Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Policy Planning Staff Files⁴⁹

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State⁵⁰

[Extracts]

secret

[Washington,] December 1, 1945.

Foreign Policy of the United States

fundamentals

President Truman has set forth the following “fundamentals” of our foreign policy:

1. We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage. We have no plans for aggression against any other state, large or small. We have no objective which need clash with the peaceful aims of any other nation.

2. We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force.

3. We shall approve no territorial changes in any friendly part of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.

4. We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. That is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.

5. By the combined and cooperative action of our war allies, we shall help the defeated enemy states establish peaceful democratic governments of their own free choice. And we shall try to attain a world in which Nazism, Fascism, and military aggression cannot exist.

6. We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power. In some cases it may be impossible to prevent forceful imposition of such a government. But the United States will not recognize any such government.7. We believe that all nations should have the freedom of the seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and of rivers and waterways which pass through more than one country.

8. We believe that all states which are accepted in the society of nations should have access on equal terms to the trade and the raw materials of the world.

9. We believe that the sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere, without interference from outside the Western Hemisphere, must work together as good neighbors in the solution of their common problems.

10. We believe that full economic collaboration between all nations, great and small, is essential to the improvement of living conditions all over the world, and to the establishment of freedom from fear and freedom from want.

11. We shall continue to strive to promote freedom of expression and freedom of religion throughout the peace-loving areas of the world.

12. We are convinced that the preservation of peace between nations requires a United Nations Organization composed of all the peace-loving nations of the world who are willing jointly to use force if necessary to insure peace.⁵¹

Secretary Byrnes has stated in recent addresses:

Today there can be no doubt that the peoples of this war-ravaged earth want to live in a free and peaceful world. But the supreme task of statesmanship the world over is to help them to understand that they can have peace and freedom only if they tolerate and respect the rights of others to opinions, feelings and ways of life which they do not and cannot share.

It is not enough to banish atomic or bacteriological warfare. We must banish war. To that great goal of humanity we must ever rededicate our hearts and strength.

To help us move toward that goal we must guard not only against military threats to world security but economic threats to world well-being. Political peace and economic warfare cannot long exist together. If we are going to have peace in this world, we must learn to live together and work together. We must be able to do business together.

Today the world must make its choice. There must be one world for all of us or there will be no world for any of us.

objectives

Our foreign and domestic policies are directed to the same end: the maintenance of peace and security and the advancement of the welfare of the people. The principal objectives of our foreign policy are:

1. To promote our national interests energetically but with full realization that the welfare of our people is inescapably linked with the welfare of all peoples.

2. To maintain the unity of purpose and action of the major United Nations and of all the United Nations to the end that the association which successfully prosecuted the war will build and maintain—by force if necessary—an organized peace.

3. To contribute to the effectiveness of the United Nations Organization by meeting our full responsibilities and by providing leadership in the Organization.

4. To prevent the misuse of atomic energy and to direct it into channels of service to mankind.

5. To prevent Germany and Japan from again acquiring the power to wage war.

6. To encourage, as conducive to international order and peace, the establishment of democratic governments.

7. To encourage conditions of life within nations, and relations among nations, favorable to the development by men and women everywhere of free and democratic institutions, in accordance with their own customs and desires.

8. To promote a greater expansion of our foreign trade and of productiveness and trade throughout the world, and thus contribute to the maintenance of full and productive employment and rising standards of living in the United States and in all countries.

9. To promote a spirit of good neighborliness and fair dealing in international relations and to encourage other nations to do likewise.

The policies and programs which this Government is following in our foreign relations in attempting to attain these objectives are summarized below.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Our policy toward the Soviet Union should be to continue our efforts to convince the Soviet authorities that it is to our mutual advantage to collaborate in all decisions in the international relations field. In order to attain this end, we should not hesitate to make clear to the Soviet authorities and, if necessary, to the American public that we cannot continue collaboration with the Soviet Union if it insists on making unilateral decisions and taking unilateral action in its dealings with other nations of the world. In pursuing the policy of collaboration, however, we should always be prepared to stand firm against Soviet demands when acceptance of these demands would mean that we would have to compromise any of our fundamental principles. The most effective way of following this policy is for us to use our full influence in backing the United Nations Organization in order to strengthen it and make it in fact an effective organization for the maintenance of peace. We should not hesitate to resist to the full any effort to weaken the organization and should be prepared to go along with all other nations who wish to make it an effective organization.

While considerable progress has been made in reaching a satisfactory relationship with the Soviet Union, it is just the beginning and there are still a number of very fundamental unsolved questions, many of which have been brought about by the unilateral action taken by the Soviet authorities. Some of these are:

1. The fact that totalitarian political regimes have been established under direct Soviet control in certain countries of Southeastern and Central Europe. We should continue to maintain that events in these countries are the responsibility of the three nations signatory to the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. The fact that we have been unable to bring the Soviet Government to live up to the principles of this Declaration does not mean we should cease our efforts directed toward its implementation. We should, under all circumstances, avoid any action which would appear to accept any “democratic” incipient totalitarian regimes in these countries without on the other hand making it clear that we renounce any responsibility for these areas because of the unacceptable character of the political regimes which are in the process of being established. While we should not withdraw formal diplomatic recognition from regimes, such as Yugoslavia, which have not permitted the holding of democratic elections, we should make it clear that the maintenance of diplomatic relations with such regimes does not imply in any way our approval of the policies of such regimes, their methods of assuming control, or their failure to implement the guarantees of personal freedoms. We should refrain from according diplomatic recognition to the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria as now constituted but, on the other hand, should accord recognition to countries, such as we have done in the case of Hungary, where free elections have been held.

