Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] June 6, 1946.

Comments on “Statement of United States Policy” (John M. Hancock Draft June 4, 1946)⁶⁷

It is assumed that this Statement, if approved by the President, is designed to serve as the instructions to the United States Representative, and that Mr. Baruch’s opening speech to the United Nations Commission would be based upon it. Study of the draft suggests the following comments:

A. The provisions of 2(b) and 2(c), pages 1 and 2, propose a system of penalties for violations of the control plan. As indicated by 2(c) the violations in question are of such a serious character that if committed by a major power they would result in complete collapse of the plan.

The treaty establishing the control plan would of course have to contain comprehensive provisions covering the grave crisis that would occur in the event the plan collapsed. But for reasons which have been described in discussions with Mr. Baruch and Mr. Hancock, it is believed that the proposed system of penalties does not represent a realistic or effective approach to the problem.

B. Paragraph 2(e), page 2, is concerned with the possibility of covering biological warfare in the plan and penalty system. As to the penalties, the same comment applies as in A above.

C. Paragraph number 2, pages 3 to 6, deals with Raw Materials control. This paragraph is in substantial conflict with the corresponding provisions of the memorandum of May 31, 1946 “Proposed Statement of United States Policy”, which was discussed with the President (copy attached)⁶⁸ and with the Report on International Control of Atomic Energy which was the basis of the memorandum of May 31.

The effort made in the draft of June 4 to leave major production activities relating to uranium and thorium in private or national hands would nullify one of the keystones of the Report on International Control of Atomic Energy. It is believed that the memorandum of May 31 indicates the maximum degree of flexibility that can safely be suggested in a general statement of position on Raw Materials. The draft of June 4 goes very much further and in so doing opens the door to an insistence by other nations on national or private operation of mines under inspection arrangements which the United States could never accept as adequate for security.

D. Paragraph number 4, page 6, “Atomic Explosives”, is similar to the corresponding paragraph of the memorandum of May 31 except for the omission of the sentence, “When the plan is fully in operation there would be no stockpiles of atomic bombs anywhere in the world, either in national or international hands.” Possibly the same thought was intended in paragraph 2(d), page 2, June 4 draft, and in that case the omission in question could be supplied by merely making paragraph 2(d) somewhat more explicit.

E. Paragraph number 5, page 6, “Strategic Distribution of Activities and Materials”, is phrased somewhat differently from the corresponding provision of the May 31 memorandum. It is not clear whether the change was intended to alter the substance of the earlier paper. Specifically, the suggestion in this paragraph of the June 4 draft that intrinsically dangerous activities should be distributed throughout the world with the approval of the Security Council has serious implications which it is believed require further consideration before the United States position becomes fixed.

F. Paragraph 7, page 8, “Definition of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Activities”, proposes that the Atomic Development Authority should have power to decide what activities relating to atomic energy are dangerous or non-dangerous and to change its decisions as conditions change. Within limits, the Authority should have this power but the problem is so complicated that it is believed the initial United States position should be left more fluid (Compare Report on International Control of Atomic Energy, G.P.O. edition, page 46). Omission of the first sentence in this paragraph would be helpful on this point.

G. Paragraph 8, page 8, is headed “Management and Licensing”. The purpose and effect of this provision is not clearly understood.

H. It is assumed that paragraph 12, page 10, “Disclosures”, would not foreclose the plan of procedure outlined in pages 2–4 of Mr. Marks’ memorandum of May 30 (copy attached).⁶⁹

I. It is not clear whether the first full paragraph on page 11 relates to protection against surprise attack during the transition period or is intended to cover both the transition and the period of full operation. The paragraph seems to require clarification.

67. The June 4 Hancock draft is printed on p. 827. On the basis of the comments contained in the present document, Messrs. Acheson and Marks completed revision of the June 4 Hancock statement on June 6. The document presented to and approved by President Truman on the following day (post, p. 846) was identical with the Acheson–Marks revision with two exceptions. In paragraph 2b of the final statement, the word “penalties” replaced the word “procedure” in the Acheson–Marks draft. Secondly, paragraph 7a of the final statement had not appeared in the draft. (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)
68. Not printed.
69. Ante, p. 806.