Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

SPA Files

Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, to Senator Austin ⁴²

secret

[New York,] November 29, 1946.

The situation on disarmament in Committee 1 when it adjourned at about two o’clock is as follows:⁴³

Molotov was not present; Vyshinsky represented the Soviet Union. Senator Connally had made the speech we prepared last night and discussed with him before he left for Lake Success.

Following Senator Connally’s speech Shawcross, the British Attorney General,⁴⁴ asked Vyshinsky four questions which he said he would like to have answered tomorrow. These questions were:

1. The United Kingdom Government assumes that the Soviet Union has no intention by its proposals to replace or sidetrack the Atomic Energy Commission. He asked Mr. Vyshinsky to reaffirm the Soviet Government’s support of the Commission.

2. He asked Vyshinsky whether the Soviet Government advocates the prompt establishment of an effective system of control. He apparently did not relate this question to atomic energy or any other particular phase of disarmament.

3. Assuming that atomic energy would be controlled by a separate agency, he asked Vyshinsky whether the Soviet Government advocates that the Security Council under the unanimity rule (veto) should control all other weapons.

4. After stating that the Canadian and Australian Governments had put forward proposals which were somewhat more detailed than the Soviet proposals, he asked Vyshinsky whether the Soviet Government sees any difference in principle among these three proposals. If no difference in principle is seen, would the Soviet Government agree to setting up tomorrow a drafting subcommittee which could boil down the three proposals into one which might then be unanimously accepted by Committee 1?

5. Vyshinsky spoke somewhat later on to the effect that (a) the Soviet Union is in favor of complete disarmament involving all weapons in every country; (b) Mr. Molotov has made abundantly clear the Soviet position in favor of controls; (c) disarmament must come first before security; (d) the Australian and Canadian paragraphs relating to atomic energy were not as good as the original Russian paragraph on this subject. (The Australian-Canadian paragraphs are close to our own views; the Russian paragraph is, of course, based on their position in the Atomic Energy Commission.)

6. Vyshinsky indicated that a revision of the Soviet resolution incorporating the new paragraph proposed by Molotov yesterday, and bringing back into the picture the Molotov proposal of several days ago linking the reporting on troops at home to reporting on armaments, was being circulated and would be distributed later today. Vyshinsky raised no objection to the British proposal of a subcommittee.

7. Subsequently Shawcross probed into the Soviet position on the veto saying that Vyshinsky had not answered his question on this subject and that it looked as though the Soviet Union was trying to interpose the Security Council between the Atomic Energy Commission and any system of international control. He expressed the hope that the prospect of disarmament would not be broken down by any misuse of the unanimity rule.

8. Vyshinsky, replying to Shawcross, said that everyone knew where the Soviet Union stood on the unanimity rule and that it would be a bad omen if the abolition of the veto should be considered a condition precedent to accomplishment in the disarmament field.

9. Meanwhile some of the British advisers had sounded out our people indicating that the Canadian resolution might be acceptable to them and asking whether we can support it.

10. Since then I understand that the Canadians and Australians have gotten together and agreed on a consolidated text which we should have available later this evening.⁴⁵

The situation we will be in at 10:30 tomorrow morning is as follows:

1. The only real difference between the Australian and Canadian proposals, on the one hand, and the Soviet proposals on the other, is with regard to atomic energy. It is clear to me, however, that the Russians could readily accept, aside from details, the Australian-Canadian formulation in this regard without weakening to any substantial degree what, I am sure, is their simple objective of getting atomic energy, general disarmament, reporting on troops, the Article 43 agreements, and related matters all jumbled together into the Security Council at the earliest possible moment.

2. I doubt whether Vyshinsky is likely to raise any strong objection tomorrow to the appointment of a subcommittee.

3. If we raise no objection to those proposals tomorrow our failure to do so may be considered equivalent to agreement in principle to their content.

4. The principal question we have to decide before tomorrow morning, therefore, is whether we do have any objections to those proposals. If so, Senator Connally would presumably state them in Committee tomorrow morning.⁴⁶

5. Having stated any objections we may have, the next question we must consider is whether we will have any alternative to propose, if not tomorrow then at an early date.

It is my strong personal view that these resolutions contain a number of objectionable features as set forth below:

1. First of all, the second paragraph of the Soviet proposal which reads, “The implementing of the decision concerning the reduction of armaments should include as a primary objective the prohibition to produce and use atomic energy for military purposes” is objectionable on two counts: (a) it links too closely together the general reduction of armaments and atomic energy and thereby weakens the focus we want to maintain on the latter; (b) it is based upon the Soviet position in the Atomic Energy Commission which emphasizes the prohibition of atomic weapons rather than the necessity of international control with effective safeguards which is the United States position. The Canadian-Australian formulation with regard to the work of the Atomic Energy Commission which “urges the expeditious fulfillment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its task” under its terms of reference, would be more acceptable to us.

