501.BC
Atomic/6–746
The statement is general in character because I want you to have authority to
exercise your judgment as to the method by which the stated objectives can
be accomplished.
If as negotiations progress you conclude that there should be changes in this
statement of policy, I will expect you to advise me and to frankly give me
your views.
I know that you will keep me advised as to the negotiations. However, I want
you to know that I am relying upon you to exercise your own discretion in
those negotiations, subject only to the general statement of policy
attached, unless you should receive from me through the Secretary of State a
further statement of policy.
[Annex]
Statement of United States Policy97
The proposals in this paper, put forth as a basis of discussion, grow out
of three basic conclusions:
[Page 847]
- 1.
- It is believed that an international agreement leaving the
development of atomic energy in national hands, subject to an
obligation not to develop atomic energy for war purposes and
relying solely on an international inspection system to detect
evasions, will not provide adequate security and indeed may be a
source of insecurity.
- 2.
- It is believed
- (a)
- That a treaty merely outlawing possession or use of
the atomic bomb would not be an effective fulfillment of
the directions under which the Commission is to proceed;
therefore, that an international atomic development
authority be set up, with adequate powers;
- (b)
- That in connection with the greatest safeguards which
can be established through a competent international
authority in this field, there should be a clear
statement of the consequences of violations of the
system of control, including definitions of the acts
which would constitute such violations and the penalties
and concerted action which would follow such
violations;
- (c)
- That one of the objectives of the plan should be that
when the system of control is fully in operation there
would be no stockpiles of bombs in existence;
- (d)
- That the plan might also include a parallel statement
as to a system of control for biological warfare.98
- 3.
- It is further believed that the aim of preventing atomic
warfare can only be achieved by entrusting to an international
organization
- (a)
- Managerial control of all atomic energy activities
intrinsically dangerous to world security;
- (b)
- Power to control, inspect, and license all other
activities and stages.
If an international agency is given sole responsibility for the dangerous
activities, leaving the non-dangerous open to nations and their citizens
and if the international agency is given and carries forward affirmative
development responsibility, furthering among other things the beneficial
uses of atomic energy and enabling itself to comprehend and therefore
detect the misuse of atomic energy, these afford the best prospect of
security.
For purposes of discussion, the following measures are proposed as
representing the fundamental features of a plan which would give effect
to the conclusions just stated. In this paper the proposed international
agency is referred to as the Atomic Development Authority.
1. General—The Atomic Development Authority
should seek to set up a thorough plan of control through various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, operation,
inspection, research and management by competent personnel.
It is believed that the plan of control in all its aspects must be
adequate not only in concept—a combination of responsibility for
developments
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as well as
control—but in type of organization and in choice of personnel to
guarantee the most effective control required to provide for the
security of the nations.
2. Raw Materials—The Atomic Development Authority
when set up should have as one of its earliest purposes to bring under
its complete dominion world supplies of uranium and thorium. The precise
pattern of control for various types of deposits of such materials will
have to depend upon the geological, mining, refining, and economic facts
involved in different situations.
The Authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will have the
most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. The
agency should also constantly investigate new methods for recovering
these materials where they occur in small quantities so that as their
recovery from such sources becomes practical, means of control can be
devised.
3. Primary Production Plants—The Atomic
Development Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the
production of fissionable materials. This means that it should control
and operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous
quantities and own and control the product of these plants.
4. Atomic Explosives—The Authority should be
given exclusive authority to conduct research in the field of atomic
explosives. Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are
essential in order that the Authority may keep in the forefront of
knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfill the objective of
preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by preserving its position
as the best informed agency will the Authority be able to tell where the
line between the intrinsically dangerous and the non-dangerous should be
drawn. If it turns out at some time in the future, as a result of new
discoveries, that other materials or other processes lend themselves to
dangerous atomic developments, it is important that the Authority should
be the first to know. At that time measures would have to be taken to
extend the boundaries of safeguards.
5. Strategic Distribution of Activities and
Materials—The activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority
because they are intrinsically dangerous to security should be
distributed throughout the world. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials
and fissionable materials should not be centralized.
