Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

560.AL/2–2846: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

secret
urgent

London, February 28, 1946—6 p.m.
[Received March 1—9:59 a.m.]

2439. For Wilcox, Stinebower and Brown from Hawkins. We transmitted Wednesday copies of February 6 memorandum on preparations of preliminary meeting to Shackle and Stirling, Board Trade, with covering note embodying substance of Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Department’s circular telegram, February 12, 6 p.m. on which they will give us their comments soon; conveyed substance of Department’s circular telegram, February 26, 4 p.m.;⁴⁴ informed them (Paragraph 1 urtel 1806, February 27) that Department considers September 1 satisfactory date for preliminary meeting barring unforeseen developments: and discussed the suggestion contained in Paragraph 2 urtel 1806, February 27 [26], concerning possible short session of Preparatory Committee to exchange ideas on preparations for full meeting in September and to bring out general reactions to our “proposals”.

2. In light of informal discussion with Shackle and Stirling (Liesching being ill) and of previous consideration of subject Fowler, Catudal, and I have arrived at following conclusions; which represent only our own views.

a) Postponement of preliminary meeting to September 1 will give opportunity for more thorough preparatory work than would otherwise have been possible. The most important use to which this additional time could be put would be to get an agreement among the nuclear countries on our “proposals” with which only the British, Canadians and ourselves are thus far in agreement.

b) We question whether a brief meeting in New York in June after the ECOSOC meeting would be well suited to this purpose. Some adverse reactions to our proposals seem inevitable. Since we could not safely let the matter rest until September meeting with important issues unresolved, we would probably have rather protracted discussions. Putting off settlement of these issues would transfer time-consuming debates to a time when we would be overwhelmed with difficult and detailed tariff negotiations, and the September meeting would be unduly protracted. There is also the consideration that our negotiating position tends to be stronger if we consider the principles independently of their detailed implementation. Unless our schedule of offers embodies maximum reductions on all key items of interest to the countries concerned, they would be inclined, knowing our desire to have the general provisions accepted, to withhold their acceptance with the idea of putting pressure on US to make the maximum tariff reductions. However, whether or not this makes any real difference in negotiating position, this mixing of negotiations on general provisions and schedules at the September meeting would leave in a state of confusion the basis for the preparatory work of formulating the schedules. If there is doubt about the acceptability of essential principles on the part of important nuclear countries, there will be confusion and uncertainty in the preparations for the preliminary meeting. If, for example, important countries refuse to agree to the principle of general elimination of import restrictions, other countries will find it difficult to know how to formulate specific requests. Brazil might ask France for larger quotas whereas our requests of France might be based on assumption of a general prohibition against quantitative restrictions. For these reasons we believe June meeting as contemplated in your reference telegram could not and should not be a brief exploratory meeting but should seek to establish a solid basis for the negotiations in September by reaching firm agreement among all the nuclear countries on our “proposals”. It is true that even if the principles were accepted they would not be binding until satisfactory schedules had been agreed to and they naturally will make the effectiveness of the general provisions contingent upon satisfactory schedules. But the important difference is that if the general principles of our “proposals” can be conditionally agreed to first, a solid basis for formulating requests and offers on items for the schedules would be established.

c) In view of above we feel that meeting should be held earlier than June. Also, if meeting held for purpose of accomplishing what we think should be accomplished started as late as June it could not be completed long enough before September meeting to give nuclear countries opportunity to complete their preparatory work on firm basis of general agreement on our “proposals”. British consider it necessary to have meeting of Empire countries prior to September meeting and have previously talked in terms of holding such meeting some 6 weeks before the preliminary meeting. There might be insufficient time for this if meeting you have in mind started in June and were as protracted as we think it would be. Earlier meeting, held before Empire meeting, would enable us to help persuade any dissenting member of Empire to accept key points in our “proposals”.

d) British raised manpower problem, with particular reference Empire countries, in connection with June or earlier meeting. While recognizing problem, we pointed out that only few people for each country required for such a meeting; that manpower requirements for preparatory work for September meeting would be reduced if it could be carried out on basis of solid commitments on essentials; and that meeting considerably earlier than June might be completed in time to permit Empire representatives to return, if necessary, to home bases to assist in preparatory work and then come to London for Empire meeting, which would be shorter than otherwise as result of prior meeting on principles, in advance of September meeting. Although bearing of timing and place of meeting on manpower problem not fully explored, there might be considerable saving for Empire countries and most of the others if meeting you have in mind could be held in London.

e) All the foregoing considerations seem to us to argue for holding the meeting in early April rather than June and in London rather than New York.

f) The draft charter referred to in the memorandum on preparations for and procedure at the conference should, we believe, be withheld from distribution until we have gotten further along with agreement on principles. The effect of distributing GA detailed draft in advance of general agreement on our “proposals” might be to make it more difficult to reach agreement on basic principles because countries not yet committed in principle would be inclined to study the details of the draft charter, and argue about them, before agreeing to the underlying principles.

g) As to the participants in the June or April meeting, we feel that all the countries on the ECOSOC Preparatory Committee should participate. The meeting would be called as a meeting of the ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the purpose of beginning to carry out the task assigned by the Council. The Committee might, at this meeting agree on an annotated draft agenda in line with our “proposals”, leaving the draft convention for a later meeting. Prior to such later meeting the draft charter could be circulated to all members on the Committee. We should warn the nuclear countries prior to the first meeting of the Committee, that we intend to seek agreement at the meeting on our proposals so that delegates from those countries can come properly prepared.

h) There may be a by-product of considerable importance from an early meeting of the Preparatory Committee called for the purpose we have in mind. Although USSR has not to our knowledge accepted US invitation to preliminary meeting of nuclear countries, Soviet representative participated in ECOSOC discussion of resolution on trade conference and voted for resolution. USSR, being one of the countries designated to compose Preparatory Committee, would probably find it difficult to decline to participate in discussion of principles if this is handled by Preparatory Committee in carrying out its task rather than by a preliminary meeting called by the US. [Hawkins.]

Gallman

44. See footnote 37, p. 1284.