Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

840.5018/5–1846

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton) to William S. Hassett, White House Administrative Assistant

Washington, May 11, 1946.

The Right Honorable Herbert S. Morrison, Lord President of the Council and leader of the Labor Party in the British Parliament,⁴ will call on the President at 12:30 o’clock on Monday, May 13, to discuss the world food situation in general and the wheat crisis in particular.

It is expected that during his stay in Washington he will wish to discuss the following problems, some of which he may raise with the President, but most of which will have to be referred to discussion groups for development of agreed data.

I. Wheat Requirements in British Areas of Responsibility.

A. Germany and Austria

1. Uniformity of rations in the three Western Zones (British, French, American).⁵

We favor standardization of rations at the beginning of the next crop year. However, we are pressing for many changes in the British Zone to increase the production of coal—among them special rations exclusively for miners, which would involve only a slight added charge on food-stuffs. We are deeply anxious that the most energetic steps be taken along all lines to increase coal production in the Ruhr.

2. Actual Requirements

We have not received complete data on requirements for the British Zone.

B. India

1. Requirements

Despite India’s assumption that agreement has been reached on her requirements, we have not received completely satisfactory data and there will have to be further discussions on the working level.

2. Source of Supply

The Indians are requesting wheat from the USA over and above what Australia can supply. To gain the good will of the Indians, we should prefer to send wheat direct to India rather than give wheat to the British and let them gain the credit by diverting other wheat to India. It is doubtful, however, that we can ship any wheat to India in May or June due to other demands, and no commitments to India can now be made.

3. Comparison with Japanese

This point may be raised. If so, it will have to be discussed in the main at the working level. We are in agreement that India ranks above Japan. However, the imports contemplated for Japan are based on a lower ration than the present ration in India and represent the minimum at which our Army supply authorities consider it possible to uphold order in Japan.

II. United Kingdom Stockpile

This question is the crux of the present situation and the probable cause of Mr. Morrison’s visit, since the United Kingdom has the only known stocks of sufficient size to permit substantial diversions to other areas in critical need. If the question arises, it should be noted that the British apparently have supplies equivalent to several months’ consumption, whereas most countries now have less than a month’s supply. Accurate statistics must be developed on the working level.

III. Underwriting of Imports to the United Kingdom

This may well be the main point of the British presentation. We are not opposed to this in principle but the reason for their presenting the problem now is that other British areas will not receive adequate supplies unless the British themselves, despite uncertainty as to replacement, reduce their excess stocks in the United Kingdom by diversions to other areas from their Canadian and Argentine sources of supply. No commitment on our part, therefore, is necessary to induce such action. However, if the British would agree to reduce stocks to a level commensurate with that of other countries and to contribute to countries other than British areas, we would consider sympathetically a request to underwrite essential imports into the United Kingdom.

IV. Conservation Measures in the USA

The President is familiar with the steps taken to date. The British may press for additional measures. It is probable that we ourselves have considered, and will again consider, all the measures they may suggest. Any detailed discussions must be handled on the working level but it would not be harmful to intimate that any additional measures we may take at this time might be conditional on the immediate contribution made available through reduction of British stocks. In addition, Mr. Morrison will no doubt suggest the continuation of all present conservation measures beyond June 30 into the new crop year. There is agreement at the working level that such continuation may be necessary.⁶

V. Reorganization of the Combined Food Board

We are agreed in principle that the CFB should be substantially enlarged from its present membership of the USA, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Progress is being made in working out the details of this proposal in intergovernmental discussions.⁷

VI. Purchasing Arrangements in Argentina

We are in agreement that there should be established in Argentina a centralized purchasing arrangement, the distribution of the grain so acquired being subject to the approval of the Combined Food Board. This would prevent competitive bidding and one-sided purchasing advantages. The only questions are the nature and make-up of the purchasing agency, now in process of discussion.

There is attached hereto a brief biographic sketch of Mr. Morrison.

William L. Clayton

4. Presumably refers to Mr. Morrison’s parliamentary position of Leader of the House of Commons.
5. This was a cardinal tenet of U.S. occupation policy. In the context of the food crisis, the Secretary of State on March 5, 1946 had sent a letter to the Secretary of War (Patterson) expressing the Department of State’s “[great concern] about the world food crisis and its effect upon the foreign relations of the United States.” The Secretary went on to state that “It has … been a policy of this Government, to which the other occupying powers in Germany have agreed, that each occupying power should be responsible for procuring and financing the essential imports required for its own zone of occupation. This policy was based on the assumption, among others, that each of the occupying powers would in fact have access to supplies sufficient to meet the import requirements of its zone. In view of the critical world supply situation, this assumption appears no long tenable. The Department of State suggests, therefore, that each of the three zone commanders in Germany who are dependent on the Combined Food Board for allocations should estimate the ration scale that can be maintained in his zone until the next harvest from such supplies as are available from indigenous sources and imports. If there should be marked difference between the three zones with respect to the ration scale that can be maintained, the Department of State proposes that supplies be equalized as far as possible to eliminate differences and provide for one ration standard in these three zones. …”(800.5018/3–546).
6. This Government’s domestic program for meeting the food crisis is documented in the Department of State Bulletin, 1946. Reference may be made also to Memoirs of Harry S. Truman (vol. i) and the memoir by former President Herbert Hoover, The American Epic (Chicago, Regnuery, 1964), vol. iv. President Truman had enlisted the support and leaderhip of the former president, famine relief administrator of World War I years, as an earnest of his own personal concern and that of this Government in the grave implications of the global food shortage.
7. For a statement of May 8 by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada, announcing their decision to continue the Combined Food Board until December 31, 1946, see Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1946, p. 861.