6. Non-Dangerous Activities—Atomic research
(except in explosives), the use of research reactors, the production of
radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such
tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to
nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from
the Authority.
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Denatured
materials necessary for these activities should be furnished, under
lease or other suitable arrangement by the Atomic Development
Authority.
It should be an essential function of the Atomic Development Authority to
promote to the fullest possible extent the peace-time benefits that can
be obtained from the use of atomic energy.
It is necessary at all times to take advantage of the opportunity for
promoting decentralized and diversified national and private
developments and of avoiding unnecessary concentration of functions in
the Authority. It should, therefore, be a primary function of the
Authority to encourage developments by nations and private enterprise in
the broad field of non-dangerous activities.
7. Definition of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous
Activities—Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn
between the dangerous and the non-dangerous, it is not hard and fast.
Machinery should, therefore, be provided to assure constant examination
and re-examination of the question, and to permit revision of the
dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may
require.
7(a) Any plant dealing with uranium or thorium
after it once reaches the potential of dangerous use must be not only
subject to the most rigorous and competent inspection by the
international Authority, but its actual operation shall be under the
management, supervision and control of the international Authority.
8. Inspection Activities—By assigning
intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to management by the
Atomic Development Authority, the difficulties of inspection are thereby
reduced to manageable proportions. For if the Atomic Development
Authority is the only agency which may lawfully conduct the dangerous
activities in the field of raw materials, primary production plants, and
research in explosives, then visible operation by others than the
Authority will constitute a danger signal.
The plan does not contemplate any systematic or large-scale inspection
procedures covering the whole of industry. The delegation of authority
for making inspections will have to be carefully drawn so that the
inspection may be adequate for the needs and responsibilities of the
Authority and yet not go beyond this point. Many of the inspection
activities of the Authority should grow out of and be incidental to its
other functions. An important measure of inspection will be those
associated with the tight control of raw materials, for this is one of
the keystones of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting,
survey and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not
only to serve the affirmative development functions of the agency but
also to assure that no surreptitious operations are conducted
[Page 850]
in the raw materials field by
nations or their citizens. Inspection will also occur in connection with
the licensing functions of the Authority. Finally, a means should be
provided to enable the international organization to make special “spot”
investigations of any suspicious national or private activities.
9. Personnel—The personnel of the Atomic
Development Authority should be recruited on a basis of proven
competence but also so far as possible on an international basis, giving
much weight to geographical and national distribution. Although the
problem of recruitment of the high-quality personnel required for the
top executive and technical positions will be difficult, it will
certainly be far less difficult than the recruitment of the similarly
high-quality personnel that would be necessary for any purely policing
organization.
10. Negotiation Stage—The first step in the
creation of the system of control is the spelling out in comprehensive
terms of the functions, responsibilities, authority, and limitations of
the Atomic Development Authority. Once a Charter for the agency has been
written, and adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which
it will be responsible will require time to become fully organized and
effective.99 The plan of
control will therefore have to come into effect in successive stages.
These should be specifically fixed in the Charter or means should be
otherwise set forth in the Charter for transitions from one stage to
another, as contemplated in the resolution of the U.N. Assembly which
created this Commission.
11. Disclosures—In the deliberations of the
United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States must be
prepared to make available the information essential to a reasonable
understanding of the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures
must be dependent, in the interests of all, upon the effective
ratification of this treaty. If and when the Authority is actually
created, the United States must then also be prepared to make available
other information essential to that organization for the performance of
its functions. And as the successive stages of international control are
reached, the United States must further be prepared to yield, to the
extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this
field to the international agency.
12. International Control—There will be questions
about the extent of control allowed to national bodies, should an
international body be established and in this respect, it is believed
that any control by an atomic energy authority set up by any state
should to the extent necessary for the effective operation of the
international control system be
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subordinate to direction and absolute dominion on the part of the
international authority. It will readily be seen at this time that this
is not an endorsement or disapproval of the creation of national
authorities, or a definition of their jurisdiction. This problem will be
before the Commission and it should deal with a clear separation of
duties and responsibilities of such state authorities if such are
included in any plan, with the purpose of preventing possible conflicts
of jurisdiction.1
