Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

SWNCC Files

Report by the Subcommittee on Rearmament to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee

top secret
SWNCC 202/2

[Washington,] March 21, 1946.

Policy Concerning Provision of United States Government Military Supplies for Post-War Armed Forces of Foreign Nations⁶³

problem

1. To study and advise the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee with respect to the extent to which the United States will support foreign countries with United States military supplies for their postwar armed forces; to determine whether certain lend-lease items still in existence should be withdrawn from particular foreign nations as a matter of United States or international security is a corollary in the implementation of the primary problem.

note: For the purpose of this paper the term “United States military supplies” is understood to mean naval vessels, arms, ammunition and implements of war obtainable through United States surplus channels or obtainable through the recapture of lend-lease articles in the hands of foreign military authorities.

discussion

2. See Appendix.

general conclusions

3. As a general guide, the State, War and Navy Departments agree that it is consistent with United States policy to support forces of foreign countries with United States military supplies to the extent stated in the “Specific Conclusions” of this paper subject to the “General Conclusions”. These conclusions should not exclude consideration of requests for minor quantities of United States military supplies, which requests should be considered on their individual merits.

4. Any support with United States military supplies should be implemented, so far as is possible within the framework of existing legislation, appropriations, etc., except enabling legislation will be necessary to avoid the mandatory recapture of certain vessels and craft. It is possible, however, in so far as surplus property located within the United States or its territories may be needed to implement such programs, that an amendment to the Surplus Property Act may be needed. The general policy guidance set forth in paragraph 3 should be considered when requests are made for new legislation or appropriations, etc.

5. The United States has the right to require the return or recapture of lend-lease military supplies. An examination of our relations with all countries indicates that it is not desirable at this time to exercise generally this right of return or recapture of such items. It is recognized, however, that the right of return or recapture may necessarily be exercised in cases where the War or Navy Department deems such action essential to meet its requirements. Any assertion by the War or Navy Department of the right of return or recapture should, however, be made only after consultation with the State Department in order that foreign policy factors may be considered.

6. In order to safeguard the future interests of the United States in the use of such items, the United States should obtain from those foreign governments which are permitted to retain lend-lease military equipment, an agreement providing that such Government will return lend-lease items on demand of the United States; and an agreement that such items will not be transferred to third governments for military use or to any party for civilian use by sale or otherwise, without the consent of the United States unless previously agreed, and then only upon such terms and conditions as the United States may impose; provided that the rights of recapture and restrictions as to use or disposition of military items of lend-lease origin may be waived only in case specific agreements to that effect are concluded within the United States Government. It is not intended that the retention of the rights of recapture expressed in this paragraph should apply in the case of lend-lease items paid for in full or in accordance with the terms of specific treaties or agreements.

8. [sic] It is neither desirable nor essential to set aside a reserve, or to disrupt existing disposal procedures, of equipment presently available to the United States, for the purpose of meeting equipment requirements that may result from these General and Specific Conclusions.⁶⁴

specific conclusions

note: The State Department wishes to invite attention that the following observations were obviously based upon foreign policy considerations at the time this paper was written, and that accordingly changes in policy are likely in the future which would affect these conclusions. In this connection it is recognized that the policy of the United States pursuant to its responsibilities in the United Nations for the regulation of armaments is now being formulated. To the extent that the specific conclusions which follow may be found not to be in harmony with such policy, modification of these conclusions may be required. It is understood by the War and Navy Departments that the State Department will initiate action to revise these specific conclusions whenever changes in foreign policy so dictate. It is assumed that the State Department will be consulted at the time any new policy or major program is proposed with respect to the furnishing of military supplies to a foreign country.

The following specific conclusions are intended to set the permissive limits within which implementation would be consistent with present national policy.

Latin America

9. It is consistent with United States policy to support with U.S. military supplies the armed forces of the other American Republics to the extent necessary to effect collaboration for the defense of the Hemisphere.

Far East

China

10. It is consistent with United States policy to support with U.S. military supplies, in reasonable amounts, the armed forces of China to the extent required to accomplish the establishment of a military organization capable of discharging Chinese national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order.

Philippines

11. It is consistent with United States policy to support the armed forces of the Philippines with U.S. military supplies to the extent required to permit them to provide for the security of the Philippines and for the mutual protection of the Islands and the United States.

