C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes
Memorandum of Conversation24
| Participants: | M. Molotov |
| M. Vyshinsky | |
| M. Pavlov | |
| Secretary Byrnes | |
| Mr. Cohen | |
| Mr. Bohlen |
After dinner, at which the above dined alone, the following conversation took place:
M. Molotov suggested two possible solutions for the Trieste question:
- (1)
- a referendum for the whole of Venezia Giulia and the countries to be agreed upon or
- (2)
- the outright cession of the whole area, including Trieste to Yugoslavia, as the result of which he said it would be possible for him to take a more favorable attitude toward Italy’s desires in regard to the colonies and reparations.
He strongly favored the latter course, pointing out that any plebiscite would require some time and it would be better to settle the question of Venezia Giulia right away.
M. Byrnes explained to him that we could not agree to a referendum for the whole area since whatever the result, there would be left a serious minority problem which was what we desired to avoid and would furthermore run counter to the basic decision in London to accept the ethnic principle as the guiding one for the solution of this question. He again pointed out that east of the line proposed by the US there was no dispute and therefore no need for a plebiscite since that area would go to Yugoslavia in any case. As to Molotov’s preferred solution, the Secretary stated that the US could under no circumstances agree to turn over the predominantly Italian city of Trieste to Yugoslavia merely because the latter was an ally and in order to make a concession to the Soviet Union. He suggested that if the CFM was unable to agree on a definite frontier between Yugoslavia and Italy it adopt a provisional line to be worked out by experts somewhere between the line proposed by the British and French experts, which should remain for a year, when the final disposition might be referred to the General Assembly under Article 14 of the Charter.
M. Molotov objected strenuously to this, claiming that any temporary line would be no solution at all and the cause of great trouble and disturbance.
[Page 248]M. Byrnes then endeavored to obtain from M. Molotov more accurately what he meant by a more favorable attitude toward Italy in regard to the colonies and reparations.
M. Molotov would not commit himself in regard to the colonies beyond the vague statement that Italy might be considered as eligible for a trusteeship of one or two colonies under the UN, but would make no specific statement in regard to Tripolitania.
As to reparations, from the discussion it emerged that what Molotov had in mind as a concession to Italy was that Yugoslavia in return for Trieste should renounce all claims for reparations against Italy, and that Greece should do likewise in return for the Dodecanese Islands.
M. Molotov stated flatly that the Soviet Government could not renounce its claim or $100,000,000, which it regarded as excessively modest. When it became apparent that Molotov’s suggested “trade” offered no hope as a basis for agreement, Molotov and Vyshinski then turned the discussion to a wider field and produced a series of obvious propaganda charges in support of the view that the US was engaged in a policy of “imperialist expansion”.
M. Molotov cited the alleged existence of US bases in Iceland, the presence of US troops in North China and alleged desires of the US to obtain bases in Turkey, Egypt, Iran and elsewhere. They attributed these expansionist plans in customary style to “imperialist circles” in the US, which had a strong influence on US policy.
M. Byrnes pointed out with vigor the complete absurdity of these charges, drawing attention to the fact that we had in all, 720 mechanics and service troops in Iceland and no plans or desires for bases in the Middle East whatsoever. He reminded Molotov that we had discussed at great length the entire situation in North China at Moscow last December,25 and that a joint statement had been issued at that time, and furthermore our troops which were in North China at the request of the Chinese Government would be withdrawn within one month against the wishes of the Chinese Government. He also reminded Molotov that in contrast to the minute quantities of American troops abroad except in Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union had hundreds of thousands of troops beyond its borders, and frequently in many cases contrary to the wish of the Governments and peoples of the countries they were in. He pointed out that our basic policy was to obtain the removal of troops from countries other than Germany and Japan at the earliest possible moment and that for this [Page 249] reason we had urged the conclusion of an agreement with Austria in order to permit the withdrawal of all Allied forces from that country, but that the Soviet Government, which had forces in Austria many times larger than those of any other Allied nation, had refused this suggestion. He said there was no one in the world who feared the US or its intentions, but that he could not say the same for the Soviet Union.
M. Molotov, in support of their contention regarding the existence of any Anglo-Saxon imperialism, even went back to 1919 and the Siberian expedition.
The conversation ended on this note and the specific problems before the CFM were not brought up again.
It was obvious that Molotov and Vyshinski adopted this absurd propaganda line simply because they saw that the US was not prepared to make a deal with regard to the question of Trieste.
- The authorship of this memorandum is not indicated in the source text. The conversation took place in Molotov’s suite.↩
- The situation in North China was discussed in the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, Second Formal Session, December 17, 1945, 4 p.m., the Informal Meeting, December 19, 1945, noon, and the Informal Meeting, December 23, 1945, noon, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, pp. 632, 666, and 743. The topic was also discussed during Secretary Byrnes’ conversation with Stalin and Molotov on December 23, 1945, at 5 p.m.; see ibid., p. 750.↩