Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson72
Notes of Meeting with Mr. Wallace73 and his Aide, Mr. Hauser, 10 a m, Friday, September 27, 1946
When he first arrived, Mr. Wallace spent about 15 minutes with Mr. Baruch while Mr. Hauser exchanged pleasantries with Mr. Hancock, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Lindsay, and Mr. Arneson.
[Page 940]At 10:15, Mr. Baruch and Mr. Wallace were joined by Mr. Hauser, and Messrs. Hancock, Eberstadt, and Swope. After some minutes of discussion, Messrs. Farrell, Gordon and Arneson were asked to join the meeting. The notes which follow are based on notes I took on the discussions that preceded intermittently during the remainder of the day.
Mr. Hauser considered that the Baruch Proposals were quite ambiguous on the question of stages. He felt that there was considerable room for interpretation as to whether those proposals had in mind retaining for the United States “unfettered discretion” in determining when specific stages had been reached and also as to what the content of stages should be. He agreed, however, that the previous discussion that the group had just finished had convinced him that we did not contemplate leaving “unfettered discretion” in the hands of the United States but that we did in fact intend to wrap the entire agreement in a “single package.”
Mr. Hauser stated that much of Mr. Wallace’s letter of July 23rd had been thought about, and in fact written, before June 14th and that references to the Baruch Proposals had been added somewhat as an afterthought.
He agreed that our position on the substance of stages was sound. The question remained, however, of the timing on stages and he referred to that part of the Baruch Proposals which states that securing dominion over raw materials should be one of the earliest duties of the ADA.
Mr. Eberstadt pointed out that the Soviets are the ones who have refused to accept an agreement in a single package. They have proposed a convention outlawing the production and use of atomic bombs to be followed at some indefinite future date by vague considerations of control. We have found it necessary to accept the Russian view that this problem can be solved piecemeal. [sic] This is the real rub of our difficulties in negotiating with the Soviets. Mr. Hauser agreed with this analysis and went on to point out that atomic energy negotiations are merely a part of the much broader problem of overall relations with Russia. Mr. Gordon stated that Mr. Gromyko himself has never raised any question about the order of events involved in setting up the ADA. Mr. Eberstadt went on to say that Mr. Gromyko was in no position to argue about stages because we have not yet spelled those stages out. They have proposed a sort of stage scheme of their own in which they want the job tackled piecemeal. Meanwhile, it would be perfectly legitimate to build atomic energy plants and to do research on military weapons. The Russian Proposal outlawing the bomb has no teeth in it.
Mr. Hauser referred to items 2 and 13 of the Baruch Proposals [Page 941] which deal with raw materials and disclosures. In his view these sections state that we proposed full disclosure of raw material sources before we would be willing to disclose any technical and scientific information concerning atomic energy. Mr. Hancock pointed out that we did propose that dominion over raw materials should be one of the “earliest” purposes of the Authority, not necessarily the first, and that this would be done not before the treaty was agreed to but after it was agreed to and the Authority had been established. As to disclosures of information, he stated that here also the question of timing would have to be settled by negotiation and specifically set forth in the treaty. There was certainly no “take it or leave it” concept in this. He said that during the discussions which Mr. Baruch and his associates had had with the Acheson–Lilienthal group at the Blair Lee House last May, the question had been discussed whether we should insist on getting information on raw materials during the negotiations stage as a means of testing the good-faith of other countries. This proposal, while discussed, had not been taken seriously by anyone. He felt that the views reflected in Mr. Wallace’s letter on this question of raw materials may have sprung from a leak concerning these discussions. Our present position, which is fully reflected in published documents, is that no nation is required to show its “trump cards” during the negotiations. Obviously, all nations must know about, and agree to, the contents to be set forth in the treaty, governing not only stages and disclosures but all other facets of the problem. Each nation is free to accept or reject the conditions that might be arrived at by negotiations. After the treaty is agreed to, there are no trump cards to be played. Mr. Wallace agreed.
Mr. Hauser asked why we did not clarify this matter of stages. He stated the position of the Federation of Atomic Scientists which proposed that the first step should be the wide dissemination of atomic energy information and that dominion over raw materials should be the second step. He thought that a clear statement of our position on stages would go a long way to rally additional support for our proposals. He felt that the ambiguity that exists concerning the timing of stages was the very center of our present deadlock with the Russians. Gromyko has proposed that all bombs should be destroyed; we have declined to accept his proposal. What point is there then in going on with an elaboration of stages unless they are revised to meet him half way. Mr. Baruch reminded Mr. Hauser that progress by stages matched with adequate safeguards by way of inspection and other means was specifically laid down in the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Eberstadt said that we have been unjustly accused in Mr. Wallace’s letter of asking for trumps in [Page 942] the negotiation stage and that the letter alleged that we had taken a one-sided position concerning stages, whereas, as a matter of actual fact, we have not yet spelled out our ideas on the substance or timing of stages. We have not yet gone beyond the basic declaration that the ADA should be set up by a series of stages which will be fair, equitable, and applicable to all nations who join in.
