501.BB/11–2946
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political, Affairs (Hiss) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
Subject: Resolutions on Disarmament
Mr. Ross has told me of his telephone conversation today with you in which the above subject was discussed briefly. In as much as you may be called upon to give opinions on this subject in the course of the next day or so, I am attaching hereto copies of the documents now before the Assembly. They are (1) the Canadian amendment to the Soviet proposal, (2) the Australian amendment to the Soviet proposal, and (3) the Soviet proposal itself. The latter is at the moment in three parts: Molotov’s original resolution of October 29, the addition he proposed on November 28, and the proposal with respect to [Page 1074] troops and armaments at home which the Soviets proposed but did not press during the debate on the troop proposals. They have now said that they will incorporate this in their disarmament resolution. A consolidated Soviet text is not yet available.
I gather from Jack Ross that the feeling in New York is that it will not be feasible simply to oppose any Assembly resolution on the subject of disarmament. Secondly, they are all now much concerned about the confusion which would be created were the disarmament matter to be referred to the Security Council along the lines of any of the pending resolutions. They are apparently of the opinion that as a result of these resolutions it would now be too late for us to propose that the matter be referred to the Security Council but only to be considered after the Security Council had disposed of the subject of atomic energy on the basis of the Atomic Energy Commission report. The alternative they are thinking of is apparently the creation of a new disarmament commission similar to the Atomic Energy Commission which would in due course report to the Security Council. They feel that this would meet the pressure for action with respect to disarmament (which they apparently consider practically irresistible) but would prevent the whole matter being thrown into the Security Council with resulting jeopardy to our position on atomic energy and on safeguards generally. Obviously any such new commission could not possibly report to the Security Council before the Atomic Energy Commission’s crisis has come and gone (or at least been disposed of in some manner).
I have suggested to Mr. Ross that they might want to give consideration to the possibility of referring the subject of disarmament, with safeguards as first priority, to the Atomic Energy Commission itself. This might accomplish the objectives they are seeking in New York without the confusion likely to arise from having two commissions working in very closely related fields at the same time.