Siam

12. It is consistent with United States policy to consider requests for strengthening the armed forces of Siam by the United States on their individual merits.

Korea

13. It is consistent with United States policy to provide a Korean National Civil Police Force with equipment adequate for the internal police requirements of that country as outlined in SWNCC 232/1.⁶⁵

Europe

The United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth

14. It is consistent with United States policy to positively support and aid the United Kingdom and British Commonwealth with United States military supplies in maintaining strong post-war armed forces.

France

15. It is consistent with United States policy to support with United States military supplies the armed forces of France, but pending further clarification of the situation in Indo-China provision of U.S. military supplies should be suspended in cases which appear to relate directly to that area.

Portugal

16. It is not considered consistent with United States policy to support with United States military supplies the armed forces of Portugal, except to the extent that they may be used to aid negotiations for permanent base rights.

Italy

17. United States policy favors the establishment within treaty limits of a military force sufficiently strong to maintain internal order in Italy, and sufficiently strong for defense of her borders against local violations and any support to Italy should be in accord therewith.

Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden

18. At this time the United States does not anticipate the rearming with United States military supplies of the armed forces of Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. It is consistent with United States policy, however, to give favorable consideration to specific requests by these countries for a limited number of aircraft. It is also consistent with United States policy to give favorable consideration to Danish requests for naval equipment for use in Greenland.

Netherlands

19. The State Department is of the opinion that requests for strengthening Netherlands armed forces by the United States should be considered on their individual merits, but that pending further clarification of the situation in the Netherlands East Indies, provision of U.S. military supplies should be suspended in cases which appear to relate directly to that area.

U.S.S.R.

20. The Soviet Government is in a position to meet its own military needs. Requests for strengthening the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. should be considered on their individual merits.

Other Countries of Europe

21. It is not considered consistent with United States policy to support with United States military supplies the armed forces of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary, Albania, Spain, Finland, Switzerland, and, of course, Germany. At this time the support of the armed forces of Czechoslovakia with United States supplies is not contemplated.

Near and Middle East

22. In accordance with the United States’ firm political policy of aiding the countries of the Near and Middle East to maintain their independence and develop sufficient strength to preserve law and order within their boundaries, it is consistent with United States policy to make available additional military supplies, in reasonable quantities, to those countries.

recommendations

23. It is recommended that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approve the above Conclusions and transmit this paper to the State, War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their guidance.

Appendix

discussion

1. In order fully to meet the requirements of the study under reference, an approach to the problem has been made by the Subcommittee from the standpoint of determining:

a. The extent to which the United States, in accordance with our foreign policy, will support in the foreseeable future foreign countries with military supplies for their post-war armed forces, and

b. Whether, in accordance with United States or international strategic security, lend-lease military equipment still in existence should be withdrawn from particular foreign nations.

2. In reaching its conclusions and recommendations the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee on Rearmament is of the opinion that so far as it is possible no new legislation is desirable for the implementation of any of the conclusions reached in this paper. It is possible, however, in so far as surplus property located within the United States or its territories may be needed to implement such programs, that an amendment to the Surplus Property Act may be needed. Also, it is believed necessary that enabling legislation must be enacted to clarify the matter of the disposition of craft now subject to mandatory recapture under Public Law No. 1, 78th Congress (H.R. 1446), and to provide for future transactions in which naval vessels and craft are involved.

3. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee on Rearmament is in accord with the conclusions … that “the State Department will recognize and make appropriate use of the bargaining power of foreign lend-lease obligations to the United States”.

4. In order to make sure that lend-lease equipment is not used in the future for purposes against the interests of the United States and to make sure that in case of future need the United States will be in a position to call for the return of this material, it would seem most desirable that before various governments are permitted to retain this equipment indefinitely they should be obliged to agree to return it upon demand.

5. The conclusion that foreign governments must agree not to transfer (by sale or otherwise) to third countries without our consent lend-lease military equipment or supplies is based generally on two considerations:

a. A factor in not recapturing this equipment from a certain country is that we want to see it in the hands of that country for security reasons, and this might or might not be the case with respect to the country of proposed retransfer, and we would want the opportunity to consider that question from the security angle case by case as they arise.

b. From the political angle, we would want the opportunity to consider whether the United States rather than the other country should get the credit for the transfer.

c. In the cases of sales, we would want the opportunity to consider whether the sale should be made for our account with proceeds payable to us.