2. The establishment of almost complete Soviet economic control over the countries of Eastern and Central Europe through war booty and reparation deliveries, by bilateral barter trade agreements, and in certain cases by “agreements for economic collaboration”, all of which in effect mean an economic blackout in these areas for all other nations. In conformity with our announced policies of favoring access to all raw materials by all nations and of equal economic opportunity in all areas, we should use our full influence to break down the firm hold which the Soviet Government is endeavoring to fasten on Eastern and Central Europe. We should be prepared to grant credits on an approved transaction basis to those countries in Eastern and South-eastern Europe in which sincere efforts are being made to establish representative democratic regimes. In granting such credits, however, we should be sure that the credits are not used as an indirect method for the payment of reparations to the Soviet Union. In connection with the economic developments in Eastern Europe, we should insist upon protecting all legitimate American interests and property in that area and demand compensation for the value of the American interests involved in the event that property owned directly or indirectly by United States nationals cannot be retained.

We should not accord credits to the Soviet Union until we have received concrete and tangible assurances and supporting evidence that its economic policies are in general accord with our announced international economic policies. In order to protect the basic interests of the United States we should not accord global credits but should grant credits only on an approved transaction basis, thus permitting a review of the situation each time an application is made for an advance for a specific purpose. Because of the comparatively limited facilities the Soviet Government has for obtaining foreign exchange, the total amount of credit granted should be limited to a sum for which there are reasonable assurances that repayment can be made in the normal processes of international trade.

3. The Soviet policy of endeavoring to prevent full news reports from being sent to the outside world from areas under Soviet domination makes it difficult for the American public to evaluate developments in these areas. Now that we have obtained permission for American correspondents to enter these areas, we should continue our efforts to see that they are permitted freely to send factual reports on developments.

4. The indications of the adoption of a policy by the Soviet Government in the Far East of giving indirect support to communist elements in that area. While we have primary responsibility for the control of Japan and therefore the establishment of normal conditions in the Far East, we should nevertheless, as far as circumstances permit, make a full effort to consult with the Soviet Government in all matters affecting this area. As is the case in Europe, we should use our full influence, however, to assure that democratic regimes are established in the area, rather than Soviet-sponsored totalitarian governments.

In our policy in dealing with countries under Soviet domination we should, when possible, work out a concrete program, both political and economic, designed to support all the democratic elements in these countries but should not take any action which would strengthen the totalitarian left. On the other hand, since in general the non-communist left appears to have the broadest basis of popular support in this area, we should be prepared to assist these groups whenever possible. Present indications point to the possibility that the Soviet Government may realize that its efforts completely to control the areas under Soviet domination are not meeting with success and are in fact proving to be a liability. This development appears to be taking place because of the growing resistance to Soviet methods and the disrupting influence which contact with these countries is having on Soviet occupation troops. Since the Soviet Union itself has many internal problems to solve in the next few years, it is possible that because of the difficulties encountered in Eastern and Central Europe and because it needs to exert its maximum efforts internally, the Soviet Government may decide to abandon its policy of full control in these areas. We should adapt our policy to encourage them in this direction without loss of face, if circumstances permit.

In the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Government we must always bear in mind that because of the differences between the economic and political systems of our two countries, the conduct of our relations requires more patience and diligence than with other countries. We should be prepared to overlook minor grievances, explain carefully and in detail our reasons for all of our actions or requests, and if it is deemed advisable to take a firm position regarding the Soviet Union, we should always be as careful as possible to assure that our facts are correct. The adoption of a firm and friendly attitude in our dealings with the Soviet Government when our interests are involved will put our relations on a much more satisfactory basis than yielding in the hope of securing greater consideration in the future, or the adoption of half-way measures, or failure to make our position clear in each case. On the other hand, in order to minimize Soviet suspicions of our motives we should avoid even the appearance of taking unilateral action ourselves.

49. Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1947–1953. The source text is filed in this lot although the Policy Planning Staff did not come into existence until May 7, 1947.
50. This document consists of two sections. The first, pp. 1–25, treated general aspects of United States policy, and was considered as a possible public statement. The second part, pp. 26–106, dealt with policy with respect to specific areas of the world. It was never intended for public use, but was entirely for working purposes. The document was transmitted to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee for the information and comment of the War and Navy Departments on December 17, 1945.
51. Quoted from the President’s Navy Day address, October 27, 1945; for full text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1961). p. 431, or Department of State Bulletin, October 28, 1945, p. 653.