811.20/11–145

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson)

top secret

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Careful consideration has been given to your memorandum of November 1, 1945 and to the three questions set forth in the enclosure to your memorandum.

I am enclosing a memorandum which has been prepared in the Department of State, setting forth answers to the questions propounded in your memorandum.

Twice in your lifetime and mine, the United States has, while engaged in a World War, demonstrated that our country can build up and effectively utilize military strength at a prodigious rate, perhaps faster than any other country has ever done in history. We seem to be in a fair way of demonstrating a second time that our country can demobilize and tear down its military strength more rapidly than any other country in the world.

I am deeply concerned at the rate at which we are losing our military strength. It is not so much that I am unduly pessimistic about the international situation with its admitted uncertainties. It is rather that I know that this is a time when our country should be united and strong in order that it may make its influence for good, for peace, and for justice effectively felt in the councils of the world and on the peace settlements.

As the President said in his address on October 27 (after listing the “four principal tasks” which determine the kind of armed might we propose to maintain):

“These four military tasks are directed not toward war—not toward conquest—but toward peace.

“We seek to use our military strength solely to preserve the peace [Page 1129] of the world. For we now know that that is the only sane [sure] way to make our own freedom secure.

“That is the basis of the foreign policy of the people of the United States.”

I am sure that you will understand that it is not possible to answer some of the questions which you put to me as definitely as both of us would desire. I shall, of course, be glad to work in the closest possible cooperation with you and with the Secretary of the Navy in jointly endeavoring to meet the problems which face us in the field of foreign affairs and defense.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Byrnes
[Enclosure]

Answers to Questions Contained in the Memorandum Dated November 1, 1945 From the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State

Question:

1. Is it your estimate that as of 1 July 1946, 1 Jan 1947, and 1 July 1947, the situation will require occupation forces in the countries listed below? If you so estimate, what will the functions of these forces be in each listed country?

Answer:

a. Europe:

(1) Germany:40 It is anticipated that occupation forces will be required in Germany on July 1, 1946, January 1, 1947 and July 1, 1947. The precise functions of these forces in Germany on the indicated dates are difficult to determine at this time. If by these dates considerable progress has been made in the Control Council on the reestablishment of German agencies, the possible transition from military government to a general supervisory civilian control, it is conceivable that a police type force of occupation would be sufficient. It is understood that the War Department is already developing plans for this type of occupation force.

If this system can be developed, the functions of the ocupation forces would presumably be limited to the maintenance of order and the many functions of military government now in effect could be transferred to German agencies and to Allied civilian control. This transition in the occupational system of Germany will, however, require negotiations with the other powers represented on the Control Council in Berlin [Page 1130] and will no doubt require a modification of the present agreement on control machinery for Germany. The Department of State cannot predict with any certainty at this time when or exactly how this transfer of functions may be effected.

(2) Austria:41 The Department of State expects to initiate discussions shortly with the War Department for the purpose of presenting proposals in the Allied Council at Vienna for a reduction of Allied occupation forces in Austria.

We shall require military advice as to how this proposal can most effectively be presented. The Department of State would like to obtain agreement in the Allied Council in the near future for a reduction of occupation forces in Austria. It would certainly be desirable to have the occupation forces in Austria transposed into a police type by July 1, 1946 and, if possible, withdrawn entirely by January 1, 1947. The qualified recognition which has now been extended to the Renner Government in Austria is the first step in this direction.

(3) Czechoslovakia:42 The American Government and the Russian Government have now agreed that American and Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia by December 1, 1945.

(4) Italy and Venezia Giulia:43 The Italian campaign was initiated and carried through as an Allied campaign. Allied Military Government was set up in the liberated territory as a joint organization, and both British and American forces have been used for the maintenance of order. There would appear to be at least a moral obligation on our part to maintain American forces for AMG as long as required.

The establishment of Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia, as a disputed area, and the continuation of AMG in that area, and perhaps in Bolzano as well, until the final peace settlement, was approved by the President on September 19, 1944. This approval was confirmed to the Secretary of War by the Acting Secretary in a letter dated April 26, 1945, in which it was also stated that participation of American forces in these areas was a “sine qua non” in British agreement to the establishment and maintenance of AMG.

On April 28, 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommended that the forces necessary in Venezia Giulia be provided jointly by the US and UK, and directive in this sense was despatched to SACMED on April 30, 1945.44

[Page 1131]

b. Far East: Japan45

(1) Occupational forces will be needed on a fairly wide scale on July 1, 1946. By January 1, 1947, if progress continues at the same rate as at present toward achievement of the objectives of the occupation, it should be possible for the occupation forces to be concentrated in a few important strategic places and their numbers perhaps reduced in comparison with the forces maintained on July 1, 1946. Occupation forces will continue to be required on July 1, 1947. If the same tendency as mentioned above continues in Japan, it may be that a further reduction by July 1, 1947 will be possible. Perhaps by that time a minimum number of mobile occupational units will be needed to assure the continued control over Japan, but that, of course, depends upon developments.

The functions of the occupation forces, after the complete disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese forces is completed, will be to assure that Allied policies, as implemented by the directives of the Supreme Commander, are carried out. These forces will act primarily as enforcement agencies and may also be required to carry out the inspection of Japanese industry to prevent the growth of Japan’s war-making power.

