Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Marks) to the Under Secretary (Acheson)

[Washington,] May 30, 1946.

The “Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy” outlined proposals for international action but expressly left numerous questions of procedure and substance for later consideration. This was done in part because of the limited time which the Board of Consultants had in preparing the Report and in part because the nature of the questions seemed to require different qualifications or different terms of reference from those of the Board.

If the proposals in the Report are to be advocated as a basis of discussion in the United Nations Commission these questions will have to be carefully investigated by the United States in order to equip our representative for the deliberations of the Commission.

General procedure—In many ways the procedural problems of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy will not differ from those of other international meetings, for example, the Bretton Woods or Dumbarton Oaks Conferences. The organization of the Commission and its sub-committees, the question of open and closed sessions, liaison between representatives of the several member nations—in dealing with these and many similar matters the practices followed in other international meetings should provide a guide.

In view of the extensive experience which Mr. Alger Hiss and his staff have had in such matters, I assume that they should work intensively on them and give Mr. Baruch and his associates all possible assistance. I understand from Mr. Hiss that some work has already been done along these lines and that he feels that much more should be done. Definite arrangements should be worked out between Mr. Hiss and Mr. Baruch’s staff for providing the most effective cooperation on a continuing basis.

Procedure in relation to disclosures—One of the most important aspects of procedure, is peculiar to the subject itself. The Board’s Report states that at an early stage in the Commission’s deliberations, we must be prepared to make available enough presently classified information to enable the representatives of other nations to understand and appraise our proposals. In dealing with this issue there are two main questions: (1) At what stage in the deliberations and under what conditions should we make such disclosures and (2) what should be the scope of the disclosures to be made.

(1) There are doubtless a good many possible alternatives as to the time and circumstances of disclosure. Perhaps a reasonable proposition might be worked out under which we would not make any disclosures until other nations agreed to do something in return, either in the way of reciprocal exchange, or in some other form. But, I think it fair to say that none of us who worked on the Report have been able to think of an arrangement of this character which would be generally acceptable to other nations or at any rate acceptable if it involved their supplying us with anything that we would really be interested in getting. However, it may be that the Secretary of State and Mr. Baruch will have ideas on this subject and it would certainly be worth-while to give further consideration to the possibility if anyone in a position of responsibility feels that it may be feasible.

Another alternative would be to proceed in the following manner. Submit the Report as a basis for discussion. Be prepared to discuss the Report as it now stands and without any reference to classified information. Discussion on this basis might be pursued as long as necessary to make certain that the essential features of the Report are understood by other nations and that they are seriously interested in it. During this stage our representatives would have to state frankly that the scientific premises on which the Report is based would have to be accepted for the time being without discussion of underlying classified information. However, as our own internal meetings have shown, there is a great deal of unclassified information, technical and nontechnical which is not included in the Report but which can be used to illuminate the Report itself. An example of this is Doctor Rabi’s⁵⁰ introduction to the Doubleday-Doran edition of the Report. Because our scientists and public officials have given so much thought to the subject, they are perhaps in a better position to draw upon and organize this unclassified information in ways that could be of great assistance in promoting a clear preliminary understanding of the Report itself among the representatives of other nations.

This preliminary consideration of the Report might take several weeks or much longer. If skillfully conducted, it might evoke rather clear signs of understanding and interest on the part of other nations and when these occur we might then begin to take up the classified material which your Committee agreed the Commission would require “for an understanding of the proposals” and which you found it possible to define “within satisfactory limits”.

A third alternative would be to make the information in question available at the outset as a sign of our own seriousness and good faith.

Whether one of these or some other alternative is to be adopted, the point that needs to be emphasized now is that a decision of major policy must be made in resolving this question of procedure.

(2) The scope of information to be made subject to disclosure will have to be carefully worked out in advance. When in the meetings between your Committee and the Board, this information was “defined … within satisfactory limits”, the definition was of necessity based upon consideration of very general categories of data. In preparation for the Commission meetings these categories will have to be examined in detail and decisions made as to the numerous specific items which may be used in discussion.

In short, a second “Smyth” report⁵¹ will be needed to guide our representatives or in some other way responsibility will have to be fixed and authority conferred to enable our representatives, in the language of the Report, to make available the “limited category of information which should be divulged in the early meetings of the United Nations Commission”.

This advance preparation is of critical importance. For it is quite likely that the better we prepare, organize and present information, the less information we shall have to use. A limited amount of data presented effectively and at the right moment in the deliberations may well provide necessary understanding. On the other hand, if data is not readily available as required and if it is not presented in the most orderly and effective form, the resulting confusion may well involve more disclosures than would otherwise be necessary or may preclude satisfactory understandings.

