Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/C.4/32

Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles of the United States Delegation⁶⁸

secret

[New York,] November 30, 1946.

Mr. Gerig and I dined with Messrs. Gromyko and Novikov on November 28th. They said they wished to consider whether some formula could be found to permit the Trusteeship Council to be established. They said that the two big difficulties, and the only serious difficulties, were:

(1) Which were the “states directly concerned”; and

(2) Could trust areas be fortified without the approval of the Security Council.

They stated as to (1) that it was the Soviet view that the five Permanent Members need not necessarily be considered “states directly concerned” in relation to all trust territory; that there could be a prior agreement between them that some would be deemed to be “states directly concerned” with reference to certain trust territories and others be deemed to be “states directly concerned” with reference to other trust territories. They intimated that the Soviet Union was not particularly interested in being considered a “state directly concerned” so far as the African mandated territory was concerned, but that they stood absolutely on the proposition that they were a “state directly concerned” in so far as related to enemy territory, specifically the Italian colonies, any Japanese islands and the Japanese mandated islands. There was a slight suggestion that if that position was conceded, they might not even claim to be a “state directly concerned” in Western Samoa and New Guinea.

We said that if the Soviet Union would not claim to be a “state directly concerned” as regards the African mandated territory, its position would be the same as that of the United States as regards these territories. We suggested that the Trusteeship Council might be set up on the basis of trust agreements with Great Britain, France and Belgium for African mandated territory. They said that they would not be willing to agree not to be a “state directly concerned” as regards the African territories, except as part and parcel of an agreement that they were a “state directly concerned” as regards other areas, notably the Pacific islands.

We said that instead of discussing which were and which were not “states directly concerned” it might be useful to consider what practical consequences the Soviet might want to draw from being a “state directly concerned” in Pacific islands. They said that their particular interest was in military fortifications. It was their view that under the Charter there was no right to fortify for national purposes. There was a right to local defense and the maintenance of order. Otherwise, the only right was for international peace and security and that the only body which could administer international peace and security was the Security Council. Therefore, there could be no fortification beyond the need of local defense except in accordance with special agreements negotiated by the Security Council under Article 43. They indicated that in this respect they saw no difference between strategic and non-strategic areas.

They also referred to a continuing right in the Security Council to inspect fortifications which might be authorized by the Security Council in trust territory.

We said that we could not agree at all with their legal construction of the Charter, but that it might be more profitable to consider the practical aspects of the matter. The concrete result of their theory was that the United States would not have the right to maintain bases in trusteed Pacific islands except as might be specifically authorized in each case by the Security Council, i.e., by Russia, and subject to its supervision and inspection. I said that that result was not one which was acceptable to the United States and that they could take it as absolutely positive that the United States would not agree to any construction which would involve those consequences. We said that the United States preferred trusteeship to annexation or de facto possession because that would give the native inhabitants the benefit of the Charter provisions with respect to the inhabitants of trust territories. Also, trusteeship would make it easier to move toward internationalization of military establishments if and when the Security Council actually demonstrated that it could be relied upon to maintain the peace. However, that had not yet been demonstrated and until it was demonstrated, we would want in the Pacific Islands the same rights that the Soviet Union would presumably exercise in such islands as the Kuriles Islands. We said that the Soviet Union had shown no disposition to accept for the Kuriles Islands the regime which it was seeking to impose on us as regards Pacific islands which might come under our administration.

They said that this was different because it had been agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union that the latter could annex the Kuriles Islands. We said that that was an informal agreement which had not yet been ratified by peace treaty and that other nations than the United States were concerned in this matter, notably China.

I said that it was personally my strong hope that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would have advanced military bases or military zones which would menace each other or other friendly nations. But that the United States would not agree to a double standard under which the Soviet Union did not subject to Security Council control areas in its possession which it deemed vital; whereas the United States, as to comparable areas in its possession, would be subject to control and inspection by the Soviet Union.

Messrs. Gromyko and Novikov affirmed strongly that, if necessary, the Soviet would fight the issue through to the floor of the Assembly, and they expressed confidence that they could defeat approval of trusteeship agreements with provision for bases, etc.

While the discussion was extremely frank, the atmosphere throughout was friendly and cordial and it was agreed that we would each think the matter over to see whether there was any possible basis for agreement which would permit of going ahead harmoniously on the trusteeship matter.

68. Addressed to the Secretary of State and Senator Austin.