Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes of a Meeting Between Members of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canadian Delegations to the Atomic Energy Commission, New York, October 1, 1946, 3 p.m.⁷⁵

New York, October 1, 1946, 3 p.m.

confidential

Present

Mr. B. M. Baruch	Dr. W. B. Mann
Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. V. Lawford
Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton	Mr. Lincoln Gordon
Mr. J. M. Hancock	Mr. F. A. Lindsay
Mr. F. Eberstadt	Mr. G. E. Cox
Sir George Thompson	Mr. R. G. Arneson
Dr. R. C. Tolman

In response to Sir Alexander’s question on how best to proceed at tomorrow’s meeting,⁷⁶ Mr. Hancock said he thought it was of great importance that we proceed in such a manner as to achieve a full understanding of the Scientific and Technical Committee report. Tentatively, it would seem that two or three formal sessions might be devoted to talking out the report and its broad implications. Procedurely, he felt the chief point to bear in mind was that we should avoid at all costs precipitating political debates in Committee No. 2 at the outset. Referring to General McNaughton’s suggestion for informal meetings, he thought that the idea was a good one. It did, however, present the difficulty that representatives other than those officially on Committee No. 2 might be appointed to attend these informal meetings. We should, if possible, make sure that the official representatives of Committee No. 2 shared in the educative process involved in informal meetings.

In response to a question from Sir Alexander, General McNaughton elaborated his views on the desirability of proceeding on an informal basis. The Scientific and Technical Committee was the first committee to achieve any basic agreement on the facts of the problem before us. During his month’s tenure as chairman, General McNaughton had studiously avoided any activity on the part of the political committees which would interfere with the work of the Scientific and Technical Committee. This approach has achieved the conspicuous result of a unanimous report of the Scientific and Technical Committee. This report is a unanimous statement of the basic facts of the problem which points out where controls might be applied if the will exists to apply them. To be sure, the report contains nothing that was not already well-known before the Committee began its work. The importance of the report lies in the fact that twelve nations have agreed on the facts which it contains. It has cleared the way for further action, if we have the will to proceed.

We must now be prepared to grapple with the political implications of these facts. General McNaughton made it a point of talking to most of the delegations to ascertain whether they would agree to adopting an informal procedure for Committee No. 2. This would involve nominating political representatives from each of the twelve countries who would sit informally to go over the political implications of the report. The work should proceed by developing the basic facts of the problem and their implications, rather than by taking votes. Experts should be invited to participate whenever desirable. This procedure would build up a climate of opinion among the twelve nations favorable to a solution along the lines of the U.S. proposals. This procedure would also aid in educating the rest of the world to the implications and imperatives of the problem of control. In the course of these informal meetings it would be desirable to secure additional volumes of scientific information from the U.S. Delegation.

General McNaughton stated that he was prepared to move the adoption of this procedure in Committee No. 2, if there was general support for this approach. He would propose that the discussions proceed from the least contentious to the more contentious aspects of the problem. For example, phase one might deal with measures to prevent diversion of materials. Under this the following aspects would be considered:—(a) mining; (b) extraction of ore; (c) production of metal; (d) production of nuclear fuels (primary reactors); (e) secondary reactors. Phase two would consider measures to prevent clandestine operations. Phase three would discuss measures to prevent seizures. Phase one could be handled in such a way as to minimize any political discussion, for these measures of preventing diversion could be considered either in national or international terms. It was presumed that several weeks might be taken in completing the discussion of phase one.

General McNaughton said that when this program was first considered, he had hoped that he might take a major role in pushing it along. Recently, however, he has agreed to undertake the job of working out the Canadian Control Board for Atomic Energy and consequently, will have less time than he had hoped.

Mr. Hancock expressed full support for the idea of both formal and informal meetings of Committee No. 2. He reported that a number of other delegations seem to be vacillating as to what ought to be done—some of them being in favor of compromise. He was sorry to hear that General McNaughton would not be able to participate full time in the program he proposed. He wondered who else might be considered.

Sir Alexander likewise gave full support to the general procedure suggested by General McNaughton and suggested that this method of approach should be proposed at tomorrow’s meeting.

General McNaughton said that he would be prepared to move at tomorrow’s meeting that Committee No. 2 should take up the discussion of the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee in informal meetings—these meetings to be attended by political representatives of the delegations and open to whatever experts the Committee might wish to invite. Any reports that the informal committee might wish to draw up on the basis of its discussion should be submitted to Committee No. 2 in formal session. The informal discussions should proceed along the lines of the topical outline mentioned above.

Mr. Baruch stated that he thought it most desirable that we have a plan of action ready for tomorrow’s meeting in order to forestall any alternative proposals which might prove unacceptable.