Mr. Swope felt that while Mr. Wallace was perfectly correct in sending his letter to the President, inasmuch as the President has asked him to do so, there was gross error in not having checked the facts with our group before the letter was sent. Mr. Hancock agreed with this pointing out that Mr. Wallace has a right to hold any opinions he wishes to but that he did have a responsibility for checking the facts on which such inferences and opinions were based.
After that portion of Mr. Baruch’s letter to the President dealing with the question of the veto had been raised and discussed in some detail, Mr. Wallace stated: “I am in full accord with your explanation of the veto problem” He went on to say that he thought that the whole handling of the veto in this field should be spelled out in the treaty itself.
Mr. Wallace urged that we should seek some face-saving device which could be presented to the Russians to induce them to go along with our proposals. The Soviets must be convinced that we are not out to destroy them. He felt that their intransigence, as exemplified by their stand on the veto, stemmed from a deep distrust of other nations and the unhappy developments under the League of Nations Covenant. He felt that atomic energy negotiations were only a part of a much broader problem of working out mutual confidence and trust between the USSR and the western powers. He hoped that Mr. Baruch and his associates would find it desirable at a later date to meet with other government groups to work out a common policy of bringing about mutual trust and confidence.
Mr. Eberstadt inquired of Mr. Wallace what essential departure we could make from our plan in order to save face for the Russians. Mr. Wallace replied that we could agree to stop the manufacture of bombs and perhaps allow the Security Council to inspect to make sure that we had in fact stopped. Mr. Eberstadt then pointed out that we would be in a very bad position if negotiations broke down and we found it necessary in the interests of national security to resume manufacture. He said that Mr. Wallace’s proposal would have some weight if we had any real assurance of completely getting agreement of international control of atomic energy, Mr. Wallace agreed that the time was not yet ripe to make any such face-saving move. He urged, however, that we should be prepared to make some such move at the appropriate time.
[Page 943]As Mr. Wallace was about to leave, he summed up his view of the discussion by stating: “It is obvious that I was not fully posted” After Mr. Wallace left, Mr. Hauser stated that he was going to suggest to the Secretary that he bring the matter up to date. He thought that Mr. Wallace would probably want to issue a statement.
Mr. Hauser went off to another room to prepare a draft statement of the sort he thought Mr. Wallace had in mind and Mr. Swope discussed the matter with him in some detail. When Mr. Swope returned to the meeting, he reported that Mr. Wallace planned to put out a pamphlet which would contain his Madison Square Garden speech and also his July 23rd letter to the President. It was proposed that the section of the letter dealing with atomic energy would be left intact but would be followed by an addendum which would contain our memorandum to the President plus a short statement to the effect that Mr. Wallace agreed with the corrections of fact which our letter contained. Mr. Swope stated that he thought it would be completely wrong to circulate a letter which contained so many errors even though the addendum device was used to attempt to correct those errors.
Mr. Eberstadt felt that we should have no part of Mr. Wallace’s pamphlet; that we should publish our letter to the President plus a statement from Mr. Wallace in which he would admit his errors. Mr. Swope agreed that we should publish our own letter plus Wallace’s retraction but that in addition we might have our letter printed in the addendum to the pamphlet. Mr. Baruch stated that whether Wallace published a pamphlet or not was entirely his own affair and that we should have nothing whatever to do with it. To this, both Mr. Hancock and Mr. Eberstadt expressed their full agreement.
After lunch, Mr. Hauser met again with Messrs. Hancock, Swope, Gordon, Johnson, and Arneson. We read to him a draft of the statement we wanted Mr. Wallace to agree to. (Attached, Tab A). Mr. Hauser expressed some doubts as to whether Mr. Wallace would agree to it, and that the text could be remedied so that he would—by adding a short 5 sentence summary of the points of correction on which Mr. Wallace had agreed.
After interminable discussion, which extended late into the afternoon, the text of Wallace’s statement was agreed to by all. (Attached, Tab B). Mr. Hauser expressed his conviction that he would be able to sell this statement to Mr. Wallace and would undertake to do so immediately.
[Page 944]After Mr. Hauser had left to return to Washington, the staff continued its discussion of strategy. Mr. Hancock summed up his views by saying that if Mr. Wallace agrees with the text of the statement which had been arrived at with Mr. Hauser, we should then put out that statement along with Mr. Baruch’s letter to the President. If Mr. Wallace does not agree to the text as written, then we should not consider ourselves bound to any course of action but should feel free to proceed in any manner we see fit.74
- Staff member, United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.↩
- President Truman had asked for and received Mr. Wallace’s resignation as Secretary of Commerce on September 20.↩
- The attachments are not printed here. Mr. Wallace subsequently refused to endorse a statement acceptable to Mr. Baruch. Consequently, the latter released “Tab A,” “Tab B,” and a memorandum he had addressed to President Truman on September 24 which answered Mr. Wallace’s criticisms point by point; for texts, see the New York Times, October 3, 1946.↩