Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission ⁴⁷

[Washington,] May 30, 1946.

Those present were Messrs. Byrnes, Acheson, Baruch and Hancock.

I cannot attempt to outline in detail the entire compass of the talk this morning. The discussion roved over many points which have been discussed by all of us, and I don’t plan to cover those in this memorandum.

Mr. Byrnes stressed the importance of laying on the table a working document on the day before it was up for discussion in the general meeting or in a subcommittee. The difficulties of language make this very important as a matter of procedure. He stressed the danger of using the word “present” in connection with any documents we offer, because the word “present” implies that it has our validation. As to the several documents we proposed to give to the delegates, he and Acheson both thought it wiser to have them available without any formal presentation on our part.

This brought me to the clear conviction that we should not present the Acheson Report unless we were to be under the embarrassment of being accused of having validated such report. There is no objection to having the backbone of our approved policy embodied in Mr. Baruch’s speech, but whatever is included should be supplied to the delegates also as a working paper. I believe that this backbone will have to be discussed in the Committee as a whole and that it will not lend itself with reference to the subcommittee.

The old query arose as to what we would say if the Russians were to query us about stopping making bombs. I pointed out that under my approach under which we outlaw the possession of bombs and dangerous projects in general, there would necessarily be some agreement covering both the further making of bombs and the disposal of all bombs then in being. I don’t want to see us open the door as to the best plan of disposing of bombs. Any plan for entrusting them to the scattered bases or of turning them over to the Security Council will have to be discussed by the Security Council. This is going to be a very difficult determination, which will require our approval, and I don’t want to see us use any words which would imply any approved plan as to the manner of disposal or transfer to anyone else. Of course, we could always convert that material back to use in power plants.

A long discussion was had as to the manner of handling the other weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Byrnes’ statement, made upon his return from Moscow, indicates his thought at the time that it related only to weapons using atomic energy. He says, however, that in discussions in Moscow reference was made to biological warfare. Byrnes thinks it would be a serious mistake to attempt to cover these other weapons as a part of our present assignment.

Mr. Baruch was very strong in pointing out that the problem of atomic energy is a problem of the hearts of men and that no plan so far proposed gives any guarantee or assurance. Every plan offers lots of hope, but in the end the best any plan gives, even if it works, is an advance warning. Men will differ as to the time of the warning, but, at best, this advance warning is too short a time to meet the needs of our people’s frame of mind in which they shrink from going to war except in reply to an overt act.

We had a long discussion about penalties. We will discuss it further tonight. I think Mr. Acheson will have no objection to penalties, but he still will feel that it will not be self-operative under any plan we can now conceive of, and as a matter of fact, any nation that has in mind to violate the plan as we propose it would already have in mind the making of alliances and the marshaling of the tools of war, and before a violation of this kind took place, the nation would be ready to go to war. As a result, the only sanction is war.

Mr. Baruch raised the question about a provision in the Constitution of all the nations, similar to the provision General MacArthur⁴⁸ has inserted in the Japanese Constitution. He also referred to the principle back of the Nuremberg trials, that of individual responsibility for violations of international law. They were not commented upon at length this morning.

Mr. Acheson pointed out this morning that there always has to be some ultimate authority to enforce a Treaty and that the only such authority is going to war.

I proposed that big power plants using material which would be potentially dangerous should be authorized by the A.D.A. only subject to approval of the Security Council. I think this is necessary; otherwise there might well be plans for granting Russia the power to build a number of large plants which would be very near in point of time to the utilization of their construction for the manufacturing of bombs. This plan of requiring the Security Council to approve construction of such plants would make the veto in the Security Council a very powerful weapon. I do not believe that the power to disturb the military balance should be left in the A.D.A. without some further control. I assume the Security Council would naturally take the same view.

When we raised the question of our relationships to Canada and Britain, Mr. Byrnes thought that we should work with them in advance of our meeting. He was not concerned about charges of a compact block because he felt our joint effort put us all in a similar position.

Byrnes spoke at length of the difficulties of language and the importance of starting out with one word and continuing to use it. He said that whenever a word was changed, there was always a query as to why it was changed. He felt that we should avail ourselves of the expert treaty draftsmen of the State Department. He has no thought that we should lay down the form of a Treaty at an early date. He thought the parts should be drafted as principles are established.

We had some discussion about the make-up of the Atomic Energy Authority. It would seem to me that if true internationalists of competence could be found, they would make the best body to handle the problem. We felt, however, that we would have to follow a pattern somewhat similar to the Security Council and that we would have to have national representation in the body. We doubted that in [any] body of trustees of international character would win the support of our people. The question in the end is, however, do we balance national interests in the make-up of the Board of Directors. In the discussions the name of Nils Bohr⁴⁹ arose as one ideal type.

In regard to the exchange of information and the survey plans with regard to raw material, Byrnes thought the suggestion would be worthless because the Russians would disagree. He does agree that it should be a part of the Treaty. He feels that our proposing it as a part of our national platform would invite an early breakdown without a clear and adequate basis for such a breakdown.

We had quite a long discussion about the dangers of the leakage of scientific data and the plans for limiting the fields for inspection. Nothing very definitive came out of the discussion beyond our own present thoughts in these respects. The question naturally was whether foreign inspectors might seek to do espionage work under the cover of a geological survey. There was willingness to trust the Atomic Energy Authority for a decision in such matters, and it was thought that this would be enough safeguard regarding the danger of snooping as a part of the inspection process.

Mr. Baruch was very strong as to the matter of penalty and told Mr. Acheson (as Byrnes was leaving for the Carter Glass funeral) that he had to be in the position of advocating something in which he believed.

This summarizes down to this: That we omit from our statement of policies (May 30th draft) the last item regarding the raw material survey; that we present the statement of policies of this Government as the working document; that we embody them in Mr. Baruch’s speech or not, as we wish; that we avoid endorsing any document as United States policy except the working paper we present.

Every impression I gained was that they are relying in the State Department upon a development of policy on the initiative of B.M.B. When B.M.B. asked Mr. Byrnes what his policies were, Byrnes replied, as nearly as I can recall, “Oh hell, I have none. What are your views?”

Acheson was willing to have the inspection in the field of raw materials be empowered to go beyond, in the event any diversion were discovered, to tracing down the destination of such diverted material.

47. Messrs. Baruch and Hancock met with Messrs. Byrnes and Acheson in Washington on May 30 and 31 with a view to drafting a statement of United States policy to guide Baruch in the preparation of his statement to the Atomic Energy Commission; for an account of those conferences and subsequent events culminating in Presidential approval of a statement of United States policy on June 7, see Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 567–574. The meeting here described occurred in the Department of State.
48. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Pacific; Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan.
49. Niels Bohr, Danish theoretical physicist; pioneer in nuclear physics.