Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum by the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) to President Truman 70
I have no other purpose than to serve. My presence here is, first, to get from you my instructions as to major policy and, second, to decide with your help and JFB’s, whether I am the best instrument of carrying out your policy.
Frankly, I believe that the only possible issue that can arise is as to how far this country wants to go in the declaration of policy. I have been immersed in this for almost two months now, with greater intentness than in any other work that I have assumed. I am deeply convinced that any expression which falls short of bringing a sense of security and a sense of truth to the public would be a gigantic error.
In fact, I have convinced myself that this is the only course I can follow with justice to the job. It may not be the best from the standpoint of the country—on that I shall not presume to judge—but I know it is the best from the standpoint of my serviceability.
That policy is to set a goal for which we should strive. Necessarily it must be inclusive of a statement of regulations, controls, and above all, punishment or sanctions. In this last lies the essential difference between the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and my own position.
There is no difference between the Acheson Report and my own view, except this:
I want to go further than the text of that document, while the authors are content with its limitations. Those limitations I regard as dangerously restrictive. Quite apart from the fact that no punishment is provided or indicated for violators of the regulations, it is admitted that we would only have from 3 months to a year in the way of warning, and as time goes on and as the art and science of the bomb improve, that factor of safety will be diminished.
I give you this high light, relating to the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, because of my unrest at a disposition I have observed, to take that document as our basic policy and to have further policy grow out of committee meetings and negotiations.
If you will permit me to say so, I doubt that that is the proper method. It may be the best course to pursue in the ordinary processes of diplomacy but, as I see this question, it is one that strikes to the [Page 839] very heart of public thinking and feeling and, therefore, you and this country should be the first to proclaim an intention of reaching not merely a basis of negotiations but a formula of a secure peace.
There are two courses open to us:
- 1.
- To …71 these people and express the hopes of finding a solution to the problem, as laid down by the terms of reference, in the statement of Messrs. Truman, Attlee and King, and at the Moscow Conference, and which has been laid down by Mr. Byrnes on many occasions. “Here is the Acheson Report which we give you as an approach to the subject and, as has been indicated by some, there will be developed in the discussions and negotiations an understanding and a meeting of minds that will bring results.”
- 2.
- The other course is to state the necessity of the Atomic Development Authority, of an international organization, outlining it not in complete detail but so that it can be grasped with its control of raw materials up to the final use of atomic energy. And further bringing to the attention of the American people the short-comings so as not to have their hopes or that of the world raised, and showing the necessity of adding enforcement to the engagements entered into by the nations. At this time I must bring to your attention that denaturing, which has raised the hopes of the people, has been overplayed in the Acheson plan. At the same time I want to tell you that our secrets are not as secret as we think they are.
Let me make plain to you, Mr. President, that I think the Acheson Report is a very good document within very sharp limitations. I do not believe that it represents a plan on which you can stand, but it is an important plank in that platform. And incidentally, may I add, that I have a very high opinion of the Under Secretary personally.
In saying to you that I regard penalization as being the sine qua non of our policy, I am quite aware of the fact that it may bring us athwart of the veto power, for this particular purpose, since it might require war as an ultimate penalization. If so, then either the penalty must be dropped or the structure of the United Nations must be changed or this is a separate body functioning outside of the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
I cannot, at the moment, supply an outline of the mechanism whereby punishment is to come, but that might be developed in the course of negotiations, if there were true intent on the part of all the nations to eliminate the atomic bomb—eventually to eliminate war—and [Page 840] eventually to abolish the use of other instrumentalities of destruction with the eventual purpose of eliminating war.