6. It is the feeling of members of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee on Rearmament that a more appropriate title to this paper would be “Policy Concerning Provision of United States Government Military Supplies for Post-War Armed Forces of Foreign Nations”.⁶⁶ As explained in paragraph 1 above, this paper deals with the larger problem of United States foreign policy toward the support of post-war armed forces of foreign countries, as well as with the immediate problem of the recapture of lend-lease military equipment. Moreover, the scope of this paper goes beyond countries which have been furnished lend-lease equipment. Furthermore, the initial request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was for guidance for the War and Navy Departments “with respect to the extent to which the United States will support foreign countries with military supplies for their post-war armed forces”.

7. While it is unquestionably the function of the War and Navy Departments in the first instance to determine those lend-lease items which should be recaptured to meet their respective military requirements, the final determination in respect to recaptured items should of necessity give full consideration to this Government’s basic policies toward the post-war strength and position of any given country from which lend-lease material might be recaptured. For example, in the cases of France and Great Britain consideration should be given to the fact that it is our policy and it is in our national interest to have those countries politically, economically and militarily strong. While there would be no conflict with that policy on the recapture of items surplus to the needs of those countries, recapture of war materials which would materially weaken their military positions might well run counter to our basic interest. Accordingly, any request for the return of lend-lease items should only be made after full consideration has been given whether the recapture might involve the weakening of the military organization of a friendly country.

Latin America

8. The general problem of providing military aid to Latin America is discussed in SWNCC 4/10⁶⁷ and in other papers (ref. SWNCC 246 and SWN–3658) now before SWNCC.^67a The objective embodied in these papers, and set forth in paragraph 8 of the Specific Conclusions is the development of such relations with the armed forces of other American republics as will contribute the maximum to hemisphere security in the light of both military and political considerations.

Far East

China

9. There is an urgent need for reorganizing and modernizing China’s armed forces in order that they may be forged into an instrument capable of discharging China’s national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. To meet this need, the President has laid down as a principle of American policy toward China that “As China moves toward peace and unity . . . . the United States would be prepared to assist the National Government (of China) in every reasonable way to . . . . establish a military organization capable of discharging China’s national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order.” In keeping with the President’s policy as enunciated above, the United States should be prepared to support with United States military supplies the armed forces in China to the extent needed to accomplish the establishment of a modern and effective military organization.

Philippines

10. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of March 24, 1934 authorized the retention of military installations in the Philippines after they become a free and independent state on July 4, 1946. In a Joint Resolution of Congress (Public Law 380, 78th Congress) approved June 29, 1944, this policy was reaffirmed and the President of the United States was authorized to acquire and retain bases and necessary appurtenances thereto in the Philippines, and all rights incident thereto, in addition to those provided by the Act of March 24, 1934, “for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and the United States”. It can, therefore, be said that there is an obligation to aid the armed forces of the Philippines by making available to them United States military supplies not only for their own security but also for the security of the United States. In addition, it is essential that measures be taken to insure peace and order in the Philippines following the granting of complete independence on July 4, 1946.

Siam

11. The Department of State believes that favorable consideration should be given to requests by the Government of Siam for U.S. military supplies. However, in view of the international political implications of any such transaction, it is believed that such requests should be considered on their individual merits.

Korea

12. In approving SWNCC 232/1, it was considered inadvisable to authorize anything beyond the arming of Korean military police until such time as U.S. and Soviet occupying forces had been withdrawn or a responsible Korean government created which could support a military organization.

Europe

France

13. In late August 1944, the British Embassy approached the State Department, and the British Chiefs of Staff approached the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with reference to the adequate equipment of the forces of the Western European Allies, to enable them to maintain security in their own countries and to take part in occupying Germany. The question was asked whether the United States Government would be willing to reequip a French Army for such purposes from American sources during the next few years, having in mind that present French land forces are provided with American munitions and material. British Chiefs of Staff suggested a continuance of British supply to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium.

The United States Chiefs of Staff, through Admiral Leahy, stated to the Department of State that there was no objection on military grounds to the Division of responsibility proposed but that no commitments should be made that will be rigidly exclusive for the future.