2. All three resolutions in one form or another would have the General Assembly recommend that the Security Council take action in this matter. The Soviet paragraph incorporating this recommendation is the most objectionable, not only because it is incomplete but because it would have the effect of referring to the Security Council for implementation both atomic energy and the general reduction of armaments. It seems clear that Vyshinsky evaded this issue under questioning by Shawcross today. The Canadian-Australian formula is an improvement over the Soviet formula because, having in a separate paragraph emphasized the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, the recommendation to the Security Council would be limited to the general reduction of armaments. Beyond this, however, there are a number of objections to the reference of even the general reduction of armaments to the Security Council at this time as set forth below:

(a). The most serious objection is that despite all the efforts we have been making to keep the related questions of atomic energy and general disarmament in separate channels the reference by the Assembly of the general disarmament question to the Security Council at this time would throw the two subjects immediately together since we are making every effort in the Atomic Energy Commission to get a vote in the Commission referring our specific proposals to the Security Council before the end of the year. That is, the reference from the Atomic Energy Commission of specific proposals on atomic energy would arrive in the Security Council almost simultaneously with the recommendation from the Assembly that the Security Council take up the general reduction of armaments. Once brought together in this way in the Security Council, it would be extremely difficult to keep them separated so that we could keep the emphasis on the atomic energy proposals. In the course of a telephone conversation just now with Mr. Eberstadt, who called me on another matter, I asked his reaction to this point and he agreed with my analysis.

(b). As a result of Molotov’s initiative in the Assembly on October 29, the world has been led to expect some progress in the general disarmament field. Because of the veto power the Soviet Union would be in a position to block any progress in this field except on their own terms from the outset and at every step of the way.

(c). On the other hand, it is possible to respond to the strong pressures which have built up to do something about general disarmament without interfering in any way with the progress of our atomic energy program if we can deflect the general disarmament question away from the Security Council and into another channel.

(d). The Canadian-Australian proposal speaks of the advice and assistance of the Military Staff Committee. However competent in their highly specialized field, the members of the Military Staff Committee may be, we are here dealing with matters of the highest political importance: the professional and technical details of tonnages and the like, while important, are of a distinctly subordinate character. While the MSC should certainly assist in any program, they cannot fairly be expected to do the job that needs doing. Another suggestion has been a subcommittee of the Security Council comparable presumably to the so-called Committee of Experts which has worked on the veto. Again because of the highly political character of the subject it is not believed that any such subcommittee would be effective.

(e). In view of the emphasis which has been placed on disarmament as the principal issue at this Assembly, failure of the Security Council to accomplish any tangible result whatever in this field for the reasons stated above will further seriously damage the status and reputation of the Security Council which was established as one of the vital organs of the United Nations.

3. The three resolutions also have in common the idea of establishing some kind of control commission. In the case of the Canadian-Australian proposals such a control commission would be based upon a general disarmament treaty or convention. The principal objection to this proposal is that it greatly over-simplifies one of the key points in our policy which is the necessity of effective safeguards by way of inspection in application to any phase of disarmament. This oversimplification is bound to confuse the already badly confused thinking on this subject and fails to take into account that the nature of safeguards and of the instrumentality to apply them requires very careful and patient study and could probably vary considerably from one phase of disarmament to another. It is believed that Dean Acheson would feel particularly strongly about this point.

If the foregoing objections are valid, the next question is whether in stating these objections we will be in a position to offer any alternative approach. The only alternative which seems at all feasible would be the proposal of appropriate machinery which would, on the one hand, deflect the general disarmament question away from the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Security Council but which would, on the other hand, provide a realistic opportunity for some accomplishment in the general disarmament field in response to the demand for such accomplishment.

42. The source text accompanied the following handwritten covering note:

    “11/29. Dear Alger [Hiss]: Copies of attached were supposed to go down to you and Dean [Acheson] tonight but I’m not sure and am sending this as precaution. Will you see that Dean sees if he didn’t get his copy. Austin talked to Sec. at length tonight—not much on attached—but Austin is sending original to Sec. 1st thing in morning. This is very rough dictation in course of busy afternoon. Yours, Jack [Ross].”

    A copy was also sent to Mr. Cohen.

43. For the record of the 31st Meeting of the 1st Committee, November 29, see GA (I/2), First Committee, pp. 185–199.
44. Sir Hartley Shawcross, British Representative at the General Assembly.
45. In a letter to the Secretary-General, November 29, the Canadian Delegation submitted a revision of the Soviet draft which combined the earlier Canadian and Australian proposals; for text of the letter, see GA (I/2), First Committee, p. 340.
46. Although the 32nd Meeting of the First Committee, November 30, was devoted to the question of the regulation of armaments, neither the United States nor Soviet representative was called upon to speak. The 33rd Meeting, December 1, concerned itself with another subject.