, on the other hand, we should not offend Italy, which will soon join the United Nations. We must make clear the difference of our attitude toward the new Italy from our previous attitude toward Fascist Italy. He suggested that they not proceed further with the question at this time, but after this exchange of views go on to the next question.

M. Bidault agreed but he said he merely wished to add that there was hardly a single Italian in Cyrenaica, but in Tripolitania it was largely because of the 45,000 Italians on the coast and some 48,000 Jews that Great Britain was willing to accept Italian trusteeship over that area.

M. Bevin remarked that the next subject was the clause relating to war criminals.

M. Molotov stated that if this question was regarded as of great importance by his colleagues, he thought they might find a solution.

M. Byrnes said that on thinking this question over, he had come to the conclusion that might be well to try and clean up the question of war criminals before the treaty went into effect. For example, could not the Council of Foreign Ministers call on any Allied countries which wish to request the delivery of war criminals from the satellite countries for crimes committed on the territory of the Allied countries in question to present their requests to the Allied Control Commission or appropriate Allied body within ninety or one hundred days. He pointed out that under the present circumstances, it would be several months before the peace treaty actually went into effect, and that the question of war criminals should be disposed of before that date.

M. Molotov replied that M. Byrnes’ suggestion could be considered. It was agreed that the war criminals clause should go back to the Deputies for study.

M. Bevin then remarked, with regard to the next item, the fortification of Sicily and Sardinia, that the French had a reservation.

M. Bidault replied it was only a question of facts and that there were some French officers studying the actual state of affairs. He saw no serious difficulties involved in this matter.

M. Bevin said the next question was the demilitarization of the Franco-Italian frontier.

M. Bidault pointed out there was a difference between the US and French point of view and suggested that the military experts be asked to reexamine the question.

M. Molotov said he could accept the French suggestion for a demilitarization provided a similar arrangement was made for the Italo-Yugoslav frontier.

M. Bevin inquired if the two questions were to be linked together.

M. Molotov answered that they should be treated separately, but he thought, in justice, a similar attitude should be adopted toward both.

M. Byrnes said that the US position, based on the opinion of our military experts, was that we were disarming Italy, limiting its forces, and depriving it of the right to have long-range guns, and it was, therefore, unnecessary to provide for a thirty kilometer demilitarization zone. It was agreed the military experts should restudy the question.

M. Bevin suggested demilitarization of both sides of the frontier as was done between the US and Canada.

M. Bidault pointed out that French fortifications were only a small item in the French military budget and he did not think France should be penalized for the crime of having been a victim of aggression. He repeated that the French did not expect to spend much money on the fortification of that frontier. It was agreed that the military experts should restudy the question.

M. Bevin stated the next item was the disposal of the surplus vessels of the Italian fleet.

M. Byrnes said he believed the Ministers were not familiar enough with the details and suggested this matter be left to the naval experts. His suggestion was accepted.

M. Bevin said the next question was the Allied Inspectorate and Treaty Commissions, and inquired whether there was general agreement that there should be such Allied Commissions.

M. Molotov replied that the Soviet Delegation felt that these Allied Commissions were unnecessary. The question was passed over without agreement.

The next question was that of reparations.

M. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation was awaiting the views of their colleagues on this question, but they noted with satisfaction that the French had accepted the Soviet view in regard to the Soviet claim. He said he hoped his other colleagues would recognize the justice of the Soviet claim.

M. Bidault said that the French proposal¹ had been made in the hope of reaching an agreement and was guided by the following basic principles, on which he felt there was general agreement: (1) that Italy should pay something as reparations; and (2) that such reparations should not be borne by countries supplying Italy with raw materials and food. In regard to current production, the French Delegation felt that with a moratorium of two years, some reparations could safely be drawn from that source. If no agreement could be reached on the global figures for all reparations, at least the figure of $100,000,000 for the Soviet Union could be accepted. He said he felt that the French proposal was an equitable solution which could, of course, be amended by the experts.

M. Molotov said that everyone recognized that $100,000,000 was a tiny part of the damages done by the Italian Army in the Soviet Union. It represented a symbolic payment on the theory that the invasion of the territory of others should not go unpunished. It would not be possible to explain to the Soviet people why Italy should go unpunished. He said he felt that this insignificant amount, as well as the claims of Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania, were not beyond the capacity of Italy to pay, nor would adversely affect the interests of others. If the question of reparations could be settled favorably, he felt it would help in the settlement of other questions.

M. Byrnes stated that heretofore he had been against the fixing of a global sum without an examination of Italy’s capacity to pay. He suggested that this question be passed over until tomorrow.

M. Bevin agreed and remarked that if ships and equipment were taken into account, he felt agreement could be reached.

M. Bevin then raised the question of bilateral treaties and inquired whether pre-war bilateral treaties with Italy remained in force. He said the difficulty was that if the Soviet suggestion was adopted, it would be left to Italy to decide which treaties should remain in force. He said the British position was that if [each of?] the Allied Governments should decide for itself the continuance or abrogation of its bilateral treaties with Italy, and inquired if agreement could not be reached on that basis.

M. Vyshinsky said he wished to correct a wrong impression of the Soviet position. It was not their suggestion that Italy should decide, but that they did not feel Italy should be placed in an unequal position, that almost all of these treaties were of a technical character, and that they felt that this question should be decided by mutual agreement and not dictated to Italy without consulting her wishes. He said, furthermore, that no one knows what are the treaties involved. The Soviet Delegation is anxious to find out which are to be annulled and which are to be continued. Under the present draft of Article 104,² it meant giving a blank check to Italy without knowing what was involved. He said there were some twenty countries which had been at war with Italy and contradictions might arise between the various treaties. He said as a compromise, however, the Soviet Delegation was prepared to adopt the wording of Article 104, but with a note to the effect that these treaties could be renewed in any case unless there was objection on the part of one of the major Allied powers.

M. Byrnes suggested the matter be referred to the Deputies, but no decision was reached on this point.

It was agreed that the Ministers should meet at 11:00 o’clock on May 11 in restricted session.

98. The Secretary’s summary report to the President and the Acting Secretary on this meeting, which was sent in telegram 2304, Delsec 490, May 11, from Paris, not printed, ended with the following observation:

    “It was obvious during this meeting that under the spur of my proposal to hold a peace conference at a fixed date, irrespective of the degree of agreement among the ministers, the Soviet Govt was adopting a more conciliatory attitude on all open questions other than Trieste. The indications are that the Soviet Govt will seek to reach an agreement to strengthen its bargaining position on the question of Trieste.” (740.00119 Council/5–1146)

99. The reference here is to the Charter of the United Nations.
1. The reference here is presumably to the French proposal set forth in document C.F.M. (46) 20, May 2, 1946, the text of which is incorporated into Section IV of document C.F.M. (46) 53, May 7, 1946, p. 286.
2. The reference here is to article 104 of the Draft Heads of a Treaty with Italy, the British proposal set forth in document C.F.M.(45) 3, September 12, 1945, which was used by the Deputies as the basis for their work in preparing a draft peace treaty with Italy. The document is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 135.