Office of the Historian

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
USMS 334 CCAE
[New York,] 7 June 1946.

Subject: Visit to Office of Mr. Bernard Baruch.

1.
At 1030 hours on 6 June
  • General Kenney88
  • Admiral Turner89
  • Lt. General Ridgway90
  • Rear Admiral Ballentine91
  • Colonel Gilmer92
called at the Office of the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Control Commission93 on the 64th floor of the Empire State Building.
2.
The members of the Atomic Control Commission present were:
  • Mr. Bernard Baruch, Chairman
  • Dr. Richard C. Tolman, Scientist
  • Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, Adviser
  • Mr. Fred Searls, Jr., Adviser
  • Mr. John Parks Davis, Executive [Officer]
3.
No representatives of the State Department were present.
4.
It was explained to Mr. Baruch that the US MSC Representatives had made the visit in order to become acquainted and to offer assistance.
5.
Mr. Baruch indicated that he had taken the job but that a clear piece of paper had not been given him; that there were many reservations already indicated such as the Acheson Report, the personal thoughts of President Truman, those of Mr. King (Canada), and those of Mr. Attlee (Great Britain). He mentioned also that Mr. Stassen94 and a Mr. Woodward of Oxford University had propounded certain theories on this subject.
6.
The matter of a treaty was discussed in considerable detail. Mention was made that such treaty would cause a profound change on our entire governmental structure, the power of Congress and also the government structure of all nations as well.
7.
Mr. Baruch stated that he was struck by General Arnold’s95 exposition on a series of bases around the world. Here he mentioned that our methods of offense and defense would be changed drastically now that we have to deal with the atomic bomb.
8.
Mention was made by Mr. Searls of the possibility of establishing bases of strategic readiness with stock piles of four to six bombs at specific locations over the world; that base commanders could have sealed orders. It was pointed out (1) that with different nationalities under the security force it would be difficult to expect them to participate against their own countries, and (2) that the United States would not desire to have foreign powers near the United States with atomic bombs at their disposal to drop on us without notice.
9.
Mr. Baruch said, “It will be too late, if something is not done by prior agreement outside the Security Council on such happenings. The need is so great that we must re-examine every possibility for an international authority. If it can’t be done the whole argument (for an international Atomic Authority) is no good.”
10.
Mr. Baruch stated that he proposed to be very frank with the President on this matter; that he felt “dreadfully hobbled.”
11.
Mr. Baruch felt that the military should be warned on the great implications of the atomic matter and that he would like to get the J.C.S. answer “before the President approves the proposal.”
12.
The following statement was made by Mr. Eberstadt: “Can we do anything worth while or is what ever we do worthless.” He felt that the elimination of bombs was not in itself important.
13.
General Kenney pointed out the difficulties we were having in [Page 845] the MSC; that the J.C.S. of no nation agree; that the policies must stem from the politicos before the military can operate.
14.
Mr. Baruch stated that he did not want to offer anything that the Army or the Navy does not consider feasible; that the safety factor of from three months to one year, now estimated by the scientists under a strict method of inspection, would diminish rapidly.
15.
Mr. Baruch stated that a warning by itself was not “worth a damn.”
16.
Mention was made that General Groves had “consented to the Acheson Report.”
17.
Mr. Baruch stated that if Atomic Control could not be made an international matter that it (a treaty) would not be worth “ten cents”; that if we did have international control that it would mean “an immediate and drastic transformation of our form of government.”
18.
Mr. Eberstadt offered three possibilities:
a.
Effective world control of war (counter-part of our own Federal Government).
b.
Warning approach implemented by prompt action.
c.
Warning approach without prompt action.
19.
There was considerable discussion of these three approaches. Some felt that if the bomb was eliminated war would be eliminated.
20.
Admiral Turner stated as a personal opinion that he believed it would be impossible to obtain agreement at present on an over-all sovereign world government having an International Army constantly ready, and believed any such proposal would involve a very prolonged debate. He felt that about all that should now be proposed (and referred to world action on Chemical Warfare for an analogy) would be an agreement to:
a.
Seek renunciation by all nations of the use of atomic energy in warfare, except in retaliation for the improper use of atomic bombs.
b.
Agreement among all nations to accept international supervision of atomic energy, approximately along the lines of the Acheson Report.
c.
Confine to the Big Five alone punitive action in case anyone violates agreement. Such punitive action would be taken after “consultation” among the Big Five.
d.
It would be necessary also to agree that the veto power would be relinquished in deciding on such action.
21.
It was made quite clear to the Baruch group that:
a.
We in the MSC were discussing these matters among ourselves, but cannot give effective advice without going to the J.C.S. We, of course, cannot discuss this matter with representatives of the other nations until so instructed by the J.C.S. (Mr. Searls has gained the impression that nothing is being done.)
b.
General Ridgway gave his personal opinion (and General Kenney and Admiral Turner concurred) that of course there should be a penalty clause—sanctions for violations of agreements.
c.
General Ridgway made it clear that military men agree that a plan is needed, however improbable we think the success of it might be. That as far as we know to date no such plan exists.
d.
General Ridgway made it clear to the Baruch group that “we withhold nothing” from them.

The meeting ended at 1220 hours.

Denys W. Knoll

Secretary
  1. Gen. George C. Kenney, United States Representative on the Military Staff Committee.↩
  2. Adm. Richmond K. Turner, United States Representative on the Military Staff Committee.↩
  3. Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, United States Representative on the Military Staff Committee.↩
  4. Rear Adm. J. J. Ballentine, Member of the United States Delegation to the Military Staff Committee.↩
  5. Col. Dan Gilmer, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Military Staff Committee.↩
  6. The organization under reference is the United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.↩
  7. Harold E. Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota; Member, United States Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, 1945.↩
  8. General of the Army Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, 1942–March 1946.↩