Other questions of procedure—At least one other question of procedure which should be given consideration now concerns the order in which matters should be taken up. Assuming that the Report is adopted as a basis of discussion, and discussions proceed far enough to establish a serious interest and understanding of the proposals by other nations, it seems probable that the next step would be to commence work on drafting a charter or treaty. At this point, or before, it is probable that other nations will raise questions as to the steps in the transition period.

When this occurs we may want to urge that the problem of the transition should be deferred until after substantial progress has been made in the drafting of a charter. If we are unsuccessful in this, we shall have to face at the outset of the drafting or even before, the extremely difficult problem of the transition steps. During the extensive discussion of the transition steps in the meetings between your Committee and the Board, you will recall that quite a number of the participants pointed out that the most intensive kind of study would have to be given to this problem in order to determine how it should be handled from the standpoint of negotiations. This then is one of the most important matters to be thought through as soon as possible and will require the assistance of the most highly qualified people.

Substantive questions—As the Board of Consultants stated, a succession of processes like that involved in preparing the Report itself will be necessary, each building on the preceding analysis, before even the major ramifications of the problem can be understood and the major questions partially answered. Numerous matters which are adverted to in the Report in the most general terms will have to be made the subject of analysis in order that our representative may be prepared to deal with them in the negotiations. Among the more important are the following:

(1) Raw Materials—The discussions in the Blair Lee House meetings sufficiently indicated how complicated the raw materials problem is. Even if the general recommendation in the Report with respect to raw materials is adopted it is clear that the precise pattern of control would have to vary, depending upon the facts in different types of situations. But, until the available geological, mining and economic facts concerning the occurrence, distribution and use of uranium and thorium have been closely examined it will not be possible to spell out the detailed measures of control. Intensive study undertaken now should go a long way toward simplifying this problem.

(2) Strategic Distribution of Dangerous Facilities and Stockpiles of Raw Materials and Fissionable Materials—This problem likewise requires immediate study with the help of geographers, economists, military personnel and people experienced in political affairs. With such help, the experts in the field of atomic energy should be able to give some indication of the pattern of distribution that would afford a sound strategic balance geographically. Many questions which would otherwise be extremely troublesome in the negotiations can be avoided through such advance preparation. For example, the point has been made that if a single primary production plant were located in each of the five major nations that might place any two of the nations at a numerical disadvantage if the others took aggressive action in concert against them. But if, as seems probable, investigation of the scientific facts shows that any nation controlling one or two of these plants could wage just as effective atomic war as a nation which controlled three, then the problem of shifting political alignments becomes less troublesome.

(3) Financial Problems—The Blair Lee House discussions and the Report itself sufficiently indicated the difficult financial questions that would have to be solved. Since they are bound to arise in some form before the negotiations have proceeded very far, advance preparation in this field also seems necessary.

(4) Personnel Problems—This was another matter touched upon at the Blair Lee House and on which there appeared to be agreement that considerable advance study by experts in the field would be desirable.

(5) Management Problems—There are numerous questions concerning the organization of the Authority which need to be explored. Some of these are mentioned in the Report but none of them are discussed at length and there are many others that are not touched upon.

(6) The “Veto” and “Sanctions”—In relation to these matters it is evident that considerable confusion exists and that there are many serious questions which need to be thought through and answered. The scope of the problem was pretty well defined during the Blair Lee House meetings. There is a related matter which so far has not been discussed. This has to do with the definition of evasions. Some types of evasions would have to be regarded as so serious that they signify a complete breakdown in the plan. Others could be safely regarded as minor and subject to disposition under some form of administrative machinery provided in the plan itself. These definitions and the machinery would have to be spelled out in considerable detail in the charter. To do this will require very careful advance preparation.

(7) Scientific Problems—In the various discussions of the Report these problems have not received much attention. However, they are among the most important of all. The definition of the dividing line between safe and dangerous activities, the conditions under which research in atomic explosives should be undertaken by the Authority, the measures by which security can be “built” into the facilities of the Authority and into licensed facilities—these are all enormously complicated scientific and technical problems. In order that they may be sufficiently simplified so that the negotiations can make progress it will be necessary for us to put our qualified scientists and technicians to work on them as soon as possible.

Herbert S. Marks

50. Dr. Isador I. Rabi, a Columbia University physicist; consultant to Manhattan Engineer District.
51. See footnote 72a, p. 751.