Acceptance of the British proposal was recommended to President Roosevelt, who gave his approval. In the memorandum approved by President Roosevelt it was stated “Our present policy toward France is based on the belief that it is in the best interests of the United States that France resume her traditional position as a principal power capable of playing a part in the occupation of Germany and in maintaining peace in Europe. The recruiting and equipping of French military forces would be a natural corollary of this policy, and politically such a move could be portrayed as a further evidence of American friendship for France and a proof of our desire to see her as a strong nation. The furnishing of arms by the United States to France may provide this Government with a lever to exercise a certain measure of influence on French policy for a number of years. However, it must be borne in mind that France will make every effort to obtain arms from any source.” This continues to be State Department policy.

In March 1945, President Roosevelt approved a program of additional military equipment for the French military force. This program involved the equipment of eight additional French divisions. This program was only partially completed by V–E Day.

Due to the unsettled conditions at present prevailing in Indo-China, the Department of State finds itself in a somewhat difficult position. As indicated above, it believes that as a general principle, the United States should support the armed forces of France with military supplies. On the other hand, it does not at this juncture desire to strengthen the hand of the French Government in its current attempt to restore by force the pre-war position of France in Indo-China.

It is obvious that any material delivered to the French Government could easily find its way to Indo-China for purposes to which this Government is currently opposed. It goes without saying that once combat material is delivered to the French it will be extremely difficult to determine the ultimate use to which it is put.

Whereas the position taken in this juncture by the Department of State may not result in its desiderata being obtained in all respects, it is felt that the application of paragraph 12^67b of this paper can best serve the current interests of the United States.

Italy

14. Approval has been given (SWNCC 188 Series) to the sale to the Italian Government of approximately 150 P–38 aircraft now on loan to that government, and (SWNCC 170 Series) to the sale to Italy of military material furnished Italian troops. United States policy favors the establishment within the limits of treaty arrangements of an Italian military force sufficiently strong to maintain internal order and also strong enough for defense against outside encroachment.

Portugal

15. JCS document 1289/2,⁶⁸ November 12, 1945, sets forth the desires of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to post-war military rights in the Azores Islands. Negotiations for those rights have not yet been undertaken.

In view of the fact that the Department of State will shortly undertake negotiations with the Portuguese Government looking to securing for the United States permanent base rights in the Azores, it would be most useful if the American negotiators were in position to indicate to the Portuguese authorities that the supplies envisaged in the staff talks and possibly additional supplies might be made available to Portugal at preferably an extremely favorable price. Portuguese agreement to base rights might be the more readily obtained. It seems logical also that if this base is to be a joint Portuguese-American undertaking the Portuguese should have modernized equipment preferably United States standard equipment.

United Kingdom and British Commonwealth

16. It is recognized that it is in the interest of the United States that the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth have forces sufficiently strong to discharge their defense responsibilities. A strengthening of the armed forces of Canada, Australia and New Zealand is favored.

In any program of recapture of lend-lease equipment from the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, consideration should be given to the basic United States policy with respect to these countries and caution should be exerted in filing requests for recapture lest an actual weakening of the armed strength of those countries might result.

Netherlands

17. At the present time the Department of State finds itself in a somewhat difficult position due to the uncertainty of developments in the Netherlands East Indies. On the one hand it is agreeable to furnishing the Netherlands Government with United States military supplies intended for the defense of the metropolitan area, while on the other it does not, at this juncture, desire to assist that Government in an attempt to restore by force its pre-war position in the Netherlands East Indies. It is obvious that the Dutch might ship war material secured on the basis of use in the metropolitan area, to the Netherlands East Indies, for purposes to which this Government is currently opposed, and it is equally obvious that once combat material is delivered to the Dutch it would be extremely difficult to trace such material further.

Whereas the position taken at this juncture by the Department of State may not result in its desiderata being obtained in all respects, it is felt that the phrase “individual merits”, plus the caveat on the Netherlands East Indies contained in paragraph 16^68a of this paper, can best serve the current interests of the United States until the situation in the Indies is further clarified.

Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden

18. Although United States policy favors a strong Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, it is expected that these countries will receive outside support of military supplies from the United Kingdom. However, any requests from Denmark for naval equipment for use in Greenland should be favorably considered particularly as it would aid our negotiations for rights in that area.

Individual requests for commercial and trainer-type aircraft in limited quantities are to be expected from these countries and should be favored. Some requests for commercial-type aircraft have been received.