In discussing General McNaughton’s proposal around the table, Mr. Hancock stated that he thought the approach was a good one. Admittedly, it would be a slow process but might achieve real results in terms of education. He reported that Dr. Hsia appeared to want a restatement of the U.S. position in terms of its minimum essentials with the view of working out some compromise solution with the Russian proposals. General McNaughton reported that Mr. Parodi seemed to be leaning toward some kind of compromise also. With these two exceptions, however, the majority of the delegates seem to favor an approach along the lines of his proposal. Sir Alexander expressed strong support for the proposed plan, stating that the nature of the problem lent itself to working up from the bottom. He felt strongly that any attempt to reopen the issue of general principles would be doomed to failure. General McNaughton felt that through this process of education the delegates would find themselves ending up with a solution of the problem which would be virtually identical to the Baruch proposals. He stated his intention of raising in a meeting of Committee No. 2 the question of whether adequate steps were being taken to inform the world generally of the nature of this problem and the work of the Commission in moving toward a solution. Mr. Eberstadt pointed out that the proposed approach had the merit of being exploratory rather than consummative and avoided creating a crisis. Sir Alexander was particularly in favor of the idea of exploring what might be done, rather than taking of votes on whether anyone was willing to do what was indicated. This procedure would build up a logical structure starting from the Scientific and Technical Committee report which would be most useful to world opinion whether we attain final success or not. General McNaughton saw the additional merit in the plan in that while it provoked no crisis, it was sufficiently flexible so that once the international situation improved the more political questions could be drawn into the discussions.

General McNaughton raised the question about the reservations that some delegates might have about discussing raw materials in phase one. In the discussion that followed it was agreed that mining in the terms of preventing diversion should proceed along general lines and should avoid any implication that the control mechanism would necessarily have to be international. All the delegates should be invited to participate in this discussion and draw upon his knowledge of how control is achieved in his own country. In no event should discussions in phase one be pushed to a point where delegates would balk at carrying the discussion forward. Questions that involve serious political conditions whether on the subject of mining or production of nuclear fuels should be put aside until phase two and phase three. In fact, phase one would be a softening-up process which might lay the groundwork for more crucial consideration of political problems in a later phase. For example, the question of undisclosed mines—that is mines not yet discovered—should not be discussed in phase one but should be left to a later period. As regards information on raw materials, General McNaughton stated that he was authorized by his government to say that he was prepared to discuss all information concerning the raw materials situated in his country, if other countries would undertake to do likewise.

Dr. Tolman pointed out that as far as raw materials were concerned, we wanted to know not only about reserves of the twelve countries represented on the Commission, but reserves in all nations throughout the world. To this Sir George replied that precise knowledge concerning world reserves of uranium and thorium would not be important in the first phase of discussion.

General McNaughton felt that the Scientific and Technical Committee should remain in being and that out of informal discussions of Committee No. 2 might come specific requests to the Scientific and Technical Committee to prepare reports on different phases of the problem as they arose. He hoped that the members of the Scientific and Technical Committee would not be drawn in too closely into any political discussions that might go on in Committee No. 2. He thought that the scientists should be invited to attend these informal discussions and participate as individuals.

Mr. Hancock summarized his understanding of the proposal as follows: Committee No. 2 should resolve itself into an informal working committee for the purpose of considering the question of controls as raised by the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee. Its discussions should proceed along the lines of the tentative outline proposed by General McNaughton. The heads of the several delegations should be asked to send as their representatives to these informal meetings anyone they chose. Individual members of the Scientific and Technical Committee should be invited to participate in these discussions as individuals. Whatever conclusions might be arrived at in these informal discussions should be written up in reports for presentation to Committee No. 2 in formal session for whatever action it deemed desirable.

General McNaughton thought that such reports as might be developed in informal discussion ought to be presented to the formal committee via the Chairman of the informal group. Mr. Hancock said this raised the question of whether it might be possible to break through the established pattern of the monthly rotation of chairmanship. General McNaughton proposed that a way to do this would be to have a deputy chairman appointed to Committee No. 2 who would be specifically charged with responsibility of chairing informal meetings. This suggestion was generally agreed to. Dr. Tolman and Mr. Gordon suggested that an excellent choice for this post would be Dr. Vallarta.

There was general agreement that General McNaughton would take the initiative on tomorrow’s meeting to move the adoption of a procedure along the lines he had discussed earlier.⁷⁷ It was generally agreed also that Dr. Vallarta⁷⁸ or Dr. Nervo would be our candidates for deputy chairman.

The meeting adjourned at 4:15 PM.

R. Gordon Arneson

75. Drafted by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson of the United States Delegation Staff.
76. Sixth Meeting of Committee 2, October 2.
77. At its 7th Meeting, October 8, Committee 2 accepted the Canadian proposal that it conduct informal meetings on subjects considered in the Committee 3 report; regarding the nature of the meetings which occurred between October 15 and the end of the month, see Hewlett and Anderson, p. 607.
78. Dr. Manuel Sandoval Vallarta, Mexican Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.