Far East: Korea46

(2) It is hoped that by July 1, 1946 an international trusteeship will be in operation in Korea. If so, only those armed forces requested by the High Commissioner for Korea (provided for in the trusteeship draft) and approved by the proposed Executive Council for Korea for the maintenance of internal law and order will remain in Korea. The same answer applies to occupation forces as of January 1 and July 1, 1947. Since it is hoped that native police and a native constabulary will, to an increasing degree, assume responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Korea, it should not be necessary for the High Commisioner to request that large numbers of troops be made available to assist him.

Question:

2. a. Forces presently planned to be available in Europe on and after 1 January 1946 will be capable of policing Germany and enforcing surrender terms. These forces will not be capable of making a show of force to implement political policies should a firm stand against a militant power prove desirable. Are these military capabilities in consonance with foreign policy of our government?

[Page 1132]

Answer:

a. It is undeniable that the presence of large numbers of United States forces in Europe gives tangible evidence of the interest of our Government in European affairs and lends authority and support to the position taken by our Government on political questions. This is true even though no conscious effort is made, or should be made, to create “a show of force”. It seems unlikely that the size of the occupation force in Europe by next July (probably under 200,000) will be large enough to be impressive in providing support for our political policies. The situation would not be greatly improved if the size of the force were double that figure next July. The important thing is that our Country must have sufficient military strength at home and abroad to give evidence of a determination to back up the policies of our Government anywhere that may be necessary. Our influence and prestige throughout the world are to a large extent dependent on this. Our military potential, demonstrated in 1917–1918, was not enough to keep us out of World War II.

Question:

b. (1) What is the maximum proportionate military participation which the U.S. will allow our Allies in the occupation of Japan? The composition of Allied occupational forces depends upon the answer to this question.

b. (2) In connection with granting our Allies certain rights in Japan, what, if any corollary involvement in continental affairs in the Far East do we foresee and accept?47 From a military point of view, this determines what military steps must be designed against unacceptable aggression in the Orient. For instance, it would be most valuable to have a clear cut statement of minimum interests from which the U.S. will not retreat in the event of a clash of interests in the Far East, particularly concerning Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, North China and Korea.

Answer:

b. (1) In a memorandum from the JCS to the SWNCC of October 24 it is stated:

“General MacArthur considers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur, that if the United States is to maintain the controlling voice in the occupation of Japan, U.S. participation in the occupation forces must be at least equal to that of all other nations combined.”

The Department feels that it is essential for the United States to maintain the controlling voice in the occupation of Japan. The proportionate United States military participation in the occupation necessary [Page 1133] to maintain this position is considered to be primarily a military question. Therefore, in accordance with General MacArthur’s view, the Department feels that the maximum proportionate military participation which the United States should allow our Allies in the occupation of Japan is not more than fifty per cent.

b. (2) In the absence of any indication as to the character of “certain rights” which we might grant to our Allies in Japan, it is difficult to answer this question. If the reference is to stationing of military contingents by our Allies in Japan, we do not understand how such stationing of contingents would give rise to any corollary involvement by the United States in continental affairs in the Far East. As to your request for a statement of minimum interests from which the United States will not retreat in the event of a clash of interests in the Far East, the Department does not believe it possible to give any such statement which would be sufficiently reliable or certain as to furnish the basis on which the War Department might determine in advance the military steps to be taken against possible aggression in the Far East. It is believed that the problem posed by your question in regard to this Department’s contribution of political guidance to the Armed Forces can best be met by consistent and close cooperation between the Departments concerned.

Question:

3. Are there any U.S. requirements other than military which will necessitate continuation of the operation of ATC facilities by the War Department in occupied areas or on foreign routes? If so, what are these requirements in detail, including length of time and specified operation to be continued?

Answer:

3. We do not know of any U.S. requirements other than military which will necessitate continuation of the operation of ATC facilities in occupied areas or on foreign routes. It seems likely that military requirements will for some time necessitate operations by the ATC to Berlin and certain other places in Europe. Since our only means of communication with Berlin is over ATC service it is our hope that it will be continued until regularly scheduled commercial services are instituted. The same situation applies at various other places in Europe and in the Far East. In these circumstances it is hoped that the War Department will confer with the Department of State informally in advance before reaching a decision to terminate important ATC services to Europe and the Far East.

Answers regarding Japan, Korea and Far Eastern matters based on memoranda prepared by FE.48

  1. For documentation on United States policy with respect to the occupation of Germany, see vol. v, pp. 481 ff.
  2. For documentation on United States policy with respect to the occupation of Austria, see vol. v, pp. 283 ff.
  3. For documentation on United States interest in the reestablishment of democratic government in Czechoslovakia, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 420 ff.
  4. For documentation on United States policy with respect to Italy and Venezia Giulia, see ibid., pp. 1103 ff., and ibid., 1946, vol. vi, pp. 824 ff. passim.
  5. For a description of the directive, see telegram 323 to Caserta, ibid., 1945, vol. iv, pp. 11201121.
  6. For documentation on United States policy with respect to the occupation and control of Japan, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, pp. 710 ff. and 1946, vol. viii, pp. 85 ff.
  7. For documentation on general political policies of the United States toward Korea, see vol. viii, pp. 1018 ff.
  8. For documentation on United States policy with respect to China, see volumes ix and x .
  9. Office of Far Eastern Affairs.