Other Countries of Europe

19. State Department policy with respect to the support of these countries with United States supplies is set forth in paragraph 20[21] of the Specific Conclusions.

Near and Middle East

20. The State Department advises as follows with respect to United States foreign policy regarding nations of the Near and Middle East:

In general, the United States had adopted the firm policy of aiding the countries of the Near and Middle East to maintain their independence and to develop sufficient strength to keep a reasonable degree of law and order within their boundaries. None of the governments of the area are believed to possess excessive armaments, and few of them have sufficient strength at present to police its territory adequately. By and large, therefore, we favor the according of additional military supplies, in reasonable quantities, to those countries of the area which may be able to purchase them.

As regards recapture, relatively little in the nature of military supplies has been furnished these countries under lend-lease with the exception of Turkey. Even in the case of Turkey, the supplies furnished were far less than those promised to Turkey by Prime Minister Churchill, with President Roosevelt’s concurrence. A few LST boats were furnished to Greece, and small amounts of military supplies may have been retransferred to Iran and Egypt by Great Britain. We are not aware of any instance in this area where an effort to recapture military supplies would be advisable, although the United States military authorities may find an instance here and there in which some country may have an excessive supply of some particular item of United States military lend-lease origin.

Afghanistan

21. United States foreign policy favors a government in Afghanistan which is capable of controlling the tribes and maintaining internal security. The country already possesses a moderate amount of military equipment but will need new supplies and replacements. We should examine sympathetically any Afghan requests to purchase such supplies from the United States in moderate amounts, for internal security purposes and to enable Afghanistan to defend its frontiers against marauders.

A complicating factor in the case of Afghanistan is British desire to have no such equipment transferred to Afghanistan without British approval, since the security of Northwest India is closely tied to that of Afghanistan. American representatives in London in 1944 concurred in the view that no arms should be sold by the United States to Afghanistan without prior consultation with the British. While this was an informal arrangement, without suggestion as to the duration and applied primarily to the existing war situation, the Department of State will undoubtedly feel it desirable to discuss with the British authorities any Afghan requests to purchase arms. Other military supplies such as uniforms, communications, supplies, et cetera, might be sold without prior consultation, although prior notification would be a proper courtesy. Decision regarding consultation in the latter type of case can be made in each case as it arises. The Afghan Government has indicated a desire to acquire certain surplus United States military supplies in India but no formal request has yet been received. If such a request were received, we should view it sympathetically.

Egypt

22. A treaty between Great Britain and Egypt gives Great Britain preferential treatment in the training of its Army by British military instructors and in furnishing military supplies which are to conform, as far as possible, to British specifications. As long as the foregoing treaty provisions are in effect, Egypt is understood not to be in a position to obtain military equipment without British concurrence. We should consider favorably any reasonable Egyptian requests which have British approval.

Ethiopia

23. In accordance with our policy of affording all appropriate assistance to the Ethiopian Government to enable it to maintain the independence of the country and in fulfillment of our assurances of aid in Ethiopia’s rehabilitation, it is recommended that the United States provide such military supplies as competent American and Ethiopian military authorities may deem necessary to ensure domestic tranquillity. From the international aspect, it is difficult to envisage a future armed threat to Ethiopian independence from any of her present neighbors, but border incidents may continue to occur as a result of the Government’s present inability to maintain complete order throughout the 350,000 square miles of its domain. The furnishing of additional military supplies should assist the Government to augment its police and military forces and to increase its ability to deal with unstable border elements.

The Ethiopian Government has recently furnished the State Department a long list of supplies which it desires to obtain, including various items of military equipment. It is not yet certain, however, how the Ethiopians intend to handle this request formally. When this request is received in proper fashion the State Department considers that the request should be viewed sympathetically.

Greece

24. It is desirable to cooperate with the British to enable Greece to maintain security, especially along North and Northwestern frontier. The amount of arms necessary for this purpose will depend on the extent of armament in neighboring countries, a subject on which the Big Three are in disagreement. In principle, United States foreign policy favors the further strengthening of Greek forces.

Iran

25. United States foreign policy toward Iran envisages a strong national entity capable of maintaining internal security. To attain this objective, we would look with favor on the furnishing of arms and equipment to the Iranian Army, police and gendarmerie. We have, in fact, been furnishing such equipment during the war under cash reimbursable lend-lease, through requisitions filed by the heads of the two American Military Missions to Iran. It is recommended that we continue to furnish any military supplies to Iran, against payment, which may be recommended by our military missions there.

Iraq

26. As long as the present Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance remains in effect, Iraq is presumably precluded from obtaining any military supplies except with the concurrence of Great Britain. In any event, it would seem advisable for us to cooperate closely with Great Britain in any program for supplying arms to Iraq.

Liberia

27. Liberia occupies a special position in our foreign relations. We have been looked to as “next friend” ever since Liberia was founded by American philanthropic institutions. Our policy has been to support internal order and to give economic and political assistance when required. We should support Liberia with military supplies for its small post-war armed forces, should requests for such supplies be considered necessary by American representatives in Liberia. The United States, during the course of the present war, undertook the defense of Liberia for the duration, and in that connection provided arms and training for the Liberian Frontier Force.

Saudi Arabia

28. The United States has every interest in assisting the Government of Saudi Arabia in maintaining peace and order in the country, where an American company has an oil concession of great potential importance to American strategic as well as commercial and political interests. Furthermore, some 1200 American citizens are residing in the country without protection from possible tribal disturbances and the most feasible means of protection is to strengthen the Government with adequate military supplies.

It should be added that this Government has indicated willingness to continue to assist Saudi Arabia in the development of a modern post-war Army, both ground and air force, through military missions and other means. From October 1944 to July 1946 a small United States Military Mission consisting of 12 officers and men was stationed in Saudi Arabia to train the Saudis in the use and care of military lend-lease items being shipped to that country. In response to a request from King Ibn Saud a new military mission to Saudi Arabia was organized in March 1945, but during subsequent negotiations the King expressed fears that further military assistance would be misinterpreted and opposed by his tribal chieftains, by his external enemies and by the British. For the time being at least, the King has declined such military assistance. One the other hand, he has let it be known that his decision is not final. It is quite possible, therefore, that the King may yet request military assistance in some form, and this Government would then be under commitment to render such assistance.

Syria and Lebanon

29. Syria and Lebanon, especially the former, are in urgent need of military supplies if they are to be enabled to maintain internal security. It is recommended that we furnish such supplies as requested to the greatest extent feasible. These two countries are just now emerging into independent status and are endeavoring to establish rudimentary armed forces sufficient to enable them to maintain order. We have recognized their independence and assured them of our willingness to assist them in their efforts to create firm governments.

Turkey

30. We should continue, in general, to sell the Turks such reasonable amounts of arms and equipment as they may wish to buy. We must guard against a charge of actively and aggressively arming Turkey against the U.S.S.R., but there seems no likelihood of Turkey’s developing aggressive tendencies and any arms they obtained would be for defensive purposes.

63. The present paper had its origins in a request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee as SWNCC 202/D on October 3, 1945, that the Subcommittee on Rearmament prepare a report on policy with respect to lend-lease and the support of foreign countries by the provision of military supplies. The initial Subcommittee report was circulated as SWNCC 202/1, January 24, 1946, “Policy Concerning Settlement of Lend-Lease Obligations.” That document was similar in form and content to the present paper. At its 35th Meeting, February 7, the Committee considered SWNCC 202/1, agreeing upon amendments which were incorporated into SWNCC 202/2. After undergoing certain minor additional revision, SWNCC 202/2 was approved by the Committee on March 21 in the form in which it appears here. (SWNCC Files)
64. In memorandum SWN–3830, February 4, the Department of State approved SWNCC 202/1 subject to the addition of this paragraph and of the words “In this connection … may be required” in the Specific Conclusions immediately below. Neither item had appeared in any form in SWNCC 202/1. (SWNCC Files)
65. SWNCC 232/1, Police Force and National Defense Forces for Korea, was approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on December 29, 1945. For the directive on this subject from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Mac-Arthur, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, see telegram Warx 92187 to Tokyo, January 9, 1946, in Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, p. 1156.
66. Documents SWNCC 202/D and SWNCC 202/1 are titled “Policy Concerning Settlement of Lend-Lease Obligations” (SWNCC Files).
67. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ix, p. 251.
68. Neither printed.
69. The reference to paragraph 15 under “Specific Conclusions” herein, p. 1147.
68. Not printed.
69. The reference is to paragraph 19 under “Specific Conclusions” herein, p. 1149.